



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

B 1,198,241





Library of the University of Michigan
The Coyl Collection.

Miss Jean L. Coyl
of Detroit

in memory of her brother
Col. William Henry Coyl
1894.



CTPABE

BA
27
A1

21


PUBLICATIONS
OF THE
NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY

VOL. XXI.

BLOCKADE OF BREST

1803-1805

VOL. II.



CAPTAIN PETER PUGET'S

DISPATCHES AND LETTERS
RELATING TO THE
Blockade of Brest

1803—1805

EDITED BY
JOHN LEYLAND

VOL. II.



PRINTED FOR THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY
MDCCCII

THE COUNCIL OF THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY

1901-1902

PATRON

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES, K.G., K.T., K.P.

PRESIDENT

EARL SPENCER, K.G.

VICE-PRESIDENTS

FREMANTLE, ADMIRAL THE HON.
SIR EDMUND, G.C.B.
LYALL, SIR ALFRED C., K.C.B.

NORTHBROOK, EARL OF, G.C.S.I.
PROTHERO, G. W., Litt.D.,
LL.D.

COUNCILLORS

BOWDEN-SMITH, ADMIRAL SIR
N., K.C.B.
BOYD, ARCHIBALD.
CLARKE, COLONEL SIR GEORGE,
K.C.M.G., F.R.S.
CORBETT, JULIAN S.
DAVIES, LIEUT.-GEN. H. F.
ELGAR, F., LL.D., F.R.S.
FANSHAWE, ADMIRAL SIR
EDWARD, G.C.B.
FIRTH, C. H.
GEARY, LIEUT.-GEN. SIR H.,
K.C.B.
HAMILTON, ADMIRAL SIR R.
VESEY, G.C.B.
HAWKESBURY, LORD.

LEE, SIDNEY.
MARKHAM, VICE-ADMIRAL A. H.
MARKHAM, SIR CLEMENTS R.,
K.C.B., F.R.S.
MARSDEN, R. G.
MORRIS, MOWBRAY.
NEWBOLT, HENRY.
PAYNE, E. J.
RICHARDS, ADMIRAL OF THE
FLEET SIR FREDERICK, G.C.B.
TANNER, J. R.
TRACEY, ADMIRAL SIR RICHARD,
K.C.B.
WALPOLE, SIR SPENCER, K.C.B.
WHARTON, REAR-ADMIRAL SIR
WILLIAM, K.C.B., F.R.S.

SECRETARY

PROFESSOR J. K. LAUGHTON, King's College, London, W.C.

TREASURER

H. F. R. YORKE, C.B., Admiralty, S.W.

165861

The COUNCIL of the NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY wish it to be distinctly understood that they are not answerable for any opinions or observations that may appear in the Society's publications. For these the responsibility rests entirely with the Editors of the several works.



INTRODUCTION

THE scope and purpose of this concluding volume upon the 'Blockade of Brest' is to carry forward to a period after Trafalgar the series of papers and documents of which the publication began in its predecessor. Some slight difference may be noted in its character. While the first volume dealt in a considerable degree with the detailed work of the ocean blockade conducted by Cornwallis, in order to illustrate somewhat fully the system employed, the present volume is mainly concerned with the larger considerations which necessarily arise from the more important nature of the later operations. There is the same purpose of discerning and explaining the strategical ideas of statesmen and commanders, of describing the tactical methods employed, and of indicating the conditions attending the blockade, as also of recording much splendid gallantry, and of illustrating the hardships suffered and the labours undergone—in a word, of making known, 'through the written testimony of the time, what was the nature of the great ocean blockade.' It must be pointed out once more that the title of the book only partially explains its scope, though it suggests

its limitation, for, though it deals with the blockade of Brest, it is not less concerned with the operations at Lorient, Rochefort, Ferrol, and other places which came under the supervision of Cornwallis, or were intimately related to his operations.

The documents included in the present volume are mostly drawn from the Admirals' Dispatches and other sources in the Public Record Office ; but a special acknowledgment is due to Colonel Cornwallis West for placing in my hands a most valuable series of papers, which enable me to add what is practically a new chapter to naval history. For a few documents in this volume I am indebted to Mr. C. Wykeham Martin, and to Lieutenant H. Blackett, R.N. I have also used very freely some manuscript sources of information in the Ministère de la Marine and the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, and certain especially interesting illustrative letters from the 'Correspondance de Napoléon' are included.

In the Introduction to the first volume some account was given of the 'invasion flotilla,' and of the preparations made for the larger operations, principally intended against Ireland, though more grandiose projects were taking shape even before the close of 1803. It is the less necessary to deal at very great length with the flotilla in this place, because, through the recent publication, by the Historical Section of the General Staff of the French Army, of the third volume of Captain Desbrière's very valuable work upon the projects and attempts made, between 1793 and 1805, for the invasion of

the British Isles, we are in possession of a vast mass of information throwing light upon the operations.¹ Yet it is desirable to offer some considerations in regard to the purposes of Napoleon in his organisation of the flotilla of 1803-5, and chiefly to the difficulties it encountered in the vicinity of Brest. The great plan laid down on July 21, 1803—which proposed a flotilla having for its object 'to carry war into the very heart of England,' the centre of the organisation resting upon Dunkirk, Gravelines, and Calais, the right upon Nieuport and Ostend, and the left upon Wissant, Ambleteuse, Boulogne, and Etaples—failed entirely and in every part. There was inability to carry to completion the programme for the necessary improvement of the ports and the building of the boats; and it was impossible, in the presence of a rigorous blockade, to assemble the boats constructed at the rendezvous appointed. Captain Desbrière concludes, since the plan consisted essentially in the dispatch of a flotilla from Boulogne and the neighbouring ports during the winter of 1803-4, and since it failed, and could not, in truth, at that period have succeeded, that Bonaparte himself never hoped to realise the enterprise. It does not seem to me that the folly of the projected invasion can be regarded as a sufficient reason for believing that it was never seriously contemplated. The vast correspondence relating to it published in Napoleon's letters, and the huge masses of documents in the

¹ *Projets et Tentatives de Débarquement aux Iles Britanniques.* Par Edouard Desbrière. Paris : R. Chapelot et Cie. Vol. iii. 1902.

French archives, displaying minute and exhaustive care in the work of preparation, all militate against such a belief. Opposed to such a weight of evidence the views of Metternich, of Miot de Mérito, and of such writers as the mysterious 'ami' of the Comte d'Antraigues—a British spy at Dresden, whose letter is published by Captain Desbrière—cannot have much weight. It was the manifest interest of Napoleon, when his projects had failed, to represent that they had never been intended to succeed. The nature of the preparations, however, the greatness of their scale, the labour which they involved, the character of Napoleon, the circumstances in which he was placed as the incarnation of the idea of an invasion of England, all seem to confirm the opinion that he believed he should achieve his purpose. It is not necessary to think that at all times he attached the first importance to it, but he must have realised that, in any case, and whatever happened with his special projects, this flotilla of transports must be used for the conveyance of the army which was to dictate terms of peace at the British capital.

The attempted concentration of the boats was a matter of the utmost difficulty, and many fighting episodes occurred in the neighbourhood of Cape de la Hève, the Cotentin peninsula, Cape Gris-Nez, and the extremity of the Breton peninsula. It is upon these last that these volumes throw a good deal of light. It would appear that the misadventures of the flotilla had impressed upon Decrès, Minister of Marine, the absolute worthlessness of the flat-bottomed boats in any encounter. If their movements in the Channel were long and difficult, these difficulties were as

nothing compared with those encountered by the boats which had to run the gauntlet of the vessels attached to Cornwallis's squadron. General Boyer, who was charged with the inspection of the French coasts, agreed with Caffarelli, the naval Prefect at Brest, upon a plan which, as he fondly believed, would make the passage outside the Bec du Raz thenceforth no longer dangerous to the flotilla. Guns had been mounted, and Captain Le Boizec, who had charge of the convoys coming from the south, would leave Audierne at the first favourable wind, and the British ships would be unable to interfere with his passage. This was in April 1804, but nothing happened, although Napoleon had given urgent orders as early as January for the movement of the flotilla from the ports in the Bay of Biscay. Some hope was inspired by the capture of the *Vencejo*, Captain John Wesley Wright, on May 8, 1804, but up to the end of that month not a single boat had been able to get into the Channel. The actions of Captain Innes (p. 42), Captain Hawkins (p. 102), Captain Dundas (p. 133), Lieutenant Swain (p. 150), Captain Poyntz (p. 180), Lieutenants Nicholson and Batts (p. 181), Lieutenant Rose (p. 216), and others recorded in this volume, will show how rigorous was the watch kept upon the movements of the enemy. Caffarelli himself (February 4, 1805) bears testimony to it. It was evident, he said, that we maintained a vigilant force in the neighbourhood of the Chausey Islands, Bréhat, the Ile de Batz, the Passage du Four, the Iroise, Audierne Bay, Quiberon, Belleisle and Rochefort (p. 176). A little later he deplored the grievous misfortunes which

had overtaken a section of the flotilla in charge of Captains Le Boizec and Porchier (p. 182). Captain Desbrière's opinion is that the flotilla, in its conduct and its actions, had shown how small was its value. By the losses which it had suffered, and by the incapacity with which it had been handled, the impossibility of its serving its purpose had been demonstrated. Ganteaume, who was opposed to Cornwallis in the game at Brest, before being appointed to the command of the squadron there, and when he was yet naval Prefect at Toulon, had expressed to Napoleon his belief that the flotilla project, if not impossible, was extremely risky, and that success could only be attained by some great event impossible to foresee.¹

It became evident to Napoleon at length that, if the flotilla was to attain its purpose, its movements must be subject to the attainment of a temporary command of the sea, and accordingly the squadrons preparing at the ports were to be associated with it for that purpose. Ganteaume, though he believed the attempt would have been *extrêmement hardie*, *extrêmement périlleuse*, thought it would be better to endeavour to disturb the plans of the British ships in the Channel, by dispatching a light squadron thither from the Mediterranean, than to trust to the flotilla alone. In that way a respite of forty-eight hours in our vigilance might be hoped for. In December 1803, the First Consul had thrown out to Ganteaume some ideas upon these subjects, which will be found in the 'Correspondance,' No. 7359, and by the end of that year, or at any rate

¹ *Archives Nationales*, AF^{iv}, 1, 191.

early in 1804, the French schemes were being modified, and the operations of the flotilla were being made subordinate to those of the fleet, and projects against Ireland and distant parts of British dominions began to hold the chief place in Napoleon's plans.

The great preparations in progress, the vast armaments being prepared, and the evident approach of the time when decisive action would be taken by the French, impressed upon the British Admiralty and the British commanders the need of still greater vigilance and of redoubled efforts. The series of papers which opens this volume will show that the immense advantages to be derived from striking a crushing blow at the French fleet in the harbour of Brest occupied the attention of Cornwallis and his captains in the summer of 1804. They constitute, indeed, a very interesting and not less suggestive chapter of naval history, and I am gratified to be able to place before the public the brilliant courage and enterprise of officers to whom inadequate justice has been done. We cannot value too highly such qualities as were displayed at that time by Captain Peter Puget, Captain Patrick Campbell, Captain Charles Brisbane, Lieutenant Thomas Ussher, and some other young officers who were in Cornwallis's fleet. It would appear that Lieutenant Ussher, afterwards the well-known admiral who conveyed Napoleon to Elba, in or about the month of March 1804 courageously entered the harbour of Brest on a dark night in a small boat, and rowed along the French line, obtaining exact information as to the positions of the ships, and that, when he came

abreast of the flag-ship, he was discovered and pursued, and only cleared the Goulet by extraordinary endeavours.

The account of what he had seen seems to have fructified in the mind of Captain Puget, of the *Foudroyant*, who, in June 1804, presented to Cornwallis a plan for destroying the French fleet by means of fire-ships. The name of that gallant officer is little known, but it is interesting to remember that he had been a comrade of Vancouver, that Puget Sound is named after him, and that he was in command of the *Goliath* in the Baltic in 1807. Captain Puget's proposal is the first paper in this volume. He had discussed it with Captain Patrick Campbell, of the *Doris*, an intrepid officer, who, at Dunkirk in 1800, had been engaged in a gallant action in which fire-ships had been employed. Lieutenant Graves, of the *Foudroyant*, and Lieutenant Miln, of the *Mary* cutter, as well as Lieutenant Ussher, were in his confidence. The idea was that ten fire-brigs in two divisions, under command of Captains Puget and Campbell, should secretly enter Brest Harbour on a favourable night to accomplish their desperate task, while three sloops made a diversion in Camaret Bay to cover their retreat. The brigs were to be fitted inside and out in such a manner as to insure an immediate communication of fire to the hulls of the French vessels, and the officers and men were to escape if they could in six-oared boats. The details given of Captain Puget's intrepid purposes will show that he had taken account of every condition of wind, tide, and light, and that, though 'all could not expect to

survive,' there were assuredly great chances of success, and that the immensity of the result to be attained amply justified the enterprise.

As was recorded in the last volume, Cornwallis went ashore in July 1804. He did not return to the fleet until August 23. During the interval he broached Captain Puget's project to Lord Melville, then First Lord of the Admiralty, and the confidence which the Admiral felt inspired the First Lord to give his sanction to the enterprise, in relation to which circumstance it deserves to be noted, as significant of a special character of naval administration, that he did not communicate his purposes to his colleagues of the Board. Lord Melville had recognised the national advantages that would result from the success of such an enterprise, and he had confidence that a bold and daring attempt was likely to succeed (p. 8). As a measure of greater safety, however, and apparently guided by the advice of Cornwallis, he took counsel with Captain Charles Brisbane, afterwards a distinguished admiral, and it was decided that the whole enterprise should be placed under that officer's command. From what followed it is only too clear that much disappointment was felt by Captain Puget and his friends in the fleet at the adoption of this course, though there is not the slightest suspicion that any one of those officers ever lost interest or zeal in any degree in the great enterprise. Captain Brisbane remodelled the plan, and his instructions are extremely interesting. They will be found in No. 289, p. 19. There were to be three divisions, under Captains Brisbane, Puget, and Campbell, and a special feature

of the plan was that, if retreat through the Goulet should be impossible, the courageous men were to attempt to escape across the neck of land between the harbour of Brest and Douarnenez Bay, and to get on board a frigate to be anchored in the latter. I shall not repeat the details which are given in the text, but Captain Brisbane's instructions are a brilliant illustration of the splendid enterprise and gallantry that inspired those who were to take part in the operation. Desperate service, he said, required desperate acts, and he hoped every man's mind was completely made up either to execute the service in a gallant manner or to fall in the attempt, but, if anyone felt doubt upon reflection, he could still withdraw without any stain remaining upon his character as a brave man. Not one of those gallant fellows, however, took advantage of the opportunity offered.

If success had attended this enterprise, the whole subsequent course of the operations of 1804-5 would have been changed. There were, unfortunately, causes at work which defeated the gallant purposes of the officers. It was arranged to send out an adequate number of fire-vessels, and the documents I publish show how careful were the preparations made by Sir Andrew Hamond and General Congreve for the fitting of the boats, and with what great precautions their movements were veiled. But, through various circumstances, the operations were singularly retarded, and Lord Melville's letters will show how keenly he regretted what occurred. It would be profitless to attempt to ascribe the responsibility for this unhappy postponement, which,

however, did not in the least damp the ardour of any concerned. Cornwallis (p. 12) on August 17, in a letter to Lord Melville, presaged one of the causes of the enterprise being abandoned. The fire-vessels were to be sent out under lieutenants, and he hoped they might be such as were appointed to the squadron, so that they might leave room for the officers specially chosen ; but, at the same time, he pointed out the difficulty of removing an officer regularly appointed to a vessel going upon service. As a matter of fact, when at length all was ready, the lieutenants in the boats were every whit as eager to join in the enterprise as the officers originally selected, and it is evident that the unfortunate difficulty of removing the officers was one element in the collapse of the enterprise.

It was not, however, the principal cause of the failure : that lay in the attitude of the Admiralty Board, for Lord Melville, at some date before September 5, imparted to his colleagues what was intended, and from them received no encouragement to persevere. 'They concur in thinking that the enemy must be supine beyond example, and totally negligent of the common vigilance which every commander of a fleet in the circumstances of the Brest fleet ought to use, to give the most remote chance of success in this attempt.' Lord Melville's mind was evidently a little swayed by this opinion, and though he had the utmost confidence in Cornwallis's judgment, it was remote from his mind to give an order originating from his own knowledge or speculation for carrying such a service into execution. While this was going forward, Captain

Brisbane and his associates were gratified at the prospect of meeting their friends off Ushant, and were eagerly expectant of the honourable service before them. The boats had left for the rendezvous under conditions of the greatest secrecy, many of the appliances, in the charge of Lieutenant Miln, being carried by the *Happy Return*—name of sarcastic omen.

But Lord Melville's letter carried with it dismay and discouragement. Cornwallis, although recognising the enterprise to be a daring service, had always been of opinion that much might be done by surprise, and 'I have formerly thought,' he said, 'that our ships, superior to all the world at sea, were not always so secure at anchor.' He told the officers that Lord Melville was now 'rather tender' upon the subject, but spoke with the most generous appreciation of the gallant men who had undertaken the courageous duty (p. 25). The end of the enterprise was lamentable. Cornwallis told Lord Melville that the opinion of the sea officers did 'a little damp the ardour of some.' We may suspect that in reality it cast deep gloom and discouragement upon all who had looked forward to the notable service they had proposed. However this may have been, the enterprise fell through, and the melancholy conclusion of it may be read in these pages. There cannot be any reflection upon the gallantry or courage of those who had volunteered. The letters I publish add new glory, indeed, to the annals of the British navy,¹ and the incident may stand as an excellent example

¹ Many projects appear to have been presented to Cornwallis by enterprising officers, and a second suggestion by Captain

of a well-planned scheme, emanating from the experience and observation of distinguished officers, failing through want of appreciation on the part of those at home who neither knew nor realised the opportunities. It is perhaps worth while to add that Lord Melville's chief naval adviser at the time was Admiral (afterwards Lord) Gambier, an officer who upon certain occasions, as in the famous affair of the Basque Roads in 1808, shrank from the final extremities of war. There were some in the French fleet who showed a similar hesitation. In the previous blockade of Brest, when Fulton proposed to blow up the British ships by mean of his Nautilus, Villaret-Joyeuse, the admiral, and Caffarelli, the prefect, discountenanced the proposal, on grounds of humanity. It was, said the latter, a disgraceful way of making war, carrying with it such reprobation that those who engaged in it deserved to be hanged. 'Certes, ce n'est pas là la mort des militaires!'

Cornwallis, as I have said, returned to the squadron on August 23, 1804. During his absence, Sir Charles Cotton had had considerable apprehension lest the French should put to sea from Brest. It was the strong opinion of Sir Thomas Graves, who was with the inshore squadron, that they would make the attempt at the first opportunity. There were also rumours that the squadron at Rochefort under Missiessy, consisting of six sail of the line and several frigates, was about to leave the port, possibly Puget, for a closer system of blockade, with fire-ships always in readiness, will be found in No. 348, p. 77.

to cover the escape of the ships from Ferrol. Some of our officers felt little doubt that the Rochefort squadron could get away,¹ as, indeed, it subsequently did. Sir Robert Calder, who was off that port, saw growing signs of activity, and was apprehensive lest he might be caught between the French squadron there and one coming from Brest. It was necessary for him to keep his squadron further out in the offing, for otherwise, if the wind should be to the westward, it might be impossible for him to get clear of the land. So serious seemed the danger in the middle of August that Sir Charles Cotton sent the *Warrior* and *Acasta* to reinforce Calder, not deeming it advisable to wait until a ship arrived from England ; but the advanced squadron at Brest, under Graves, was reduced to six sail of the line and three frigates, the *Montagu* being appointed to take the station between the squadrons.

Napoleon was peculiarly insistent in his communications with his naval authorities that the ships' companies should constantly be under training. He had realised from the analogies of military preparation that a sluggish life in harbour could not fit the ships for work against vigilant adversaries constantly trained in the strenuous conditions of an ocean blockade. These considerations had been urged upon Dordelin and his successor Truguet, and they were not less pressed upon Ganteaume. The Admiral was to get his ships under way from time to time, and Napoleon saw advantages in feints against

¹ See the letter of Collingwood, who had succeeded Calder off Rochefort, November 4, p. 120.

the English at the mouth of the Goulet, and in continual exercises which were to give valuable experience. In a remarkable letter to Ganteaume (p. 59), in September 1804, the Emperor said that he had enough experience of the sea to know that, if the ships did no more than lift their anchors, spread their sails and anchor afresh, if they had no greater training even than general quarters, the advantage would be very great. He insisted upon these matters, and particularly directed attention to the importance of practice in signalling. The *mirriflores* of the squadron might laugh at these exercises, but their value was unquestionable. He deplored the want of admirals, and asked for men still in the prime of life. He doubtless remembered that Morard de Galles, in his senility and half blind, had been the helpless agent of the vain ambitions of Hoche, who had sneeringly vaunted that he would 'see for him.' Ganteaume himself was forty-eight at the time, and was esteemed an officer of the highest qualities. It was to him that Napoleon had turned for his opinion on the flotilla before the Admiral was appointed to the Brest fleet, as I have shown above, and he destined him for the chief command in the final operations.

But Ganteaume had many difficulties to surmount. In August 1804 the ships were short of complements, which an attempt was made to furnish by embarking workmen and soldiers; and in September not a seaman remained for the transports, and he reported that the men on board would be useless in bad weather. There came a time, in January 1805, when some of the vessels of the

flotilla were deprived of their men in order to supply the squadron, and enable some of the soldiers to be sent ashore (p. 152). Since the orders issued to Latouche-Tréville in July 1803, a great change had come over the views of Napoleon. In September 1804 larger projects, afterwards modified, had taken shape, and the Toulon squadron and that from Rochefort were to proceed to the West Indies, there to seize our possessions, and, under the orders of Villeneuve, were to make an expedition to Surinam, afterwards returning to Europe to relieve the blockade of Ferrol. There was also the expedition to Ireland, to be under Ganteaume, which took new shape at the same time. In March 1804 orders issued to the naval Prefect at Brest—*à vous seul*—suggest that the project had been temporarily laid aside,¹ but by September the whole plan was under way once more, and Napoleon thought that Lough Swilly was the best point for disembarkation. This operation, however, was to be only the first act, for Ganteaume, after having withdrawn the seamen from the transports at that place, was to enter the Channel and to appear before Cherbourg, where he was to receive information as to the situation of the flotilla, in order to cover its passage.

It is very interesting to learn how far Cornwallis had divined the purposes of his adversary. He knew that the French would probably attempt to deceive him. If only a part of the squadron sailed, with a considerable body of troops, he believed the object must be Ireland, and would detach a part of his force to pursue. If they went out in detach-

¹ *Archives de la Marine*, BB², 95.

ments, without any considerable body of troops, he thought they might be going to the Mediterranean, or if with five or six sail of the line full of troops, that their destination was probably the Leeward Islands (pp. 48, 49). His directions to the admirals and captains under him gave instructions that they were to keep a vigilant look-out for French ships from the Mediterranean, and were to give timely warning to Cochrane off Ferrol or himself off Brest, and he indicated that their course might be to Ireland if they had troops on board. Lord Melville knew that the French were attempting to take advantage of Irish disaffection, and never doubted that if the King's dominions at home were the object, an expedition would go to Ireland. He thought it would give an additional feeling of security, and would, indeed, make such an expedition a desperate undertaking, if Lord Gardner, on the Irish coast, could have a respectable force under him. The First Lord's letter (p. 95) throws a very interesting light upon the views of English statesmen and seamen at the time.

The situation of affairs at Ferrol was daily growing more serious through the year 1804. Napoleon was making it impossible for the Spaniards to stand aloof, and Cochrane, who had his flag in the Northumberland, with a more irritable manner than that of his statesmanlike predecessor on the same station, Pellew, was watching for every manifestation of hostile purpose. His correspondence with Don Francisco Octaraneo and Don Felix de Texada is very interesting. He insisted to the former that

for the French to dispatch soldiers across Spain to reinforce their squadron, then lying in the harbour of Ferrol, was contrary to the principles of neutrality and to the established law of nations. He was himself wishful to offer bounties for the drafting of Dutch and able-bodied French seamen into his own squadron. It was he who, on September 5, 1804, urged upon Lord Melville that the Spaniards were only awaiting the arrival of their treasure ships to put on a different countenance, and the suggestion bore fruit in the orders issued shortly afterwards. The activity at Ferrol at the time was very great, and Cochrane had not any doubt as to the hostile intentions of the Spaniards. He protested to the Captain-General against the fitting out of squadrons in the various ports, as was being done at Ferrol, and he demanded an explanation. He declared that if the French squadron, consisting of five sail of the line, should come out, it was his determination to attack it, and he hoped in this he should not be opposed by the Spanish squadron. The Captain-General attempted to temporise and explain, but Cochrane was not one whit less urgent in his protests against what was going on.

On September 21 Cornwallis issued most secret orders to him to resist the sailing of the Spaniards, if they should endeavour to come out, and he was to inform the Spanish Government of his instructions. It was in this letter also that Cochrane received orders to seize the Spanish treasure ships from South America if he should fall in with them (No. 345, p. 74). On the following day Cornwallis issued orders to Captain Graham Moore, of the

Indefatigable, in the same sense, and like instructions appear in some other of Cornwallis's orders to his captains. Captain Moore's account of his execution of this important service will be found in Nos. 354 and 364, pp. 87, 98. The seizure was accompanied by a smart action, and the terrible destruction of one of the Spanish ships, and it was vehemently denounced as an act of piracy by all the enemies of England. As a matter of fact, the action belonged to that class of operations not strictly justified by international law, which often precede an actual declaration of hostilities, and are measures dictated by vigilant foresight and resolute purpose. The seizure of the treasure ships impressed Lord Melville with the idea that the Spaniards would be angry, as he explained in a letter to Cornwallis on October 18 (No. 363, p. 97), at the same time rescinding his instructions for the detachment of the Earl of Northesk with five sail of the line to join Lord Gardner at Berehaven, but orders were issued for such a detachment on December 8 (No. 397, p. 140).

Notwithstanding the vigorous action which had been taken, Cochrane was encouraged to think, on November 5, that an amicable adjustment might still be attained, but a few days later his hopes were dashed, for on November 13 he received intelligence that Mr. Frere, Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid, had demanded his passports in consequence of the unsuccessful issue of negotiations, and in December war was declared. On the 22nd Cochrane's boats were ordered off, and communication with the shore was prohibited, which added greatly to his diffi-

culties, as many papers in this volume show. The actual declaration of war with Spain was not received in London until January 7, 1805. The secret convention between France and Spain was signed in Paris on January 4, by Decrès and Vice-Admiral Don Federico Gravina.

Meanwhile, in September, Cornwallis was anticipating a probable movement of the enemy from Brest, and he indicated his ideas to Calder off Rochefort and Cochrane off Ferrol, establishing a rendezvous for the junction of the two squadrons off Cape Machichaco. His instructions for their conduct will be found in No. 325, p. 54. Cornwallis himself was at the time impressing upon the Admiralty the deficiency of his squadron in frigates, sloops, and small vessels. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, the letters in this volume will show how very close and vigilant was the watch kept. In October the Admiral issued instructions, in view of the winter gales from the west, for the manner in which the ships were to anchor when they bore up for Torbay. The Admiralty also, in view of the danger to ships of the line serving with the inshore squadron, gave orders that thenceforth it should consist only of frigates, sloops and small vessels. Among the many proposals put forward at the time was one by Captain Hurd, who had been making a survey of the Bay of Brest, that it would be very advantageous to seize the islands of Ushant and Molène, and to use Douarnenez Bay as an anchorage, and his arguments, which are very interesting, will be found (No. 370, p. 104) in a letter from Lord Melville to

Cornwallis, which incloses Captain Hurd's report. They were views that did not entirely meet with the approbation of Cornwallis, who wrote to Lord Melville on the subject on November 6. Mention may be made here of the interesting secret orders to Sir John Orde, issued on October 27, to watch the movements of the French and Spaniards at Cadiz, and to take possession of any Spanish treasure ships which might come his way (No. 372, p. 114). Another very interesting letter is that of Lord Melville to Cornwallis, November 2, 1804. The Admiral had insisted upon the inadequacy of his force, and to the relaxing of the strictness of blockade formerly resorted to. Lord Melville indicated his own difficulties and could not at once promise a large accession of strength; but although he admitted the soundness of Cornwallis's arguments touching a close blockade, he could not shut his eyes to the fact that the Admiral could not keep the necessary force if his ships were to be torn to pieces by an eternal conflict with the elements during the tempestuous months of winter (No. 374, p. 117). The Venerable was lost in Torbay on November 25. There were terrible storms in the following January, and many of the ships suffered severely (pp. 147-55.)

The French had so far made their preparations for the great operations which had now shaped themselves in Napoleon's mind that Missiessy made the first move in the strategic game by putting to sea from Rochefort on January 11, with orders to proceed to the West Indies, the intention being that he should unite with the fleet of Villeneuve from

Toulon. As a matter of fact, the latter Admiral did not leave his port until March 29, so that Missiessy's successful cruise bore little fruit. His object was not divined by our commanders, and it was not until February that it was known the Frenchmen were victualled for a distant expedition, whereupon Cochrane from off Ferrol was ordered to pursue them with six sail of the line, and was replaced on his station by Sir Robert Calder with a force withdrawn from before Brest. The Admiralty by implication censured Sir Thomas Graves for being in Quiberon Bay, watering his ships improperly, when Missiessy got away. It is worth while to remember, however, that Collingwood on November 4 (No. 375, p. 120) had expressed the opinion, when on the Rochefort station, that it would not be practicable for him to prevent the Frenchmen from escaping. At a later date, February 4, the same Admiral remarked that to sail from one blockaded port and enter another was a movement that did not come within the comprehension of city politicians, whose idea was that ships were like sentinels standing at a door. 'So long as the ships are at sea they are content, little considering that every one of the blasts which we endure lessens the security of the country; the last cruise disabled five large ships and two more lately' (No. 424, p. 174). When the dispatches from Graves announcing the escape of Missiessy were being brought by Captain Jervis, in his boat from the Tonnant to the San Josef, the craft was overturned, and that zealous officer was lost, while Captain Campbell was providentially saved. The

latter officer, however, had unfortunately lost his own ship, the *Doris*, in the storms, and the dramatic story of that misfortune will be found in his letter to Graves (No. 414, p. 163).

Napoleon's specific orders to Ganteaume to take command of the whole of the operations against us were issued on March 2, 1805, and their purpose was only defeated by the vigilance of Cornwallis and the other Admirals employed on the blockade. There were times, indeed, when success was very near. With twenty-one ships of the line and six frigates, well manned, and supplied to the fullest extent possible, the French Admiral was to escape from Brest, to attack our blockading squadron at Ferrol, and signal to Gourdon, who was in command of the ships there, to join him, and then to proceed to Martinique, where he was to meet the squadrons from Toulon and Rochefort, which had instructions to place themselves under his orders. He would thus have more than forty ships of the line, and, after disembarking men in certain of the islands, was at once to return to Europe, keeping away from the ordinary routes, and to fall unexpectedly upon any ships we might have off Brest, after which he was to proceed to Boulogne, where Napoleon would be present in person to communicate to him further instructions. This very important order will be found in No. 444, p. 199, and it will be seen that it contains alternative instructions in the event of Villeneuve being unable to join Ganteaume, as also as to what the Admiral should do in case his squadron was not

made up to the force expected. Ganteaume visited Paris to discuss these important matters with Napoleon or the Minister of Marine, and on March 15 the Emperor wrote to him that not a moment was to be lost. 'Do not forget the great destinies which you hold in your hands. If you are not wanting in enterprise, success is certain' (No. 453, p. 209).

On March 24, all being ready for the great venture, Ganteaume telegraphed to Napoleon that he was ready and could get under way on the next evening, but that fifteen British ships were in the Iroise Passage, and that it was impossible to go out without risking an engagement, concerning the success of which, however, he entertained no doubt. The reply was characteristic. It expressed the purpose of evasion, which was uppermost in Napoleon's mind. 'A victory in these circumstances would lead to nothing. Have but one object—to execute your mission. Go out without fighting' (No. 462, p. 215). It will be seen that Napoleon was endeavouring to impose impossible conditions upon the unfortunate Admiral, and the conclusion is inevitable that he had entirely failed to grasp some elemental factors necessary for his success. On April 3, Ganteaume was informed that Villeneuve had left Toulon, and on the 11th that Gravina was ready to join that Admiral, increasing his force to twenty ships of the line, and Napoleon hoped that Ganteaume would therefore leave the distant rendezvous with more than fifty sail. 'You hold in your hands the destinies of the world' (No. 474, p. 224). It was a grandiose project, doubtless having within it some

elements of possible success, but the great schemer was foiled by the operations of Nelson, and even more by the strenuous grasp of Cornwallis.

The Emperor foresaw, however, the possibility of Ganteaume being unable to escape, and on April 14 he dispatched an order to Villeneuve, who was to be joined by Magon with two ships from Rochefort, that if, thirty-five days after the arrival of the latter at Martinique, no intelligence should be received of Ganteaume's approach, Villeneuve was to conclude that he had been detained by the blockade, and was then to return directly to Ferrol, where it was expected that fifteen French and Spanish vessels would increase his fleet to thirty-five. In this letter is contained the very important instruction to Villeneuve, which he afterwards failed to execute, that, with his conjoined force, he should proceed to Brest, and there unite his force with the twenty-one ships of Ganteaume, without, however, entering the port. In these circumstances Villeneuve was to have had the chief command (No. 479, p. 231). On April 23 Napoleon wrote to Ganteaume, saying that he only awaited intelligence of that Admiral's departure. Again, on the 29th, writing to Decrès, expressing greater urgency and impatience at the failure of his Admirals, he took into consideration the possibility of a complete collapse of his plans, and suggested in such case that an expedition to India might be undertaken in September (No. 495, p. 244). He had been told (May 2) by many that Ganteaume had failed to escape because of a delay of twenty-four hours, and because many of his captains were not on board their ships (No. 500,

p. 249). At length, on May 8, he issued express orders that, if Ganteaume did not leave Brest by midnight on the 20th, he was to remain in the port notwithstanding any favourable opportunities which might offer, and there await the arrival of Villeneuve (No. 501, p. 254). Several letters in this volume show that Ganteaume was displaying a great deal of activity at the time, but the order of Napoleon that he must avoid the engagement that was inevitable paralysed effective action.

Meanwhile, on March 3, Cornwallis had requested leave of absence from the fleet for six weeks or two months. His request was granted, and Sir Charles Cotton, on March 18, assumed the duties temporarily, pending the arrival of Lord Gardner, who was appointed to the command during Cornwallis's absence. It will be seen from a letter of Cornwallis's, dated February 24 (No. 439, p. 186), that he had been censured for the indefinite character of the intelligence he had transmitted concerning the escape of Missiessy from Rochefort, but his letter appears to be a complete explanation. Another letter to Mr. Marsden, dated March 16, shortly before he left the squadron, is also indicative of his personal feeling at the time (No. 456, p. 211). He resented communications which Sir Robert Calder, off Ferrol, had addressed to the Admiralty, and remarked that 'the Vice-Admiral might have waited until an opportunity offered for him to know my sentiments before he had troubled their Lordships on that head.' A perusal of the papers will show

that some difference of feeling existed between Cornwallis and Calder. The latter did not approve certain dispositions which the Commander-in-Chief made in regard to the conduct of the squadron off Ferrol.

When Lord Gardner arrived off Ushant he took rather a gloomy view of the situation. He was not in good health, and Collingwood found him altered for the worse—old and out of spirits; but he added to his correspondent that, if Lord Gardner were recovered, he would be as active as ever, and there was 'no officer a more perfect master of the discipline of the fleet.' The French were at that very time perfectly ready for sea, and at the end of March the ships had come down to Bertheaume Bay. It was the very period at which Ganteaume had expressed his perfect readiness to leave the port as well as his confidence in the result of an engagement. As a matter of fact, he had twenty-one ships of the line to seventeen, and his squadron was under way several times in April as if with the intention of coming out. Lord Gardner had no confidence that the French could be held in Brest, and he felt very uneasy (April 12) for the squadron under Sir Robert Calder (No. 477, p. 227). Again, on April 19, he said if the enemy should escape from Brest, which he by no means thought improbable, and should form a junction with the squadron at Ferrol, Sir Robert Calder would then be very unpleasantly situated (No. 481, p. 233). Although Ganteaume would almost certainly have been brought to action, the engagement might well have been inconclusive, and there can

be no doubt that Calder's situation was somewhat perilous at the time, for he had but six sail of the line and two frigates, while the French and Spaniards in the port had thirteen sail of the line and several frigates, and the Toulon squadron was at large and had passed Gibraltar. Gardner represented the danger with great cogency on April 27 (No. 490, p. 240). He expected the enemy with thirty-one sail to come northward, and hoped that the detached squadrons under Sir Robert Calder and Sir John Orde would endeavour to join him. Orders were, in fact, issued by the Admiralty in this sense, to be executed so soon as intelligence of the course of the enemy should reach Calder. Nelson's conception of Villeneuve's strategy (April 19) was identical (p. 268). The enemy, he believed, were not bound to the west, but intended forming a junction with the squadron at Ferrol, and pushing direct for Ireland or Brest, and his reason was that the approach to both was easy. Many papers relating to the escape of Villeneuve from Toulon, and having reference to the situation of the ships under Gardner's orders at the time, are included in this volume.

The possibility of distant operations on the part of the enemy had impressed upon the Admiralty, in March or earlier, the advisability of fitting a squadron, to be drawn mainly from that off Brest, for distant service under the orders of Collingwood. A number of letters and papers included in this volume will show how this plan took shape. The Dreadnought, Foudroyant, Barfleur, Tonnant, Ramillies, Windsor Castle, Warrior, Mars, and other vessels were ordered to be fitted for this employ-

ment, and to be supplied for six months. Collingwood was to proceed to Madeira with five sail of the line, but the movement was deferred. It is not generally known that it was intended to dispatch that Admiral with eight sail of the line to Barbados, and that orders were issued to him by Gardner to that end on May 15 (pp. 261 and 271). Lord Gardner, however, in view of the fact that Missiessy, after his adventurous cruise, had returned to Rochefort on May 20, took upon himself to retain five of Collingwood's ships, and the contemplated expedition of that Admiral, owing to new conditions that arose, was never carried out. A very interesting letter to his friend Dr. Carlyle (No. 546, p. 296) describes his movements at the time. The sailing of the Toulon squadron had set him in motion, and he was to have had fourteen sail of the line to pursue the enemy, but, on his way south, he met Sir Richard Bickerton, who informed him of the real state of things, and he determined to proceed off Cadiz, anticipating all the time that he would 'have all these fellows coming from the West Indies again before the hurricane months.' He felt no doubt that the object of the enemy was not so much conquest as to draw our force from home.

Missiessy having returned to Rochefort—where, owing to ill-health, he was shortly succeeded in the command by Captain Allemand—made it necessary to establish a new blockade of that port, and Ganteaume observed that the ships off Brest were reduced in number, and he reported again on June 8 that all his vessels were ready for sea (No. 534,

p. 287). A week later Napoleon wrote to Decrès expressing strong views. He did not see what Ganteaume could do. 'What would be the use of a battle? Nothing!' He desired to mislead us by false intelligence in the papers, and he enjoined the greatest secrecy as to his real objects. 'Do not mention the name of Brest or of the Channel to anyone whatever.' Again, on June 22, he curbed the operations of his Admiral at Brest. He did not think it advantageous that Ganteaume should leave, but was willing to give some discretionary power, and if the Admiral thought it really necessary to go out he might do so, provided the movement was made before July 4. This unwilling and tardy concession evidently did not inspirit Ganteaume to activity. Yet, on July 18, Napoleon could not understand why he did not make a sortie. The Emperor had at length reached the conclusion that a battle might be risked, and on the 20th gave orders that, if the English should be found off Brest with fewer than sixteen sail of the line, Ganteaume was to attack with his twenty-one, while, if Cornwallis's squadron should not be met, the Admiral was to proceed off Boulogne, where everything was ready, and where, master of the sea for three days, he might 'terminer le destin de l'Angleterre.' These various letters are extremely interesting, and show how Napoleon's plans were transformed.

Cornwallis rejoined the fleet on July 7, whereupon Gardner proceeded to Cawsand Bay. Allemand's squadron from Rochefort set sail on July 17,

comprising five sail of the line and three frigates, with the purpose of falling in with Villeneuve on his return, but he failed owing to a change in the latter's plans, and the Didon carrying Villeneuve's dispatches for him was captured by the Phoenix on August 10.

There is something pathetic in Calder's letters explaining his inferiority. Bickerton had been ordered to part company, and he was left on June 18 with only eight sail of the line and the Sirius frigate, while the enemy at Ferrol had thirteen sail of the line, five frigates, and three corvettes (No. 538, p. 289). The enemy's ships had come down to Corunna, and he thought it would be a much more difficult task to prevent them from escaping thence. On July 11, Cornwallis issued certain orders which have been a good deal discussed. On the 7th the Curieux had anchored at Plymouth, and Captain Bettesworth had reached the Admiralty with Nelson's dispatches at 11 P.M. on the next day. On the morning of the 9th Lord Barham (who had succeeded Lord Melville at the Admiralty) had dispatched orders to Cornwallis, in pursuance of which he took the action which has been questioned. In view of the danger to Calder, he instructed Stirling to reinforce him with five sail of the line, and, upon Stirling's arrival off Ferrol, Calder was to proceed thirty or forty leagues to the westward for six or eight days for the purpose of intercepting, if possible, the combined squadron of the enemy. Calder alleged that Cornwallis had never heard that the returning squadron consisted of more than sixteen sail of the line. Stirling's departure from before

Rochefort had made it easy for Allemand to get away, and his own westward movement from Ferrol would have enabled the ships of the enemy to escape from the Spanish port. In relation to this matter it may be observed that, if Villeneuve had approached the coast, and had got into communication with Gourdon and Gravina, Calder would probably have been caught between the two squadrons, while, by proceeding to the westward, he gained the opportunity of meeting Villeneuve alone. It is true that the ships might have come out from Corunna, but if they had done so they would have had before them the peril of falling in with Calder, and might have missed Villeneuve altogether. What happened is well known. On July 22, forty-nine leagues west of Ferrol, Calder fell in with Villeneuve's squadron, consisting of twenty sail of the line, with three large armed ships, five frigates, and three brigs, while his own force was only fifteen sail of the line, two frigates, a cutter, and a lugger. The action, though successful, was perhaps necessarily inconclusive, but Calder was greatly blamed for not renewing it on the following day. He demanded a court-martial, and I have included in this volume some part of his defence, dealing with the antecedent conditions of his action, as well as his dispatch to Cornwallis describing his action (pp. 311 and 372).

After the action, which took place in a shifting fog, stormy weather succeeded, and Calder was blown from his station. Villeneuve proceeded to Vigo Bay, and anchored on the evening of the 26th, and, leaving again, arrived at Ferrol in Calder's

absence on August 1. In view of the superiority of his adversary, Calder therefore proceeded off Ushant to join Cornwallis, but on the 16th Cornwallis put under his orders twenty sail of the line and again directed him to go off Ferrol and blockade the port, or, if the enemy should have left, to pursue them. Some of the ships he took with him had joined Cornwallis with Nelson on the 15th, when Nelson had been instructed to proceed in the *Victory* to Portsmouth. Cornwallis's action in dividing his force has been adversely criticised, and was regarded by Napoleon as an *insigne bêtise*. It was undoubtedly a bold move, and in the presence of a stronger man than Villeneuve might have had unfortunate results. It left Cornwallis with a force that would have been inadequate to deal with the squadron of Villeneuve if he had been able to out-manceuvre Calder and appear off Ushant, and at the same time there was Ganteaume's fleet of twenty-one ships to take account of. It seems possible that in such circumstances Cornwallis would have had no course but to fly, and that the great concentration of fifty ships in the Channel, which Napoleon had hoped for, might have been brought about.

While these movements were in progress Napoleon had left Saint-Cloud for Boulogne, and Ganteaume had received instructions that his fleet should be prepared for action and should lie in Bertheaume Bay under the cover of the batteries which had been erected. The Emperor wrote on August 22 that Villeneuve had come out from

Ferrol on August 10, though he had been unable to leave the coast until the 14th. So far as Napoleon could understand his dispatches, his purpose was to approach Brest by the Raz de Sein, as was suspected with the intention of spending a few days in the harbour. In this matter, however, supreme power was given to Ganteaume, who was not to allow Villeneuve to adopt that course. He was not to permit him to lose a single day, in order that, gaining the advantage of the presence of the fifty ships which would be assembled, and which were to proceed into the Channel, he might appear before Boulogne. 'I depend upon your ability, your strength, and your character in these important circumstances,' Napoleon wrote to Ganteaume on the 22nd. 'Leave the port and come here. We shall have avenged six centuries of insults and of shame. Never for a greater object have my seamen and soldiers exposed their lives' (No. 587, p. 349). Ganteaume was ready, and that same day made a feint against Cornwallis's squadron. On the 21st, the French ships had been lying across the channel of approach to Brest, between Bertheaume and Toulinguet, and Cornwallis, with the intention of getting at them if possible, had anchored his squadron for the night off the Black Rocks. At daybreak Ganteaume took the initiative, and advanced, as if to attack, off St. Matthew's Point. Cornwallis made an attempt to cut off the rearmost ships, but this could not be accomplished owing to the immense quantity of shot and shell thrown from the batteries. Three men were killed and six wounded in the *Cæsar*, and

Cornwallis himself was struck by a spent fragment, while the French, having accomplished their purpose, returned to their anchorage off Bertheaume.

The hopes of Napoleon appeared to him to be on the eve of accomplishment, but, as is well known, Villeneuve, after leaving Ferrol, instead of attempting to appear off Brest, turned to the southward and entered Cadiz. Into the reasons of his conduct I shall not enter here. His explanation was that he had no confidence in his fleet, that he believed that the state of affairs had changed since he received his orders, and that he saw no hope of success. His failure in the supreme moment was the bitterest incident in Napoleon's career. All his plans had been directed by adventurous strategy to the accomplishment of the object of his life, and by Villeneuve's action every hope of success was in an instant swept away. Readers of the 'Consulat et Empire' know the exasperation that filled his soul in that terrible moment. 'What a fleet! What sacrifices for nothing! What an Admiral! All hope is gone!'

Such were the events that led up to Trafalgar. It was the intention of Napoleon to replace his discredited Admiral, but untoward Fate prevented M. de Rosily from reaching Cadiz until Villeneuve had gone out to encounter the fleet of Nelson. With the great day of Trafalgar the main interest of the blockade of Brest and of the ocean ports, as it is recounted in the papers in this volume, came to an end. In the following winter the closeness of the blockade was somewhat relaxed, and, while Brest and its approaches were watched, the squadron of Cornwallis was often at anchor in

Torbay or at Falmouth. This system of blockade had been directed by the Admiralty, and it enabled Leissègues and Willaumez to put to sea on December 13, each of them to waste his force in useless endeavours. Cornwallis returned from Ushant to Torbay at the end of January 1806, and struck his flag on February 22, being succeeded in the Channel command by Lord St. Vincent.

In this volume, as in its predecessor, are many lustrous illustrations of the brilliant qualities of British seamen at the time. In the early pages of this Introduction it has been shown with what vigilance they watched the movements of the invasion flotilla, and how effectually they acted against it. Some special incidents may be mentioned here. Thus, Captain Maitland, of the *Loire*, in August 1804, captured the frigate privateer *Blonde* after a gallant action which reflected the greatest credit upon all who were engaged (p. 43). There are several examples of the intrepid bravery of Lieutenant Ussher, afterwards the distinguished Admiral, who was deeply concerned in the projected attempt to burn the French fleet in Brest (pp. 184, 358). An interesting account is given by Lieutenant Bourne, of the *Felix*, of his action with a large French schooner privateer off Santander on April 12, 1805. His conduct of the action was most fearless and gallant, but, when he believed that his adversary had struck her flag, his own ship being severely injured at the time, he was cheated of his prize by her making sail and reaching port (p. 228). Another action that deserves to be noted is the capture, by

a boat of the *Rapid*, of *La Paix Désirée* off the Penmarcks, in a cutting-out action, on May 30, 1805 (p. 281). A remarkable engagement was that of Captain Dundas, in the *Naiad*, with Allemand's squadron, which had escaped from Rochefort. Captain Dundas displayed the greatest coolness and courage and the best seamanship in the running fight against very superior force, and his description of it will be read with the utmost interest (p. 332). Still more interesting is the exultant dispatch of Captain Baker, of the *Phoenix*, announcing his capture of the fine French frigate *Didon*, of 44 guns, which he took in very important circumstances. She was carrying Villeneuve's dispatches intended for Allemand, which, if they had reached their destination, would probably have brought about a concentration of force that might have determined the French Admiral to bolder action (p. 338). The captures, by Captain Barton, of the *Goliath*, of the *Faune* and *Torche*, French corvettes, in August 1804, were other interesting episodes of the time (pp. 342, 346). Several other like incidents will be found described in these pages, but it is unnecessary to pursue the tale of gallantry further, and it is gratifying to be able to add new testimony to the fine qualities of the seamen who were associated with Cornwallis in his great ocean blockade.

For the courage, endurance, resource, and generally for the great strategic and tactical ability of Cornwallis himself, these pages are testimony enough. They will entitle him to even a higher place among our great seamen than has hitherto been assigned to him, and we can only regret, with

Nelson, that some great opportunity of encountering the fleet, which he had watched so vigilantly and so long, was not vouchsafed to him. His work in the blockade was a masterpiece of the administrative and seamanlike handling of a great naval force in operations of supreme importance to the country. It may be fitting in conclusion to pay a high tribute also to the qualities displayed by Gardner, Calder, Collingwood, Pellew, Cotton, Stirling, and other Admirals who had a part in Cornwallis's great blockade.



CONTENTS

1803-1805

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	vii
NO.	
281. Captain Puget to Cornwallis. June 23, 1804	2
Inclosure : A plan for burning the enemy's fleet in Brest	3
282. Lord Melville to Cornwallis. July 10	8
283. Lord Melville to Cornwallis. August 9	9
284. Memorandum by Captain Brisbane. August 16	10
285. Cornwallis to Lord Melville. August 17	11
286. Lord Melville to Cornwallis. August 26	13
287. Lord Melville to Cornwallis. September 5	14
Inclosures :	
A. Lord Melville to Mr. Marsden. September 4	16
B. General Congreve to Sir Andrew Hamond. August 22	17
288. Captain Brisbane to Cornwallis. September 7	18
289. Captain Brisbane's Instructions. September	19
290. Admiral Young to Cornwallis. September 7	21
291. Cornwallis to Lord Melville. September 11	22
292. Lord Melville to Cornwallis. September 14	23
Inclosure : Lord Melville to Admiral Young. September 14	23
293. Cornwallis to Captain Brisbane. September 17	24
294. Cornwallis to Captain Innes. September 26	25
295. Cornwallis to the Lieutenants of the Rifleman, Pelter, Biter, Thrasher, Phosphorus. September 29	26
296. Cornwallis to Lieutenant Higginson. September 30	27
297. Lord Melville to Cornwallis. October 10	27
298. Cornwallis to Lord Melville. October 16	29

NO.	PAGE
299. Captain Puget to Lieutenant Ussher. November 3 . . .	30
300. Captain Puget to Lord Melville. November . . .	31
301. Lord Melville to Captain Puget. November 26 . . .	32
302. Captain Wolfe to Sir R. Calder. July 16 . . .	33
303. Cochrane to Don Francisco Octaraneo. July 19 . . .	34
304. Don Francisco Octaraneo to Cochrane. July 21 . . .	35
305. Sir Thomas Graves to Sir Charles Cotton. July 21 . . .	36
306. Cochrane to Cornwallis. July 25 . . .	36
Inclosure : Extract from a letter from Mr. O'Brien British Vice-Consul at Santander, dated July 12 . . .	
307. Lord Melville to Cornwallis. July 29 . . .	37
308. Captain Neve to Sir C. Cotton. July 29 . . .	38
309. Sir R. Calder to Sir C. Cotton. August 4 . . .	39
310. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. August 8 . . .	39
311. Sir R. Calder to Sir C. Cotton. August 10 . . .	41
312. Captain Innes to Sir C. Cotton. August 16 . . .	41
313. Captain Maitland to Lord Gardner. August 18 . . .	42
314. Sir C. Cotton to Mr. Marsden. August 19 . . .	43
315. Cochrane to Mr. Marsden. August 19 . . .	44
316. Statement of the Spanish Navy at Ferrol. August 22 . . .	45
317. Captain Aldham to Cochrane. August 23 . . .	45
318. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. August 23 . . .	46
Inclosure : Sir T. Graves to Sir C. Cotton. August 22 . . .	
319. Indorsed 'Abstract of secret orders, dated the 24th August'	48
320. Ganteaume to Napoleon. August 27 . . .	50
321. Captain Neve to Cornwallis . . .	51
322. Cochrane to Mr. Marsden. August 27 . . .	51
323. Captain Hurd to Cornwallis. September 1 . . .	52
324. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. September 2 . . .	53
325. Cornwallis to Sir R. Calder, off Rochefort, and Rear-Admiral Cochrane, off Ferrol, severally. September 3 . . .	54
326. Napoleon to Decrès. September 3 . . .	56
327. Cochrane to Cornwallis. September 3 . . .	57
328. Cornwallis to Captain Rathborne. September 4 . . .	58
329. Napoleon to Decrès. September 6 . . .	59
330. Napoleon to Ganteaume. September 6 . . .	59
331. Lieutenant Bourne to Vice-Admiral Young. September 5 . . .	62
332. Cochrane to Lord Melville. September 5 . . .	64
333. Cornwallis to Collingwood. September 7 . . .	65
334. Consul O'Brien to Cochrane. September 9 . . .	66
335. Cochrane to Lord Melville. September 11 . . .	67
336. Cochrane to Captain-General Texada. September 14 . . .	67
337. Ganteaume to Napoleon. September 14 . . .	68

CONTENTS

xlvi

NO.	PAGE
338. Ganteaume to Decrès. September 14	69
339. Captain Moore to Sir Thomas Graves. September 16	69
340. Captain-General Texada to Cochrane. September 15	70
341. Captain-General Texada to Cochrane. September 15	71
342. Cochrane to Captain-General Texada. September 16	72
343. Captain-General Texada to Cochrane. September 18	72
344. Cochrane to Lord Melville. September 20	73
345. Cornwallis to Rear-Admiral Cochrane. September 21	74
346. Cornwallis to Captain Graham Moore. September 22	75
Inclosure : Cornwallis to Captain Graham Moore. Sep- tember 22	75
347. Decrès to Napoleon. September 19	76
348. Captain Puget to Cornwallis. September 23	77
Inclosure : Plan for blockading Brest. September 23	78
349. Cornwallis to Captain Elphinstone. September 23	80
350. Cochrane to his Captains. September 24	81
351. Napoleon to Decrès. September 29	82
352. Collingwood to Cornwallis. October 2	84
353. Cornwallis to Collingwood. October 3	86
354. Captain Graham Moore to Cornwallis. October 6	87
Inclosure : Strength of the Spanish squadron	90
355. Napoleon to Decrès. October 6	90
356. Napoleon to Decrès. October 8	90
357. Cornwallis to the respective Flag-officers and Captains. October 6	91
358. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. October 8	92
359. Lord Melville to Cornwallis. October 10	92
Inclosure : Admiralty Minute	93
360. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. October 15	94
361. Cornwallis to Lord Melville. October 16	94
362. Lord Melville to Cornwallis. October 17	95
363. Lord Melville to Cornwallis. October 18	97
Inclosure : Extract of a letter from Captain Gore. Octo- ber 5	97
364. Captain Graham Moore to Cornwallis. October 19	98
Inclosure : A general statement of goods and effects	99
365. Lieutenant Bourne to Cornwallis. October 22	100
366. Captain Masefield to Cornwallis. October 22	101
367. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. October 23	102
368. Captain Hawkins to Captain Rathborne. October 25	102
369. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. October 25	103
370. Lord Melville to Cornwallis. October 26	104
Inclosure : Captain Hurd's report	107

NO.	PAGE
371. Decrès to Vice-Admiral Martin, Naval Prefect, Rochefort.	
October 26	113
372. Admiralty to Vice-Admiral Sir John Orde. October 27	114
373. Cochrane to Cornwallis. October 30	116
374. Lord Melville to Cornwallis. November 2	117
375. Collingwood to Mr. J. E. Blackett. November 4	120
376. Cochrane to Mr. Marsden. November 5	121
377. Cornwallis to Lord Melville. November 6	122
378. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. November 12	124
379. Cochrane to Mr. Marsden. November 13	125
Inclosure : Mr. Frere receives passports. November 8	126
380. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. November 14	126
381. Admiralty to Sir John Orde, Bart. November 15	126
382. Collingwood to Cornwallis. November 18	127
383. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. November 20	128
384. Captain Martin to Cornwallis. November 25	129
385. Cochrane to Cornwallis. November 25	130
386. The Duc de Bouillon to Mr. Marsden. November 25	131
387. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. November 26	132
388. Captain Dundas to Cornwallis. November 27	133
389. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. November 27	133
390. Captain Aldham to Cornwallis. November 27	135
391. Mr. Thomas Hort to Cochrane. November 29	136
392. Vice-Consul O'Brien to Cochrane. November 30	136
393. Captain Dundas to Cornwallis. December 2	137
394. Vice-Admiral Thévenard to Decrès. December 3	138
395. Vice-Consul Fernandez to Cochrane. December 3	139
396. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. December 6	139
397. Admiralty to Lord Gardner. December 8	140
398. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. December 14	142
399. Cochrane to Cornwallis. December 22	143
400. Captain Elphinstone to Cornwallis. December 27	144
401. Cochrane to Cornwallis. January 1, 1805	145
402. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. January 6	147
403. Captain Dundas to Cornwallis. January 7	148
404. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. January 8	149
405. Lieutenant Thomas Swain to Cornwallis. January 9	150
406. Napoleon to Decrès. January 12	152
407. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. January 11	152
408. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. January 14	153
409. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. January 15	154
410. Sir Robert Calder to Mr. Marsden. January 15	155
411. Decrès to Napoleon. January 15	156

CONTENTS

xlix

NO.	PAGE
412. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. January 16	157
Inclosure : Captain Aldham's report of the enemy at Brest	157
413. Sir Thomas Graves to Admiral Cornwallis. January 17	158
Inclosures :	
A. Lieutenant Bourne to Captain Campbell. January 13	160
B. Information received by Lieutenant Henry S. Jones from the American schooner Lydia. January 15	161
414. Captain Campbell to Sir Thomas Graves. January 19	163
415. Captain Morris to Sir Thomas Graves. January 23	166
416. Sir Charles Cotton to Cornwallis. January 25	168
417. Sir Charles Cotton to Mr. Marsden. January 26	168
418. Sir Charles Cotton to Mr. Marsden. January 27	169
419. Lieutenant Beauman to Cornwallis. January 27	170
420. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. January 30	170
421. List of the enemy's force in Brest. January 31	172
422. Lieutenant Beauman to Cornwallis. February 1	172
423. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. February 3	173
424. Collingwood to Mr. J. E. Blackett. February 4	174
425. Caffarelli to Decrès. February 4	175
426. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. February 7	177
427. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. February 9	178
428. Sir R. Calder to Mr. Marsden. February 11	178
429. Intelligence obtained by Captain Sir Francis Laforey on February 13	179
430. Captain Prowse to Cornwallis. February 12	180
431. Captain Poyntz to Cornwallis. February 12	180
432. Lieutenant Nicholson to Cornwallis. February 13	181
433. Lieutenant Batt to Captain Poyntz. February 13	181
434. Lieutenant Gregory to Captain Prowse. February 13	182
435. Caffarelli to Decrès. February 15	182
436. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. February 18	183
Inclosure : Lieutenant Ussher to Cornwallis. February 11	184
437. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. February 19	185
438. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. February 22	186
439. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. February 24	186
440. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. February 25	189
Inclosures :	
A. Information received from the master of a Danish brig, February 13	190
B. Observations made by the Ajax off Ferrol, Feb- ruary 14	190
C. Cochrane to Cornwallis. February 21	192
441. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. February 25	192
442. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. February 27	193
II.	C

NO.	PAGE
443. Sir Robert Calder to Mr. Marsden. March 2	194
Inclosures :	
A. General instructions to the squadron to watch the enemy at Corunna and Ferrol. March 2	196
B. Captain Legge to Sir Robert Calder	198
444. Napoleon to Ganteaume. March 2	199
445. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. March 3	202
446. Decrès to Caffarelli. March 4	203
447. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. March 4	203
448. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. March 7	204
449. Sir Robert Calder to Mr. Marsden. March 8	204
Inclosure : Captain Otway to Sir Robert Calder. March 4	205
450. Copy of intelligence obtained from the Indefatigable off Ferrol. March 9	206
451. Sir Robert Calder to Cornwallis. March 10	207
452. Sir Robert Calder to Mr. Marsden. March 12	208
453. Napoleon to Ganteaume. March 15	209
454. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. March 12	209
455. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. March 14	210
456. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. March 16	211
457. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. March 18	212
458. Cornwallis to Sir Charles Cotton. March 18	212
459. Sir Charles Cotton to Mr. Marsden. March 19	213
460. Captain Gosselin to Sir Charles Cotton. March 18	214
461. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. March 23	215
462. Ganteaume's Instructions. March 24	215
463. Lieutenant Rose to Captain Prowse. March 25	216
464. Sir Charles Cotton to Mr. Marsden. March 28	216
465. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. March 30	217
466. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. March 31	218
467. Admiralty Minute for Lord Gardner. March 31	219
468. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. April 3	219
469. Napoleon to Ganteaume. April 3	220
470. Sir Robert Calder to Mr. Marsden. April 4	221
471. Captain Gosselin to Lord Gardner. April 9	222
472. Collingwood to Mr. J. E. Blackett. April 9	223
473. Napoleon to Ganteaume. April 7	223
474. Napoleon to Ganteaume. April 11	224
475. Sir John Orde to Lord Robert Fitz-Gerald. April 10	225
476. Sir John Orde to Lord Gardner. April 12	225
477. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. April 12	227
478. Lieutenant Bourne to Lord Gardner. April 13	228
Inclosure : List of killed and wounded on board the Felix on April 12	231

CONTENTS

li

NO.	PAGE
479. Napoleon to Villeneuve. April 14	231
480. Captain Gosselin to Lord Gardner. April 18	232
481. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. April 19	233
482. Napoleon to Decrès. April 20	234
483. Napoleon to Decrès. April 21.	235
484. Captain Legge to Sir Robert Calder. April 21	235
485. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. April 22	236
486. Captain Lord Mark Kerr to Lord Gardner. April 23	237
487. Napoleon to Decrès. April 23.	239
488. Napoleon to Ganteaume. April 23	239
489. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. April 26	240
490. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. April 27	240
491. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. April 27	242
492. Lord Gardner's Instructions	242
493. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. April 28	243
494. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. April 29	243
495. Napoleon to Decrès. April 29	244
496. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. April 30	245
497. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. April 30	246
498. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. May 1	248
499. Captain Dundas to Lord Gardner. May 2	248
500. Napoleon to Decrès. May 2	249
501. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. May 3	250
502. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. May 3	251
503. Captain Gosselin to Lord Gardner. May 4	251
504. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. May 5	252
505. Sir John Orde to Lord Gardner	253
506. Intelligence obtained from Captain Martin, of the <i>Impétueux</i> , May 6	253
507. Napoleon to Decrès. May 8	254
508. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. May 9	255
509. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. May 10	257
510. Admiral Thévenard to Decrès. May 10	257
511. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. May 11.	258
512. Intelligence by Captain Martin. May 12	259
513. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. May 15.	260
Inclosure : Lord Gardner to Collingwood. May 15	261
514. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. May 15.	261
Inclosures :	
A. Captain Sturt's information. May 14	263
B. Sir Robert Calder to Lord Gardner. May 10	263
C. Captain Otway to Sir Robert Calder. May 9	264
D. The enemy's force in Ferrol Harbour reconnoitred by the <i>Montagu</i> . May 9	264

NO.	PAGE
515. Captain Scott to Lord Gardner. May 15	265
516. Captain Gosselin to Lord Gardner. May 16	266
517. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. May 19.	266
Inclosures :	
A—No. 1. Lord Nelson to Captain R. H. Moubray. April 19	267
B—No. 2. Lord Nelson to Mr. Marsden. April 19	268
C—No. 3. Lord Nelson to Mr. Marsden. April 19	269
D—No. 4. Captain Moubray to Lord Nelson. April 29.	270
E—No. 6. Lord Nelson to the officer commanding on the Irish station. April 19.	271
518. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. May 19	271
519. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. May 19	271
520. Admiralty Minute on the preceding. May 21	272
521. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. May 20.	272
522. Captain Lake to Lord Gardner. May 20	273
523. Admiral Thévenard to Decrès. May 21	273
524. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. May 22	274
525. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. May 22.	275
Inclosure : Sir Robert Calder to Lord Gardner. May 15.	276
526. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. May 27.	278
527. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. May 27	279
528. Lieutenant Gwillim to Lord Gardner. May 31	281
529. Admiral Martin to the Minister of Marine. May 31	282
530. Lieutenant Batt to Captain Gosselin. June 1	283
531. Sir Robert Calder to Lord Gardner. June 3	284
532. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. June 5	285
533. Admiral Thévenard to Decrès. June 7.	286
534. Ganteaume to Decrès. June 8.	287
535. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. June 11	287
536. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. June 13.	288
537. Napoleon to Decrès. June 16	288
538. Sir Robert Calder to Mr. Marsden. June 18	289
539. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. June 20	290
540. Napoleon to Decrès. June 22.	291
541. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. June 24	292
542. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. June 27	292
543. Sir Thomas Graves to Lord Gardner. June 28	293
Inclosure : Captain Fleeming's report of the enemy's force in Rochefort. June 20	295
544. Captain Fleeming's report of his examination of the brig Catherine from Rochelle	295
545. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. July 1	296
546. Collingwood to Dr. Carlyle, of Inveresk. July 2.	296

CONTENTS

liii

NO.	PAGE
547. Sir Robert Calder to Lord Gardner. July 5	298
548. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. July 6	299
549. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. July 7	300
550. Lord Gardner to Mr. Marsden. July 8	300
551. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. July 9	301
552. Sir Robert Calder to Mr. Marsden. July 11	301
Inclosure : Captain Prowse's report. July 10	302
553. Rear-Admiral Stirling to Cornwallis. July 12	302
554. Sir Robert Calder to Cornwallis. July 15	303
555. Sir Robert Calder to Cornwallis. July 15	304
Inclosure : Lieutenant Nicholson to Sir Robert Calder. July 12	305
556. Admiral Martin to the Minister of Marine. July 17	305
557. Napoleon to Decrès. July 18	306
558. Napoleon to Ganteaume. July 20	307
559. Captain Poyntz to Cornwallis. July 23	309
560. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. July 26	309
561. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. July 28	311
Inclosure : Sir Robert Calder to Cornwallis. July 23	311
562. Private letter from the Senior Lieutenant of the <i>Egyptienne</i> . July 29	313
563. Letter from an unknown Correspondent. July 23	320
564. Captain Buller to Sir Robert Calder. July 23	324
565. Sir Robert Calder to Cornwallis. July 26	325
566. Sir Robert Calder to Cornwallis. July 26	326
567. Lord Nelson to Cornwallis. July 27	327
568. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. July 29	328
569. Captain Buller to Sir Robert Calder. July 31	329
570. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. August 2	329
571. Napoleon to Decrès. August 2	330
572. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. August 4	330
573. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. August 9	331
Inclosure : Captain Dundas to Cornwallis. August 8	332
574. Lieutenant Delafons to Cornwallis. August 11	334
575. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. August 12	336
576. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. August 13	337
577. Captain Baker to Cornwallis. August 13	338
Inclosure : List of killed and wounded in the <i>Phoenix</i> and Didon, August 10	341
578. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. August 13	341
579. Captain Barton to Cornwallis. August 15	342
580. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. August 16	343
581. Cornwallis to Sir Robert Calder. August 16	344
582. Captain Barton to Cornwallis. August 18	346

NO.	PAGE
583. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. August 19	346
584. Intelligence obtained by Captain Hope from a Portsmouth sloop, August 21	348
585. Napoleon to Decrès. August 20	348
586. Napoleon to Ganteaume. August 20	348
587. Napoleon to Ganteaume. August 22	349
588. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. August 22	349
589. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. August 27	351
590. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. September 2	351
591. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. September 2	352
592. Lieutenant Simpson to Cornwallis. September 3	352
593. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. September 5	354
Inclosure : Collingwood to Mr. James Gambier. August 20	355
594. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. September 7	357
595. Lieutenant Ussher to Cornwallis. September 8	358
596. Captain Parker to Cornwallis. September 17	359
597. Sir Robert Calder to Cornwallis. September 21	360
598. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. September 22	361
599. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. September 28	362
600. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. September 29	362
601. Sir Robert Calder to Mr. Marsden. September 30	364
602. Mr. Marsden to Cornwallis. October 9	365
603. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. October 12	366
604. Lieutenant Pater to Cornwallis	367
605. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. November 20	369
606. Cornwallis to Sir Richard Strachan. November 20	369
607. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. December 2	370
608. Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden. December 20	372
609. Extract from Sir Robert Calder's Defence at the Court-martial	372
INDEX	379

ILLUSTRATIONS

CAPTAIN PETER PUGET'S PLAN FOR THE DESTRUCTION
OF THE FRENCH FLEET IN BREST HARBOUR,
JUNE 23, 1804 *Frontispiece*

*Prepared from the Original in the possession of Colonel
Cornwallis West.*

THE PLAN FOR DESTROYING THE FRENCH FLEET IN
BREST HARBOUR AS MODIFIED BY CAPTAIN CHARLES
BRISBANE, AUGUST 16, 1804 *To face p. 19*

*Prepared from the Original in the possession of Colonel
Cornwallis West.*

MAP ILLUSTRATING THE OPERATIONS ON THE
SPANISH COAST UNDER PELLEW, COCHRANE, AND
CALDER, 1803-1805 " 71

MAP ILLUSTRATING THE OPERATIONS AT FERROL AND
CORUNNA " 195



PAPERS RELATING TO THE
BLOCKADE OF BREST

1803-1805

[Admiral Cornwallis arrived at Portsmouth in the *Ville de Paris* on July 29, 1804, having left Sir Charles Cotton, in the *San Josef*, temporarily in chief command off Brest, under an order dated July 17, which was the last document (No. 280) printed in the first volume of this book. During the weeks he spent on shore the Admiral appears to have been in frequent personal communication with Lord Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty, in relation to the subject of the following papers (No. 281 to No. 301). These deal with a proposal made to Cornwallis by Captain Peter Puget, of the *Foudroyant*, before the Admiral left Brest, that an attempt should be made to destroy the French fleet in the harbour there by means of fire-ships. I have thought it expedient to print together all the documents relating to this enterprise, covering the period from June 23 to November 26, 1804, and then to resume the series describing the progress of the blockade. There is the less reason to preserve strict chronology at this point, because the whole of the papers concerning the daring project were of secret character, and stand apart from the other records of the blockade. With the exception of Nos. 299, 300, and 301 these papers are in the possession of Colonel Cornwallis West.]

No. 281

CAPTAIN PUGET TO CORNWALLIS

Foudroyant, Cawsand Bay, 23rd June, 1804.

Sir,—Having turned my thoughts to the possibility of annoying the French fleet at their present anchorage in Brest, and conceiving their position to be favourable for that purpose, I have, under that impression, ventured to submit to your consideration the inclosed papers, containing a plan for an attempt to destroy them by fire-vessels, and, at the same time, offering my services to conduct such an undertaking, and to lead the vessels into Brest.

Permit me to hope that, in the event of this plan being honoured with your approbation, you will have the goodness to mention my name, as well as those of the officers who have volunteered for this enterprise, as persons ready to execute it; and I trust, if we are permitted to undertake it, we shall, by our exertions, entitle ourselves to your notice and protection. To those officers I have confided my scheme, and when I mention Captain Patrick Campbell, of the *Doris*, Lieutenant Thomas Graves, first of this ship, Lieutenant Miln, of the *Mary cutter*, and Lieutenant Ussher, of the *Sir John Colpoys schooner*, you will think with me that there is every reliance to be placed on their secrecy.

I have selected Lieutenant Graves to accompany me in the vessel that leads in, from the knowledge I have of his abilities and judgment, that, should any accident happen to me going in, I feel confident he would conduct the enterprise to their appointed stations.

I beg leave to remark to you, that it frequently occurs that convoys pass from the eastward round

St. Matthew's into Brest. Probably the enemy might be deceived into a belief that our vessels were of that description, and therefore let them pass unmolested.

As the success of this enterprise must principally depend on the equipment and fitting these vessels, and if the charge is entrusted to my care, I should hope to be allowed to attend that service for a short time, and, to enable me to do so, that an acting captain might be put into the Foudroyant.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient and humble devoted servant,
PETER PUGET.¹

INCLOSURE

A Plan for Burning the Enemy's Fleet in Brest

I would propose that ten brigs from 100 to 130 tons each, and three sloops from 50 to 60 tons each, should be appropriated for this service—the former to go into Brest, the latter into Camaret Bay.

¹ Captain Peter Puget was an officer of whose career too little is known. As a lieutenant he was a companion of Vancouver in his famous voyage, and the deep inlet of Puget Sound, one of the most magnificent reaches of inland water in the world, was named after him. He was greatly esteemed as a surveyor, and rendered valuable service at the time. When Lieutenant Broughton came home with dispatches in 1793, Puget succeeded him in command of the Chatham, one of Vancouver's ships. He was promoted to the rank of captain on April 29, 1797, and his enterprise and daring when in command of the Foudroyant are seen in these papers. He made another and distinct proposal to Cornwallis in regard to the system of blockade, also implying the use of fire-ships, on September 23 (see No. 348). In 1807, in command of the Goliath, he took part in the expedition to Copenhagen, which brought about the surrender of the Danish fleet, and was hotly engaged inside the Trekroner. He also accompanied the expedition to the Baltic in 1808. Captain Puget became a rear-admiral in 1821, and died in that rank.

Each vessel to be fitted in such a manner—both outside and inside—as to insure an immediate communication of fire to the masts, yards, and hulls of these vessels. They should be supplied with grapnels and chains, as also with two fast-rowing six-oared Deal boats. One boat would be sufficient for the sloops each.

Two captains, ten lieutenants, ten master's mates, ten midshipmen, with a hundred seamen, would be sufficient to conduct the brigs; three lieutenants, three midshipmen, and eighteen seamen, the sloops; in all 156 persons, the whole to be volunteers.

The brigs should be formed into two divisions under the directions of the respective captains. They should, with the sloops, meet under Dungeness with all possible dispatch, by which it would be imagined their operations were intended against Boulogne. They could join the Commander-in-Chief off Brest either with the first easterly wind, or whenever it was thought advisable.

The best time for making the attempt to destroy the enemy's fleet in Brest appears to be in the last quarter of the flood tide, on a starlight night, with the wind blowing a commanding breeze from the N.W., or, indeed, further to the westward, for the boats could always secure their retreat with the assistance of the ebb tide.

Supposing it was high water at 12 in Brest water; on that night, after dusk, I would have the frigates (attached to the advanced squadron) anchor as close as possible off the Goulet; and the hired cutters, assisted by the boats of that squadron, within the frigates; these would cover the retreat of the boats if pursued by others, or could assist in the attempt on the gun-vessels in Camaret Bay. The fire-brigs should be off Point St. Matthew's a little before ten, and then and there be guided by circum-

stances as to the proper time for making sail towards the enemy.

In going in, the fire-brigs should keep close under the north shore, on the principle that the nearer the vessels are carried to the enemy's batteries, the effect of red-hot shot would be lessened, for they would pass through both sides, instead of lodging; the rapidity with which we should alter our situation with the batteries would prevent the enemy having any other advantage than that which he would derive from a point-blank shot.

I would form the brigs in a loose, compact line. When the leading vessels had arrived off the battery of Portzic, they should, with the first division, haul up for the southern part of the French fleet; the second division for the northern part; each should make for the ship pointed out in the plan,¹ and immediately lay her on board, by running athwart hawse; and, when there (and on no consideration not [*sic*] till then) set her on fire, and secure her to the enemy's ship by the grapnels and chains. The sloops should be ready (when they perceive the flames in Brest water) under the direction of the frigates, to push into Camaret Bay among the gun-vessels anchored there, and, by attempting to burn them, it would divert their attention from the boats in their retreat, and confine it to their own safety. The fire-brigs should be on board the enemy, if possible, a quarter of an hour before high water, for it would be of essential benefit in assisting them to maintain their situation, and, if the enemy cut from his anchors, he would drift on board the ships astern of him. It would also be the means of more effectually spreading the flames, as with the flood

¹ Plans prepared from the originals of Captains Puget and Brisbane, by permission of Colonel Cornwallis West, accompany this volume.

tide and the wind, I have already pointed out the enemy's ships would ride with their heads nearly in that direction; consequently the flames would be driven aft. Besides, it would prevent those men who jumped overboard, as many most assuredly would, reaching our boats. In the general confusion, which would inevitably follow such an unexpected attack, it would be impossible to fix any positive mode of retreat; therefore, as soon as the commanding officer of each brig had performed his duty of seeing the fire well established, he should then take to his boats and, keeping on the north shore, pull strongly to secure his retreat.

I certainly believe that such a plan may, and will, be successful; from the operation of fear on the human mind, it is well known the consternation which even a common fire produces on shore, when assistance is near to get the flames under. In a ship, fire is considered the greatest calamity that can happen; and such effect has it on the mind that I have known in three cases men jump overboard on the first alarm, thus rushing from an uncertain to a certain death, to avoid even the probability of being burned. How much more would that fear be increased when a ship is grappled by an enemy for the avowed purpose of destruction, and whose plans are all arranged! If one man in such a situation jumped overboard, the rest would instantly follow, and this would certainly happen, not only from the fear of fire, but from the apprehension of an immediate explosion.

There certainly appears, at the first glance, something like desperation in the attempt, but, when it is considered that our plans have the advantage of arrangement, and the enemy off his guard, we may presume that the boldness of the measure I propose, its sudden operation, and the certain con-

fusion and consternation it would produce, will induce success to this enterprise.

There may be some objection to this plan, from an apparent difficulty of securing our retreat. The only obstacle I can perceive to our escaping will be from the gun-vessels in Camaret Bay, for which I have already provided. I trust these gun-vessels will have sufficient employment on their hands to pay any attention to us.

In attempts of this nature, those attacked most commonly consult their own safety, and the preservation of their vessels, instead of pursuing those who caused the mischief. Besides, the enemy would naturally suppose we had some force following us up to cover our retreat. As to the chance of losing men—and which may be called an objection—I can only say we cannot all expect to survive. But I can perceive no more danger attached to this plan than in many attempts during the last war. To cut out vessels from the enemy's port, it frequently occurred that 200 men have been sent to board a single ship. I only require in all 156 persons for this attempt, which combines objects of far greater magnitude.

Should the Commander-in-Chief be pleased to approve of the attempt being made, I beg leave to offer my services to command it, and that I may be allowed the honour of leading the fire-ships into Brest. I beg leave also to mention Captain Patrick Campbell, of the *Doris*, who, from the conversation I have had with him, would, I am certain, readily undertake the command of the second division. Also Lieutenant Thomas Graves, first lieutenant of the *Foudroyant*, Lieutenant Robert Miln, of the *Mary* cutter, and Lieutenant Ussher, commanding the *Sir John Colpoys* schooner. These officers have already volunteered their services under me, and I have the strongest pledge of their secrecy, on

which depends principally the success of this plan. There are other lieutenants who, I am certain, would be rejoiced to join me in this undertaking.

I should presume to hope that, in the event of the attempt being made, and the charge intrusted to my care, I may be allowed to superintend the equipment and fitting the fire-vessels, and that, under these circumstances, I may have an acting captain put into the Foudroyant during my employment on this service.

PETER PUGET.

Foudroyant, Cawsand Bay, 23rd June, 1804.

[The plan proposed by Captain Puget was laid by Cornwallis before Lord Melville, whose reply follows.]

No. 282

LORD MELVILLE TO CORNWALLIS

[*Confidential.*]

Admiralty, 10th July, 1804.

Dear Admiral,—I have received your letter with its inclosures, which I return, as I don't know if you have copies of them. If the enterprise proposed could be successfully executed, it would certainly redound much to the splendour of the British navy and its enterprising officers, and the means pointed out for the attempt are certainly on a moderate scale. You must feel how incompetent I am to form an accurate judgment on the subject, and must therefore refer myself to you. It is certainly a general impression I entertain on such occasions that very bold and daring enterprises generally succeed, and Captain Puget seems to detail his project very distinctly, together with the grounds on which he founds his hopes of success. The national advantages

attending its success are too obvious to require illustration. I must therefore repeat again that I put myself, and my decision upon it, totally into your hands. It is not from a desire to avoid responsibility that I state my sentiments in this way. I have no such feeling, for, if it fails, I should think it my duty to take the responsibility on myself, but, if it succeeds, the whole merit should belong to those to whom it is justly due. If you resolve on the attempt, I suppose I shall hear from you more in detail, and it is probable you will think right to appoint an acting captain to the *Foudroyant*, and send Captain Puget home to make the preparations you may think necessary.

I have the honour to remain, dear Admiral,

Yours very truly,

MELVILLE.

[The following letter belongs to the period when Cornwallis was in England, and from the tenor of it we learn that it had meanwhile been decided, apparently between Lord Melville and the Admiral, to intrust the chief command of the enterprise to Captain Brisbane. Captain Puget's feelings in this matter are implied rather than expressed in a later letter to Lord Melville. See No. 300.]

No. 283

LORD MELVILLE TO CORNWALLIS

[*Secret.*]

Wimbledon, 9th August, 1804.

Dear Admiral,—In your absence Captain Brisbane has just called on me, and I have conversed with him on the subject we discussed at our last meeting. I have confidentially communicated to

him Captain Puget's plan, with which he is much pleased ; and I think there is room for availing ourselves of the service of both those enterprising officers in the execution of this attack, if, upon mature consideration, you shall determine on making it. My own mind certainly inclines to it, for the advantage to be gained by success so far exceeds the risk to be run ; it is exactly one of those cases which call for a discreet exertion of the British valour and enterprise. Of course you will have a complete explanation with Captains Brisbane and Puget. It occurs to me, and Captain Brisbane confirms me in the idea, that it might excite suspicion if fire-vessels were sent to your fleet before you were ready for the immediate use of them ; but I shall take care that Admiral Young is instructed to have everything ready for you the moment you call for them, and I have desired Captain Brisbane to see Admiral Young, and to prepare him for the calls that may be made upon him. It does not occur to me that there is anything more necessary to be added by me at present, but I remain, dear Admiral,

Yours very sincerely,
MELVILLE.

No. 284

MEMORANDUM BY CAPTAIN BRISBANE

[Memo.]

16th August, 1804 (on board the Glory).

The fire-ships should be ordered to leave their port to the eastward for Boulogne, and then sail with sealed orders, to be opened off the Lizard. They should join the fleet by the 29th of the month.

The officers commanding the different fire-ships should be appointed by Admiral Cornwallis, who is well acquainted with the abilities of officers that ought to be employed on this service.

The fire-ships to be formed into three divisions, under the directions of Captains Puget, Campbell, and Brisbane.

Eight fire-ships to be sent, a number sufficient to execute the service.

To request the *Megæra* and another fire-ship of her size may be sent as part of the eight.

It would expedite the service if the vacancies of lieutenants that may be in the fleet were put on board to command the fire-ships until they joined Admiral Cornwallis, as then there would not be any difficulty in appointing officers of known determined courage.

No. 285

*CORNWALLIS TO LORD MELVILLE*¹

Glory, off St. Helen's, 17th August (1804).

Dear Lord Melville,—Captain Brisbane joined me on board the *Glory* yesterday afternoon. He is very much flattered, and sensible of your Lordship's condescending manner of talking upon the particular subject with him.

It is proposed that eight fire-vessels should be employed upon this service. Two of them should be of the size of the *Megæra*, and it would be desirable that ship should be one of them. I had the honour of mentioning to your Lordship how necessary it is that the officers to command the vessels should be chosen men, such as have offered

¹ From a draft of the letter in the Admiral's own hand.

themselves for such service, or of known zeal for such enterprise. The captains, of course, to command the divisions will be Brisbane, Puget, and Campbell; the lieutenants, Ussher, Miln, if in the way, and two or three others whom I know to be men anxious for the most daring service. Your Lordship may depend upon it that no motive whatever shall induce me to employ any other.

Perhaps, if it is necessary to send lieutenants out in the vessels, they may be such as are appointed to ships of the squadron, which they will, of course, join, and leave room for the appointment of those intended for the particular service. Your Lordship is aware of the [difficulty of ?] removing an officer regularly appointed when a ship is going upon service; in which case he will, of course, complain, whether he had really an inclination for it or not.

The ships and vessels might be ordered to leave port to go eastward for Boulogne, and then have sealed orders to be opened off the Lizard. They should join the squadron by the 29th. I intend the sooner it can be attempted the better. I have been detained by strong westerly winds, rather unusual at this season, and I have been apprehensive, if I had attempted to beat out of the Channel, we might have found ourselves in the Downs.

I am certain that your Lordship's own zeal upon this occasion will have the desired effect. There are so many events occur in such enterprises that there is no answering for success. At all events it will redound to the honour of our country, which is the first consideration.

I have the honour to be, dear Lord Melville,
Your most obedient and obliged humble servant,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 286

LORD MELVILLE TO CORNWALLIS

[*Secret.*]

Wimbledon, 26th August, 1804.

Dear Admiral,—Although I cannot lay any blame of remissness at the door of any person employed, it is clear that our preparations cannot be advanced so much as to admit of the vessels, &c., being off the Lizard Point so early as the 29th of this month. Mr. Miln, one of the persons you proposed to employ, being accidentally on the spot, I appointed [him] to one of the vessels to be employed, and, as he had the whole explained to him in his original communications with Captain Puget, I thought it best to avail myself of his assistance in preparation, and employed him to have, for that purpose, confidential communications with Sir Andrew Hamond and Mr. Congreve¹ at Woolwich. Mr. Miln thought some of the vessels which had been prepared not well calculated for the service, and, although it creates some days' delay, I thought it best to substitute others in their place. Mevagissey Bay² has been mentioned to me as a proper place of rendezvous for the vessels to assemble at, in order to be finally prepared and arranged, previous to their junction with your fleet, which I take it for granted you will not choose to take place till the moment the attempt is to be made. If, however, I don't hear from you in answer to this, before the vessels sail, I think it will be best to order them

¹ General Sir William Congreve, Bart., the distinguished military engineer, who invented the rocket known by his name. It was used at Boulogne in 1806, and subsequently in the Basque Roads and at Walcheren, as well as in the Peninsula, in the attack on Algiers, and in many other operations.

² Near St. Austell, Cornwall.

to go off the Lizard Point, as that was the place you formerly mentioned to me, in your letter of the 17th, for a day or two. I shall have occasion to write to you again at greater length on the whole of this interesting subject.

In the meantime, I remain, dear Admiral,
Yours very truly,
MELVILLE.

No. 287

LORD MELVILLE TO CORNWALLIS

[*Secret.*]

Admiralty, 5th September, 1804.

Dear Admiral,—Sir Andrew Hamond reports to me that everything requisite for the secret service is now ready to be sent from the river, and I trust, therefore, that if the wind or weather does not obstruct their progress, the vessels will not be long in reaching you. The inclosed is the memorandum I have this day given to Mr. Marsden,¹ that everything may be duly expedited. The latter part respecting the private letter to yourself was not in the minute I gave to Mr. Marsden, meaning myself to write to you. And I likewise propose to write a few lines to Admiral Young, that he may dispatch everything without delay when the vessels reach Plymouth.

Having now put the means into your hands of making this enterprising attempt, I should not act fairly or candidly with you, if I did not explain to you that I had recently communicated to my Naval Colleagues the preparations I was secretly making, and the objects of them, and from them I certainly have received no encouragement to persevere.²

¹ Inclosure A.

² In relation to this remark see Cornwallis's letter to Captain Brisbane, September 17, No. 293.

They concur in thinking that the enemy must be supine beyond example, and totally negligent of the common vigilance which every commander of a fleet in the circumstances of the Brest fleet ought to use, to give the most remote chance of success in this attempt. Without being skilled, as they are, in naval operations, every man of common understanding must be aware that the attempt is not less dangerous than it is enterprising, and nothing would be more remote from my mind than to give an order originating from my own knowledge or speculation for carrying such a service into execution. But that is not the shape in which the question comes before me, nor the view in which I am called upon to consider it. The suggestion comes from able and meritorious officers, who have examined the subject on the spot, who, being capable to appreciate the chances of success and the consequences of failure, have formed a confident hope of success, and have urged their request to be permitted to volunteer the service. These sentiments they have with earnestness laid before their Commander-in-Chief, and by him the project has not been discountenanced, but transmitted to me. Under these circumstances, and duly appreciating the importance of the service—if the result of the enterprise is favourable—I do not feel disposed to put a negative if, upon again revolving the whole in their minds, the same meritorious, able, and enterprising officers shall still entertain the same opinion and hopes which they have formerly conveyed to you.

I shall be most anxious to hear from you again—till then I shall flatter myself with every hope, as I must entertain every wish for your success. But, whatever your ultimate determination may be, I am confident the best will be done.

I have received your letter of the 27th. The

proposition which has been laid before you of acting on shore, seems to be attended with many difficulties, and certainly does not accord with former intelligence; but, at any rate, it would be inexpedient to postpone any other enterprise in contemplation till another operation could be combined with it.

You will observe that the rendezvous of the vessels now dispatched to join you is, according to your original suggestion, off the Lizard Point, and they will act afterwards agreeably to the orders they may there receive from you.

The inclosed is a copy of a memorandum which Sir Andrew Hamond received from General Congreve.¹ I send it to you, although it is not probably of any use, as Lieutenant Miln has had a full communication with General Congreve on every part of the business.

I remain, dear Admiral,

Yours very truly,

MELVILLE.

INCLOSURE A

LORD MELVILLE TO MR. MARSDEN

[Memorandum.]

4th September, 1804.

Orders to be given from the Admiralty for the seven vessels named in the margin² to proceed with all possible dispatch to the Downs, and follow the directions of Admiral Lord Keith for their further proceedings.

Lord Keith to be apprised of their sailing, and

¹ Inclosure B.

² Gun-brigs: 1. Thrasher, Lieutenant Miln, fitted to carry the stores from Woolwich Warren; 2. Phosphorus, fitted also for the same purpose; 3. Waller; 4. Teazer; 5. Pelter; 6. Rifleman; 7. Biter.

to be desired to put them under the charge of a sloop of war to see them to their destination. Also to furnish each of them with a fast-rowing boat in lieu of one of their own.

Admiral Young to be apprised that the above vessels are coming to put themselves under his command, and to be directed to give them secret orders to proceed off the Lizard, and wait there for Admiral Cornwallis's instructions. Admiral Young to be also instructed to apprise Admiral Cornwallis, by the quickest conveyance, of the before-mentioned vessels having sailed for their destination.

Admiral Cornwallis to be informed by private letter of their coming, and acquainted that Lieutenant Miln, of the Thrasher, has charge of the combustibles, grappling irons, and chains; likewise instructions from General Congreve for distributing the former.

INCLOSURE B

GENERAL CONGREVE TO SIR ANDREW
HAMOND

22nd August, 1804.

Dear Sir,—Your commands of yesterday are carrying into execution with all dispatch. The fire stores for six vessels shall be put on board the instant you send for them, but the additional stores cannot be got ready sooner than I formerly reported—viz. three days. But no time shall be lost in the preparations but what is unavoidable.

I have the honour, &c.,


W CONGREVE,

Comptroller of the Royal Laboratory

P.S.—Pray persuade the seamen not to trust to quick match leaders, because they are liable to fail on board ship through damp. But port-fires (of

which there are plenty sent for each ship) can be used to advantage, either in wood, or when stuck into the fire barrels.

If the port-fire A is intended to burn some time before the combustibles are to take fire, care must be taken that the sparks may fall clear of the barrel.



A FIRE-BARREL IN A PAINTED COVER

No. 288

CAPTAIN BRISBANE TO CORNWALLIS

Goliath, 7th September, 1804.

Dear Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of yours of the 4th inst. I beg to assure you I feel much gratified at the prospect of seeing our friends off Ushant.

I am sorry our tides turn out so bad in Brest until near the full moon; yet moonlight shall not be any obstacle on our part to the execution of the service. Tides we must study from their strength in the Goulet, and you will perceive by the inclosed paper that Wednesday, the 19th,¹ will answer extremely well as to tide, and on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday after the full. In fact we cannot have everything to our wishes, and, in my opinion, notwithstanding the full moon, we ought on those

¹ High water in Brest, 3.08 A.M.

days to make a dash, if possible, as, after that period, the tide will not answer for several days.

Sir Thomas has been outside for a few days. The Goliath remained at her anchorage off the Black Rocks. The enemy are in the same state as before. There are two gun-brigs plying about St. Matthew's.

I have the honour, &c.,
CHAS. BRISBANE.


No. 289

CAPTAIN BRISBANE'S INSTRUCTIONS

(September 1804.)

A pinnacle or barge to attend each fire-ship, manned with volunteers. The fire-ships to be in three divisions, under Captain Brisbane, who will lead, Captain Puget the centre, Captain Campbell the rear. To close up on discovering the French fleet, and sail down on them in a line of Brest [*sic*], every man taking his bird.

It is Captain Brisbane's intention to board the Vengeur, if possible, now bearing the French admiral's flag. Whatever may be the effect of the battery's opening on us in going in, which is likely to take place—and it may also happen to some of us to have our masts disabled, so as to prevent the possibility of closing with the enemy's fleet—it is my positive order the ship will not be set on fire in that situation, as it will be the means of sacrificing those who may be nearly grappled with the enemy; and you must wait, however dangerous your situation,



until you have discovered some of the enemy's ships on fire.

You have then my orders to destroy the brig you command, to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy. The loss of topmast is not to prevent our boarding. You must be guarded in not suffering a boat to lay you on board; be prepared with pigs of ballast, should she attempt it, ready to throw in, which I trust will have the desired effect of sinking her. No prisoners to be taken, nor are we to suffer ourselves to be taken alive.

In the event of a gale setting in from the westward during our operation in Brest, which possibly may prevent our retreat through the Goulet, there will be a ship lying in Douarnenez Bay to give us a chance of escaping across the neck of land.

Desperate service requires desperate acts, and I trust, being driven to this resource, we should be able to make a good retreat across. The frigate to commence firing off St. Matthew's on discovering the fire in Brest. The launches of the squadron to be ready, the schooners and cutters up the Goulet. A frigate to be anchored between Camaret and Bertheaume. I have to request, when the fire may be plainly discovered, that sky rockets may be thrown up from the frigate, to point to the boats the situation of the ship. It will be necessary to have boarding nettings. A false fire or blue light set off is a signal we are coming on board the ship in Douarnenez Bay—which will be carried in Captain Brisbane's pocket. Boats to be near the shore ready to take off any who may escape from the enemy in crossing.

It is my positive order to the officers in command of the fire-ships, that they will not on any account set fire to their brigs until absolutely grappled with the enemy.

I hope every man's mind is completely made up to execute this service in a gallant manner, or fall in the attempt. You will remember it is not the wish of Admiral Cornwallis, nor the wish of our country, that any but volunteers should be sent on this service. You will therefore have time to decline going on it without any reflection on your character as a brave man; for officers and men are very apt, on the first proposal of enterprise, to volunteer their services to their country, fearing they are marked men by their captains if they do not come forward. I beg to assure them that, on this service, I shall be more obliged to them to keep back if they do not feel themselves ready and equal to execute this service at the expense of their lives.

C. BRISBANE.

No. 290

ADMIRAL YOUNG TO CORNWALLIS

[*Secret.*]

Plymouth Dock, 7th September, 1804.

Dear Sir,—I send you two letters received this morning. They will probably inform you that the vessels have gone down the river. If the easterly wind we had yesterday had lasted they would have been here in good time, but the wind having this morning changed to the westward the time of their arriving must be uncertain. However, as they have moved, I send you everything I have to send, which, to prevent suspicion, or at least surprise, I have wished to keep to the last moment. What I have will be carried by the *Happy Return*, who has orders to convey them to the *Tromp* at Falmouth, for the storekeeper at Gibraltar; but, by orders which I write myself, and which he will not open till he is at sea, he will be directed to go immediately

to you. What he carries are—two boxes, three packages sewed up in hammocks, and six sloop's top chains, all of which Brisbane will, of course, have mentioned to you. The boxes contain dark lanterns, the packages the parts of grapnels, which Brisbane should have in time to put them together. I have kept them separate that the men who made the different parts should not guess for what purposes they might be intended. You had better keep the cutter with you till the business is in some way determined, that her returning here may not discover what she has been doing. To prepare for this, the order to go to Falmouth directs him, after having done so, to cruise in the Channel.

The Rambler shall be with you as soon as possible. Her captain is nearly well.

I am, &c.,
W. YOUNG.

No. 291

*CORNWALLIS TO LORD MELVILLE*¹

Téméraire, 11th September (1804).

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 5th. I have a vessel off the Lizard, to direct the vessels mentioned in your Lordship's letter to me. I can only say that those who planned the enterprise have not at all fallen off in their zealous expectations of success—if the secret is kept. I was obliged to communicate in a distant manner that something is intended to Sir Thomas Graves, which, indeed, he must have known, as his captain is so deeply concerned. I showed, a few days [since], some instructions drawn up by Captain Brisbane² to a lieutenant of this ship, who performed

¹ From a rough draft in the Admiral's hand.

² See No. 280.

a boarding service last summer much to my satisfaction, and I intend should go in. Brisbane told me he had put everything in the worst light possible. I showed this to the lieutenant, and told him he should go in one of the vessels. He has appeared to me ever since to be very much pleased. I intend to go to the advanced ships and see them all before any attempt is made. It is a daring service, but I have always been of opinion that much might be done by surprise, and I have formerly thought that our ships, though superior to all the world at sea, were not always so secure at anchor.

No. 292

LORD MELVILLE TO CORNWALLIS

[*Secret.*]

Wimbledon, 14th September, 1804.

Dear Admiral,—I can say nothing in addition to my last letter on the subject of our secret service, beyond what you will find in the enclosed copy of a letter I this morning wrote to Admiral Young. I am not in perfect good humour on the score of the delays which have taken place, and I will take additional precautions to prevent anything of the kind happening again.

I remain, with great regard, dear Admiral,
Yours very truly,
MELVILLE.

INCLOSURE

LORD MELVILLE TO ADMIRAL YOUNG

[*Copy.*]

Admiralty, 14th September, 1804.

Dear Sir,—As I cannot cure what is past by repining at it, I shall be silent; but I am satisfied

there were unnecessary delays in more quarters than one. Otherwise the vessels from the river would have been down some days sooner, when many other vessels got down. I am really at a loss to suggest; for, as you justly observe, there will be so much light when the vessels reach Admiral Cornwallis, he will not think it expedient to make the attempt; and, if the vessels join him any considerable time before he makes the attempt, it will give rise to speculations and divulge our views. Of course I will be perfectly satisfied with what you do, but I am rather disposed to think they should not go further than the Lizard Point till you can ascertain with precision what Admiral Cornwallis's own wishes are. The steps you took in consequence of my last letter are perfectly judicious.

Let me know that you are in advance on this secret service, and, I remain, &c.,

MELVILLE.

No. 293

*CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN BRISBANE*¹

[*Confidential.*]

17th September, 1804.

Dear Brisbane,—Lord Melville, in his last letter, tells me he had mentioned the intended secret service to the sea officers at the Board, and from them he has received no encouragement to persevere. They concur in thinking the enemy must be supine beyond example, and totally negligent of the common vigilance which the commander of a fleet, &c., &c., and that it gives the most remote chance of success.

The opinion of those in office ought, undoubtedly, to have very great weight; and I would not on any

¹ From a draft in the Admiral's hand.

account have the attempt made unless you, Captains Puget and Campbell, who have so nobly offered yourselves for such desperate service, should (notwithstanding the length of time which has elapsed and all the circumstances) continue firmly of opinion as to the favourable prospect of succeeding in the enterprise. The least doubt or alteration in your opinions upon the subject would determine me not to allow you to proceed, and it would not in the smallest degree reflect upon your characters, for which, as the bravest of men, I shall ever have the highest respect; and happy should I be if at any time it should be in my power to prove it to all of you.

Vice-Admiral Young informs me that the vessels were not out of the river when he last wrote to me, and regrets having sent the *Happy Return* so soon.

I have a vessel off the *Lizard* upon the look-out. Lord Melville, of course, after the opinion of his colleagues, is rather tender upon the subject, and I imagine the delay has only been occasioned by what frequently happens upon such an outfit.

I must beg of you not to communicate the contents of this to any except Captains Puget and Campbell, and to them in the most secret manner.

I am, dear Brisbane,

Yours most sincerely,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 294

CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN INNES (RAMBLER)

By the Hon. William Cornwallis, Admiral of the White, &c.

You are hereby required and directed, in the sloop you command, to proceed off the *Lizard*—but

with the wind easterly, endeavour to fetch further to windward—for the purpose of falling in with the gun-vessels, named in the margin;¹ but the name of the latter, there is reason to believe, is changed. You are to keep those vessels with you off the Lizard until a ship of the squadron joins you, but, if that should not happen, in ten days from your arrival upon that station, you are then to proceed to Plymouth, directing the officers commanding the gun-vessels to acquaint the Admiral, or Secretary of the Admiralty, and follow such orders as they may receive accordingly.

You are to return and join me, so soon as you have delivered the gun-vessels to any ships of the squadron sent to receive them, or upon parting company with them upon their arrival in port.

Given, &c., Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 26th September, 1804.

No. 295

*CORNWALLIS TO THE LIEUTENANTS OF THE
RIFLEMAN, PELTER, BITER, THRASHER,
PHOSPHORUS*

*By the Hon. William Cornwallis, Admiral of the
White, &c.*

You are hereby required and directed, in the gun-vessel you command, to proceed with all possible expedition to the Downs, following the orders of the Right Honourable Admiral Lord Keith, K.B., for your farther proceedings.

Given, &c., Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 29th September, 1804.

¹ Phosphorus, Teazer, Waller.

No. 296

*CORNWALLIS TO LIEUTENANT HIGGINSON
(HAPPY RETURN)*

You are hereby directed, in the cutter you command, immediately to return to Plymouth, following the orders of Vice-Admiral Young, the Commander-in-Chief, and you will take charge of the dispatches herewith delivered to you.

Given, &c., Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 30th September, 1804.

No. 297

LORD MELVILLE TO CORNWALLIS

Admiralty, 10th October, 1804.

Dear Admiral,—I cannot disguise from you that I was much surprised when I heard of the return of the fire-vessels to the Downs, and I scarcely think you can have recollected the purport of my letter to you from East Cliff on the 19th August.¹ I gave no explanation to the officers sent out with those vessels that they might be changed, because it was your anxious wish that no circumstances should take place which might lead to a suspicion of the business they (the fire-vessels) were going upon. On that same ground they were not even fitted out for the purpose they were intended, but simply as gun-brigs, and all the combustibles for the fitting them out were put under the charge of Lieutenant Miln, the only person to whom the object of sending them was known, and whom I entrusted because he was one of those you named as destined to be employed in the enterprise. If it had been explained to the

¹ I have not found the letter.—J. L.

officers sent out that they could not be employed because others had previously volunteered, they could not have been hurt, but would have taken it for granted that I would not allow them to be ultimately sufferers. But, even if they had been so unreasonable as to murmur after you had explained to them the contents of my letter to you of the 19th August, it was a matter certainly not to be put in competition with the execution of so important and brilliant a service. If on any other grounds the officers who had originally volunteered had changed their minds, of that I do not complain, be their reasons for it good or bad ; but I do not think any over-delicacy to the officers who were sent out with the ships was a sufficient reason for laying aside the execution of the service.

I avoid making any observations on the other ground of postponing it, namely, the opinion of my naval colleagues not [having] been sanguine in the hopes of success. I thought it fair to you to state that circumstance to you, but there was no especial disapprobation put upon it, and I left it where all such business must ultimately be left, to their own feelings and judgment, recognised by yours. I again repeat that I don't in any degree blame or criticise any of those who volunteered, for entertaining a different sentiment from which they formerly did, or of their acting on that sentiment, but I may doubt if the reason for the alteration of sentiment was altogether satisfactory. I need not at present trouble you further upon it. I am not sure if I may not soon have occasion to correspond with you on a business having a similar object, but founded on a different principle as to its mode of execution.

I remain, dear Admiral,

Yours sincerely,

MELVILLE.

No. 298

CORNWALLIS TO LORD MELVILLE¹[*Extract.*]

16th October, 1804.

In regard to what your Lordship observes of moving officers in command to make way for volunteers. Great and important service ought to outweigh every other consideration, but there is nothing more disgusting to the service than it would have been, and the officers all declared themselves ready to go upon that or any other service. They will not reason the matter fairly, and, if they give up when going upon immediate service, they are open to the reflections of their brethren, who are not apt to spare much on such occasions.

Captain Brisbane was, I assure your Lordship, perfectly ready to the last, and took infinite pains to persuade the officers in command of those vessels to make way for those who had volunteered long before.

The particular service had unavoidably been delayed considerably beyond the time, and Captain Puget had observed that the enemy had changed their position as well as some gun-vessels. The unfavourable opinion of the sea officers of the Board did also a little damp the ardour of some.

I shall be most ready and happy in receiving, and putting into execution, your Lordship's commands upon any intended service.

¹ From a rough draft in the Admiral's own hand.

No. 299

CAPTAIN PUGET TO LIEUTENANT USSHER¹

Foudroyant, Cawsand Bay, 3rd November, 1804.

My dear Sir,—I beg leave to add my testimony to the many already in your possession of your services; and how much I felt obliged for the readiness with which you came forward when I suggested to you the plan for destroying the enemy's fleet in Brest by fire-vessels. Had that plan been put into execution you were to have followed in the next brig to me, and as I should have led in I felt assured of extensive success with such support.

I have likewise to acknowledge the assistance I received from you in reconnoitring the enemy's fleet during the time that plan was in contemplation;² and nothing I assure you would afford me

¹ This letter and the two next following are reprinted from Marshall's *Royal Naval Biography*.

² The following is the special service by Ussher to which Captain Puget refers. During a frosty night, apparently in the spring of 1804, Ussher entered Brest harbour in a four-oared gig, rowed along the French line, and obtained exact information as to the enemy's strength. He was not discovered until he arrived abreast of the flag-ship, when three boats were dispatched in pursuit of him. He cleared the Goulet, but the boats of eleven gun-brigs, lying in Camaret Bay, which he had surveyed, joined in the chase. Ussher was closely pressed, but managed to effect his escape. Lieutenant (afterwards Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas) Ussher entered the navy in May 1791, and was present in the action of June 1, 1794, and at the reduction of St. Lucia in 1796. He is said to have been engaged in upwards of twenty boat actions while in the Pelican, and was severely wounded on April 5, 1798, in an attempt to cut out a vessel near Guantanamo. In the blockade of 1803-5, in the Joseph cutter and Colpoys schooner, he rivalled his earlier service in daring boat actions, which confirmed his repute as a most courageous and enterprising officer. He was promoted to commander, and continued to distinguish himself in the same kind of service. On May 7, 1808, near Cape Trafalgar,

more heartfelt gratification than hearing of your promotion, on which I hope very shortly to congratulate you. I have taken the liberty of writing to Lord Melville on this subject.

Believe me to be, my dear Sir,

Your sincere friend,

PETER PUGET.

No. 300

CAPTAIN PUGET TO LORD MELVILLE

(November 1804.)

My Lord,—As the plan for destroying the enemy's fleet in Brest appears for the present abandoned, I think it my duty to state to your Lordship the readiness with which the following officers volunteered their services on that occasion—Lieutenants Gravès, Ussher, Miln, and Mends; and though their expectations were a little damped from the circumstance of my being deprived of the principal command, yet even holding a secondary situation, these officers did not shrink from their original offer, but came forward still under my auspices to execute that service.

The unwearied diligence they bestowed in every stage of the undertaking, and their anxiety to execute it with honour and credit to themselves,

he fell in with seven armed vessels, convoying twelve coasters, of which eight were captured and eight sunk. For this gallant action he was promoted to post rank, and commanded the *Leyden* and *Hyacinth*, performing a notable service at Malaga, where he brought out two of the largest privateers, though with great loss. He was appointed to the *Euryalus*, and afterwards, in April 1814, to the *Undaunted* during the blockade of Toulon, and on April 28, when Napoleon abdicated, received him on board, and conveyed him to Porto Ferrajo. He afterwards wrote a *Narrative of Events*. He was promoted to flag rank in 1846, and died January 6, 1848.

deserve every recommendation I can give them, not exactly on that account, but for the secrecy they observed. I feel fully convinced, had it been our good fortune to have concluded that enterprise, these officers would have merited your Lordship's countenance and protection ; as it is I think it but common justice to mention their spirit and alacrity.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

PETER PUGET.

No. 301

LORD MELVILLE TO CAPTAIN PUGET

Admiralty, 26th November, 1804.

Sir,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, and I have much satisfaction in observing the favourable testimony you bear to the zeal of Lieutenants Graves, Ussher, Miln, and Mends, in their voluntary offer to accompany you in a particular service, and to their diligence and discretion during the whole period that the execution of the project was in contemplation.

For the zeal which you yourself manifested in suggesting this project, and the ability with which you appear to have digested and detailed the means of carrying it into effect, you are fully entitled to, and have, my entire approbation.

I am, &c.,

MELVILLE.

[Captain Puget afterwards presented a memorial to the Admiralty, from which it appears that the original intention was to place twelve fire-brigs at his disposal ; but that their Lordships were of opinion that Captain Charles Brisbane should conduct the contemplated enterprise.]

[With the following letter the chronological series of documents is resumed.]

No. 302

CAPTAIN WOLFE TO SIR R. CALDER

Aigle, 16th July, 1804

Sir,—After passing the squadron on the 9th instant, when at the anchorage No. 5, was driven to the S.W. by the gale; on the 10th we lost sight of the Hawk. On the 12th, when standing in for Cordouan, in beating up for the rendezvous, saw a large brig and ship with all sail set, steering to the southward. I supposed them to be part of the squadron from Rochefort. At 5 P.M. closed with them, they never altering their course from our first seeing them. Prepared, and, expecting from their manœuvres and signals a close action, they having shortened sail (with men at their quarters) when within proper distance; but to our great surprise, after firing their starboard broadside at us, they ran the ships on the strand within a stone's cast of each other and directly took to their boats, which instantly swamped on touching the beach, about ten leagues to the south of Cordouan, and some of them were drowned. The wind being at N.E. and about two points off the land, I had great hopes of getting one or both of them afloat again, and anchored the Aigle about a mile from the beach; but after a night and part of the next day in fruitless efforts, from the very great surf set in by the late western gale, I was obliged to destroy them by fire, which was effectually done by Mr. Furlonger, master, and Mr. Steel, the gunner, as scarcely any part was perceptible when the Aigle made sail.

The prisoners on board the Aigle are John

II.

D

Sanson, lieutenant de vaisseau, the officers, and eight soldiers and sailors of the French national ship the Charente, of four hundred and twenty tons, twenty guns, six-pounders, four swivels, and one hundred and four men; Benjamin Godobert, lieutenant de vaisseau, his officers, and nine soldiers and sailors of the French national brig La Joie, two hundred and fifty tons, pierced for fourteen, but only eight twelve-pounders mounted, two swivels, and seventy-five men. La Joie had sixteen six-pounders, a quantity of arms, powder, shot, and other ordnance stores in the hold. They were from Rochefort, but had sailed in the morning from the Gironde, stealing alongshore for Bayonne, and intended to return from thence with stores for the French marine at Rochefort, which I am proud in having prevented, and trust in meeting your approbation. None of their shots struck us, nor did ours materially injure them, as only their masts and sails were a little torn. Had they come alongside, as expected, the brig having shifted her guns for the purpose, I am certain the crew of the Aigle would have acquitted themselves as Englishmen do on those occasions.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GEORGE WOLFE.

No. 303

COCHRANE TO DON FRANCISCO OCTARANEO

Northumberland, off Ferrol, 19th July, 1804.

Sir,—I think it proper to acquaint your Excellency that the French Government have lately sent parties of soldiers across Spain from Malaga in order to reinforce their squadron lying at the port of Ferrol, and that they are now sending detachments

of seamen, from ten to fifteen in each party, along the coast from Rochefort and Bayonne for the same purpose. One division is already arrived at Ferrol, and another was at Santander on the 12th current. As the countenancing such proceedings in a neutral country is directly contrary to the established law of nations, I hope I have only to make it known to your Excellency, and induce you to give orders to stop those parties of men from proceeding to Ferrol through the province, and in your Excellency's government, and that you will be pleased to signify this requisition of mine to the governors of the provinces between this and the frontiers of France, that due measures may be taken to prevent so direct a breach of neutrality. I have also to beg that your Excellency will be pleased to lay this request of mine before his Catholic Majesty's Ministers at Madrid.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

A. COCHRANE.

No. 304

DON FRANCISCO OCTARANE TO COCHRANE

[*Official translation.*]

Corunna, 21st July, 1804.

Sir,—I have received your letter of the 19th inst. relative to the intelligence which you have received respecting the detachments of certain numbers of soldiers and sailors being sent from France to join the French squadron at Ferrol.

As I have but very recently taken on me the command of Captain-General, I can only at present say to your Excellency that I will take precautions necessary in such cases, whenever they may happen, and act according to the laws of neutrality, which it is my wish to observe, and which are expressly recommended to me by Royal Orders to that

effect; and by this post I have communicated to his Catholic Majesty's Ministers the contents of your letter as you desire.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
FRANCISCO OCTARANEO.

No. 305

*SIR THOMAS GRAVES TO SIR CHARLES
COTTON*

[*Extract.*] Foudroyant, at anchor off Brest, 21st July, 1804.

There appears every reason to believe that nine sail of the line have an intention to put to sea shortly. The wind blowing strong last evening, though not to the eastward of north, induced me to resume my anchorage here, as it might have afforded them a fair chance of getting out, it being my firm opinion they will make the attempt the first opportunity.

Lieutenant McKenzie, of the Joseph cutter, says the frigates in Brest have moved further to the northward, which I conceive to be with an intention to avail themselves of a wind from that quarter to put to sea.

[Sir Thomas Graves reported on the 24th that five sail of French ships had stood out as far as St. Matthew's Point, but had returned to their anchorage.]

No. 306

COCHRANE TO CORNWALLIS

[*Extract.*] Northumberland, Ares Bay, 25th July, 1804.

I have to observe that since the capture of the French vessels with money trade has been

carried on in Spanish bottoms ; should any of them be met with, and cannot show a regular clearance from the Spanish custom house for the money, and that it has paid the export duty to the King, it will be a fair prize. A great deal of this trade is carried on between the ports of Spain and France.

INCLOSURE

Extract from a Letter from Mr. O'Brien, British Vice-Consul at Santander, dated 12th July, 1804.

I am just informed by Mr. John Croker, late master of the homeward-bound Jamaica ship Recovery, who lives in a house much frequented by the officers of French privateers, that last evening he overheard them say that the Rochefort squadron—composed of six to seven sail of the line, and some frigates—should soon put to sea to cover the departure of their ships at Ferrol, and that to complete the manning of these, six to seven hundred men were sent through different directions, and of whom a band from twelve to fifteen have slept in this town last night, and have proceeded this morning for their destination. Mr. Croker had absolutely seen the men I allude to. I therefore, in acquiescence to your desire, give you the earliest information of the report, which I believe is perfectly consistent, and so much so, that on combining of circumstances, the probability scarce admits doubt as to the intent, but I should also presume that the Rochefort ships will not stir till advice is given that the Ferrol ships be in perfect readiness.

[On July 26th Cochrane reported that he did not think the French ships at Ferrol could be ready for two months if they were to take their turn with the Spaniards for docking.]

No. 307


LORD MELVILLE TO CORNWALLIS

[*Private.*]

Wimbledon, 29th July, 1804.

Dear Admiral,—You will, of course, feel that in common with the other members of the Board of Admiralty, I participated in the satisfaction of receiving your letter of the 26th, expressive of your readiness to return, at any moment, and on board any ship they might choose, to your command. I cannot help troubling you with a few private words on the subject. I should be, indeed, of all men the most unreasonable if I was even to entertain, far less express, a wish for your return one moment sooner than suits your own convenience. All, therefore, I can permit myself to say upon the subject is that, as you must have a daily correspondence with your fleet, and are best acquainted with the character and efficiency of those you have left behind you, so by those considerations I am certain your conduct will be regulated. As I have the highest respect for the professional talents of those on whom the command has devolved, I must be at ease on that score ; but, on the other hand, you must be aware that, without depreciating the merits of any other officer, you possess the confidence of the country in the important trust which is now placed in your hands, and I am perfectly certain you will not be absent from the discharge of that trust at any moment you think it essential to the public service that you should be there. You have given too many eminent proofs of that feeling to leave a doubt of it in the mind of any person.

I have a great desire to hold a conversation with you before you return to your command, and it will be no inconvenience to me to run down to you at



any time you let me know it would most suit your convenience.

I am not unmindful of your wishes respecting Captain Gosselin. I have reserved, in my own mind, the *Latona* for him, and the moment she comes forward, which will be soon, he shall be appointed to her.

I remain, dear Admiral,
Yours very faithfully,
MELVILLE.

No. 308

CAPTAIN NEVE TO SIR C. COTTON

Hazard, off Lorient, 29th July, 1804.

Sir,—I have the honour to inform you that his Majesty's sloop under my command chased a sloop between Lorient and Quiberon this day, who took shelter within the small island of Tiviec, close to the shore, on which I dispatched Lieutenant Geo. Walker with the cutter, who very gallantly brought her out without any loss, although exposed to a heavy fire of musketry from the shore. She proves to be *La Colombe*, laden with wheat for the victualling office at Lorient.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
R. S. NEVE.

No. 309

SIR R. CALDER TO SIR C. COTTON

[*Extract.*] Prince of Wales, off Rochefort, 4th August, 1804.

Yesterday the wind being favourable, I sent the *Boadicea* into the Pertuis d'Antioche, to reconnoitre the enemy, under the protection of the *Hero* and *Repulse*, and to ascertain their force, as I

had learned from a neutral it was increased. Of this I had in my last dispatches the honour to inform you. Captain Maitland reports the enemy's force now at Rochefort, to be six sail of the line (two of which are three-deckers), four frigates, one corvette, one brig, and a number of large armed transports. The weather lately having been bad, with a strong westerly wind and a heavy sea, I have been obliged to keep the squadron in the offing, and purposely out of sight of their signal ports. This induced (three days since) four sail of the line and two frigates of the enemy to come out a small distance to sea, but upon the *Boadicea's* making the signal to me of their having so done, they tacked, making all sail back, and I am sorry to say they arrived safe at their anchorage before the headmost of this squadron could close with them. I am led to think it will be advisable to reinforce this squadron with another ship of the line, and it will be absolutely necessary for me to have two frigates, a sloop, and a cutter or schooner to watch the enemy at this port properly. I should hope the *Goliath* is out, and on her way to rejoin me with bullocks and vegetables. I conclude the *Hawk* will also soon rejoin me.

[At this time (August 7th) Vice-Admiral Martin, naval prefect at Rochefort, reported to the Minister of Marine that sickness at the port was increasing to an alarming and dangerous degree. The hospitals were crowded, and in the naval hospital were 1,300 men. The 3rd Artillery had 129 sick and 66 incapacitated out of 532, and the 1st battalion of the Piedmontese Legion 262 sick out of 584, while of conscript artisans, 152 were available and 228 sick.—*Arch. de la Marine*, BB⁷, 232, f. 180.]

No. 310

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Glory, Spithead, 8th August, 1804.

Sir,—Admiral Montagu having communicated to me the intelligence sent by the telegraph yesterday evening, I immediately came on board and am proceeding to sea accordingly.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 311

SIR R. CALDER TO SIR C. COTTON

Prince of Wales, off Rochefort, 10th August, 1804.

Sir,—His Majesty's ship *Phoenix* joined me early this morning, bringing your dispatches dated the 2nd, 3rd, and 7th instant, with the different accounts of the enemy's force and movements at Brest. I shall be prepared to counteract their plans as far as my force will permit me to do ; but, in order to effect which with security to myself, it will be absolutely necessary for me to keep the squadron under my orders further out in the offing than I otherwise could wish to do for the watching the enemy here, otherwise I might be caught between this squadron from Brest and that at Rochefort ; when, if the wind should be to the westward, it would be impossible for me to get out clear of the land. I shall therefore keep this squadron for the present plying between Baleines Lighthouse and the Isle Dieu. I must beg leave to repeat that it is now become absolutely necessary to have one or two line-of-battle ships added to this squadron, with two frigates and a cutter, besides the *Hawk*, who I should hope

to be on her passage to rejoin me. The enemy's force now at Rochefort being increased to six sail of the line, five frigates, two corvettes, &c., &c. Four of their line-of-battle ships here, and two frigates, came out to sea about four leagues—as I had the honour to inform you in my last. This appears to be the same day those at Brest attempted to come out, from which it evidently appears, these two squadrons are meant to act together, and if possible to sail at the same time the winds here and at Brest answer for their so doing. I hope to have some ship here in her way to Ferrol to give us some water, at we are beginning to be low. I have directed Captain Baker to proceed to Ferrol, agreeable to your orders.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ROBT. CALDER.

No. 312

CAPTAIN INNES TO SIR C. COTTON¹

Rambler, at Sea, 16th August, 1804.

Sir,—I have the honour to acquaint you that, being between the Isle Dieu and the Main, on the morning of the 7th instant, I observed nine sail of sloops and *chasse-marées* close inshore, steering to the southward and eastward. About nine it fell calm; I then sent the boats, under the command of Lieutenant Foreman and Mr. Cox, master's mate, to take possession of them, but, favoured by a light air, they came to an anchor under the battery of St. Gilles, and within musket-shot of the shore; notwithstanding which, two of the sloops were got off with great gallantry, under a smart fire from

¹ Covering letter to the Admiralty, dated on board the San Josef off Ushant on the same day.

field-pieces and musketry; the others cut their cables, and ran aground so near to the pier head it was impossible to get them off.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

THOMAS INNES.

No. 313

*CAPTAIN MAITLAND TO LORD GARDNER*¹

Loire, at Sea, 18th August, 1804.

My Lord,—I have much satisfaction in announcing to you the capture (by his Majesty's ship Loire) of a frigate privateer, belonging to Bordeaux, mounting thirty nine-pounders, with two hundred and forty men, which I had the good fortune to fall in with in lat. $49^{\circ} 30'$, long. $12^{\circ} 20'$, on the 17th instant; she has been a wonderful annoyance to the British trade during the present war, and is the ship Captain Gordon so gallantly contested with, until the Wolverine was in the act of sinking.² She held the Loire a chase of twenty hours, the last quarter of an hour being a running action. From our situation, together with the darkness of the night, few of our guns took effect upon her till latterly. Seven of her men were badly wounded, two of which are since dead. Six of the Loire's men were wounded, two only severely, and, I am

¹ Covering letter to the Admiralty, dated at Cork, 22nd August, 1804.

² The Wolverine, 13, in charge of a convoy, had engaged the Blonde, 30, on 24th March. Owing to one of her 18-pounder guns jamming, and her ports being near to the water-line, she was obliged to engage to leeward. The action continued for fifty minutes at fifty yards' range, when the Wolverine, severely damaged, and having five killed and ten wounded, hauled down her colours. She sank shortly afterwards.

happy to add, are in a fair way of recovery. I have every reason to be pleased with the conduct of the officers and ship's company I have the honour to command, during the short time the action lasted ; and feel satisfied that had she been a frigate of equal force to the Loire, they would have lost none of the credit they so deservedly obtained on a former occasion.

The Blonde had been out twenty days from Pasages in Spain, without having made any capture. She is a very fine ship, sails remarkably fast, and appears to me very well calculated for his Majesty's service. Inclosed is a list of the wounded on board the Loire.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
F. L. MAITLAND.

No. 314

SIR C. COTTON TO MR. MARSDEN

San Josef, off Ushant, 19th August, 1804.

Sir,—You will please to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I have detached the ships named in the margin,¹ to reinforce Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, not deeming it advisable to be deferred till a ship arrived from England. The advanced squadron under the orders of Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Graves is now reduced to six sail of the line and three frigates, having appointed the Montagu to take the station of the Majestic between the squadrons,

I have the honour to be, &c.,
CHARLES COTTON.

¹ Warrior, Acasta.

No. 315

COCHRANE TO MR. MARSDEN

Northumberland, off Ferrol, 19th August, 1804.

Sir,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st inst., by H.M.S. Phoenix, conveying to me the approval of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty of my having paid the bounty to the Dutch seamen, and directing the same to be done to such able-bodied French seamen as might enter.

I have every reason to think, when this information reaches those now on board the squadron at Ferrol, a good many will be induced to come off to the ships under my orders, and I expect that a number of the Dutch seamen will join as soon as they receive their pay, which they expect to do in a few days. We have already got some good men, and many others have sent messages that they intend to follow.

The French ships are much as formerly. Until the Spanish line-of-battle ships now in dock are repaired, the Redoutable and Duguay-Trouin cannot be taken. As they continue to receive supplies of men by land from France, I conceived it my duty to write once more to the Captain-General of this Province.

I am, &c.,

A. COCHRANE.

No. 316

STATEMENT OF THE SPANISH NAVY AT
FERROL, 22nd AUGUST, 1804

Two of seventy-four guns in the dry dock, and for want of planks supposed will not be ready to come out these six weeks.

Four of seventy-four guns rigged, with yards and topmasts struck, and in good order for sea at short notice. Three three-deckers, and four frigates in ordinary and without masts.

Two of sixty-four guns with few mounted, loaded with timber and ready to sail for Cadiz. This makes three of that class which have loaded the same within these six weeks, and there is as much more timber found, which had been buried for many years, as will load three or four ships more; besides their daily progress in still recovering more—all oak timber and in good condition. Several packets rigged and ready for sea, one of which sailed from this, a little while ago, to Corunna, and sailed from that the 18th inst. for Buenos Ayres. I observed her take in several pieces of heavy ordnance, mortars, howitzers, &c. Two sail of the line building and some gun-brigs. They have also a number of gun-boats for twenty-four pounders long guns. But their exact number I have not yet ascertained.

A. HODGE,

Lieutenant of the Northumberland.

No. 317

CAPTAIN ALDHAM TO COCHRANE

Nautilus, at Sea, 23rd August, 1804.

Sir,—I have the honour to acquaint you that his Majesty's sloop under my command on the 9th inst., twenty leagues to the north of Santander, fell in with and after a short chase recaptured the William Heathcotte from Demerara to Liverpool, a fine frigate-built ship of five hundred tons burden, laden with cotton and sugar, and mounting twenty-four nine-pounders on her main-deck. The William Heathcotte was captured on the 4th inst. by the

French privateer, *Le Général Augereau*, of twelve guns and ninety-two men, on the day following her parting company from the homeward-bound convoy, within sight of the high land of Dungarvan, after an obstinate conflict, in which the captain, his son, one passenger, and one seaman were killed; the mate, another passenger, and seven seamen badly wounded. The prize master acknowledges *Le Général Augereau* suffered considerably in her hull, and had three killed and the captain and five men wounded, but from other authority I am informed their loss is much greater. Unwilling to lose a prize so valuable and so dearly acquired, the privateer kept hovering near her during the chase apparently ready for a run, which she effected by crowding all sail the moment we fired at the ship, and I have to regret that it was impossible for me to prevent the escape of that notorious marauder.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

G. ALDHAM.

No. 318

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Glory, off Ushant, 23rd August, 1804.

Sir,—I request you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I have this morning joined the squadron off Brest. I found the *Ambrosia* and *Amphitrite*, victuallers, with the squadron, and have ordered them to be immediately cleared and sent in. I inclose a letter Sir Charles Cotton had just received from Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Graves and one from Captain Prowse, of the *Sirius*.¹

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

¹ Captain Prowse's intelligence is recited in the inclosure.

INCLOSURE

SIR T. GRAVES TO SIR C. COTTON

Foudroyant, off Brest, 22nd August, 1804.

Sir,—I have the honour to inclose you a letter I have just received from Captain Prowse by the Mary cutter, whose lieutenant informs me that at seven o'clock yesterday morning he perceived four ships, apparently frigates, getting under way in Brest, who anchored in Bertheaume road in the afternoon about three o'clock. At half-past six the same morning four deserters from the 1st Regiment French Marine Artillery got on board her from Brest, two of whom I have now the honour to send to you. Captain Prowse has detained one, and I have kept another in the hopes of being able to turn his services to some useful purpose. I shall get close in the moment the weather permits, and keep a strict watch on their movements.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

THOS. GRAVES.

No. 319

INDORSED 'ABSTRACT OF SECRET ORDERS,
DATED THE 24th AUGUST,' [1804].¹

Enemy supposed about to take advantage of some favourable opportunity, &c. If sail without considerable number of forces, probably meant to cover a descent on the coast of England.

Watch motions of the enemy closely to collect intelligence to ascertain their real object in order to frustrate, and they probably attempt to mislead us.

¹ From rough memoranda in Cornwallis's hand. Cf. the orders to Calder, Cochrane, and Captain Rathborne, Nos. 325 and 328, and Napoleon's orders to Decrès and Ganteaume, Nos. 326, 329 and 330.

If, by stress of weather, or other cause, they escape—must act according to the best of judgment. If intelligence should lead to belief their course is for England or Ireland, go off the Lizard until you can learn if they have passed up Channel. If not, proceed off Cape Clear or other post according to information. If you cannot discover their route, continue upon your rendezvous, or return off Brest. Employ small vessels, &c., to look out. If a part only sail, with a considerable body of troops, then Ireland probably the object: detach an adequate part instead of going with the whole. If they proceed out in detachments, without any considerable body of troops, to the southward—may have some other destination than [England] or Ireland—Mediterranean; if five or six of the line full of troops, probably Leeward Islands. Send a detachment, who are to endeavour to discover their destination and pursue; but if they cannot, they are to return to their station. If with whole, or part, object may be blockading squadrons. Calder and Cochrane to form a junction, N. part of coast of Spain or elsewhere, to inform them of the fleet or squadron having left port; not to quit their station but from appearance of superior force or stress of weather; to form a junction, if the enemy continue in those parts, then return. Inform Admiral and Lord Gardner.

Watch Passage du Raz; the frigates and sloops or cutters to the southward. Blow strongly from west, &c. Lastly [incomplete].

Two frigates and two sloops or cutters to the southward of the Passage du Raz, close to it, with instructions to commanders to give earliest intelligence to me, to Vice-Admiral Calder and Rear-Admiral Cochrane in case of the enemy's passing that way; a small vessel or two to be kept well up between Toulinguet Pass and Passage du Raz.

If it should blow hard from westward : reduced to topsail, not to risk damaging the ships by contending, &c., but bear up—advanced squadron also, should the gale increase so as to make it necessary. Frigates and small vessels to resort to most western anchorages. The whole to return to their stations the moment the weather becomes favourable for that purpose.

To keep the squadron victualled to five months and stored the same : to send them in succession to Cawsand Bay for that purpose, and to inform Vice-Admiral Young at Plymouth of such supplies as you may require, from time to time, that he may give directions to the agents for victualling. These to send them to you when the weather is favourable for receiving supplies at sea. If anything should occur to which these are not applicable, to act at discretion, informing the Commander-in-Chief for the information of their Lordships.

No. 320

GANTEAUME TO NAPOLEON¹

Brest, 9 fructidor an XII [27th August, 1804].

Je viens d'adresser au ministre de la marine l'état général de la situation de tous les vaisseaux, duquel il résulte que, pour compléter les 20 qui sont sur la rade, les 4 frégates et la corvette, il nous faudrait seulement 573 hommes. Mais le Patriote, qui, réparé à neuf, va devenir un de nos meilleurs vaisseaux, n'a pas un seul homme ; son équipage est à faire en totalité. Ce vaisseau est prêt à sortir du port et j'ai demandé qu'il fût mis en rade sans délai ; il y sera demain. Je me propose, pour lui faire un

¹ *Arch. Nat. A.F. iv. 1195, 2nd Dossier, No. 4.* Napoleon's reply to this will be found in No. 330, p. 59.

fond d'équipage, de lui donner quelques matelots que je retirerai des autres vaisseaux, et qu'il nous faudra nécessairement remplacer par d'autres hommes. Pour pouvoir mettre ce vaisseau en état d'agir avec les autres il nous faudra donc environ 700 hommes, qui, réunis aux 573 qui manquent, forment un total de 1,273 hommes.

No. 321

CAPTAIN NEVE TO CORNWALLIS

[*Intelligence.*]

On Saturday evening, August the 18th, stood close in to Lorient; observed a French frigate with a commodore's broad pennant flying, with topgallant yards across, all ready for sea, in the harbour, under Port Louis fort, a ship corvette, all ready, a ketch, and two schooners, all ready. On Sunday morning the whole were gone and nothing left in the harbour but the Portuguese frigate. I expect the above squadron sailed with an intention of cutting off the Hazard, as the wind was to the N.W. They probably went through the Teignouse Passage, between Houat Island and Quiberon, and probably now are either in the Morbihan, Croisic, or Nantes; had they proceeded to the S.W. the Hazard must have seen them.

R. S. NEVE.

No. 322

COCHRANE TO MR. MARSDEN

Northumberland, off Ferrol Harbour, 27th August, 1804.

Sir,—Last night I expected that the *Héros* and *Argonaute* were to put to sea: by the information I received they are either prepared to make the attempt or they expect a squadron to appear off this port which they intend to join. For two days

neither officer nor man has been on shore—a circumstance most unusual with them, as all the officers except one used to reside on shore. Yesterday morning two launches full of men were sent on board them from the other ships to complete their complements. They are both very deep, and from every account I can collect they are bound to the East Indies.

Their Lordships may rest assured that every look-out will be kept—and should they venture out I hope in my next letter to be able to give a good account of them.

This letter goes by the Comet, extra India ship, carried in here and sold by the French without condemnation. She has been purchased by an American—now detained by the squadron as a recapture.

I am, &c.,
A. COCHRANE.

No. 323

CAPTAIN HURD TO CORNWALLIS

Santa Margarita, 1st September, 1804.

Sir,—I had the honour of receiving your letter in answer to one I addressed to Sir Charles Cotton requesting a passage into port, in doing which I had no other intention but that of forwarding the business I have been sent here to perform, and to supply myself with some instruments necessary for my purpose. Never having been upon this part of the French coast, I knew not exactly the nature of the service I was to execute, nor of the means it might be necessary to use on the occasion; under these circumstances I wished to return that I might supply myself with such things as are wanting, as well as have an opportunity of laying down correctly on paper the work I have already done.

As I cannot have free access to the shore all my operations are necessarily confined to boat work, which makes this survey the more difficult, and more than half my time is taken up in going from and returning to the ship to which I am attached—and will make it, I am afraid, a work of time.

The boats I have been hitherto furnished with being six-oared cutters are not equal to the necessary purposes of my work, as they do not afford room enough for myself and instruments, besides my having occasion for the men constantly at the lead, while the others are occupied at their oars.

I should therefore wish to be furnished with a proper boat for my own particular use, and that I may be at liberty occasionally to take one of the cutters or schooners to attend me in my distant work. As the ships keep the sea in westerly winds, where I can be of no service in the business entrusted to me, I shall wait your pleasure with respect to my return into port during their continuance.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
THOMAS HURD.¹

No. 324

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Glory, off Ushant, 2nd September, 1804.

Sir,—I had the honour of receiving yesterday in the evening, by the Nile lugger, the orders and instructions from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 24th ultimo.

I request you will be pleased to acquaint their Lordships that I shall pay the utmost attention

¹ Captain Hurd was employed in surveying the approaches to Brest, as well as Douarnenez Bay. His report thereon and his suggestions concerning the system of blockade will be found in the inclosure with No. 370.

thereto. I beg to state that the squadron is very deficient in frigates, sloops, and small vessels to execute the service of watching the enemy and guarding the coast. Their Lordships will see by the disposition that there is only one frigate in port, one frigate was added to Sir Robert Calder's detached squadron during my absence. The enemy are very strong in frigates at Rochefort. The *Phoenix* was sent with letters, off that port and Ferrol, to return, which has prevented that frigate being stationed upon the coast. I have, as will be seen, placed a frigate, brig, and cutter off Abrevrac'h, where two of the enemy's armed brigs were chased by the *Doris*—the *Passage du Four* requires to be well watched. I have had a frigate, sloop, and schooner off Santander—that part of the coast in the bay being much used by the enemy's privateers, where they have been in the habit of carrying any prizes they may happen to take. But the *Indefatigable*, *Nautilus*, and *Felix* are gone into port after a long cruise, and I have none to replace them with.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 325

*CORNWALLIS TO SIR R. CALDER, OFF ROCHE-
FORT, AND REAR-ADMIRAL COCHRANE, OFF
FERROL, SEVERALLY*

[*Secret.*]

*By the Hon. William Cornwallis, Admiral of the
White, &c.*

You are hereby required and directed to pay the strictest attention and obedience to the following instructions :—

From intelligence received, as well as appearances, it is probable some movement of the enemy's naval and military force may shortly take place from the port of Brest; and there being no possibility of ascertaining their destination—if a squadron only, it may be the Mediterranean, the Leeward Islands, or to endeavour to join the ships at Rochefort or Ferrol, and attack our blockading squadrons; I have therefore thought it proper to establish a rendezvous for the junction of the squadron acting under your direction and that with Rear-Admiral Cochrane [Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder] off Cape Machichaco. But with an easterly wind it will always be in the power of the squadron off Rochefort to proceed further on to join that at Ferrol. Should it from any sudden or unexpected event be thought necessary, every attention will be paid to give the earliest intelligence to the commanders of those squadrons, should the enemy escape without the squadron immediately off Brest being able to get at them.

Those officers are, however, to observe that they are not to quit their stations off Rochefort or Ferrol, unless they should be obliged to do so from the appearance of a superior hostile force, or from stress of weather. In the former case the officer so obliged to quit his station will proceed to the rendezvous to form a junction with the other, or any detachment I may send to reinforce those squadrons. Should the squadrons of the enemy remain in those ports, notwithstanding the blockade should have been raised by the sailing of any other force of the enemy, the squadron under my command intrusted to your care, as well as that in charge of Rear-Admiral Cochrane [Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder] is to return, and vigilantly watch the enemy's motions in those harbours in the same

manner as they were doing before the blockade was raised.

Given, &c., Glory, off Ushant, 3rd September, 1804.

No. 326

*NAPOLÉON TO DECRÈS*¹

Aix-la-Chapelle, 16 fructidor an XII [3rd September 1804].

Donnez l'ordre au vice-amiral Villeneuve de se rendre à Paris, ainsi qu'au contre-amiral Missiessy. A leur arrivée, vous leur ferez part de leur mission respective, l'un de Toulon l'autre de Rochefort. Il faudra aussi causer avec Villeneuve sur le grand projet auquel est destinée son escadre.

NAPOLÉON.

[Latouche-Tréville had died on board the Bucentaure at Toulon on August 19th,² and, after some deliberation as to the respective merits of Bruix, then commanding the invasion flotilla, who was in ill-health, of Rosily, and of Villeneuve, who was commanding at Rochefort, the last named was appointed to the Toulon command between August 28th and the date of the above letter, Missiessy succeeding him at Rochefort. Villeneuve's appointment had not satisfied Napoleon, and in October 1805, when the combined squadron was at Cadiz, Rosily was ordered to replace him, but owing to a coach accident arrived at the port too late, Villeneuve having hastened to sea to meet the fleet of Nelson.³]

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (ix.) No. 7982.

² Napoleon's instructions to Latouche-Tréville are given in vol. i. (No. 274).

³ 'Ma foy, mon cher Ministre, M. le Vice-Amiral de Villeneuve a pris les devants, et M. le Vice-Amiral Rosily trouvera aujourd'huy les oiseaux dénichés.'—General Beurnonville in Madrid to the Minister of Marine, October 23, 1805.

No. 327

COCHRANE TO CORNWALLIS

[*Information.*]

3rd September, 1804.

An insurrection has taken place in the province of Biscay, and the inhabitants have had recourse to arms. The letters by yesterday's mail mentioned that as many as eight thousand were encamped. All suspected persons who were supposed to be in the interest of the Crown have been arrested by the insurgents. Deputations have been passed between the Biscayans, Guipuscoans, Alvarez, and Navarrians. The insurrection has originated on a demand made from the Crown of enrolling of Militia. It was peremptorily refused. There are several thousand troops ordered to march to the frontiers of the provinces in insurrection, but it is not yet known what the ulterior result of the commotion may be, as there seems to pervade a general dissatisfaction. Should the case be so far connected as reports affirm, the insurrection of Biscay may lead to a general rise of the other provinces. The Navarrians have sent some hundreds of armed men to the support of the Biscayans. It is mentioned from Corunna that a considerable force is to be drafted from the regiments there in garrison; also several field pieces, and the letters from Madrid state that troops are marching from the interior of the country, all directed against the insurgents, and from the character of the Biscayans and Navarrians it may be presumed they will not be easily reduced. The junction of the four confederate provinces is susceptible of opposing the whole force of the Crown, especially as their frontiers form a chain of very high grounds on one side, and have France on the other.

No. 328

CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN RATHBORNE
(SANTA MARGARITA)

*By the Hon. William Cornwallis, Admiral of the
White, &c.*

You are hereby required and directed, in the ship you command, to proceed without a moment's loss of time, and cruise close in to the southward of the Passage du Raz, taking the Mary cutter with you, and it is intended that two frigates and two sloops or smaller vessels shall be stationed there, most diligently to watch that passage; and, if a squadron of the enemy should be seen to pass that way, you are to endeavour to discover their route, giving me immediate notice of their having passed, and sending with all expedition to Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, off Rochefort, and Rear-Admiral Cochrane, off Ferrol, acquainting them of a squadron of the enemy having passed that passage, and their force, if possible, as well as the course they may be steering. But you are not to wait until you can make such discovery, but send off immediately, as before directed. Should you, by following them at a distance in the ship you command, be able to observe to a certainty their destination, you are then to push on before them, and give notice to those commanding upon the station where they are bound. But you are to observe, if it should be a strong squadron with troops on board, intended for a descent upon Ireland or Great Britain, they are very likely to sail to the westward first, and may afterwards take a favourable opportunity of altering their course for Ireland or the Channel, and therefore you must be

upon your guard not to determine too soon the destination of such squadron.

Should you fall in with the *Aigle*, who is now stationed off the Penmarcks, you are to make known to her captain that he is immediately to join me.

Given, &c., Glory, off Ushant, 4th September, 1804.

No. 329

*NAPOLÉON TO DECRÈS*¹

Aix-la-Chapelle, 19 fructidor an XII [6th September 1804].

Monsieur Decrès, Ministre de la marine, je désire que vous me fassiez deux rapports : le premier, sur la colonie de Surinam etc., le second, sur l'expédition d'Irlande. Il me paraît que l'escadre de Brest est enfin dans la position de faire quelque chose. Nous avons 21 vaisseaux armés, des frégates et quelques flûtes : 16,000 hommes et 500 chevaux devraient pouvoir être embarqués au commencement de brumaire. Faites-moi connaître sur quoi je puis compter. Je désire aussi que, dans le prochain état de situation de l'armée navale, vous fassiez porter le nombre des matelots de chaque classe à bord de chaque vaisseau, afin que je puisse voir de quelle classe sont ceux qui manquent.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 330

*NAPOLÉON TO GANTEAUME*²

Aix-la-Chapelle, 19 fructidor an XII [6th September 1804].

Monsieur le Vice-Amiral Ganteaume, commandant en chef l'armée navale de Brest, j'ai reçu votre

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (ix.) No. 7994.

² *Ibid.* No. 7996.

lettre du 9.¹ J'ai donné ordre que les 1,273 hommes qui manquent au complet de votre escadre soient mis à votre disposition, savoir : 200 hommes de l'artillerie de la marine, 600 conscrits ouvriers de la marine et 500 hommes d'infanterie de ligne. Voilà donc le Patriote en rade ! Avec 21 vaisseaux, j'espère que vous serez dans le cas de faire quelque chose.

Votre sortie a imprimé une grande terreur aux Anglais.² Ils savent bien qu'ayant toutes les mers à défendre, une escadre qui s'échapperait de Brest pourrait leur faire un ravage incalculable ; et, si vous étiez en mesure de porter en brumaire 16,000 hommes et 500 chevaux en Irlande, le résultat en serait funeste à nos ennemis. Dites-moi si vous pensez pouvoir être prêt, et quelles sont les probabilités de réussite. Voyez le général irlandais O'Connor, et causez avec lui sur les points où l'on pourrait débarquer. Je pense bien qu'une sortie comme celle que vous avez faite demande des circonstances de temps qui ne se présentent pas tous les jours ; mais je ne comprends pas pourquoi vos vaisseaux n'appareilleraient pas chaque jour pour faire bordée dans la rade. Quelle espèce de danger y a-t-il à faire cela ? Les mirliflores de l'escadre pourront en rire et se moquer de ses grandes expéditions ; il n'en serait pas moins vrai que, dans ces continuels exercices, vous donneriez à votre escadre une tenue et une expérience bien précieuses, et vous auriez fait tout ce qui dépend de vous. Je ne connais pas assez la rade de Brest pour savoir si une escadre de cinq vaisseaux peut y évoluer et à votre signal se mettre

¹ See No. 320.

² The reference is to the activity displayed by the French in July, reported by Sir Thomas Graves. Several sail came down from Brest harbour as far as St. Matthew's Point on the 24th and returned. See No. 305.

en bataille pour les différentes manœuvres : si cela est exécutable, pourquoi ne le fait-on pas ? J'ai fait faire de ces manœuvres par la flottille de Boulogne ; le résultat en a été très-bon, et aujourd'hui cela se continue ; c'est un objet d'encouragement et d'instruction dont personne ne peut plus contester l'avantage. Il ne faut pas chercher ce qui nous manque ; je ne puis faire des miracles ; mais il faut faire tout ce qui est possible. J'ai assez d'expérience de la mer pour savoir que, ne ferait-on que lever l'ancre, déployer ses voiles et revenir mouiller, je dis plus, ne ferait-on que le branle-bas, le résultat en serait toujours très-avantageux. Soyez sincère : combien avez-vous de vaisseaux dont le branle-bas se fasse bien ? Les hamacs sont mal placés, tout ne se prépare point comme il le faut ; rien enfin n'est indifférent pour le succès. Pourquoi ne feriez-vous pas faire, tous les huit jours au moins, le signal du branle-bas, et ne vous portez-vous pas alors pour visiter les vaisseaux et voir ce qu'il peut y avoir de mal ? Je vais encore plus loin : je pense que même l'exercice des signaux en est un utile, et accoutume tous les vaisseaux à les répéter avec la promptitude et l'expérience convenables. Je répète encore qu'on se moquera de ces exercices, mais il sera néanmoins de fait que les états-majors des vaisseaux apprendront à connaître bien les signaux, et franchiront les obstacles qui sont apportés souvent à leur prompt arboration et répétition. Lorsque les Anglais ont su que vous étiez dans la baie de Camaret, l'opinion des marins en Angleterre était que vous n'étiez pas attaquant.

Je n'ai plus de généraux de marine. Je désirerais faire quelques contre-amiraux, mais je voudrais choisir ce qui peut m'offrir le plus d'espérances, sans considération d'ancienneté. Envoyez-moi une liste d'une douzaine d'officiers propres à faire des contre-amiraux, ayant les qualités nécessaires pour mériter

la préférence, et surtout des hommes encore dans la force de l'âge.

NAPOLÉON.¹

No. 331

LIEUTENANT BOURNE TO VICE-ADMIRAL
YOUNG

Felix, Hamoaze, 5th September, 1804.

Sir,—In reply to your letter of this date desiring to be informed of the particulars of the capture of the French *chasse-marée*, Ste. Catherine, and another—name unknown—by his Majesty's schooner under my command,² I have the honour to acquaint you that, cruising off Santoña on the morning of the 15th June—it being then nearly calm—I dispatched our two boats under the direction of Mr. Inskip, the master, and Mr. Harrison, midshipman, in pursuit of several small vessels inshore of us, some of which I had reason to believe belonged to the enemy. Our boat, having obtained information that two French *chasse-marées* were then on their passage from Santander to Bayonne, pulled in a direction to avoid the observation of the enemy, who, having rounded an intervening point, were suddenly met by our boats. The *chasse-marées* were then rowing, and immediately altered their course towards the Spanish shore, and being nearly within musket shot, and unable to escape from our pursuit, the crew betook themselves to their boats, and reached the Spanish shore about the same time one of our boats

¹ Ganteaume's reply to the above will be found under Nos. 337 and 338.

² The Chevalier d'Anguague had complained of this breach of the neutrality of the Spanish shore in a letter to Lord Harrowby, dated Portland Place, 7th August, 1804. He remarked that the schooner had taken four French vessels near to the coast indicated.

took possession. The other continued the chase in the hope of arriving up with the fugitives, and with a view to obtaining some documents towards the condemnation of the captured vessels, unguardedly landed, and brought off two persons who had escaped from them. I should have sent them back immediately had I not been apprehensive that the delay in doing so might have subjected his Majesty's schooner to the attack of a ship-privateer of thirty guns (the *Blonde*)¹ and two brig-privateers then on that coast, and which, it was reasonable to presume, on hearing of the value of our prizes, would endeavour to intercept us on our return to England. I beg leave to add that I made use of the first opportunity that presented itself to correct the error that had without my sanction or knowledge been committed, in having, two days afterwards, sent the detained Frenchmen on board an American brig bound to Bordeaux. Although the flood tide set the *chasse-marées* considerably towards the shore after our becoming possessed of them, I have the positive assurances of the master, midshipman, and each individual of the boats' crews, that neither of them ever took the ground. It is not consistent, Sir, to suppose that, if they had touched any of the rocks against which the sea unceasingly breaks with great violence, it would have been possible to have got them off again, unaided by a breeze or by an anchor, the water there being too deep to admit of its being used with effect. I beg leave to state that my conduct on this occasion was influenced by my conception of the orders I received from Admiral Cornwallis, which authorised me to cruise for the purpose of intercepting the supplies of the enemy passing from Santander towards Bordeaux, and, that part of

¹ The *Blonde* was captured by the *Loire* on August 17th. See No. 313.

the Spanish coast where the *chasse-marées* were taken being wholly remote from any cannon whatever, I thought I fulfilled my orders in capturing vessels belonging to the enemy which were not in a situation to claim the protection of a neutral battery.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

RICHD. BOURNE.

No. 332

COCHRANE TO LORD MELVILLE

[*Extract.*]

5th September, 1804.

Orders are just arrived to fit out the ships mentioned in the inclosed list, with all possible dispatch. This coupled with the sailing of two three-decked ships from Cadiz for this port to be followed by another, and the circumstance of the inclosed ships being ordered to victual for three months *only* (although said to be bound for America) makes the conjecture that their designs are not of the most pacific nature. I have therefore ordered the *Illustrious* to proceed directly to Plymouth without calling off Ushant.

Should the Spaniards have any hostile views against Great Britain within a month, the following force may be collected here : three first-rates from Cadiz ; three seventy-fours fitting here ; five French ships, making in all eleven sail of the line. The finances of this country are low. They only wait the arrival of the frigates with treasure to put on a different countenance. I cannot conceive that Spain, even if at war with America, could require so many line-of-battle ships, for similar orders are given at Cadiz and Carthagená. The time that the armament will be ready for sea corresponding with that of the French squadron, the three first-rates fitted at

Cadiz to come round here—all tends to show that they have some united object in view. Numbers of soldiers for the French are now arriving at Ferrol from France ; many more are now upon the road.

[The French ships at Ferrol at the time were reported to be the Héros, Argonaute, Redoutable, Duguay-Trouin, and Fougueux, 74's, the Guerrière and Revanche, 44's, the Observateur brig, and the Téméraire schooner. The Dutch ship Oldenbarneveldt, 64, was also at the port but in a bad state. The Spanish ships were two 74's in dry dock, four 74's which might be ready at short notice, three three-deckers and three 74's without masts in the arsenal, three 64's with few guns mounted, loaded with timber, and two frigates to be ready shortly, and three others without masts. Two vessels were building.

Cochrane's insistence upon the hostile purposes of the Spaniards, and upon the fact that only money was needed to bring them to execution, greatly impressed the Ministers at home, and led to the seizure of the treasure ships, for which see Nos. 345, 346, 353, and 354.]

No. 333

CORNWALLIS TO COLLINGWOOD

*By the Hon. William Cornwallis, Admiral of
the White, &c.*

[An order to Admiral Collingwood to proceed in the Dreadnought off Rochefort, there to relieve Sir Robert Calder, and take under his command the Téméraire, Hero, Warrior, Repulse, Minotaur, Acasta, and Boadicea. On the same day Calder

was directed to proceed with the Prince of Wales to Spithead for repairs to that ship.]

Given, &c., Glory,¹ off Ushant, 7th September, 1804.

No. 334

CONSUL O'BRIEN TO COCHRANE

[*Extract.*]

Ferrol, 9th September, 1804.

The Cabinet courier that arrived from Madrid on the 7th brought dispatches for the Admiral of Ferrol with pressing orders to hurry the armament and complete equipment of the three 74-gun ships, two frigates, one corvette, an armed brig, and a large store-ship of 40 guns, and also for the additional armament of another 74 now under repair in dock; and as there are not a sufficient number of seamen now at Ferrol to complete the crews of these ships, orders have been issued to the naval commanding officers of the different districts of the coast of Galicia and Asturias to send to Ferrol with the shortest delay as many as two thousand registered seamen. It is the opinion of the best informed that six weeks will elapse before that number can be collected, and it is to be observed that the victualling office does not at this moment contain one month's provisions for this small armament; however, the unremitting assiduity with which every repair and equipment is carried on (even on Sundays and on the most solemn holidays) clearly evinces that the object of the armament is very urging.

The foregoing information is in substance the full of what I have been able to collect, and which I send you for the information of his Majesty's ministers.

¹ The *Ville de Paris* joined Cornwallis off Ushant on 9th September, and he moved into her from the *Glory*.

[It did not appear to Cornwallis that the intelligence from Ferrol at this time made it immediately necessary to send a ship to Cochrane in the place of the *Majestic*, which was ordered to the Downs.]

No. 335

COCHRANE TO LORD MELVILLE

[*Extract.*]

11th September, 1804.

I have been forced to keep the *Illustrious*, as there does not remain a doubt of the hostile intentions of Spain. Mr. Frere will inform your Lordship that Spain has agreed to the propositions made by America, so that there is no pretence for supposing that the armament is on account of that country. Should they proceed to the westward, Trinidad is certainly the object; for I doubt if their force will be equal to an attempt upon Jamaica. Three thousand men embark from hence. I am told that the whole of the ships will be ready to leave this port in fourteen days.

No. 336

COCHRANE TO CAPTAIN-GENERAL TEXADA

His Britannic Majesty's ship *Northumberland*,
off Ferrol, 14th September, 1804.

Sir,—Knowing the political situation in which Great Britain and Spain stood with respect to each other, I was much astonished at being informed that orders had been sent to the different naval departments of this country to increase their marine establishments, and fit out squadrons similar to what is now doing in the port of Ferrol.

As Spain is not engaged in any foreign war, I feel it my duty to demand an explanation, more

particularly as the harbour of Ferrol contains five sail of the line belonging to the French, as also one Dutch man-of-war of the same rate, the officers of whom I am informed declare that they intend sailing in company with the Spanish squadron, which report seems to be confirmed by their late preparations.

The situation in which I am placed by commanding a division of his Britannic Majesty's ships calls upon me to inquire of your Excellency if the above facts are true, for should the two squadrons sail in company, I declare to your Excellency that it is my determination to attack that of France and Holland, and I trust in doing so I will not be opposed by the Spanish squadron, the consequences of which may prove fatal to the harmony and good understanding that has so happily subsisted between the two countries, and which my best endeavours have hitherto been used to preserve; at the same time there is a duty I owe my country in maintaining its honour and dignity, that is paramount to every other consideration, and by this I must be governed.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

A. COCHRANE.¹

No. 337

GANTEAUME TO NAPOLEON²

Brest, 27 fructidor [14th September, 1804].

Au moment du départ du courrier, je reçois votre dépêche du 19 fructidor, et je m'empresse de vous rendre compte que j'ai adressé, depuis avant-hier, au ministre de la marine un travail détaillé en réponse aux demandes qu'il m'avait faites de votre

¹ For the Captain-General's replies see Nos. 340 and 341.

² *Arch. Nat.* A.F. iv. 1195, Dossier 2, No. 5.

part, sur la possibilité de tenter avec les forces que nous avons sur cette rade une expédition sur l'Irlande dans les premiers mois de l'année prochaine.

No. 338

*GANTEAUME TO DECRÈS*¹

Brest, 27 fructidor [14th September, 1804].

L'armée serait prête dans dix jours, mais ce sont les transports qui sont difficiles à organiser, parceque nous n'avons pas un homme de mer à notre disposition. Nos vaisseaux sont même sur ce point dans un état pitoyable. Tous les hommes que nous avons à bord sont parfaitement exercés au canon ; ils se battraient bien dans une belle mer, mais, s'il fallait manœuvrer avec le mauvais temps, nous serions fort embarrassés. Ainsi, mon armée ne te promets aucune ressource sur nos vaisseaux pour les transports. Il y a de quoi frémir, lorsqu'on considère la petite quantité d'hommes instruits que nous avons pour manœuvrer.

No. 339

CAPTAIN MOORE TO SIR THOMAS GRAVES

Indefatigable, off Brest, 16th September, 1804.

Sir,—On the 15th instant in the forenoon a ship of war was seen running through the Passage du Four towards Brest, and was immediately pursued by the ships and vessels under my orders ; but she was favoured by the baffling and variable winds, and effected her escape into Brest by the time the Indefatigable and Doris got as far up as Bertheaume Castle. From the appearance of the

¹ *Arch. Nat. A.F. iv. 1195, Dossier 2, No. 8.*

ship I have no doubt that she was the same *gabare* that Captain Jervis intended to have attacked under Conquet in the month of March last. In standing out again towards the Black Rocks, the weather became on a sudden squally, and so foggy that the pilot could not see the land; and the *Indefatigable*, owing to this circumstance and the ebb tide, struck forward, either on the rock called Gouémont or La Vandrée, and I fear has received considerable damage. She struck twice and then went off; part of her false keel immediately floated past, and part of the gripe with all the false keel about the fore-foot seems to be beat off. I hope however, as the water she makes in consequence of the accident is very trifling—not above four inches an hour—that she will be able to continue on the service she is employed on.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GRAHAM MOORE.

No. 340

CAPTAIN-GENERAL TEXADA TO COCHRANE

Ferrol, 15th September, 1804.

At three-quarters past twelve of this day I have received your Excellency's official of yesterday, directed to ask me explanations upon the subject of the armament of ships that your Excellency says is making in this port, and to manifest that you are determined to attack any of the French ships of war and the Dutch ship that are here, should they verify their departure at same time that the Spanish ships of war effect it.

To the first point I have no objection to answer your Excellency, that, though in this department there have been armed three ships and one frigate,

besides another that was already fitted out, and some smaller ships for a secret commission, the manner in which these ships have been tripulated [*sic*] with only half crews—this circumstance alone by itself dissipates all hostile apprehension on the part of any European Power.

And as to what regards the second point, I can only say to your Excellency that I remain informed of the declaration which your Excellency makes of attacking the French and Dutch ships of war should they effect their sailing with the Spanish ; and not having the least knowledge of the French intending to depart from this port with the ships of my sovereign, I give account to his Majesty of what your Excellency has just officiated with me for his royal information, which I lay before your Excellency, in reply to your said official.

God preserve your Excellency many years.

FELIX DE TEXADA

No. 341

CAPTAIN-GENERAL TEXADA TO COCHRANE

Ferrol, 15th September, 1804.

After having closed the adjoined packet for your Excellency, and having sent it with one of my adjutants to the English Vice-Consul, who not being found, and when my dispatches were already in the post-office, in which I inform my Court of what your Excellency had officiated with me, and for my reply I have received orders for to disarm his Majesty's three ships that are in this port, and that only to remain so the two frigates, the packets and transport ships, that were so before to be employed in their particular commissions ; with which motive I have again opened the said packet,

for to subjoin to it this information, which should pacify the apprehensions you manifested in your official of yesterday.

God preserve your Excellency many years.

FELIX DE TEXADA.

No. 342

COCHRANE TO CAPTAIN-GENERAL TEXADA

Northumberland, off Ferrol, 16th September, 1804.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date in answer to mine of the 14th inst. It affords me much pleasure to understand that your Excellency has received orders to retire into the arsenal and disarm the Spanish squadron now in the harbour of Ferrol. May I beg of your Excellency to know, for the information of my Court, if the orders are for the actual disarmament of the squadron, that is to say, disembarking their guns, provisions, rigging, &c., &c., as also for the discharge of their respective ships' companies?

I am well aware that ships of every description can remain in the arsenal equally ready for sea as at anchor where they now are, and the duty I owe my country puts me under the painful necessity of making the demands I now do.

May God long preserve the peace between our two countries and grant your Excellency many happy years.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

A. COCHRANE.

No. 343

CAPTAIN-GENERAL TEXADA TO COCHRANE

Ferrol, 18th September, 1804.

To the official that your Excellency has been pleased to address me under date of the 16th of the

present month, and which was delivered to me yesterday morning, I can only reply to your Excellency that the King's ships which I informed your Excellency by my second official, dated the 15th, should enter the arsenal, have already effected it, will remain in the same state before they were in before their equipment for to get into port, which has been the origin of the apprehensions your Excellency had, and which you manifested to me in your letter of the 14th, and to which I have replied to your Excellency by my two officials on the following day, which I reassure your Excellency in answer to your said official, and wishing for opportunities in which I may be able to evince the consideration I have for your Excellency's person. God preserve your Excellency many years.

FELIX DE TEXADA.

No. 344

COCHRANE TO LORD MELVILLE

[*Extract.*]

20th September, 1804.

I enclose a copy of my letter of yesterday's date to Admiral Cornwallis with the accompanying papers. In addition to which I can only say that I do not think the professions of Spain are sincere. It is now pretended that the Captain-General of the Marine had no orders to send the ships out of the arsenal, that his directions went no further than to fit transports to convey the troops to Biscay, but as the men-of-war were in a state of forwardness, he ordered them upon that service. Such a story is not to be credited. No man in this country dare take such responsibility upon him. While hundreds of small vessels were to be hired to perform this service, it is not likely that four ships of the line consisting of 84 guns, two of 74, and one of

64, with several frigates, sloops, &c., would be fitted out on purpose to carry 3,000 troops 120 leagues. I have since received an answer from the Captain-General of the Marine to my last letter—the evasive nature of which must strike your Lordship, as it does me, that the retiring of the squadron into the arsenal is a mere blind where they are equally ready for sea as when at anchor in the harbour. Most of their crews live in the vicinity of Ferrol, and they have, it is said, leave granted them until the 15th of next month. I must, however, remark that they can be assembled at any time within a few hours.

No. 345

CORNWALLIS TO REAR-ADMIRAL COCHRANE

*By the Hon. William Cornwallis, Admiral of
the White, &c.*

[*Most Secret.*]

Pursuant to directions from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, you are hereby required and directed to continue the blockade of the port of Ferrol with the utmost vigilance, not only with the view of preventing the French squadron from escaping from that port, but likewise with a view of preventing any of the Spanish ships of war sailing from Ferrol, or any additional ships of war from entering that port. You are immediately to inform the Spanish government of these instructions, and the determination to resist, under the present circumstances, the sailing of the French or Spanish squadrons, if any attempt should be made for that purpose by either of them.

Some frigates are expected soon at Cadiz laden with treasure from South America. If they should be met with by any of the ships of the squadron, they

are, in conjunction with any other of his Majesty's ships, to intercept, if possible, the ships in which the above mentioned treasure may be contained, and detain them until his Majesty's pleasure shall be further known.

Given, &c., Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 21st September, 1804.

[On the same day the Ajax (Viscount Garlies), carrying the dispatch, and the Neptune (Sir Thomas Williams) were directed to join Rear-Admiral Cochrane.]

No. 346

CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN GRAHAM MOORE
(INDEFATIGABLE)

*By the Hon. William Cornwallis, Admiral of
the White, &c.*

You are hereby required and directed, in the ship you command, to proceed without a moment's loss of time to the westward of the Saints, and then open the sealed order herein inclosed.

Given, &c., Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 22nd September, 1804.

INCLOSURE

CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN GRAHAM MOORE
(INDEFATIGABLE)

[*Secret.*]

You are hereby required and directed, in the ship you command, to proceed off Cadiz and the entrance of the Straits with all possible dispatch, and use your best endeavours, in conjunction with any of his Majesty's ships you may find there, to intercept, if possible, two Spanish frigates expected

with treasure from South America, and to detain the vessels containing such treasure until his Majesty's pleasure shall be further known.

Given, &c., Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 22nd September, 1804.

[These orders were carried by the hired lugger Nile to the Indefatigable inshore off Brest. Captain Hamond in the Lively was directed, on September 23rd, to proceed on the same service, placing himself under the orders of Captain Moore. See No. 354, for Captain Moore's report of his proceedings in pursuance of these orders.]

No. 347

DECRÈS TO NAPOLEON¹

Paris, 2^e jour Complémentaire an XII [19th September, 1804].

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser à Votre Majesté Impériale le rapport du général Ganteaume. Votre armée de Brest sera prête à transporter 16300 hommes et 472 chevaux avant la fin de vendémiaire, et c'est le bon moment. L'amiral composerait son armée de 21 vaisseaux, 4 frégates, une corvette, une frégate armée en flûte et 5 transports. Il faut faire les équipages de la flûte et des 5 transports. Le désarmement de la partie de la flotille qui est près de Brest peut seul m'en donner les moyens, et je sollicite de Votre Majesté l'ordre d'y pourvoir de cette manière.

Si Votre Majesté décide que l'expédition aura lieu, il reste à voir sur quel point le débarquement devra s'effectuer. L'amiral observe que l'ennemi semble s'attendre que ce soit dans la baie de Bantry ou celle de Kenmare; il examine toute la côte et

¹ *Arch. Nat. A.F.*, iv. 1195, Dossier 2, No. 9.

remarque que la baye de Loch-Swilly serait la plus avantageuse, tant par ses détails et son fonds que parce que les habitants y seraient plus disposés à nous seconder.

[Two detailed reports of Ganteaume to the Minister of Marine are included in the *dossier*.]

No. 348

CAPTAIN PUGET TO CORNWALLIS

Foudroyant, off Ushant, 23rd September, 1804.

Sir,—The presentation of plans to you lately for harassing the enemy have been so frequent, that I have been deterred submitting the inclosed to your consideration. But I feel confident you will have the goodness to excuse it, as it proceeds from an earnest wish to make myself as useful as possible in the present blockade.

Should the inclosed plan meet your approbation, permit me to offer myself as a candidate to command that particular service ; nor should I lament quitting my present ship, provided I should be so fortunate as to communicate to you early intelligence of the enemy's movements.

Should a small squadron come into Bertheaume or Camaret roads, and you would please to intrust me with directions for that purpose, I feel confident I should be able to destroy them.

The obligations and gratitude I already feel for your good opinion will at all times make me solicitous to secure it in a greater degree than I have yet been able to accomplish ; and I can assure you, Sir, that no exertions shall ever be wanting on my part to keep my station, if the execution of the present plan is intrusted to my management.

In the event of your approval of this system of

blockade, may I be permitted to name Lieutenants Thomas Graves, Ussher, Miln, and Mends, as candidates also for this employment in the command of the small vessels?

I have the honour, &c.,

PETER PUGET.

INCLOSURE

PLAN FOR BLOCKADING BREST

That a frigate or ship sloop, three brigs, and one schooner, or two brigs and two schooners and three cutters, are a sufficient force for this service.

That each vessel should be supplied with fire-boxes, and the ship, brigs, and schooners partially fitted as fire-ships, and to be supplied each with a fast rowing gig, as well as grapnels of a peculiar construction.

That the whole should be under the orders of a post-captain, the brigs under that of commanders, and the rest under lieutenants.

That these should be kept continually close in between St. Matthew's and the Black Rocks.

That in the event of westerly winds setting in, the whole should, if possible, repair to Douarnenez Bay, and there be in readiness to put to sea at a moment's warning; or, being hard pushed by southerly or S.W. winds, they could put to sea through a passage discovered by Captain Hurd, close to Béniguet, by which the batteries near Conquet are avoided.

That the advantages of a closer blockade than has hitherto been adopted must be obvious on any account. It would in a great measure prevent the arrival of French convoys from the eastward, one or two of which have recently arrived safe in Brest.

In case any small squadron of the enemy should

anchor in Bertheaume or Camaret roads, we should have fire-ships ready to act the very evening the enemy anchored ; or, if the plan for destroying the Brest fleet is hereafter adopted, we could be on the spot to act with any other vessels which might be sent out for that particular purpose, and their arrival might be considered as only a relief to those already there.

In the event of the enemy putting to sea, provided it met with the Commander-in-Chief's approbation, I would immediately order a brig to proceed without loss of time through the Passe du Raz to the Rochefort and Ferrol squadrons, and thus on to the Mediterranean to the fleet there. One of the schooners should go on the same service, and to the same stations, in case the brig should not arrive safe. One cutter to be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, and another to Ireland—the ship to keep on the enemy's rear, and the other brig between her and the British fleet to repeat signals. The remaining schooner and cutter to remain off Brest in case of any further movements. Letters to be kept ready written, as thus—'The enemy have put to sea with sail of the line steering . . . They left Brest at this . . . and went round . . .' This would prevent improper signals being made by detached vessels, which has been the case. There would be another advantage gained by this plan—that of having fire-vessels attached to the fleet, always ready to act, and it would spare the frigates at present employed for other service.

PETER PUGET,
Captain of H.M. ship Foudroyant.

Foudroyant, off Ushant, 23rd September, 1804.

No. 349

CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN ELPHINSTONE
(DIAMOND)

*By the Hon. William Cornwallis, Admiral of the
White, &c.*

[*Secret.*]

You are hereby required and directed, in the ship you command, to proceed to cruise off Cape Finisterre, for the protection of the trade of his Majesty's subjects, and to use your utmost endeavour to intercept any of the enemy's cruisers. You are also to look out for any squadron of the enemy which may be coming from the Mediterranean, or any port in the Bay of Biscay, to observe their course, and, having discovered their destination, you are to endeavour to push on before them to give timely notice to Rear-Admiral Cochrane, who is with a squadron off Ferrol, or off Rochefort, or to me, off Brest; or to Ireland, if they should have troops on board, and that should appear to be their route, giving notice with all expedition to the officers so stationed, that they may be the better prepared to intercept the force of the enemy which you may have fallen in with. You will also be vigilant during your cruise, to take or destroy any privateers of the enemy you may fall in with, and to prevent their carrying any prizes they may have made to Vigo, or any of the Spanish ports thereabouts.

In the event of your falling in with two Spanish frigates expected with treasures from South America, you are, in conjunction with any of his Majesty's ships you may meet with, to detain the vessels containing such treasure until his Majesty's pleasure shall be farther known.

And you will continue to cruise until your water

and provisions are nearly expended, when you are to join me off Ushant, or wherever else you may learn I am at the time with the squadron.

Given, &c., Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 23rd September, 1804.

[Cornwallis had received 'most secret' instructions from the Admiralty in regard to the subject of the above order. He also detached the Neptune and Ajax, which were the latest from port, as well as the Indefatigable and Lively. The last named had just joined him with the gun-vessels Steady, Attack, and Growler. The Sirius rejoined on the 26th, and the Aigle on the 28th, the last named being sent inshore off Brest to relieve the Doris.]

No. 350

*COCHRANE TO HIS CAPTAINS*¹

By the Hon. Alexander Cochrane, Rear-Admiral of the Blue, &c.

Pursuant to orders from the Hon. Admiral Cornwallis, Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's ships and vessels employed in the Channel soundings, &c., &c., &c.,

You are hereby required and directed to prevent any Spanish ships of war from sailing from, or entering into, the ports of Ferrol or Corunna. Should any squadron consisting of Spanish or French ships attempt to leave the above ports, they are to be opposed.

Given on board the Northumberland, off Ferrol, the 24th September, 1804.

A. COCHRANE.

¹ To the captains of the Malta, Neptune, Illustrious, Ajax, Ganges, Spartiate, Majestic, Northumberland, and Endymion.

No. 351

NAPOLEON TO DECRÈS¹

Mayence, 7 vendémiaire an XIII [29th September 1804].

Monsieur Decrès, Ministre de la marine, je vous ai fait connaître mes intentions sur la manière dont j'envisage mes trois expéditions : Surinam, Demerari, Essequibo, Sainte-Hélène et la Dominique.

Dans cette dépêche, je vous fais connaître mes vues sur l'Irlande. Il faudrait supprimer un des six transports, et le remplacer par la Pensée ou par la Romaine armée en flûte ; achever l'Océan, et pour cela travailler, s'il est nécessaire, aux flambeaux. Je pense que c'est le seul moyen de pouvoir porter 18,000 hommes, dont 3,000 de cavalerie, artillerie, génie et non-combattants, et 15,000 hommes d'infanterie ; 500 chevaux, dont 200 de cavalerie, 200 d'artillerie et 100 d'état-major ; moins que cela ne ferait pas un corps d'armée.

Le point de débarquement que vous me désignez me paraît le plus convenable. Le nord et la baie Lough Swilly est, à mon sens, le point le plus avantageux. On doit sortir de Brest, doubler l'Irlande hors de vue de toute côte, et l'aborder comme l'aborderait un vaisseau venant de Terre-Neuve. En parlant ainsi je ne parle que politiquement et point nautiquement, car les courants doivent décider du point où l'on doit attaquer la terre. Politiquement, il vaudrait mieux s'exposer à attaquer l'Ecosse qu'à attaquer plus bas. Cette manœuvre déconcertera l'ennemi. Trente-six heures après avoir mouillé, on doit reprendre le large, laissant les bricks et tous les transports. La Volontaire aura ses canons à fond de cale, dont l'armée se servira,

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (ix.) No. 8063.

soit pour batteries de côte, soit pour tout autre évènement imprévu. Sur tout ceci, je suis d'accord avec vous. Mais le débarquement en Irlande ne peut être qu'un premier acte, si seul il devait former une opération, nous courrions de grandes chances. L'escadre doit donc, après s'être renforcée de tous les bons matelots des six transports, entrer dans la Manche, se porter sur Cherbourg, y recevoir des nouvelles de la situation de l'armée devant Boulogne, et favoriser le passage de la flottille. Si, arrivée devant Boulogne, les vents étaient plusieurs jours contraires et l'obligeaient à passer le détroit, elle devrait se porter au Texel ; elle y trouverait sept vaisseaux hollandais et 25,000 hommes embarqués, les prendrait sous son escorte et les conduirait en Irlande.

Une des deux opérations doit réussir ; et alors, soit que j'aie 30 ou 40,000 hommes en Irlande, soit que je sois en Angleterre et en Irlande, le gain de la guerre est à nous.

Lorsque l'escadre sera sortie de Brest, Lord Cornwallis ira l'attendre en Irlande. Lors qu'il saura qu'elle est débarquée dans le nord, il reviendra l'attendre à Brest ; il ne faut donc pas y retourner. Si même, en partant d'Irlande, notre escadre trouvait les vents favorables, elle pourrait doubler l'Ecosse et se présenter au Texel. Lorsqu'elle partira de Brest, les 120,000 hommes seront embarqués à Boulogne, et les 25,000 au Texel. Ils doivent rester embarqués tout le temps que durera l'expédition d'Irlande.

C'est ainsi que je conçois l'expédition d'Irlande. Ainsi toute la première partie du projet jusqu'au débarquement en Irlande, je l'approuve. J'attendrai le rapport que je vous ai demandé pour statuer sur le désarmement des divisions armées de la flottille.

La seconde partie du projet doit être l'objet de vos méditations et de celles de l'amiral.

Je pense que le départ de l'expédition de Toulon et de l'expédition de Rochefort doit précéder le départ de celle d'Irlande, car la sortie de ces 20 vaisseaux les obligera à en expédier plus de 30. Le départ des 10 ou 12,000 hommes, qu'ils sauront très bien être partis, les obligera à faire partir des troupes pour les points les plus importants. Si les choses pouvaient se faire à souhait, je désirerais que l'escadre de Toulon pût partir le 20 vendémiaire [12th October], celle de Rochefort avant le 20 brumaire [11th November], et celle de Brest avant le 1^{er} frimaire [22nd November].

NAPOLÉON.

[The above dispatch marks a change in Napoleon's plans since the orders given to Latouche-Tréville on July 2nd (No. 274, vol. i.). The three expeditions referred to were to be undertaken by the Toulon squadron, of 11 or 12 sail of the line, picking up the ship at Cadiz after passing out from the Mediterranean, and by the Rochefort squadron, under Missiessy, who was to proceed to Martinique, take possession of St. Lucia and Dominica, and place himself under the orders of Villeneuve, who was to command the expedition to Surinam. The combined squadron was then to return to Europe, to raise the blockade of Ferrol, liberate the five ships of the line there, and proceed to Rochefort with 20 sail, besides frigates.]

No. 352

COLLINGWOOD TO CORNWALLIS

Dreadnought, off Rochefort, 2nd October, 1804.

Sir,—As some of the ships of the squadron are getting short in their water and provisions, I send

the Pickle with an account of their state and condition, in which it appears the Repulse has not more than three weeks', and must soon go into port. What water the Hero could spare was supplied to the Boadicea, but both the frigates will soon be short.

The information which has been received of the enemy was by an American vessel from Rochefort spoken by the Acasta, who states their squadron at anchor near the Isle d'Aix to be six sail of the line—one having joined them from Rochefort—and by a small vessel taken by the Pickle which had been a fortnight from Lorient. Captain Maitland was informed that a ship of seventy-four guns was there ready for sea, and supposed to be coming to join the squadron at Rochefort, that a new frigate had lately sailed from Nantes, and that a ship of twenty-four guns was ready for sea at Bordeaux, which is all the intelligence I have. This increase of their number at Rochefort will make it necessary to keep the Repulse as long as possible, or until a ship comes to relieve her.

I have given to the ships of the squadron a sealed rendezvous to be opened after separation, if the event should occur, for which I have directed the conduct of the squadron by your order to Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Calder of the 3rd ult., and also rendezvous whilst cruising off this station during the winter months, copies of which I have the honour to inclose to you together with the weekly return of the sick.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CUTHB. COLLINGWOOD

No. 353

CORNWALLIS TO COLLINGWOOD

*By the Hon. William Cornwallis, Admiral of
the White, &c.*

Pursuant to directions from the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty, you are hereby required and directed, upon falling in with any Spanish ships or vessels laden with naval or military stores, to detain them, and to give orders to that effect to the respective captains and commanders of his Majesty's ships and vessels under my command with you either to send or bring them into the nearest port in England, there to remain until his Majesty's further pleasure shall be known respecting them ; and they are to transmit to the secretary of the Admiralty an account of their having so done.

And in the event of their meeting with some Spanish frigates who are expected with treasures from South America, they are, in conjunction with any other of his Majesty's ships, to detain the vessels carrying such treasures, until his Majesty's pleasure shall be further known. On the 10th of July, six or eight Spanish frigates were at Monte Video,¹ laden with fourteen million of dollars. The late Governor, Berlerzante, was to come home with them. The frigates were not half manned—probably would sail early in August for Cadiz.

Given, &c., Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 3rd October, 1804.

[The same order was sent to Sir Thomas Graves and Rear-Admiral Cochrane ; and orders to the same purport to the captains and commanders of the Sirius, Phoenix, Nautilus, Felix, Diamond, Indefatigable, and Lively.]

¹ Mendo Video in the original.

No. 354

*CAPTAIN GRAHAM MOORE TO CORNWALLIS*Indefatigable,¹ at Sea, 6th October, 1804.

Sir,—I have the honour to acquaint you that I have executed the service you did me the honour to charge me with.

On the morning of the 29th of September, the Indefatigable got off Cadiz; on the 30th we fell in with the Medusa. Captain Gore having informed me the Amphion was in the Strait's mouth, and that the Triumph was off Gibraltar, and that Sir Robert Barlow meant to go into Cadiz for the trade there, on his way to England, I thought fit to send the Medusa to apprise Sir Robert Barlow of the nature of my order, that he might then judge whether or not he should go into Cadiz, and I directed Captain Gore to rejoin me with the Amphion as soon as possible off Cape St. Mary. On the 2nd inst. I was joined by the Lively, and on the third by the Medusa and Amphion; the latter having communicated what I thought necessary to Sir Robert Barlow.

Yesterday morning, Cape St. Mary bearing N.E. nine leagues, the Medusa made the signal for four sail W. by S.; I made the signal for a general chase; at eight A.M. discovered them to be four large Spanish frigates, which formed the line of battle ahead on our approach, and continued to steer in for Cadiz, the van ship carrying a broad pennant, and the ship next to her a rear-admiral's flag. Captain Gore's being the headmost ship, placed the Medusa on the weather-beam of the commodore;

¹ The Indefatigable had struck upon a rock on 15th September in standing out from Brest, having chased a presumed store-ship but apparently without serious damage.

the Indefatigable took a similar position alongside of the rear-admiral ; the Amphion and Lively each taking an opponent in the same manner, as they came up. After hailing to make them shorten sail without effect, I fired a shot across the rear-admiral's fore-foot, on which he shortened sail, and I sent Lieutenant Ascott, of the Indefatigable, to inform him that my orders were to detain his squadron ; that it was my earnest wish to execute them without bloodshed, but that his determination must be made instantly. After waiting some time, I made the signal for the boat, and fired a shot ahead of the admiral. As soon as the officer returned, with an unsatisfactory answer, I fired another shot ahead of the admiral, and bore down close on his weather bow. At this moment the admiral's second astern fired into the Amphion ; the admiral fired into the Indefatigable ; and I made the signal for close battle, which was instantly commenced with all the alacrity and vigour of English sailors. In less than ten minutes, la Mercedes, the admiral's second astern, blew up alongside the Amphion, with a tremendous explosion. Captain Sutton having, with great judgment, and much to my satisfaction, placed himself to leeward of that ship, the escape of the Spanish admiral's ship was rendered impossible. In less than half an hour she struck, as did the opponent of the Lively. Perceiving at this moment the Spanish commodore was making off and seeming to have the heels of the Medusa, I made the signal for the Lively to join in the chase, having before noticed the superior sailing of that ship. Captain Hamond did not lose an instant, and we had the satisfaction, long before sunset, to see from our mast-head that the only remaining ship had surrendered to the Medusa and Lively.

As soon as our boats had taken possession of

the rear-admiral, we made sail for the floating fragments of the unfortunate Spanish frigate which blew up ; but, except forty taken up by the *Amphion's* boats, all on board perished. This squadron was commanded by Don José Bustamente, Knight of the Order of St. James, and a rear-admiral. They are from Monte Video, Rio de la Plata, and, from the information of the captain of the flag-ship, contained about four millions of dollars, eight hundred thousand of which were on board the *Mercedes*, which blew up. Other accounts state the quantity of specie to be much greater, public and private, and there is besides much valuable merchandise on board the captured ships. Our loss has been very trifling. I have not yet had the returns from the other ships, but the *Indefatigable* did not lose a man. The Spaniards suffered chiefly in their rigging, which was our object. The captains of the different ships conducted themselves so ably, that no honour could accrue to me but the fortunate accident of being senior officer.

The zeal, activity, and spirit of the officers, seamen, and marines of the squadron is best evinced by the complete manner in which they performed their work. Lieutenants Gore, Parker, and Ascott, of the *Indefatigable*, and Lieutenants Havilland and Hole of the *Marines*, gave me that support which their uniform good conduct formerly taught me to rely on. Mr. Griffith the master's conduct has my perfect approbation. I presume to recommend in the strongest manner, Lieutenant Gore, of the *Indefatigable*, to your favour and protection.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GRAHAM MOORE.¹

¹ It would appear that intelligence of the seizure of the treasure ships had not been received in Madrid on November 8th, when Mr. Frere, on his own demand, received his letters of

INCLOSURE

Force of the Spanish Squadron

La Medea (flag-ship), 42 guns, 18-pounders, on the main deck, and 300 men taken ; two men killed, and ten wounded.

La Fama (commodore's ship), 36 guns, 12-pounders, on the main deck, 280 men taken ; no returns.

La Clara, 36 guns, 12-pounders, on the main deck, and 300 men taken ; no returns.

La Mercedes, 36 guns, 12-pounders, on the main deck, and 280 men, blew up ; second captain and forty men saved.

No. 355

NAPOLEON TO DECRÈS¹

Trèves, 14 vendémiaire an XIII [6th October 1804].

Je suis étonné que, le 11, vous n'avez pas reçu mes ordres pour les expéditions. Je suis fâché que vous ayez écrit à Ganteaume que vous me proposiez le désarmement des divisions arrières de la flottille ; personne ne doit connaître ce qui se passe entre vous et moi.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 356

NAPOLEON TO DECRÈS²

Trèves, 16 vendémiaire an XIII [8th October 1804].

Votre lettre du 14 m'instruit que vous n'avez donc pas reçu mes dépêches ; et si, après les recherches que je vous ai indiquées, vous ne les avez

recall. (See his letter inclosed with Cochrane's dispatch to Mr. Marsden, November 13th.) Mr. Frere did not think a peaceful solution of the difficulty with the Spanish Government could have been arrived at even if the treasure ships had not been seized.

¹ *Corresp. de Napoleon* (x.) No. 8092. ² *Ibid.* No. 8115.

pas retrouvées, il ne faut pas douter qu'elles ne soient tombées entre les mains des Anglais. Répondez-moi sur cette question. Avez-vous reçu les plans et cartes d'Irlande que vous m'aviez envoyés antérieurement? Les dépêches étaient renfermées dans le même paquet. La perte de ces dépêches serait un petit mal, si elle ne me donnait lieu de croire qu'elles sont tombées dans les mains des ennemis. Il faut changer toutes les expéditions, car les expéditions d'Irlande, de Surinam et de la Dominique étaient tracées dans ces dépêches. . . .

NAPOLÉON.

No. 357

*CORNWALLIS TO THE RESPECTIVE
FLAG-OFFICERS AND CAPTAINS*

*By the Hon. William Cornwallis, Admiral of the
White, &c.*

[*General Memorandum.*]

If, from strong westerly winds, the squadron should put into Torbay, the several flag-officers and captains are to observe that the ships of the van squadron are to anchor to the southward, those of the centre next, and the rear squadron to the northward. It is not intended to moor, and the ships are to be placed at a considerable distance from each other. Every exertion will be made to fill as much fresh water as possible whilst at anchor. The ships are, however, to be kept constantly ready to weigh when the weather moderates, and upon the first appearance of the wind inclining to the northward.

Should the ships employed in advance off Brest come to Torbay, the officer in charge is to anchor with them distinct from the other ships in the bay, and he is to move without waiting for signal, whenever he judges from the change of weather that he

shall be able, with the ships attached to him, to recover his station off Brest.

Given, &c., Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 6th October, 1804.

No. 358

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 8th October, 1804.

Sir,—I request you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that after I sent my letter of yesterday evening the gale increased very much, and I bore up for Torbay with the ships in company named in the margin.¹ The *Britannia* having been more than three months out, and in want of stores and some species of provisions, I made her signal to go into Cawsand Bay, to replenish there.

The wind is now to the northward of west, as it generally happens in steering away for this place, with a south-west gale.

I have written to Vice-Admiral Young at Plymouth to send provisions if the wind should remain to the westward. Their Lordships may be assured I shall put to sea the moment I see a favourable prospect, and in the meantime we shall get all the fresh water we can.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 359

LORD MELVILLE TO CORNWALLIS

Admiralty, 10th October, 1804.

Dear Admiral,—When I was at the Board of Admiralty this morning they mentioned to me their

¹ San Josef, Prince, Glory, Plantagenet, Princess Royal, Téméraire, Prince George.

opinion that the following instruction is one they were very desirous to send to you. The ground of their opinion is that, when you are at Torbay, or when you are at a distance from Brest with the great body of your fleet, the inshore squadron can only be of use to watch the enemy, and not to fight them, and therefore smaller ships are equally available for that purpose as large ones, and far preferable, in so far as they are not liable to receive the same damage as the large ships are. I did not pretend to have any opinion different from my naval colleagues on such a subject, but, before I give my concurrence to send it out as an official order, I wish to know what are your sentiments on the subject. When you return at any time from your blockade, the commanders of the Rochefort and Ferrol squadrons will of course keep a good look out, in case the enemy should form the idea of surprising them. I am aware, however, that there is not a great apprehension to be entertained upon that score, as the same wind that brings you off keeps them in Brest.

I remain, dear Admiral,

Yours very faithfully,

MELVILLE.

INCLOSURE

ADMIRALTY MINUTE

Having taken into consideration the danger to which his Majesty's ships are exposed by keeping line-of-battle ships in the inshore squadron off Brest, and the loss which has been and is likely to be sustained in anchors and cables during the winter months, are of opinion that the said inshore squadron should consist only of frigates, sloops, and such other small vessels as you may judge proper, till further orders.

No. 360

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 15th October, 1804.

Sir,—I request you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the weather having been so very unsettled with changeable winds, I have again put into this anchorage¹ to wait for a more favourable opportunity of getting to the westward with the ships named in the margin² in company.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 361

CORNWALLIS TO LORD MELVILLE³

16th October, 1804.

Dear Lord Melville,—I have not the smallest objection to discontinue the line-of-battle ships advanced off Brest during the winter. It was proposed to me a few weeks ago by Sir Thomas Graves.

The small ships and vessels will, of course, be driven away, and not permitted to remain very near the shore without ships of force at hand to support them. But the danger of our not joining would be serious, should the enemy come out in force, and this has been remarked as a reason against dividing the squadron. During last winter I frequently found what were called the inshore ships further from Brest than those with me. The officer in

¹ Cornwallis put to sea on the 10th, but was obliged by the gale to return, and he remained in the bay until the 20th.

² San Josef, Prince, Téméraire, Plantagenet, Windsor Castle, Princess Royal, Prince George, Glory.

³ From a rough draft in the Admiral's own hand.

charge of those ships should have a particular turn for that kind of service. Lord St. Vincent established it chiefly to watch a squadron of the enemy intended to be detached. I should think those ships which came out some time since could not have been intended for detached service, as their new first-rate was with them.

The winds, I have observed, are not always alike here and off Brest, but I shall endeavour to sail before an easterly wind, even if I should come back again, as I have now done twice.

I have the honour, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 362

LORD MELVILLE TO CORNWALLIS

[*Private.*]

Admiralty, 17th October, 1804.

Dear Admiral,—Of late there has been a good deal of agitation and restlessness in Ireland, from which we conjecture that the disaffected spirits in that country have recently received some additional assurances of support from France. You probably will be likely to know sooner than any person when there are any appearances in Brest harbour indicative of any effort to get from thence. But, indeed, independent of any intelligence, I never have had a doubt that, if an attempt seriously to invade the King's dominions at home is meant to be made, the object must be Ireland. And, therefore, not only from that cause, but from an earnest desire on my part that every species of security, and every feeling of security, should be given to that country, I have resolved to make a great exertion to afford them an additional naval protection. As Brest is the place to be chiefly watched, I remain in the opinion I formerly conveyed to you that, exclusive

of the blockades of Rochefort and Ferrol, you must never have less than a blockading force of sixteen sail of the line under your immediate command for watching the movements of the Brest fleet. In the paper of distribution I confidentially communicated to your perusal, you will perceive that I had it always in contemplation to have seven sail of the line on the Irish station, forming a part of the Channel fleet. It has occurred to me that, if it can be accomplished, it would give a considerable addition to the feeling of security in Ireland if, in place of acting as a port-admiral in Cork, with a few frigates and sloops under his command, Lord Gardner could be placed at the head of a respectable force, specially appropriated to the defence of Ireland; and the government of Ireland informed that this additional security was intended for them. I should wish this force to be not less than ten or twelve sail of the line; but my means do not as yet admit of my appropriating such a force—at least to remain permanently. But I have an idea that, unless the preparations of the Spaniards go on more rapidly than they appear to do at present in Cadiz, we may soon be able to put under Lord Gardner's command ten sail of the line; and, if other ships now refitting come forward quickly, perhaps a force to that extent may be provided for him, even if the preparations at Cadiz render it necessary to have his force for a while diminished, by withdrawing, for the blockade of Cadiz, a few of the ships at first put under his command.

If, by the exertions we are making, we shall be able to keep your blockading squadrons at Brest, Rochefort, and Ferrol equal to what I formerly stated, and, at the same time, to create an additional fleet to cruise and be ready to receive the

enemy on the coast of Ireland, I cannot help thinking that an attempt to invade Ireland must be a very desperate undertaking, and can only end, if attempted, in the ruin and discomfiture of their fleet.

I remain, dear Admiral,

Yours very faithfully,

MELVILLE.

No. 363

LORD MELVILLE TO CORNWALLIS

[*Private.*]

Admiralty, 18th October, 1804.

Dear Admiral,—Along with this you will receive an official dispatch making a material variation in the instructions you received yesterday. I thought it necessary to suggest the alteration in consequence of the action which had taken place between the British and Spanish vessels near Cadiz, joined to the paragraph inclosed, which is an extract of a private letter I have received from Captain Gore. I should not think it probable that the Spaniards are as ready at Cadiz as Captain Gore's letter represents; but the safest side to err upon is to be on our guard, for the Spaniards will be angry, and will make every exertion.

I remain, dear Admiral,

Yours very faithfully,

MELVILLE.

INCLOSURE

*EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM CAPTAIN GORE,
OF H.M.S. MEDUSA, DATED AT SEA, 5th
OCTOBER, 1804*

'The French ship L'Aigle, of 74 guns, and five sail of Spanish line-of-battle ships, are perfectly ready for sea at Cadiz. The Santissima Trinidad,

II.

H

and the Santa Ana (both first-rates) are fitting, but not ready.'

[The instructions referred to as cancelled were dated from the Admiralty, 17th October, and Lord Melville's letter to Cornwallis of the same date (p. 95) was in explanation of them. Cornwallis was to have detached Rear-Admiral the Earl of Northesk, with the Britannia, Princess Royal, Prince George, Ganges, and Goliath, to join Lord Gardner at Berehaven. He was to have communicated immediately with Lord Gardner in the event of the enemy putting to sea from Brest, and, of the 34 sail of the line remaining under his command, he was to have stationed 8 off Ferrol, and 6 off Rochefort (see No. 369). Lord Gardner was at the same time directed to proceed to Berehaven, there to take the vessels named under his command, as also the Thunderer, Defence, Polyphemus, Courageux and Ruby, which had been ordered to proceed thither as soon as ready. The cancelling dispatch to Cornwallis was dated from the Admiralty on 18th October, and stated that, in consequence of intelligence received by Captain Hamond, of the Lively, it was judged inexpedient to execute the previous order. The intelligence was of the seizure of the treasure ships.]

No. 364

CAPTAIN GRAHAM MOORE TO CORNWALLIS

Indefatigable, Plymouth Sound, 19th October, 1804.

Sir,—I have to inform you of the arrival at this port of his Majesty's ship under my command, with the Amphion, which I thought proper to order to England for the security of the two Spanish frigates, La Medea and La Clara, which we have brought in

with us. We have seen nothing of the Medusa and Lively, with the Spanish frigate La Fama, since the evening of the action, when they parted from us. I inclose a copy of the account delivered to me by the Spanish major of the squadron of the treasure and cargo on board the four ships.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GRAHAM MOORE.

INCLOSURE

A GENERAL STATEMENT OF GOODS AND EFFECTS

On account of the King

Medea : 35 sacks of Vidona wool, 20 chests and sacks of cascarilla, 1,627 bars of tin, 203 pigs of copper, and 521,940 dollars in silver.

Fama : 300 bars of tin, 28 planks of wood, and 30,000 dollars in silver.

Mercedes : 20 sacks of Vidona wool, 20 chests and sacks of cascarilla, 1,139 bars of tin, 961 pigs of copper, and 221,000 dollars in silver.

Clara : 20 sacks of Vidona wool, 20 chests and sacks of cascarilla, 1,666 bars of tin, 571 pigs of copper, and 234,694 dollars in silver.

Total : 75 sacks of Vidona wool, 60 chests and sacks of cascarilla, 4,732 bars of tin, 1,735 pigs of copper, 28 planks of wood, and 1,307,634 dollars in silver.

On account of the merchants

Medea : 32 chests of ratinia, 952,619 dollars in silver, 279,502 gold, reduced into dollars, and 124,600 ingots of gold reduced into dollars.

Fama : 316,597 dollars in silver, 217,756 gold, reduced into dollars, and 25,411 ingots of gold reduced into dollars.

Mercedes : 590,000 dollars in silver.

Clara : 622,400 gold reduced into dollars.

Total : 32 chests of ratinia, 1,859,216 dollars in silver, 1,119,658 gold reduced into dollars, and 150,011 ingots of gold reduced into dollars.

On account of the Marine Company

Medea : 8,995 seal skins.

Fama : 14,930 seal skins.

Clara : 10 pipes of seal oil.

Total : 26,925 seal skins, and 10 pipes of seal oil.

No. 365

LIEUTENANT BOURNE TO CORNWALLIS

Felix, at Sea, 22nd October, 1804.

Sir,—Pursuant to your orders of the 3rd inst., I have the honour to acquaint you that his Majesty's schooner under my command this day detained the Spanish brig Santa Isabel (alias La Victoria) from Bordeaux bound to Cadiz, having on board 173 barrels of pitch, 190 barrels of tar, 20 bales of canvas, 88 coils of cordage, 2 cables, 1 hawser, 1,120 pine planks, with sundry articles of merchandise, among which is a case of watches, some cases of silk stockings, &c., and 50 barrels of beef and pork.¹ I have put a midshipman and five men on board her with directions to take her to Plymouth, or to a more convenient British port in the event of the wind being adverse. I understand that several Spanish vessels, laden, which had been waiting at Bordeaux for a favourable wind to put to sea, have

¹ In a letter to Consul O'Brien, dated 25th October, Lieutenant Bourne stated that the Santa Isabel was detained under the belief that her cargo was French property, and that no slight was intended against the subjects of his Most Catholic Majesty.

reloaded their cargoes under the impression of a speedy war with England. La Bellone, French privateer, is still here.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
RICHD. BOURNE.

The detained brig contains a large quantity of new sails not noticed in the manifests.

No. 366

CAPTAIN MASEFIELD TO CORNWALLIS

Atalante, at Sea, 22nd October, 1804.

Sir,—I beg leave to inform you that cruising between Abervrac'h and Ushant on the 19th inst. at half-past eight A.M., I saw four sail of French vessels come through the Passage du Four, and anchor in Portzic; at nine discovered 13 gun-brigs, and 12 luggers coming down the same passage, the commodore leading in a large lugger. On discovering their force I chased and came up with their rear and exchanged several shot with them, as they ran into Abervrac'h; as those vessels are full of men, apparently troops, I thought proper to stand along-shore to the eastward, for the purpose of giving the information to any of his Majesty's cruisers I might fall in with. But not having seen any vessels of the above description, I put a letter on shore at Guernsey directed to the senior naval officer in that road with the Intelligence, and proceeded back immediately to my station. I have seen them still in Abrevrac'h, yesterday and to-day; this evening I have fallen in with the Defiance, and Captain Durham has charged me with those dispatches.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
J. O. MASEFIELD.

No. 367

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 23rd October, 1804.

Sir,—I have received your letter dated the 19th inst. signifying the direction of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, notwithstanding any orders to the contrary, whenever the weather is such as to make it necessary for me to repair to Torbay, to bring the advanced ships in with me, leaving the frigates and small vessels attached to the squadron off Brest for the purpose of watching the motions of the enemy, to which you will be pleased to acquaint their Lordships I shall attend.

And according to their Lordships' further direction therein contained, I shall not consider the Steady gun-brig as being any longer under my command.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 368

CAPTAIN HAWKINS TO CAPTAIN RATHBORNE

Dispatch, 25th October, 1804.

Sir,—I beg to inform you, that on the morning of the 24th inst. at daylight, Point du Raz bearing N.E. distant 5 or 6 leagues, I discovered two strange sail on the weather bow, to which I gave chase; and about eight A.M. came up with the sternmost, who struck; gave the brig a lift up in the wind, dropped the jolly-boat to take possession, and continued after the other, whom we captured about nine. They proved to be two national gun-vessels, Nos. 345 and 353, armed with two brass guns, one 32- and one 6-pounder, and 20 soldiers each, from

Audierne, bound to Brest, but had been blown off the land the day before. About one the Contest joined us, and soon after we discovered two more of them; sent the Contest after one, and made sail after the other. At three came up with her, when she proved to be a gun-vessel, No. 371, armed with one brass 32- and one 6-pounder, and 22 soldiers. Not thinking them safe to send to England, I therefore took the guns out and sunk them.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDW. HAWKINS.

No. 369

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 25th October, 1804.

Sir,—I have had the honour to receive the two orders from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty dated the 17th—one a copy of Admiral Lord Gardner's, the other relating to a detachment intended under Rear-Admiral the Earl of Northesk, which order has since been suspended.

Their Lordships are pleased to observe that there will be left under my command 34 sail of the line. Should that detachment take place I cannot make out the number therein mentioned. The *Glory* and *Plantagenet* are gone; the *Montagu* having joined me from Plymouth was directed to be sent back; I therefore could not employ her in the relief of the stations. The *Britannia* joined me the 23rd, which makes the number of line-of-battle ships with me 13, without reckoning the *Montagu*, *Glory* and *Plantagenet*, or the five ships which were intended to be detached. There will only remain at present 27 of the line under my orders, 14 of which are to be upon distant service; 13 will then be left

for cruising off Brest, and relieving the distant ships.¹

You will be pleased to acquaint their Lordships that on going out of Torbay the 20th, the wind suddenly fell and the tide set some of the ships very near the Berry Head; the Princess Royal after passing the Berry got into an eddy and struck upon a rock, which is called the Bridge. Captain Reynolds reports her to leak a little, but I hope she has not received much damage.

The frigates and small vessels got to their stations off Brest yesterday, the 24th.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 370

LORD MELVILLE TO CORNWALLIS

[*Private and Secret.*]

Admiralty, 26th October, 1804.

My dear Sir,—Captain Hurd, who has lately been employed in taking a survey of the Bay of Brest, having submitted for consideration some observations he made respecting the advantages to be derived by possessing ourselves of the islands of Ushant and Molène, as well as from availing ourselves of the anchorage in Douarnenez Bay, whenever circumstances may render it necessary, I have given the subject the most mature consideration, and have determined to send Captain Hurd to you with as little delay as possible, in order that you may send him, with such other officer or officers as you may think proper, into the Bay for the purpose of ascertaining, beyond all doubt, whether the opinion

¹ Ville de Paris, San Josef, Britannia, Prince, Venerable, Windsor Castle, Princess Royal, Téméraire, Prince George, Defiance, Impétueux, Terrible, Goliath.

is correct which he entertains of that anchorage being sufficiently commodious and secure for the fleet under your command in every contingency.

In corroboration of the sentiments expressed by Captain Hurd, I find an unequivocal opinion is given by Rear-Admiral Knight, and, as I am perfectly satisfied of the reputation and experience which those gentlemen possess as nautical surveyors, I am consequently induced to entertain a favourable consideration for their suggestion ; but, notwithstanding this, you must be aware that the adoption of such an important measure is of too weighty a nature for me to think of, unless their opinions shall be placed beyond all question, and shall be concurred in by you, whose duty it will be to carry the project into effect, should it be proved to be perfectly practicable.

In order, therefore, that you may be fully possessed of all the information it is in my power to give you, I herewith send you a copy of Captain Hurd's paper, and of all the other papers (including those of Rear-Admiral Knight) that I have hitherto been able to procure in this office. You will, however, receive and consider their opinions with all the caution that ought necessarily to be observed in contemplating such a momentous subject, but more especially as those gentlemen express themselves so sanguinely upon it.

The unfortunate and severe accident which Captain Puget has recently met with, and which I very much lament, will prevent your availing yourself of that officer's services and knowledge as a nautical surveyor upon this occasion ; but you will, of course, select such of the captains and other officers, whose experience and reputation in that particular may render them most competent to form a correct judgment upon the subject, and, after they shall have been into Douarnenez Bay, and made

their report to you thereon, it will I think be desirable that you should yourself—particularly if their opinions go to confirm those of the Rear-Admiral and captain—take the earliest favourable opportunity that may present itself of going into the Bay, in order that you may be satisfied in your own mind whether it be practicable or not to resort thereto with the fleet under your command in tempestuous weather, without being liable to sustain any injury from the shot or shells of the enemy.

It is quite unnecessary for me to expatiate upon the importance of such an acquisition as this anchorage would be at this crisis, as it must be equally obvious to you as it is to me. For, should we be able to avail ourselves of such a retreat for the whole of your fleet, as this Bay is represented to be by Admiral Knight and Captain Hurd, the port of Brest must henceforward be so completely and effectually locked up by our taking such a position as to render the chief naval arsenal of the enemy of little or no further annoyance; but, with these and all the other most desirable considerations which present themselves, I cannot presume to give countenance to the adoption of a measure of such magnitude until the correctness of it shall be decidedly unquestionable.

I shall hope, therefore, to receive, as soon after the survey shall be taken as circumstances may admit, a detailed statement of the opinion you may form thereon; and I shall also hope to receive a full communication of your sentiments with regard to Captain Hurd's suggestion for taking possession of Ushant and Molène, together with any information you may possess, or be enabled to obtain, with regard to the strength of those islands, or the number of troops supposed to be upon them. These two great objects may be considered separately or

conjointly ; but, if it be practicable to accomplish both, the advantages that must result therefrom to this country are incalculable, while the enemy will be exposed to mortification, discomfiture, and disgrace.

I remain, my dear Sir,

Yours very faithfully,

MELVILLE.

P.S.—As the success of any operation against Ushant depends almost entirely upon secrecy, I cannot too strongly impress upon your mind the necessity of keeping this communication solely to yourself.

INCLOSURE

CAPTAIN HURD'S REPORT¹

The port of Brest is so situated, the entrance into it so confused, and the shores so high—particularly in the Goulet—that the wind generally takes the direction of the channel, and is either directly in or directly out, so that the ships in that harbour, from the narrowness of the channel, the strength of the tides, and the height of the shores, cannot possibly leave it but with winds from N.N.W. or N.W. by N., round easterly as far as South. If they quit the port with any wind between the N.W. by N. and E. by N. they cannot pass into the British Channel by the Passage du Four, but must go round Ushant, and, if they depart with the winds from E. by N. to South, and they should be bold enough to venture through the Four Passage, with an intent to get up the Channel, they would not be able to get far up, even if the wind should be so much to the southward as the last mentioned point.

¹ See Cornwallis's remarks on this report in No. 377.

It being a well-established fact that the ships in Brest harbour cannot move from their anchors during the continuance of westerly winds, and it being also equally well known that, with all winds favourable for the enemy to leave their port, it is perfectly practicable for our fleet to keep their position close in with Brest, either by coming to an anchor or by keeping under way close in with the land, I am therefore induced, from these facts, and the experience of the last winter, to conceive that the present Board of Admiralty will not think it expedient to keep the Channel fleet at sea during the ensuing winter, or whenever the wind shall come to blow strong from any point between the South and N.W. by N., as the ships are not only liable to be separated, but disabled, and rendered unfit for service on any pressing emergency from the violence of the elements. The great expense also of wear and tear will be avoided, provided the fleet be directed to return and anchor in Cawsand Bay and Torbay, where they could remain collected and ready to take advantage of the first slant of wind that might enable them to resume their station off the enemy's port.

In this view of the case, I should recommend that, of the chain of islands which form the N.W. side of the entrance of the Bay of Brest, the two islands of Ushant and Molène should be taken possession of, and retained during the continuance of the war.

Of this range of islands, Ushant and Molène are the principal. None of the others are inhabited. The whole range extends in a N.N.W. and S.S.E. direction from St. Matthew's Point about 15 miles. Both these islands are of infinite importance, by their position, to the enemy, as they are therefrom enabled to observe every motion or evolution of our

blockading fleet, as well as to discover the increase or decrease of our force, intelligence of which they convey by telegraph from Ushant to Molène, from Molène to St. Matthew's, and so on to Brest water ; and, according to the information they thus receive, the conduct of the enemy's fleet is regulated.

Ushant is by much the largest of this range of islands, and is near four miles in length and two in breadth. There are several churches and mills, with a number of fishermen's houses upon it, but no fortifications or works of any consequence that I could perceive ; neither could I learn from the inquiries I made there were any ; but I understand there are about 200 troops of the line upon the island. These are considered more as a guard to prevent the inhabitants from having communication with the British fleet, and to prevent petty depredations being committed by boats from our ships, than for any purpose of defence.

There are several secure harbours in Ushant for small vessels, and I am informed and believe there is also a good anchorage for, and security against, all westerly gales at the N.E. end of this island, for about 8 or 10 sail of men-of-war. Besides there is a fair and open channel between Ushant and the next island, by which our whole fleet might pass through whenever it was necessary.

The island of Molène is small. There is a church, with a few houses upon it, and it appears to be of no further consequence than as it keeps up the communication between the outer island of Ushant and the mainland, for which reason a telegraph post has been established on this island for the better conveyance of signals to and from Ushant, &c. There are, I am informed, about 25 or 30 soldiers kept on Molène as a signal-post guard, but no anchorage or security for vessels of any draught

of water near it. On both these islands they have a few small guns on field-carriages, which they drag to the shore, and occasionally fire, when boats approach near enough.

The intermediate islands, or those lying between Ushant and Molène, and between Molène and St. Matthew's Point, are small, and not tenable of themselves as a post to either party; they may, however, be made useful to us as places of observation, from whence anything may be seen with accuracy on the opposite coast of St. Matthew's and Conquet, from which places the innermost of this range of islands, called Béniguet, is distant about three miles.

By the possession of these islands I conceive we should not only deprive the enemy of this grand source of intelligence with respect to the movements and state of our blockading fleet, but they would become particularly useful to us as posts from whence every motion of the French fleet can be better observed than has been heretofore. I should with this consideration only deem it a good and safe policy to secure these positions, even were no other advantages to be derived from them.

The military force necessary for this purpose would not be more than what the Marines of the fleet could furnish; but, as there would be a necessity for a garrison being established for their defence and protection when taken possession of, I conceive one regiment of from 600 to 1,000 men equal to all purposes both of attack and defence.

Ushant appears to be naturally strong and easily to be defended. It would, nevertheless, be necessary for various purposes, as well as for the further security of the island, to keep a few frigates and smaller vessels either at anchor under its shelter or cruising in the Bay, and these might,

with all northerly winds, keep as heretofore in with the Black Rocks and Point St. Matthew's, and in strong westerly winds they might find their security in anchoring under shelter of these islands, instead of being obliged to stretch out to sea where, from haze, fogs, calms, and other obstacles, they are frequently absent from and cannot regain their station off Brest for weeks together.

In addition to the advantages before described by our possessing these islands, there is another of great moment, viz., the conveyance of the intelligence of the state of the enemy's preparations or movements could be communicated with ease to the English coast from the Ushant telegraph by the means of a few light vessels that might be kept cruising between that island and the Land's End, and so forwarded by the signal-posts along our own shore to the fleet when in Cawsand Bay or Torbay ; but if, from hazy weather or any other impediment, this could not be done, a small vessel dispatched from the anchorage under Ushant to any part of the English coast she could fetch, might speedily communicate the intelligence.

The great object to which I know you have long turned your attention, and which we have so often conversed about, is Douarnenez Bay ; and, as I have been these last four months employed on a nautical survey of the sea coast in the neighbourhood of Brest, I should think myself wanting in my public duty were I not to point the great advantages to be derived by our fleets from that anchorage during westerly gales at all seasons of the year. It is a situation of all others the most likely to annoy the enemy, as it would place the two fleets within a few miles of each other, as well as within hearing of every gun that may be fired in Brest harbour, and I am much mistaken if the mast-heads of the ships

cannot be seen over the neck of land that divides them. This Bay, from my own observations and from all the information I could gain, offers much better anchorage and security against all winds and weather than either Cawsand Bay or Torbay, and the ships can anchor out of the range of either shot or shells, while, at the same time, the Passage du Raz, by which the French fleet might hope to escape to the southward, lies just at its entrance, and through which no vessel can possibly pass but in sight of the fleet lying in the Bay.

It is further to be observed that the same wind that will permit the French fleet to leave the port of Brest is equally fair for the departure of our fleet from Douarnenez Bay, with this difference in our favour, that the entrance into this Bay is wide enough to admit our fleet to push on collectively, or even to work out, should occasion call for it, while the enemy's fleet, from the narrowness of the Goulet, can only enter or leave it one ship after the other, and not in a collected body.

The only objection that appears likely to be started against this arrangement arises from the difficulty that may be supposed to exist in conveying the necessary supplies from England to the fleet while lying in Douarnenez Bay, but with the Ushant Isles in our possession I see no obstacle whatever, as all supplies might be forwarded either by victuallers from hence to Ushant, and from thence between the islands and the continent direct to our fleet. A few small craft for the purpose of watering the ships might also be kept constantly at Ushant, and pass to and from the fleet with water whenever occasion might require it.

The *éclat* that would be attached to this measure would be extreme, as we should thereby render the principal seaport of our enemy useless to themselves

and harmless to us, while they are threatening us with invasion on our own shores. It would also, I think, be more likely to cause discontent among the French people, and to render them dissatisfied with the measures of their new Emperor, than anything that has been hitherto done or attempted on our part.

THOMAS HURD, Captain in the Navy.

No. 371

*DECRÈS TO VICE-ADMIRAL MARTIN, NAVAL
PREFECT, ROCHEFORT¹*

Paris, 14 brumaire (26th October, 1804).

L'escadre commandée par le Vice-amiral Mis-siessy partira incessamment pour une destination que S. M. lui donne, et il importe essentiellement que l'approvisionnement de cette escadre soit porté s'il est possible à 7 mois de vivres, supposé toutefois qu'elle puisse embarquer cette quantité avec les autres objets qu'elle doit recevoir à bord.²

Cette escadre sera composée des 5 vaisseaux, des 4 frégates qui sont en rade, et des 2 bricks, le Lynx et l'Actéon.

Le Majestueux, le Jemmapes, la Magnanime, le Suffren, le Lion; la Poursuivante, la Gloire, l'Infatigable, l'Armide; l'Actéon, le Lynx.

Je n'ai d'autre renseignement sur cet embarquement qu'un état numérique présentant un total de 3,331 hommes, y compris les officiers.

[Oct. 27th.—Cornwallis, off Ushant, reported that Lieutenant John Gregory, of the Contest, had cap-

¹ *Arch. de la Marine*, BB², 97, ff. 333, 348, 364.

² For the operations intended to be undertaken by the Rochefort squadron see the note following No. 351.

tured the French gun-boat No. 380, and that Captain Hawkins, of the Dispatch, had also captured two gun-boats. See No. 368.]

No. 372

ADMIRALTY TO VICE-ADMIRAL SIR JOHN
ORDE¹

*By the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord
High Admiral of Great Britain and Ireland, &c.*

[*Secret.*]

27th October, 1804.

You are hereby required and directed to take under your command the ships and vessels named in the inclosed list, their commanders being directed to follow your orders, and, putting to sea the moment wind and weather will permit, proceed with them as expeditiously as possible off Cadiz, where you may expect to find the Medusa, and, taking her also under your command, cruise off that port for the purpose of watching the movements of the French and Spanish ships of war which may be lying there; and in the event of any of the latter, either separately or in conjunction with French ships, attempting to put to sea, you are to apprise their commanders that you have received instructions to insist upon their immediate return into port; and in case they should refuse to comply therewith you are then to use your utmost endeavours to compel them to do so, and if necessary to take possession of the said ships and proceed with them to Gibraltar, where they are to remain for our further directions.

¹ *Secret Letters*, 1804-1816, ff. 619-622. These orders are printed here because they are related so intimately to the operations of the various forces under Cornwallis and to the seizure of the Spanish treasure ships. They are the orders that gave such chagrin to Nelson. 'He is sent off Cadiz to reap the golden harvest, as Campbell was to reap my sugar harvest.'

If you or any of the vessels under your command should, either on your passage or when cruising off Cadiz, fall in with any ships laden with treasure coming from the Spanish colonies and bound to Spain, you are to take possession of the said ships, and send them forthwith to a British port for our further directions respecting them, taking every possible precaution to secure the treasure which may be on board them from plunder and embezzlement. Should you find it necessary to proceed yourself, or send any of the ships under your orders to Gibraltar, you are to cause particular inquiry to be made whether any epidemic or contagious sickness or disease prevails there, in which case you are strictly to prohibit any communication taking place between the respective companies of the said ships and the inhabitants or persons belonging to the garrison.

It being our intention to place his Majesty's ship *Glory* under your command, you are upon being joined by her to shift your flag to that ship, and direct the commander of the *Swiftsure* to proceed in her off Toulon, where he may expect to find Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson, and upon joining him to follow his Lordship's orders for his further proceedings. You are to take the earliest opportunity of sending one of the frigates under your command off Carthage for the purpose of obtaining intelligence of the state of the Spanish naval force at that port, and when her commander shall have gained such information, you are not thereafter to employ any of the ships or vessels under your command within the Mediterranean except to procure supplies of stores or provisions.

You are to remain upon the service hereby intrusted to your care until further order, sending the ships under your command occasionally to Tetuan or Tangier, to procure fresh beef and such

other refreshments for the use of their companies as they may respectively stand in need of from time to time, and to transmit to our secretary for our information an account of your proceedings.

Given, &c., 27th October, 1804.

J. GAMBIER.

J. COLPOYS.

P. PATTON.

No. 373

COCHRANE TO CORNWALLIS

Northumberland, off Ferrol, 30th October, 1804.

[Incloses a letter from Vigo, from Mr. O'Brien, Vice-Consul at Santander.]

I am sorry to see by it that the Sabina has escaped.¹ I will however, if the weather permits, endeavour to get hold of her; at any rate I will send the Endymion off that port to watch for the arrival of the others; this will leave me without a frigate, and I fear you have none to spare. I hourly expect to be forced to leave this anchorage, and as our watering will thereby be cut off, our supplies of that and every other species of provisions must come from England. In my former letter I mentioned that our bread was getting low; we cannot average 5 weeks in all the ships; unless supplies arrive I will be forced to return with the squadron to Cawsand Bay.

About three weeks ago 200 chests of arms came round from Bilbao or France and were put on

¹ The Sabina, 44, from Vera Cruz, having on board a rear-admiral, with 3,400,000 dollars for the Spanish Crown, 137,000 dollars for private account, and a valuable cargo, arrived at Vigo, presumably instead of Cadiz, where there was pestilence, on 25th October.

board the French frigate *Revanche*, now at Corunna; each chest contains 15 stand of arms. There are also eight field-pieces, 18-pounders, ready to be embarked in that frigate. Report says she is bound to the Isle of France; it is, however, very possible that Ireland may be her destination. The accounts are arrived at Corunna of the detention of the frigates, so that I am in hourly expectation of being obliged to put to sea. In my former letter I pointed out my suspicions that Vigo was the port to which the frigates with treasure would be ordered; the arrival of the *Sabina* there has confirmed it.

I also inclose you an extract of a letter received this day from Mr. Hunter, Consul-General at Madrid.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
ALEX. COCHRANE.

[On October 31st Cornwallis anchored in Torbay, with the *Ville de Paris*, *San Josef*, *Britannia*, *Prince*, *Venerable*, *Windsor Castle*, *Princess Royal*, *Téméraire*, *Prince George*, *Defiance*, *Impétueux*, and *Goliath*, to complete with water and be ready to put to sea with the first favourable wind.]

No. 374

LORD MELVILLE TO CORNWALLIS

Admiralty, 2nd November, 1804.

Dear Admiral,—I have received your letter of the 21st ult.,¹ and nothing can be more satisfactory to me than to receive the confidential communications of respectable officers serving under my orders; and I trust, if I am not able to administer

¹ I have not found the letter referred to, which appears to have been in answer to Lord Melville's of 17th October.—J. L.

to your wishes to the extent you suggest, you will believe it is neither from want of deference to your opinion nor a want of inclination to listen to it, but from a deficiency of means to supply what you suggest. No exertion shall be omitted, and I hope with success, to bring forward additional ships of war ; but, till that can be done, it is necessary to make the most of those we have, by a judicious arrangement and distribution of our force. Nobody is better competent to judge of the truth of what I allude to than yourself, for you know perfectly how many of the ships I found in commission when I came into office have been sent in such a condition as to require to be broken up or put into dock ; and it is physically impossible that, by any means in my power, I could, as yet, have been able to bring forward substitutes for them. With every disposition, therefore, to increase your force to the utmost of my power, I do not feel myself warranted to hold out immediately [hope of] any considerable addition to the number of sixteen I have proposed to be constantly with you.

To have a force always effective to that amount of course requires several more to supply accidents or replace those who may be obliged, from any circumstance, to come into port. I trust, however, this supernumerary force need not be so large as it must be if the system of unremitting blockade was to be adhered to ; but as that, by your orders and instructions as lately transmitted, is considerably relaxed, an opportunity will thereby be afforded to you of furnishing your fleet with those articles of provisions, and replenishing, which might otherwise have rendered it necessary for them to come into port.

I observe what you state relative to the policy of relaxing the strictness of blockade formerly resorted to. I admit the *chances* of what you state ;

but, on the other hand, I cannot shut my eyes against the *certainty* of what we must all experimentally know, that you have not the means of sustaining the necessary extent of naval force, if your ships are to be torn to pieces by an eternal conflict with the elements during the tempestuous months of winter. And allow me to remind you that the occasions when we have been able to bring our enemy to battle, and our fleets to victory, have generally been when we were at a distance from the blockading station. I am perfectly aware of the peculiar situation of Ireland, and how much it requires to be specially attended to ; but I believe it cannot be better done than by keeping your fleet in a sound and effective condition, appropriating (exclusive of the fleet stationed off Brest) at the same time a separate force for the protection of Ireland, to guard against the chance of an invading force, under a detachment from the fleet in Brest harbour, making an abrupt departure from Brest during the time the fleet under your command is obliged from weather to leave the blockading station.

As to the state of the French fleet in point of manning, it is a point certainly incapable of being precisely ascertained, but I am led to believe it is inadequately manned from various circumstances. In the first place, although the French got back at the peace a great number of their seamen, they have since had very little commerce, and, without that source to feed it, there will always be infinite difficulty to furnish the supply of seamen to any fleet. Secondly, it must be recollected that those immense flotillas, to which they have turned so much of their attention, must exhaust the great body of their seamen. And, lastly, I understood, by the reports which came from your own fleet, that

when, in the course of the summer, 10 or 12 of the French fleet came down Brest water, apparently with a view of sailing, they were obliged to man that detachment of their fleet by taking a considerable portion of the men from the remaining ships.

I remain, dear Admiral,

Yours very truly,

MELVILLE.

No. 375

REAR-ADMIRAL COLLINGWOOD TO
J. E. BLACKETT, ESQ.¹

Dreadnought, off Rochefort, 4th November, 1804

[*Extract.*]

I am here watching the French squadron in Rochefort, but feel that it is not practicable to prevent their sailing if it be their intention, and yet, if they should get past me, I should be exceedingly mortified. At this moment, and for two days past, it has blown a hard gale of easterly wind, and we are driven thirty leagues from the port. The only thing that can prevent their sailing is the apprehension that they may run amongst us, as they cannot exactly know where we are, to avoid us. . . . We have made a dash at the Spaniards, which was certainly necessary to bring them to explanation of the kind of masked hostility which they were carrying on ; but I still hope it will not be the cause of war, although it may give a check to the liberal supplies which they have furnished to France.

[On 1st November Sir Thomas Graves in the *Foudroyant*, taking with him the *Colossus*, had been ordered to relieve Collingwood, but the latter was still off Rochefort on the 18th.]

¹ Newnham Collingwood's *Life of Collingwood*, 3rd edition, p. 98.

No. 376

COCHRANE TO MR. MARSDEN

Northumberland, Betanzos Bay, 5th November, 1804.

Sir,—Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the Rose cutter arrived yesterday with a King's messenger, who immediately was sent to Corunna to proceed to Madrid. Although I have not received any letters by last post from Mr. Hunter, Consul-General, yet I am positively informed by the principal people at Corunna that the negotiation is brought to an amicable adjustment. I am in hopes by the next post to be able to give their Lordships more certain information on this subject.

We have lately had most severe blowing weather from the W.N.W., in which the Malta lost her main topmast and suffered considerably in her sails. She was forced to bear up and anchor in Vares Bay. The Endymion was also blown off, during which a packet from Monte Video got into Ferrol. The Spartiate was out and tried to intercept her, but by missing stays she was not enabled to do so. I find the packet had on board about 300,000 dollars on account of the Spanish Government. I beg leave to remark that the Spartiate sails so badly and works so ill that I am now forced to keep her constantly at anchor, as she is not safe when at sea off this coast. It is a pity so fine a ship should be in a manner lost to the service.

There are no movements making in the arsenal at Ferrol. The Duguay-Trouin has got her masts in, and the Redoutable and Fougueux are repairing—the first in dock, and the second going into the other dock immediately. There are two frigates ready for sea, having a quantity of quicksilver on

board. I could wish to be more particularly instructed how to act should they attempt to put to sea or to pass over to Corunna.

I have sent the *Endymion* off Vigo to watch for the arrival of any ships that may be ordered to that port having treasure on board from America. The bread of this squadron is getting very low ; I have put the crews to two-thirds allowance of that article.

In the event of hostilities with Spain, should the vessels sent with dispatches not find the squadron off Ferrol, when it blows hard to the westward they will be found at anchor in Vares Bay, where I am in hopes that the ships will be able to complete their water. I have not received letters by the two last posts from Madrid, from which I conjecture that my letters have been intercepted.

I am, &c.,

ALEX. COCHRANE.

No. 377

*CORNWALLIS TO LORD MELVILLE*¹

Ville de Paris, at Sea, 6th November, 1804.

Since I had the honour of writing to your Lordship on the 2nd instant, I have looked over the papers your Lordship did me the honour to send relating to Douarnenez Bay as a place of shelter for the whole squadron in a westerly wind.²

If, my Lord, it should be found, upon a more minute observation, to be a secure anchorage at a proper distance from the shore, and no difficulty in getting out when the enemy can sail from Brest, perhaps it would prove a most desirable post to watch the enemy at all times.

¹ From a rough draft in the Admiral's hand.

² Captain Hurd's report on this subject will be found under No. 370. I have not found Cornwallis's letter of 2nd November to Lord Melville referred to above.—J. L.

Captain Hurd observes, 'It being a well-established fact that the ships in Brest harbour cannot move from their anchors during the continuance of westerly winds, and it being also equally well known that, with all winds favourable for the enemy to leave their port, it is perfectly practicable for our fleet to keep their position close in with Brest, either by coming to an anchor, or by keeping under way close in with the land,' &c.

In the latter part of the observation I do not at all agree.

Is it meant that the whole squadron should anchor off the Black Rocks, as a few chosen two-decked ships have occasionally done when called the advanced squadron? Some of our bravest captains in the last war, I have been told, got into three-decked ships to avoid such service, and would Captain Hurd place the whole squadron, chiefly composed of three-deckers, in such an alarming situation?

As to the whole of the squadron keeping under way within Ushant, with strong easterly winds at any season, but particularly in the winter, when there is so little daylight—that surely cannot be meant. Off Ushant, with an easterly wind, there is no certainty of being able to keep your station when it blows hard, and the ships on such post carrying their sail, they must, of course, drift to the westward; and I have been informed that, last war, when Lord Bridport and Lord Gardner have been cruising off Ushant, they have, at times, been driven 50 and even 70 leagues to the westward.

Since I last sailed from Torbay, it blew so hard from the eastward as to oblige us for two nights to be under our storm sails; and with every exertion, knowing how very important it is for us, at the present moment in particular, not to be driven off

our station, we have unavoidably found ourselves 15 leagues to leeward.

If Douarnenez Bay is found to answer the description given to your Lordship, perhaps the English squadron may be placed more at hand to attend upon the enemy at that anchorage than anywhere else, and convoys with supplies may be sent there for the service of the squadron with safety, I should imagine, whether you occupy the islands proposed to be taken possession of or not.

I have the honour, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 378

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 12th November, 1804.

Sir,—I request you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the wind appearing to settle to the westward, on Saturday, the 10th, I bore up with the squadron early the next morning for Torbay. It came on to blow exceedingly hard with thick squalls; we had a difficulty in making the land. Beyond the Start Point the wind fell very much, and off the Berry Head came out of the Bay; afterwards a light air from the north-east. I therefore did not anchor, but stood during the night with the squadron back towards the Start. This morning, the wind settling in south-west, I have anchored in Torbay with the ships named in the margin,¹ the Plantagenet having joined me last evening.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

¹ Britannia, Prince, Téméraire, Venerable, Windsor Castle, Princess Royal, Prince George, Defiance, Impétueux, Veteran, Thunderer, Goliath, San Josef, Plantagenet.

No. 379

COCHRANE TO MR. MARSDEN

Northumberland, off Ferrol, 13th November, 1804.

Sir,—I have this moment received the inclosed letter from Mr. Frere, his Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid, which I conceive of sufficient consequence to dispatch the Joseph cutter to England with, for the information of his Majesty's Government. I have to add that the messenger who arrived here from England upon the 4th must have reached Madrid either upon the 8th in the evening or on the next day, so that Mr. Frere must have received the dispatches he was charged with before the date on which he proposed to leave Madrid.

Here the Spaniards are employed in mounting the guns on their batteries, and all the gun-boats in the arsenal are getting ready for service. I do not hear that any of the line-of-battle ships have yet moved out of the arsenal. The two frigates having quicksilver on board are ready for sea. The French squadron are in much the same state. The Duguay-Trouin will soon be fit to come out into harbour. It will not now be so easy to procure information as formerly, the Governor of Ferrol having prohibited any persons from the squadron going there. I also inclose a copy of a letter from Mr. Hunter, his Majesty's Consul-General at Madrid, by which their Lordships will see my communication with that place is now at an end.¹

I am, &c.,

ALEX. COCHRANE.

¹ Mr. Hunter's letter contains no other essential fact.

INCLOSURE

Madrid, 8th November, 1804.

Sir,—I have the honour to inform you, that having demanded my passports in consequence of the unsuccessful issue of the negotiations with which I was charged, I have received them this morning, and shall leave Madrid on the day after to-morrow to return to England by way of Lisbon.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. H. FRERE.

No. 380

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

[*Extract.*] Ville de Paris, Torbay, 14th November, 1804.

In answer to your letter dated the 30th ult. acquainting me that their Lordships desire to know whether the gun-brigs appear adapted for the kind of service under my orders, I beg to observe that they have not been complained of, the short time they have been with the squadron. Perhaps some of the hired armed ships might be useful in watching the enemy. I am sorry to say that some of the hired small vessels are continually complained of, and do but little service; the *Hero*, *Jennet*, *Gertrude*, have as yet performed scarce any. The *Rhoda* has been long ordered, but has never joined.

No. 381

THE ADMIRALTY TO SIR JOHN ORDE, BART.¹

By the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c.

Whereas in the event of a Spanish squadron sailing from the port of Cadiz, and being brought

¹ *Secret Letters*, 1804-16, f. 603-4.

to action by his Majesty's squadron under your command, it becomes necessary from the circumstance of a contagious distemper prevailing at that place, and with which the crews of the Spanish ships may be infected, to furnish you with instructions applicable thereto for your guidance: we do hereby require and direct you, in case you should be compelled, in consequence of the proceedings of the Spanish commanding officer, to engage his squadron, and the ships of which it is composed should (as may be expected) strike their colours to his Majesty's ships, to give orders to their captains not to proceed to boarding the ships which have so struck, nor to have any communication or intercourse with them by boats, but to require their commanders by hailing to throw their guns overboard, and to take such measures as may incapacitate their ships from escaping, leaving them in such a state as shall enable them to obey your orders for following his Majesty's squadron, or such part thereof as they may be directed to follow, to Gibraltar, or to such other port as under the circumstances of wind and weather may be the most convenient.

Given, &c., 15th November, 1804.

J. GAMBIER.

JNO. COLPOYS.

PH. PATTON.

No. 382

COLLINGWOOD TO CORNWALLIS

Dreadnought, off Rochefort, 18th November, 1804.

Sir,—Since the letter I had the honour to write you on the 2nd instant, by the Warrior, nothing material has occurred in this squadron, but as it is some time since I made a report to you, I have sent the cutter to inform you, Sir, that on the 14th the Doris stood into the road of Basque, and found

the enemy's squadron lying off L'Isle d'Aix in the same state they have been for some months.

The neutral vessels from Rochelle and St. Martin's that we have spoken know but little of them, more than their being there. [Reference follows to a defect in the Doris, to be made good in Quiberon Bay.]

In a former letter I informed you of the very damp state of the Dreadnought's magazines, which I am sorry to find is so much increased that I fear there is very little serviceable powder in the ship ; it is not a recent defect, but has been a subject of complaint ever since the building of the ship. The principal magazine I understand is built on an improved plan, and to make it more extent is carried out to the ship's side, from whence this damp probably proceeds, which dissolves the nitre of the powder to such a degree that every 3 or 4 days they have to remove the puddle it makes on the floor, and in the drawers under the racks. I directed Captain Reynolds to examine it, and have the honour to inclose to you a letter which he has written me on the subject.¹

CUTHB. COLLINGWOOD.

No. 383

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

[*Précis.*]

Ville de Paris, at Sea, 20th November, 1804.

Has received orders to take the Atlas and Bellerophon under his command, and incloses a letter from Captain Dundas, of the Naiad, giving

¹ Captain Reynolds reported that 28 barrels of powder and, at different times, 700 filled 32-lb. cartridges had been rendered unserviceable. All was very wet, and he recommended that the powder should be removed and the magazines inspected.

an account of the force in Brest on the 16th.¹ 'Captain Dundas's report of his having been driven off on the 3rd inst., which must have been with the strong easterly wind, serves to show that when it blows very hard from that quarter the squadron has no chance of being able to keep its ground, when a single frigate could not regain her station in less than thirteen days.'

No. 384

CAPTAIN MARTIN TO CORNWALLIS

L'Impétueux, Torbay, November 25th,
twelve o'clock at night.

Sir,—I am extremely sorry to inform you of the total loss of his Majesty's ship Venerable near Paignton. On her repeating the signal of distress, I thought it my duty to anchor as near to her as possible, and had reason to hope that by veering to three cables I might render her effectual relief, but unfortunately she was bilged the moment after striking, and we are now employed in taking such of her crew from the wreck as have not reached the shore; at present I can only learn of about 300 men being put on board the Fox cutter and our boats. The Goliath having also anchored some distance without us, I have directed the Venerable's people to be sent to this ship, that Captain Brisbane may be at liberty to proceed to sea.

At daylight, when I see the situation of the wreck, I shall act as may appear most beneficial to the service, and in doing so I trust to meet your approbation.

I shall send to Vice-Admiral Young, and to

¹ 'Twenty-one sail of the line and three frigates, and to all appearance perfectly ready for sea.'

Commissioner Fanshaw, that craft may be sent round as soon as possible to save the Venerable's stores.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

T. B. MARTIN.¹

No. 385

COCHRANE TO CORNWALLIS

Northumberland, off Ferrol, 25th November, 1804.

Sir,—Yesterday I received by his Majesty's ship *Repulse* your letter of the 12th, informing me that the *Terrible*, *Montagu*, and *Minotaur* were also ordered to join this squadron. The two first were in sight yesterday morning, and I am in hopes they will be able to join in the course of this day. The one month's bread on board those ships is a most seasonable supply, as we were getting very short of that article.

As you have left it with me provisionally to send home the *Spartiate*, I have directed Sir Francis Laforey to proceed to Plymouth, and I hope that the ship will be taken into dock, as from every account she has received injury in her bottom, I suppose at the time she got on shore at Bere haven.

The eight ships I have with me are perfectly adequate to any force that can for some time be opposed to me, although the Spaniards have it in their power soon to equip a squadron for sea ; but I doubt much if they can provide it with provisions. The day before yesterday the *Principe de Asturias*, of 114 guns, and the *San Juan Nepomuceno*, of 74

¹ On the next day Captain Hunter, of the *Venerable*, reported the disaster to Cornwallis. Some men had been lost, and but for the exertions of Captain Martin he thought the whole crew must have perished.

guns, were ordered to be masted. These, with the four others formerly fitted, may soon be fit for sea. Troops are marching in from the country to reinforce the garrisons of Ferrol and Corunna. These places are now so much in distress for flour, that they are obliged to pay the troops in money instead of using the usual rations of bread. Several packets have lately left Corunna—I suppose for the Spanish colonies—most probable to prepare them for hostilities. By accounts from Vigo the money is landed from the Sabina, and part gone to Madrid. It is said that twelve hundred thousand dollars is ordered to be sent to France.

Mr. Frere did not leave Madrid on the 10th, as he expected. I find from a letter from Mr. Hunter that he set off for Lisbon on the 14th. Mr. Hunter was to follow immediately. The Spaniards continue to allow us to receive fresh beef and other supplies from the shore.

I have just learnt that the French have got a sufficient number of men come round from different quarters to man all their ships at Ferrol, and will soon be ready for sea, except the Redoutable, which ship is still in dock.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ALEX. COCHRANE.

No. 386

THE DUC DE BOUILLON TO MR. MARSDEN

[*Secret Service.*]

Severn, Jersey, 25th November, 1804.

Sir,—I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of my Lord Commissioners, that information has reached me from Brest, of the 14th inst., that nine sail of the line, some frigates, and store-ships, particularly destined for an early expe-

dition, had received on board from 20,000 to 24,000 men (*de toutes armes*) ; the store-ships, a large proportion of entrenching tools, and chests of spare army clothing, accoutrements, and money ; which, from all circumstances my correspondent could collect, are destined for Ireland. The Irish Legion, commanded by a divisionary general (the rebel O'Connor) is among the troops embarked.

I have the honour, &c.,
D'Auvergne, Duc de Bouillon.

[Communicated by Mr. Marsden to Admiral Cornwallis, December 1, 1804. In a letter from the Duc de Bouillon, dated on board the Severn, November 29, and sent to Cornwallis from the Admiralty on December 5, some errors in the above letter—due to 'our hasty reading of the cypher, confused in the washing of the sympathetic ink'—were corrected. The troops embarked numbered from 10,000 to 14,000 men, the disposable troops of the garrison having been returned a few days prior as only 15,000.]

No. 387

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

[*Précis.*]

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 26th November, 1804.

Has received their Lordships' directions relative to the detention of Spanish ships, and that no Spanish merchant ship however laden is to be detained on any account whatever, but that no alteration is intended in the orders in respect to watching the port of Ferrol, and preventing ships of war from sailing from or entering that port.

No. 388

CAPTAIN DUNDAS TO CORNWALLIS

Naiad, off Brest, 27th November, 1804.

Sir,—I beg leave to acquaint you that at daylight this morning, seeing some small vessels at a short distance from us, and shortly afterwards perceived a fire of musketry from them on the boats of his Majesty's ship *l'Aigle*, which Captain Wolfe had sent in chase of them, I made sail and cut off two, which proved to be gunboats Nos. 361 and 369, mounting each one long brass 4-pounder and one short twelve, from Audierne[?], bound to Brest, having on board a lieutenant of the 63rd Regiment of infantry, and 36 privates, besides five seamen belonging to each vessel, being part of sixteen that had sailed from that port to a similar destination. I am sorry to acquaint you that two seamen belonging to *l'Aigle* are wounded (William Shepherd and James Mitchell), the latter dangerously. I have given Captain Hawkins, of his Majesty's sloop *Dispatch*, orders to proceed to Plymouth with the two vessels, which I think worth preserving, and to land the prisoners.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
THOS. DUNDAS.

No. 389

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 27th November, 1804.

Sir,—I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that on Saturday, the 24th, it rained all the morning, with the wind to the westward. At

2 P.M. the wind came suddenly to the north-east, the rain still continuing. I directed the officer who carried the public letters on shore half an hour after to order any launches or boats of the ships off from the shore immediately, which he informed me he did. At 4 o'clock I made the signal to weigh, and sailed accordingly. In the morning I was surprised to observe that four ships were missing—the *Britannia*, *Venerable*, *Impétueux*, and *Goliath*.

The *Britannia* joined me on Monday at noon. I wrote to Rear-Admiral the Earl of Northesk to inquire if any accident had happened. I send for their Lordships' inspection the orders I gave out some time since relative to bearing up for and the mode of anchoring in Torbay, as well the conduct to be observed whilst at that anchorage.¹ It is well known when the wind comes to the eastward a great sea heaves into the bay, and it is difficult for the ships to get their anchor. On that account, as well as to get to our station, as soon as possible, which with all our expedition must be long after the enemy have an opportunity of getting to sea, I have always wished to move the moment a change of wind takes place. If Torbay is to be considered as a harbour, and the ships are not constantly kept in a state for sea, upon a change of wind they are in greater danger, in that bay open to so many points of the compass, than if they were moored, and prepared to ride a gale out, by making a snug ship, which was the mode three years ago when we remained at that anchorage from 1st November, 1801, to the end of April following. We were particularly fortunate during the time ; there was no continuance of easterly winds, for had it blown home from east-

¹ See Cornwallis's order to the captains, 6th October (No. 357).

south-east to south, I apprehend most of the ships would have been lost. The directions I have given were thought the best both for the safety of the ships and annoyance of the enemy. But if their Lordships are pleased to give any directions upon this head I shall most readily put them into execution.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 390

CAPTAIN ALDHAM TO CORNWALLIS

[*Extract.*]

Nautilus, Gwavas Lake, Mount's Bay,
27th November, 1804.

I have the honour to acquaint you that on the morning of the 21st inst. his Majesty's sloop under my command, on her way to join you off Brest (in lat. $46^{\circ} 20'$ N., long. $7^{\circ} 06'$ W.), brought to the Spanish ship *Éco* laden with wheat, flax, iron hoops, and cordage. They had made their passage north about from St. Petersburg, and were bound to Barcelona. Considering this cargo to come under the head of naval stores, I have, in obedience to your directions, retained the vessel, and not meeting with the squadron under your command off Ushant, I ordered her to proceed for the nearest port in England.

On the 14th inst. his Majesty's sloop gave chase to four large ships off Santander, and after dark came up with two of them. They were from the Havana bound to that port, richly laden, but not with a cargo to justify their detention.

No. 391

MR. THOMAS HORT¹ TO COCHRANE

Northumberland, Betanzos Bay, 29th November, 1804.

The information which I have received at Corunna, on the evening of the 27th November, was from a merchant that is in confidence with the principal persons in office, and he assured me that the evening before an express arrived from Madrid to the Captain-General here, with orders to seize all English vessels. The merchants that have concerns with England are directed to deliver to the collector of the customs an account (within twenty-four hours) of the state of their debts for and against such English merchants as they may be concerned with, that it may be transmitted to Madrid. There has been sent within these few days a quantity of money to pay the troops at Ferrol; they having a great deal due, and which had the desired effect of quieting them, being nearly in a state of mutiny for the want of provisions as well as pay. Troops are collecting from all quarters and sent to Ferrol immediately on their arrival. The artillerymen are very busily employed at different ports in the Bay of Ferrol, and particularly at the town of Ferrol and Corunna, in mounting cannon and putting the works in a complete state of defence.

No. 392

VICE-CONSUL O'BRIEN TO COCHRANE[*Extract.*]

Santander, 30th November, 1804.

Yesterday morning a Cabinet courier arrived here, I am told, with orders for to assemble the

¹ Mr. Hort was secretary to the Rear-Admiral, who transmitted his information to Lord Melville.

regiments of Militias, and I am assured that all the merchants have been summoned to declare what British property they may have in hands ; these are hostile preludes. Further, some Russian troops have lately arrived at Corfu, and many thousands more are expected, and several thousand Albanians are also forming into battalions and officered by Russians. I have seen a letter from Bilbao received by my friend Mr. Schmidt, who went with me lately on board your ship, saying that a Parisian had lately contracted with the Spanish Government for two million *fanégas*¹ of wheat to be imported into the different ports of Spain. If hostilities should ensue this communication may be of use to you—but my name never mentioned. Could you not get me appointed Commissary of Prisoners at Madrid if Mr. Hunter quits Spain? I hope my services may give me some claim to the notice of his Majesty's Ministers.

I have inquired of many the news of the day, but can learn no decisive information. The public seem, however, to dread the determination of Government for a war, which I understand is much urged by the French ambassadors.

No. 393

CAPTAIN DUNDAS TO CORNWALLIS

Naiad, off Brest, 2nd December, 1804.

Sir,—I have to acquaint you that with some small loss we have been able to keep our station at anchor during the late easterly gale. This morning being moderate, I weighed with the Aigle to reconnoitre the enemy, and at half-past three P.M. we made their numbers as follows, viz. : Naiad : 21 sail of the line,

¹ *Fanéga*, a Spanish measure equivalent to a bushel.

5 frigates, 1 brig. Aigle : 20 sail of the line, 4 frigates, 2 corvettes, 2 brigs, 1 cutter.

I boarded two small vessels last night from Brest ; one a Portuguese, with things for you. His report is as follows : 21 sail of the line, 7 frigates, 1 brig, 1 lugger, 1 cutter. The other, a Prussian, whose report is as follows, viz. : 5 sail of three-decked ships, 10 sail of two-decked ships, 6 frigates, 1 brig, 1 cutter. This day being by the report of the two vessels the day on which Buonaparte was to be crowned Emperor of the French, last night there was a general salute from all the ships in Brest, and at daylight this morning, at noon, and at sunset they saluted in like manner, the ships being decorated with colours.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

THOMAS DUNDAS.

No. 394

VICE-ADMIRAL THEVENARD TO DECRÈS¹

Proceedings at Lorient in honour of the Coronation of Bonaparte.

Lorient, 12 frimaire, an XIII [3rd December, 1804].

J'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte que la journée d'hier, 11 frimaire, a été célébrée par toutes les autorités avec ce zèle, cet attachement, cette expression que chaque Français porte individuellement au souverain. Une réunion parfaite a donné, depuis 10 heures du matin, et successivement très avant dans la nuit de ce jour, le spectacle intéressant d'une seule et même famille, plutôt rassemblée pour se féliciter d'un événement heureux que pour satisfaire à une pompe voulue et commandée par le devoir.

¹ *Arch. de la Marine*, BB³, 230, f. 129.

Des salves, la veille et le jour même, ont fait connaître la solennité de la fête qui se préparait et se célébrait. Deux mois de solde ont été payés aux ouvriers du port. Mariage civique, banquet réunissant toutes les autorités, spectacle gratis, feu d'artifice, illuminations, bal à la salle de spectacle, enfin rien n'a été négligé pour célébrer le 11 frimaire.

No. 395

VICE-CONSUL FERNANDEZ TO COCHRANE

[*Extract.*]

Ferrol, 3rd December, 1804.

We expect war. Reprisals on English property have taken place already ; there is nothing but preparing for war ; and a considerable number of sailors are expected, in number fifteen thousand. They say that M. Gravina, who was in Paris, is to come here to take charge of this department.

No. 396

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 6th December, 1804.

Sir,—I have to acquaint you for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I am returned to Torbay with the ships named in the margin.¹ South-east and southerly winds have prevailed very much lately. It only came to the westward on the night of the 4th.²

The Bellerophon joined me the 2nd inst., but I have not received any late letters or orders from

¹ *Britannia*, *Plantagenet*, *Windsor Castle*, *Courageux*, *Prince George*, *Defiance*, *Veteran*, *Thunderer*, *Goliath*, *San Josef*.

² Cornwallis put to sea with the squadron on the evening of the 6th, but returned to Torbay on the 12th. He was off Ushant again on the 18th.

their Lordships by that ship. I have sent her to join Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Graves off Rochefort, and I have ordered the Queen to Cawsand Bay to replenish. The squadron only anchored in the night, and this morning the wind inclines to the eastward again. The Atlas, Veteran, and Crescent parted company in thick weather on the 29th; the Crescent had joined me the 28th at night; the next day it blew too hard to communicate, and therefore had not received her orders.

The Veteran rejoined me the day after, but the others I have not heard of once; the Princess Royal and Téméraire were in company when we bore up, but have not yet anchored.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 397

ADMIRALTY TO LORD GARDNER

[Secret.]

By the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c.

Whereas we have ordered the Honourable William Cornwallis, Admiral of the White, and Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's ships and vessels employed and to be employed in the Channel soundings, &c., to detach the two ships named in the margin,¹ with such other 74-gun ships under his orders as he may judge most proper, off Cork, with directions to their captains to put themselves under your command, and follow your orders

¹ Princess Royal, Thunderer. (On 15th December Cornwallis detached the Princess Royal, Thunderer, and Goliath on this service.)

for their further proceedings, your Lordship is hereby required and directed on their arrival to take the same under your command accordingly, together with the ships also named in the margin,¹ which we have ordered to proceed from Spithead to join you.

Your Lordship is to direct the senior officer of the above-mentioned ships (which are to be employed for the protection of the western coast of Ireland from any attempts that may be made by the enemy to invade it) to proceed and cruise off Cape Clear whenever the wind is moderate, or may blow in that direction by which the enemy may be enabled to sail from Brest, and by which the said officer may be enabled to join the fleet under the command of Admiral Cornwallis, or any detachment thereof, in case of its proceeding towards the coast of Ireland.

You are to direct the senior officer, in case of tempestuous weather, to put into Berehaven for shelter, taking care, however, to hold the ships under his orders in a constant state of readiness, in the event of your or his receiving such intelligence as may render it necessary for him to do so ; and your Lordship will also direct the said senior officer to return to Berehaven with the ships under his orders whenever, from a change in the wind or other circumstances which induced him to put to sea, he may judge such a measure expedient.

As Admiral Cornwallis has been directed to send your Lordship the earliest intelligence of the sailing of any of the enemy's ships from Brest, in order that you may be prepared to take such measures as you may judge most proper to oppose them in the event of their steering towards the coast of Ireland, your Lordship will take particular care to keep all the ships under your command constantly complete in their stores and provisions, for which purpose a

¹ Princess of Orange, Raisonnable.

store-ship and some victuallers will be sent as soon as possible to Berehaven.

Given under our hands the 8th December, 1804.

[Signatures not in the transcript.]

By command of their Lordships,

WILLIAM MARSDEN.

No. 398

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 14th December, 1804.

Sir,—In answer to your letter dated 11th inst., written by direction of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, I beg to observe for their Lordships' information, that I have generally kept three frigates off Brest, besides those to watch the Passage du Raz, except when I have received directions to send any away immediately, as it happened in the case of the Indefatigable.

I never keep any with me, and therefore one of those in shore is the only frigate I can upon such an emergency get at. The day after the *Naiad* was intended to be sent away (for that ship did not go at the time) the *Crescent* joined me very late. I told her captain that he was to go and watch the port of Brest, but I was not able to give him his orders that night; the next morning it blew too hard to communicate, and at night he separated.

When the *Santa Margarita* joined me some days after, I sent her off Brest, and gave her captain the orders for Lord William Stuart. The *Naiad* was, as it happened, still there with the *Aigle*. I therefore rather believe, at the time their Lordships mention, there were four frigates off Brest, besides those watching the Passage du Raz, to which place I sent the *Æolus* the moment she joined.

The orders which have been given to the frigates and small craft employed upon that service since I have been upon the station are nearly the same, or to the same effect, as those mentioned in your letter, by direction of their Lordships. If such orders had not been given long since they must have supposed me very remiss indeed.

I send herewith for their Lordships' information the copies of the orders given to the *Naiad*, *Latona*, and *Phoenix*.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 399

COCHRANE TO CORNWALLIS

Northumberland, off Ferrol, 22nd December, 1804.

Sir,—In addition to my letter of the 18th, which I have been prevented from forwarding by the *Indefatigable* being driven to sea in a gale of wind on the 19th inst., I beg leave to inform you that the squadron is now denied all species of supplies from the shore, and this day an officer came to the watering place and ordered the boats off, signifying that all further communications between the ships and the shore was prohibited. The boats that were in shore understood that a declaration of war against Great Britain was expected to arrive this night from Madrid.

Four hundred troops are sent from Corunna to occupy the Peninsula that lies between this anchorage and the harbour of Corunna, and as I understand that batteries are going to be erected, as also the guns mounted on those that command this Bay, I do not expect that the squadron will in future be able to resort here when it blows hard to the westward. I will therefore, when the ships cannot

with safety keep the sea, rendezvous in Vares Bay to the eastward of Cape Ortegal.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ALEX. COCHRANE.

[Cochrane wrote from Vares Bay on the 27th, where he had taken shelter from a severe gale, and had found a 'weatherly situation,' and one almost equally advantageous as Betanzos Bay, which he could not any longer regard as a neutral port. The ships were in great need of cables and spare sails, some having been lost. Dr. Stephen, appointed to the Northumberland, had discovered a new treatment for ulcer, which had almost disappeared from the ship.]

No. 400

CAPTAIN ELPHINSTONE TO CORNWALLIS

Diamond, at Sea, 27th December, 1804.

Lat. $42^{\circ} 51'$ N. ; long. 10° on W.

Sir,—I have the honour to inform you that this morning I chased a ship on the S.W., steering for Cape Finisterre. At 10 o'clock I fired a gun, upon which she hoisted Spanish King's colours; on firing a second she hove to. I then sent an officer on board to inform the Spanish captain it was my orders to detain and send him to England, which I hoped he would comply with without obliging me to use force. The Spanish captain after some remonstrance came away in the boat, at which instant the Spanish officers ordered their ship's company to quarters and made every preparation for fighting their ship. After my repeatedly hailing them, and seeing them determined to make resistance, I directed a gun shot to be fired over her, upon which they struck their colours. I am sorry to say by the

fire of the Diamond 3 men were killed ; at the same time I am convinced by having acted in this manner a greater loss was prevented. She is the Infante Carlos, of 18 guns, 120 men, commanded by Don Raman Romay, lieutenant de vaisseau, from the Havana bound to Corunna, laden with specie, copper, and other merchandise on the Spanish King's account.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
THOS. ELPHINSTONE.

No. 401

COCHRANE TO CORNWALLIS

Northumberland, at Sea, 1st January, 1805.

Sir,—Yesterday I was enabled to regain my station off Ferrol, and from various circumstances having conjectured that war was actually declared by Spain against Great Britain, I sent a flag of truce to Corunna with a letter to the Captain-General of Galicia, a copy of which I inclose, together with his Excellency's answer.¹ My motive in sending the boat in was to obtain private information through those channels that have hitherto furnished me with it. The boat was not permitted to land at the town, but detained at the castle, where Mr. Barrie, the person who has transacted our business, was sent by the Governor, attended by two officers, who had orders to be present at the conversation which passed between him and Mr. Hort, my secretary. The latter, watching an opportunity when their attention was engaged, requested to know of Mr. Barrie whether Spain had actually declared war, to which he was answered in the affirmative, and that 20,000

¹ This document is printed from a copy among the dispatches made by Cornwallis's secretary, and the inclosures are not with it.

men would soon be at Ferrol.¹ He could not proceed further from the return of the officers. I wish much Mr. Barrie's name may not be mentioned, as he has already been confined in the castle for his attachment to the British Government.

The circumstance of one of the forts having fired at the Lucy lugger a few days ago when standing in shore, and the fishing boats, &c., avoiding the squadron, led me to conceive this to be the case. The guarded manner in which the Governor replied to my letter is accounted for by his wish to keep me in ignorance of the fact as long as possible.

I have in consequence of the above given provisional directions to detain and send to England all Spanish vessels, and I hope in doing so I will meet with your approbation, and that of the Government.

The *Illustrious* joined yesterday, having suffered severely in the different gales. She lost her main and foretop masts, with all the sails and rigging of the latter. I have sent her demands for stores to Plymouth. I fear much, unless a supply of spare sails are sent to this squadron, some of the ships will be forced to return to Plymouth, for the gales here are both frequent and severe.

I yesterday saw into the harbour of Ferrol. All the ships seemed to be much in the same situation as when I wrote last; only one of the French ships had moved into the fair-way for coming out.

The currents upon this part of the coast are very strong and regulated by the winds, from which circumstance, should this squadron be driven to the eastward of Cape Ortegal and the wind change to the eastward, it will be in the power of the French or Spanish ships to get over to Corunna before it is possible for me to regain the station between those

¹ The declaration of war with Spain was laid before Parliament, and published 24th January.

two ports. Not having now Betanzos Bay to resort to makes a most essential difference in the blockade of Ferrol.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
ALEX. COCHRANE.

No. 402

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 6th January, 1805.

[On 15th December had given orders to Captain Reynolds, of the *Princess Royal*, to proceed according to their Lordships' directions, and the *Thunderer* and *Goliath* were to follow his orders. The *Plantagenet's* main mast was defective, but could be secured with fishes. The wind coming round in the afternoon, had put to sea, and the *Plantagenet* joined next morning with the *Æolus* and *Hazard*, which were dispatched respectively to the *Passage du Raz* and to *Santander*.]

I beg you will further acquaint their Lordships that on the morning of the 18th ulto. the easterly wind increased to a hard gale, and prevented my receiving any accounts or being joined by any ships. The gales have continued with a few hours' intervals for a fortnight, and as we were seldom able to carry any sail, and a very great sea, I was with the squadron driven far to the westward, and the ships have laboured very much. Four of them have shifted topmasts, and the *Prince George* reported to be leaky. I inclose for their Lordships' information Captain Yorke's account of the same, with her defects. Captain Pender has again complained of the *Plantagenet's* mainmast, and having sent his carpenter on board the *Ville de Paris*, Mr. Clark gave him directions for its preservation.

I have had a communication with some of the

ships, only for an hour one day, on the 23rd. It has blown exceedingly hard since that time. Both the *Ville de Paris*'s tillers have given way, and Captain Guion, of the *Prince*, has reported the same; there is therefore reason to apprehend that the squadron in general have suffered.

Upon endeavouring to make Ushant since the wind came round, the 1st inst., to enable us to make easting, it has inclined to the southward with thick weather.

The ships named in the margin ¹ are those which sailed with me from Torbay the 15th ulto., and none have joined me since. The *Nautilus* joined me the 4th, but I have not received any public letters since the day after I put to sea from Torbay. I have sent the men lately belonging to the *Gertrude* in, as they are not men belonging to the service; this ship is a great many short of her complement. All accidents help to reduce the number, and none are ever received to replenish.

The *Aigle* has made the signal that the enemy are in the same state, and as that ship has been a long time out I have sent her to Plymouth to replenish.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 403

CAPTAIN DUNDAS TO CORNWALLIS

Naiad, Plymouth Sound, 7th January, 1805.

Sir,—I beg leave to acquaint you that on the 2nd inst. at daylight in the morning, being close in with the harbour of Santander, I fell in with and detained the Spanish *Nuestra Señora de los Dolores*

¹ *Britannia*, *Téméraire*, *Plantagenet*, *Courageux*, *Warrior*, *Prince George*, *Defiance*, *Dragon*, *Prince*, *Atlas*.

from La Vera Cruz, having on board specie and cargo agreeably to the inclosed list. As she is a vessel of considerable value, and having twenty-five men besides passengers on board, I considered it most prudent to take her in tow and see her in safety to this port.

The orders under which I acted are dated as far back as 7th October, 1804, and as they relate only to Spanish frigates having treasures on board, I was greatly at a loss to know how to proceed; but I am pleased to learn by the general order now given I have done rightly.¹

If Vice-Admiral Young and Sir Charles Cotton, Bart., have no orders for me I shall proceed to sea immediately after removing my people from the detained vessel, and cruise agreeably to your orders.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

THOS. DUNDAS.

No. 404

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 8th January, 1805.

Sir,—In consequence of the defects of the *Prince George*, which I sent for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty by the *Aigle*, and the letter inclosed with the defects of the *Dragon*, received yesterday from Captain Griffith, I shall order both those ships to Spithead when it is in my power, and as the *Plantagenet* must, I imagine, have a new mainmast—and a signal was yesterday made that her bowsprit is sprung—I have therefore thought those defects

¹ See Cornwallis's letter to Marsden, 15th January. On the 9th Captain Paget, of the *Endymion*, reported that he had sent into port a Spanish ship from the *Orientoco*, laden with cochineal, hides, tallow, and cocoa. Many others were captured.

may be sooner made good at Spithead than Cawsand Bay at this season of the year; I shall send her there accordingly. The Prince, I am sorry to add, has also proved very defective, as will appear by Captain Guion's letter which I have the honour to inclose. Mr. Clark has been on board and states the danger of losing her rudder; I shall therefore be obliged to send that ship immediately to Cawsand Bay.

Vice-Admiral Collingwood in the Dreadnought, joined me in the night, which is the only ship of the line I have yet seen since the 15th of last month, when I put to sea from Torbay with eleven sail of the line. If I was to send the ships I have mentioned I should then have only eight with me. The weather has, in general, been very bad, with a great deal of sea or swell, which has occasioned the ships to labour most exceedingly; both the tillers of the Ville de Paris have given way, as well as those of the Prince and Prince George. Since the easterly wind ceased, it has generally blown either from the southward or northward, and it has been so unsettled as to oblige me to keep the sea.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 405

*LIEUTENANT THOMAS SWAIN TO
CORNWALLIS*

Attack, at Sea, 9th January, 1805.

Sir,—In obedience to your signal on 15th December to weigh and proceed off Brest, the wind inclinable to the eastward, I judged proper to make the land to the eastward of Ushant, which I accomplished at 4 p.m. on the 17th by making the land about Abervrac'h, and at 7 the same evening, by the

assistance of the moon I descried a convoy to the number of fifteen sail, steering alongshore to the westward; and not doubting but they were the enemy's, I made all sail in chase of them. At 8.30 I came up with their rear, which I found protected by a large gun-brig, and began to engage her, which she returned with a smart fire. In the meantime another gun-brig and a large cutter were seeking shelter among the rocks with the main body of their convoy, and the one engaged thinking us too much for him, made all sail and ran aground, and our distance from the shore not being then above two cables' length, rendered any further effort to bring him off useless without greatly endangering his Majesty's brig; and I have only to lament they were not a mile from the land, as I have great cause to believe one of the brigs, if not both, with as many of the convoy as we could have taken possession of, must have fallen into our hands, as I trust the handful of men I have the honour to command would have been equal to that service. But from circumstances observed I was only enabled to bring away one, which engaged with the gun-brig. The crew had deserted her, and leaves me ignorant of her destination or from whence she came. She is named on her stern the *Pique of Saint Malo*, about fifty tons, laden with wet cargo, supposed wine or spirits. I have sent her to Plymouth, and, from the convoy's instructions found on board, the commodore gun-brig appears to be numbered 164, commanded by Citizen Partoureau. The next morning in reconnoitring them, I had the gratification to observe one of the gun-brigs and five of their convoy on the rocks, and ere this from their situation must have gone to pieces.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

THOS. SWAIN.

No. 406

NAPOLEON TO DECRÈS¹

Paris, 22 nivôse, an XIII [12th January, 1805].

Faites conduire à Brest et désarmer : 1°. Les 10 péniches qui sont à Concarneau. 2°. Les 3 bateaux canonnières et les 15 péniches qui sont à Bénédict. 3°. La chaloupe canonnière et les 4 bateaux canonnières qui sont à Audierne. 4°. Les 9 péniches qui sont à Penmarch. 5°. Les 5 chaloupes canonnières et les 16 péniches qui sont à Brest.

Les équipages renforceront l'escadre. Tous les détachements des 44^e et 63^e régiments rejoindront leurs corps à Brest. Tous les autres rejoindront leurs corps au camp de Boulogne. Pressez le départ de tous les bâtiments de la flottille qui se trouvent à Saint-Malo, Granville, au Havre &c. pour les ports de rassemblement.

NAPOLÉON.

[11th January, 1805.—Cornwallis acknowledges Admiralty letter inclosing a complaint from the East India Company, that men had been impressed out of their ship *Europe*, and taken on board the *Tonnant* and *Hawk*. Inquiries were to be instituted.]

No. 407

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 11th January, 1805.

Sir,—I have this day received the duplicate order of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 18th of last month, directing me in falling in with any Spanish ships or vessels to detain them,

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (x.) No. 8270.

and either to bring or send them into port, there to remain until his Majesty's pleasure shall be known. Accordingly I shall immediately attend thereto, and give the necessary orders, with the exception of those Spanish ships and vessels who are furnished with passports, and to be permitted to proceed on their respective voyages agreeably to their Lordships' directions contained in your letter of the 3rd inst., which I have this moment received, with the copy of one therein mentioned from Sir Stephen Cottrell upon that subject.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 408

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 14th January, 1805.

Sir,—I request you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the wind came westward and blew hard yesterday morning, with heavy rain towards noon, and from the very thick weather I was not enabled to bear up with the squadron until the evening. I am now arrived at this anchorage with the ships named in the margin.¹ The Plantagenet, Prince George, and Dragon I have sent to Spithead for the purposes mentioned in my letter to you for their Lordships' information of the 9th inst., and if the wind should fortunately continue to the westward a few days, all the ships that were with me in the late continued gale will profit by it.

Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, in the San Josef, rejoined me on the 10th, and the Windsor Castle at the same time, which ship being imme-

¹ San Josef, Dreadnought, Britannia, Téméraire, Courageux, Warrior, Defiance, Atlas.

diately from port, I have detached to join Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Graves off Rochefort, to relieve the Tonnant.

I am informed by Sir Charles Cotton that the Growler gun-brig, Frisk and Rhoda cutters, have put into Plymouth from their station off Brest, and the Rambler from the Passage du Raz. The Joseph cutter has always complained. She joined me, after having been repaired, to the eastward, the 11th inst., and yesterday, when I wanted to employ her, a signal was made that she had occasion to go into port. The weather at the time prevented any communication.

I am sorry to say that there is very little dependence to be placed in these vessels keeping to their stations at this season. The Colpoys schooner and Nimrod cutter were out all the easterly gales without complaining, and the Nile lugger has been at sea ever since the beginning of October.

I shall attend to their Lordships' directions to me contained in your letter dated the 2nd inst., relating to the launches being employed for the present in watering the ships, owing for the difficulty in procuring craft for that service.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 409

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 15th January, 1805.

Sir,—I have received the order of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 12th inst., directing me to seize or destroy all ships or vessels belonging to Spain which I may fall in with, to which you will be pleased to acquaint their Lordships I shall duly attend, and immediately give the

necessary orders to the several flag officers, and captains and commanders under my orders. I have also received your letter dated the 11th inst., transmitting a copy of a paper of intelligence relative to the enemy's force in the river at St. Martin's.

The Prince of Wales, Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, came in here this morning.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 410

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO MR. MARSDEN

Prince of Wales, Torbay, 15th January, 1805.

Sir,—You will be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I arrived here this day at half-past 11 P.M. with his Majesty's ship, having encountered very severe blowing weather, with a heavy sleet, rain and sea for eight and forty hours, in consequence of which we found our new bobstays and rigging to stretch very much, and the masts to have a great deal of play, particularly the bowsprit. I therefore judged it proper to bear up for this anchorage in order to secure our masts and to look for Admiral Cornwallis, who I had reason to think had bore up also for Torbay. We got off Ushant on Saturday evening, and saw Admiral Cornwallis on Sunday afternoon under his storm stay-sails, with the wind at S.W., Ushant bearing from us at that time south, distant about 12 leagues, and the Admiral bore from us south about 3 leagues. We saw the Admiral burn blue lights at 6 P.M. on Sunday, which I took for the signal to wear, and I wore and stood to the southward for that night. The next morning, seeing nothing of the squadron, I wore and stood to the northward with the view of crossing on the squadron, but saw nothing of it all

the day. I therefore concluded he had bore up, and I did the same, and on my arrival found Admiral Cornwallis and squadron here before me.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ROBT. CALDER.

No. 411

*DECRÈS TO NAPOLEON*¹

Paris, 25 nivôse, an XIII [15th January, 1805].

L'Amiral Ganteaume a rendu compte que, d'après les ordres de M. le Maréchal Augereau, les troupes déjà embarquées sur l'armée navale de Brest pour complément d'équipage devraient faire partie intégrante de l'armée expéditionnaire; que conséquemment elles pourraient être éloignées de leur destination actuelle pour être réunies aux corps rassemblés près de Brest; et qu'ultérieurement elles pourraient aussi quitter les vaisseaux pour servir avec les troupes de débarquement. L'Amiral Ganteaume a représenté avec raison que cette disposition serait très préjudiciable à l'armée navale. En effet l'embarquement des troupes en sus du nombre déterminé pour les garnisons a été motivé sur l'insuffisance des équipages; ces troupes ont été exercées aux manœuvres hautes et basses, et si les services qu'elles rendent aujourd'hui ne sont point encore tels qu'ils pourront le devenir par la continuation des exercices, il n'en est pas ainsi de la manœuvre de l'artillerie. Ces militaires ont acquis une partie de l'expérience nécessaire sous ce rapport, ils inspirent la plus grande confiance aux commandants des vaisseaux, et il est certain qu'indépendamment de l'effet moral que produirait le débarquement de ces soldats, il en résulterait une désorganisation réelle dans les moyens

¹ *Arch. Nat.*, A.F. iv. 1195.

de défense des vaisseaux, puisqu'alors les équipages se trouveraient numériquement trop faibles pour suffire aux manœuvres et à l'artillerie.

La totalité des troupes déjà reparties sur l'armée navale de Brest s'élève à 4382 hommes, dont 2390 hommes pour garnisons, 1992 hommes pour faire auxiliairement le service des marins.

No. 412

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 16th January, 1805.

Sir,—I have the honour to inclose the report of Captain Aldham, of the Nautilus, sent by me to look into Brest road. I believe the enemy move their ships occasionally. Two foreigners came out some time since; reported 4 three-decked ships, and our ships have stated at times that number. No detachment appears to have sailed, although the secret intelligence reported the rebel O'Connor to be embarked the middle of November.

And you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the Queen joined me last night.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

INCLOSURE

Captain Aldham's Report of the enemy at Brest.

Ships of the line	20
Frigates	5

On the 12th inst. apparently in the same situation as they were when Captain Moore formerly reconnoitred.

G. ALDHAM.

[While in Torbay it was found that the rudder of the *Ville de Paris* required to be rehung, and Cornwallis proceeded to Cawsand Bay, directing Sir Charles Cotton to proceed off Brest with the part of the squadron from Torbay. They were at sea on 21st January, and the *Ville de Paris* with the *Neptune* left Cawsand Bay on the 26th.]

No. 413

*SIR THOMAS GRAVES TO ADMIRAL
CORNWALLIS*

Foudroyant, at anchor in Quiberon Bay,
17th January, 1805.

Sir,—I have the honour to acquaint you that the *Felix* joined me the 4th inst., with your letter of 15th ult. and other orders. The *Felix* had sustained so much damage by bad weather on her passage (which compelled her lieutenant to throw six of her guns overboard) as to make it necessary to caulk her all over, and give her other repairs, which has been effected here by the artificers of the squadron.

In bearing up for this bay last night to avoid the approaching gale at S.W., we were joined by the *Windsor Castle*, and soon after by the *Felix* schooner, with Captain Campbell, and part of the complement of the late *Doris* (the rest being put on board a Danish brig, now at this anchorage) who was lost on the 15th inst., having received her damage the previous Saturday night (12th inst.). The immediate departure of the *Tonnant* prevents Captain Campbell from transmitting me his official letter on that subject, which he will be enabled to forward to you on his arrival in England.

The *Felix*, by signal, apprised me of the sailing of the enemy's squadron from Rochefort, and of

having seen them the 12th inst. steering N.W., viz., 1 three-decker, 5 two-deckers, 2 frigates, and 2 brigs. I instantly hauled my wind under close-reefed topsails and reefed courses, but finding it impossible to weather the shore on either tack, and it being then past half-past four o'clock in the evening, blowing a gale of wind, I was compelled to anchor here with the squadron.

The instant the weather will permit I shall go in pursuit of the enemy, who, from the winds and weather we have had, must have returned to Rochefort, as the Tonnant passed the topmast of one of the French line-of-battle ships last night. The inclosed letter from Lieutenant Bourne, of the Felix, justifies my opinion, and I shall send him back to reconnoitre them at Rochefort the moment the Doris's men are removed from the schooner to the Tonnant, who has my order to carry them to England. I have doubly to lament the loss of the Doris, as it deprived me of the intelligence of the enemy I must otherwise have received from her and the schooner, the service of the latter being entirely taken up in saving the crew of the former. I have taken the liberty of retaining 35 of her seamen, in lieu of an equal number lent to the Lady Castlereagh, East Indiaman, in Cawsand Bay, who I understand have been since disposed of by Vice-Admiral Young to some of the ships fitting out at Plymouth; and, as this is really the worst-manned ship that ever went to sea, I have taken the liberty also to keep 10 of her marines to complete the party on board, which I trust will meet with your approbation, as we shall *then* be 31 short of complement, as will appear by Captain Nesham's weekly account of this day.

I have the honour, &c.,

THOS. GRAVES.

INCLOSURE A

LIEUTENANT BOURNE TO CAPTAIN CAMPBELL
(DORIS)

Felix, Quiberon Bay, 13th January, 1805.

Sir,—After having parted company with the Doris on the 10th inst., we were drawn considerably to the S.W., in chase of some neutrals, the report of which I have the honour to inclose. We hauled in for the Chassiron on the evening of the 11th, but the wind having, in the course of the night, veered from E. by N. to S.S.W. and threatening to blow, we stood to the westward in order to make an offing. On the following morning—the 12th—when the day was about to break, we saw several sail in the N.E., and immediately bore up for them, but soon after, being enabled to count 8 ships and 2 brigs, we hauled our wind on the starboard tack, and passed them to windward, without, however, altering our sail, to which circumstance I attribute their having suffered us to proceed unmolested, as our distance from them did not exceed half gun shot. As the day broke we distinctly ascertained them to be 6 sail of the line, 2 frigates and 2 brigs—the same vessels, I am fully persuaded, recently reconnoitred by this schooner in Basque roads. The wind was then about S. by W., and they steered N.W., under topgallant sails and other plain sail, but I observed that not one of the squadron had a main-sail set. We continued on a wind to the S.E. under easy sail, apprehending, if we prematurely bore up, the enemy's suspicion might be awakened, and we, in consequence, cut off from this anchorage, where I imagined Sir Thomas Graves would seek shelter from the threatening westerly gale. At nine we bore up north in a squall which obscured us from the view of the enemy. They were then continuing

to steer N.W. At ten it cleared up, but I could faintly distinguish them from the masthead. On retracing our courses, after having made Isle Dieu (our reckoning at the time varying but inconsiderably), we find ourselves to have been, when we saw the French squadron, in lat. $45^{\circ} 56'$ N. and long. $1^{\circ} 51'$ W., Isle Dieu bearing N. 24° W. (true), 50 miles.

I have the honour, &c.,
RICHD. BOURNE.

INCLOSURE B

Information received by Lieutenant Henry S. Jones, of the late Doris, from the American schooner Lydia of New York, from Fayal bound to Nantes (15th January, 1805).

On Monday, the 14th January, fell in with a squadron of 5 sail of the line (one of which was a three-decker), 3 frigates, and 1 brig, standing to the northward, with a fresh westerly wind. At noon they tacked, the master of the American vessel supposes, to avoid the Penmarcks, as from their situation at that time, and the wind as it was, it was not possible for them to weather the Penmarcks on the starboard tack. One of the line-of-battle ships had lost her foretopmast, another had no main topsail set, but he (the master) could not distinguish clearly whether her main topsail yard was down or not. They were under a press of sail, but endeavouring to keep the disabled ships with them as much as possible.

[Upon a review of the circumstances of the escape of the Rochefort squadron, it appeared to the Admiralty at a later date that Graves was improperly watering his ships in Quiberon Bay at the time.

The squadron which eluded his vigilance, as is narrated in the above letter, and to the supposed movements of which many of the following papers are devoted, was that of Vice-Admiral Missiessy, which made the first move in the great strategic game of Napoleon. It put to sea on 11th January with orders to proceed to the West Indies, and there to combine with the squadron of Villeneuve from Toulon. They were to leave port simultaneously if possible, but Villeveuve could not get away until the evening of the 18th. He was obliged to return, and did not finally depart until 29th March. Missiessy's squadron comprised the *Majestueux*, 120, *Jemmapes*, 74, *Magnanime*, 74, *Suffren*, 74, *Lion*, 74, *Gloire*, 40, *Armide*, 40, *Infatigable*, 40, *Actéon*, 16, and *Lynx*, 16, and had on board 3,500 troops under General Joseph Lagrange, with artillery and stores. In the British squadron the strategy had not been divined. Graves thought the ships had returned to Rochefort, and afterwards was 'very certain' they were intended for Brest; Captain Jervis shared the latter view. Cornwallis thought they were probably at Lorient. Early in February, however, it became known that the Frenchmen were victualled for four months and stored for six, and on the 13th Sir Francis Laforey reported a rumour that they had gone to the Mediterranean or the West Indies, while, even so late as the 19th, the Admiralty complained that the information was too vague to lead to a judgment. Meanwhile Cochrane, from Ferrol, had been ordered to pursue Missiessy with six sail of the squadron, and was replaced there by Sir Robert Calder, with a detachment of ships from off Brest (see later papers). Missiessy returned in safety to Rochefort on 20th May, bringing back many spoils from our West Indian possessions.]

[On the date of the above letter, 17th January, Graves again writing to Cornwallis expressed the hope that the enemy's squadron had returned to Rochefort or Lorient. He regretted the want of small vessels to maintain communication with Rochefort. His squadron could not approach sufficiently near the coast to reconnoitre. The *Felix* had suffered so severely that she was partially disqualified. *January 18th.*—The *Bellerophon* had sprung a lower yard. It was necessary for the *Foudroyant* to go into dock, and Graves requested that another ship should be appointed to take her place.]

No. 414

*CAPTAIN CAMPBELL (DORIS) TO SIR THOMAS
GRAVES*

Tonnant, Quiberon Bay, 19th January, 1805.

Sir,—It is with the greatest regret I acquaint you of the loss of his Majesty's ship *Doris*, late under my command, by striking on a sunken rock going through the Bénéguet passage into Quiberon Bay, at 6 P.M. on Saturday, the 12th instant.

After having reconnoitred the squadron of the enemy under Isle d'Aix on the 9th instant, as I was proceeding to give you information of its state, I fell in with the *Felix* schooner. From her I learnt that you were in Quiberon Bay. I immediately made the best of my way to that anchorage, and did not ascertain your having sailed until my arrival there on Friday night, the 11th. Owing to the thick weather, and the wind at S.E. it was too late to work out. In the morning we weighed, and off Belle Isle spoke an American, who informed me he had been boarded by one of the squadron the day before, and had seen it at two that morning

7 or 8 leagues to the S.W. of Belle Isle. In the evening the wind veered to the southward, and began to blow with every appearance of bad weather. Judging from your nearness to the land, you would run in if it proved unfavourable, and, not being able to weather Belle Isle or the Cardinals, induced me to bear up to gain an anchorage; and, just as the pilot had assured me the ship was in safety, she struck, but so lightly that I had no idea of her having received any material injury.

On sounding the wells, found she made water fast, and, before we could anchor, it had increased to 4 feet, and continued gaining on us to $7\frac{1}{2}$, though the people were instantly sent to the pumps. The guns, shot, spare anchors, and everything heavy that could be got at, thrown overboard, as well as having thrummed sails under her bottom. At 3 A.M. on Sunday, by the unremitting exertions of the people at the pumps and baling, we began to gain on the leaks, and, by eight, got her clear; but it required both chain pumps to keep her so. At noon it began to blow extremely hard from the southward. The ship driving, let go the other bower, and veered to two cables. Soon after the Felix schooner arrived, and informed me by signal of the French squadron having put to sea from Rochefort on the 11th instant. At this time it was blowing a heavy gale. At night it moderated, and continued so during the whole of the next day, during which time we had succeeded in nearly stopping the leaks, so that one pump forward and one aft kept her free.

Being extremely anxious you should receive the earliest information of the squadron's sailing, and having reason to believe the enemy were apprised of our distressed situation, as also the fullest confidence in the ship's being able to reach England,

at half-past five P.M. I put to sea with a gentle breeze from the southward, and every appearance of fine weather, intending, if the leaks did not increase during the night, to send the schooner in quest of you.

At 12 it began to freshen, but no appearance of the leaks increasing; at half-past one fresh gales with heavy squalls—close reefed the topsails; at 2 handed the fore and mizen; at 3 wore to regain the bay, a heavy sea running. The ship laboured much, the leaks began rapidly to increase, and the pumps in the coal hole were continually choking; the scuttles that had been made to let the water from the magazine to the pumps being stopped, the deck was scuttled, and we began baling, the leak still gaining fast. At 5 the magazine became full, the water forcing its way aft through the passages in alarming quantities. At half-past five, more moderate, but still a heavy sea running; set the fore and mizen topsails, let three reefs out, and made all possible sail for Quiberon Bay; half-past six, in a squall, the wind flew to the N.W. by N.; soon after saw Hoedic bearing N.W. by N. 5 or 6 leagues. The ship, at this time, was settling fast by the head, and had nearly lost her steerage. Finding it impossible to weather the storm, and the carpenter giving it as his opinion that the ship could not be kept longer above water, and my officers concurring in the same, I gave over all hopes of being able to save his Majesty's ship, and was under the painful necessity, a little after 9, of bearing up for an American schooner, for the purpose of saving the people, who were worn down and exhausted with fatigue.

The leaks still gaining rapidly, notwithstanding every exertion to keep them under, at half-past nine came to with both bows in 15 fathoms

water, Croisic bearing N.E. 7 or 8 miles. Hoisted out the boats, and began sending the people on board the *Felix* and *American*; but, owing to the heavy swell, could not get them all out of the ship before half-past noon. At 3, the water being nearly up to the lower deck, I set her on fire, and quitted. Soon after she blew up.

I cannot conclude this painful subject without expressing how sensibly I feel the exertions of all my officers and ship's company, which must ever reflect on them the highest credit.

I have the honour, &c.,

PATK. CAMPBELL.

No. 415

*CAPTAIN MORRIS TO SIR THOMAS
GRAVES*

Colossus, between Olonne and the Roches Bonnes,
23rd January, 1805.

Sir,—Lieutenant Bourne, of the *Felix*, having reported to me that last evening he had a good view of the anchorage where he before saw the French squadron riding, and that there was not then any ship lying there, and only one which he could discover, and which he thinks not larger than a frigate, lying above Aix Island, in part dismantled, and appeared to him to be on a careen, and he having no doubt of the correctness of his observations, I have judged it must be your wish—particularly as the weather makes it impossible to reconnoitre to-day, and will likewise prevent vessels coming out of Rochefort, from which I might obtain intelligence—for me to return to you without delay. Unsettled weather, extremely variable winds, and a heavy

western swell—also mistaking a strong light shown the first part of Monday night from Olonne for the Whale light (which Lieutenant Bourne informs me they show to deceive our ships when seen off)—and our pilot in the morning likewise mistaking a tower on Olonne for Chassiron lighthouse (neither myself nor officers having been here before), we did not arrive off the Whale light till yesterday noon. The weather squally with light winds between them, we continued, while it kept to the northward of west, to steer with the studding sails set for the passage of Antioche till within about 7 miles of Chassiron lighthouse, when the wind coming S.W. we hauled out on the larboard tack. But its lightness not forcing the ship against the swell, the ship drifted towards the Whale Bank, opposite Ars, and the anchor was let go in 13 fathoms, which, holding well in a smart squall at W.S.W., I was unwilling to weigh again till the wind might somewhat settle, it being moderate and flying about from S.S.E. to W.N.W. But, towards 7 o'clock, finding the ship drive with a breeze at W. by N. and whole cable out, I ordered the cable to be cut, and made sail under double reefed topsails. In the evening, when it was clear, we could not from our mast-head see any ships' masts in the direction of Isle d'Aix, which I think we might have done had there been any lying below it. Your order to me, sir, giving me reason to expect the enemy's squadron had put back there, made me consider it improper to anchor within the passage, which I must have done had I gone farther in, as the flood tide was running, and a swell that must make tacking doubtful.

I have the honour, &c.,

J. N. MORRIS.

No. 416

SIR CHARLES COTTON TO CORNWALLIS

San Josef, at Sea, 20 leagues due West of Ushant,
25th January, 1805.

Sir,—I have to acquaint you that on the evening of the 23rd inst., Captain Jervis, in the *Tonnant*, joined me, and by signal communicated that the enemy's squadron at Rochefort, consisting of six sail of the line and two frigates, had put to sea and were seen steering N.W. A heavy gale coming from the eastward prevented any further communication till this morning, when, by means of several signals, and a message sent by the *Contest* brig (the weather not admitting of intercourse by boats), I learned from Captain Jervis that the enemy's ships were last seen 12 days past off the Penmarcks, and that he had no doubt they were now in Brest. I immediately dispatched Lieutenant Gregory with this information to Admiral Lord Gardner, it being impossible from the state of the weather for any vessel to reach a port in England. On my arrival off Ushant on the 22nd, I directed by signal the *Defiance* to proceed to the ships stationed off Brest, but she has returned without obtaining any intelligence of the state of the enemy; and, on the 23rd, I ordered the *Sirius* to reconnoitre that port, but from my being driven to the westward she has not rejoined me.

I have the honour, &c.,

CHARLES COTTON.

No. 417

SIR CHARLES COTTON TO MR. MARSDEN

San Josef, at Sea, 26th January, 1805.

Sir,—It is with extreme concern I have to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Com-

missioners of the Admiralty, that as Captain Jervis, accompanied by Captain Campbell, of the *Doris* (lately lost), was this morning coming from the *Tonnant* to this ship, the boat was upset, by which unfortunate accident that zealous and excellent officer, with one of the crew, were drowned. Captain Campbell and the other men were providentially saved, and he is now on board the *Tonnant*. The letters (extracts of which I herewith inclose) from Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Graves were picked up by the boats sent to their assistance.¹ In consequence of the melancholy event I have directed Lieutenant Justice Finley, first of the *Tonnant*, to act as captain of that ship until further orders.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES COTTON.

No. 418

SIR CHARLES COTTON TO MR. MARSDEN

San Josef, at Sea, 27th January, 1805.

Sir,—You will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that Lieutenant Bourne in his Majesty's schooner *Felix* joined me this morning, and reports that, by the directions of Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Graves, he proceeded on the 22nd instant to reconnoitre the port of Rochefort, on which day he was enabled to have a perfect view of the Isle d'Aix and the entire of Basque roads, where he could observe only one vessel, which he imagines might be a frigate, that had the appearance of a man-of-war. From which information the enemy's squadron cannot have returned to Rochefort, as is supposed by Sir Thomas Graves in his letter

¹ The extracts referred to are not with the dispatch, but the letters are among Colonel Cornwallis West's papers, and are printed on previous pages (see No. 413 and the inclosures).

of the 17th, transmitted to you in my dispatch of yesterday. The lieutenant likewise informs me that I may hourly expect to be joined by the Rear-Admiral, he having seen him with the squadron on the 24th, carrying a press of sail to the northward.

I am using every exertion to approach Ushant to join the Commander-in-Chief, whom I suppose to be now off there.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES COTTON.

No. 419

LIEUTENANT BEAUMAN TO CORNWALLIS

Aigle, at Sea, 27th January, 1805.

Sir,—In obedience to your signal of this morning I proceeded with his Majesty's ship *L'Aigle* and reconnoitred the enemy's force in Brest harbour at 3 P.M.; had a favourable opportunity of getting a very distinct view of the fleet, and found them to consist of 21 sail of the line, 4 of which are three-decked ships, 4 frigates, 2 corvettes, 2 brigs and 1 cutter, with 1 Admiral and 2 Rear-Admirals' flags flying.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

FRAS. BEAUMAN.¹

No. 420

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 30th January, 1805.

Sir,—You will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I joined the ships with Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Cotton yester-

¹ Lieutenant Beauman, under an acting order from Cornwallis, had proceeded from Cawsand Bay off Brest, Captain Wolfe being at the time on leave, and there being urgent necessity for the services of the *Aigle*.

day, and found that Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Graves had joined him with the ships from before Rochefort the preceding evening, and that the French squadron had sailed from that port about the 12th inst.

Sir Charles Cotton tells me he had sent the *Felix* schooner on the 27th to look off Ushant, and not perceiving me to go to Cawsand Bay, the Vice-Admiral having sent you for their Lordships' information all the papers, &c. I was close in with Ushant that day but did not see the *Felix*. The *Aigle* looked into Brest roads on the 27th, had a very good view, and I sent the reports by the *Indefatigable* the next evening.

Sir Thomas Graves appears very certain that the French squadron were destined for Brest. By comparing the accounts I am inclined to think they may have put into Lorient. I have recalled the *Aigle*, and sent her with all expedition off that port to look in, and should she not observe them there I have ordered Lieutenant Beauman to go off Rochefort and bring me the earliest intelligence.

By the *Aigle* I have sent directions to the *Santa Margarita*, which ship had been sent to relieve the *Doris*, and the *Spartiate* to relieve the *Hero*, for both those ships to return. If the enemy's squadron should be at either of those ports I shall send, as it appeared to be their Lordships' intention, to watch them. It is unlikely that they should have got into Brest without some of our ships or vessels having seen them, and if they had done so, they must have been immediately hid away, as there is not the smallest appearance of any material alteration in the road of Brest. I have directed Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Graves to proceed to Cawsand Bay with the ships named in the margin ;¹ the *Windsor Castle*

¹ *Foudroyant*, *Hero*, *Tonnant*.

and Spartiate had been sent to relieve the Tonnant and Hero. The Foudroyant has defects about the stern which will, Sir Thomas Graves informs me, require a smooth harbour or dock to repair. I have therefore sent those ships in at once. The Mars cannot stay very long, but I am desirous of keeping as many as I can with me, lest the enemy should form a junction, in which case they will be of considerable force, and I shall have only sixteen ships with me.

I understand all the Doris's people are either on board the Foudroyant or Tonnant, which ships are going in.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 421

*A LIST OF THE ENEMY'S FORCE IN BREST,
31st JANUARY, 1805¹*

Three three-deck ships, 18 two-deck ships, 3 frigates, 1 ship corvette, 1 brig, 3 luggers. Admiral's flags, one; rear-admirals', two.

Melampus, off Brest, 31st January, 1805.

S. POYNTZ.

No. 422

LIEUTENANT BEAUMAN TO CORNWALLIS

Aigle, off Rochefort, 1st February, 1805.

Sir,—Pursuant to your orders of the 29th and 30th ult., I proceeded with his Majesty's ship Aigle and reconnoitred the harbour of Lorient and Port Louis on the 31st, and finding none of the enemy's squadron in the above harbours, except a man-of-

¹ Transmitted by Cornwallis to Mr. Marsden, 6th February.

war brig in Port Louis, proceeded immediately to Rochefort, which port I reconnoitred this day at 3 P.M., and found lying here an eighty-gun ship nearly unrigged; and being anxious of gaining information of the enemy's squadron, stood into Basque roads, and brought to a French sloop, loaded with firewood, the master of which informed me that the French squadron, which was at Rochefort, had arrived safe at Brest on the 23rd ult., as letters had arrived that day from Brest to that effect, and that the ship then lying at Rochefort had sailed from Lorient, with an intention of joining the Rochefort squadron, but falling in with part of the English fleet, mistaking it for his own, sprung all his masts in carrying sail to escape them, and put into this port to refit.¹

I have the honour to be, &c.,

FRAS. BEAUMAN.

[On 6th February Lieutenant Beauman informed Cornwallis that in the above letter he had omitted to say that the squadron which sailed from Rochefort for Brest had no troops on board, but was victualled for four months, and stored for six.]

No. 423

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 3rd February, 1805.

Sir,—I request you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that,

¹ Transmitting this report to Mr. Marsden on 6th February, Cornwallis said he had never heard of the enemy's squadron falling in with a part of his own. The information concerning the supposed arrival of the Rochefort squadron at Brest was quite erroneous. As has been said, Missiessy had gone to the West Indies carrying troops (p. 162).

from all the accounts I have received, it does not appear that any of the enemy's ships have entered Brest, and as the squadron from Rochefort was seen by an American (a few days only after they had sailed) to tack close in with the Penmarcks, and stand to the southward, there is every reason to believe (as they did not appear to have troops or any transports with them) that they have either put into Lorient or returned to Rochefort.

The winds having lately hung to the northward has prevented the return of the *Aigle* with any information obtained, or observations made in that ship. I have therefore thought it most advisable, before the wind changed to the westward, to detach Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder with the ships named in the margin,¹ first to look into Port Lorient, and, not finding them there, to go off Rochefort, and should the enemy's squadron be at either of those ports to cruise off for the purpose of blocking them up, or to intercept them should they attempt to put to sea. But in the event of the Vice-Admiral not finding them or being able to gain any information of their destination, he is to return immediately.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 424

*COLLINGWOOD TO MR. J. E. BLACKETT*²

Dreadnought, off Ushant, 4th February, 1805.

In the middle of last month we put into Torbay, where we were a week ; but the being in Torbay is no great relief, for no person or boat goes on shore.

¹ Prince of Wales, Neptune, Courageux, Colossus, Atlas.

² Newnham Collingwood's *Life of Collingwood*, 3rd edition, p. 99.

We visit our friends and neighbours in the fleet, but have no communication with the rest of the world without they come on board and take the chance of a cruise. The sailing of the enemy's squadron from Rochefort, and evading Sir Thomas Graves, seems to intimate that something is soon to be undertaken by them. It is not yet well ascertained where that squadron is, but by the route in which they were seen, Brest seemed to be their destination, and if they are arrived there it will be a proof how little practicable it is to block up a port in winter. To sail from one blockaded port and enter another where the whole fleet is without being seen does not come within the comprehension of the city politicians. Their idea is that we are like sentinels standing at a door, who must see and may intercept all who attempt to go into it. But so long as the ships are at sea they are content, little considering that every one of the blasts which we endure lessens the security of the country. The last cruise disabled 5 large ships and 2 more lately ; several of them must be docked.

No. 425

*CAFFARELLI TO DECRÈS*¹

Brest, 15 pluviôse, an XIII [4th February, 1805].

[In view of the serious state into which trade had fallen, a demand had been made that coastwise transit should be authorised without escort, and the minister had desired the prefect to inform him as to the possibilities.]

L'expérience que j'ai acquise des difficultés qu'offre la navigation de St-Malo à Bayonne m'a

¹ *Arch. de la Marine*, BB³, 244, f. 74.

fait défendre jusqu'à ce jour la libre navigation, et en effet quelle défense peut-on attendre de quelques barques, dont l'armement consiste dans canons de très petit calibre, quelques armes et un équipage composé d'invalides canonniers ? Nous avons vu que les bâtiments de l'Etat bien armés résistent avec peine aux attaques des péniches. Il est évident que les ennemis entretiennent une croisière constante et très assidue sur les isles Chausey, sur Bréhat, sur Perros, sur l'isle de Batz ; que le Passage du Four, de l'Iroise, de la baie d'Audierne, est sévèrement gardé ; que les Anglais ont des bâtiments légers qui approchent la côte de très près et que leurs embarcations font souvent des expéditions pour capturer les bâtiments au mouillage. Vers Quiberon, de Belle Isle et Rochefort, les croiseurs ennemis abondent, et ce n'est que par adresse et dans des circonstances très favorables, qui sont bien rares, que nos bâtiments parviennent à passer. Les navires naviguant sans escorte tomberaient infailliblement au pouvoir des ennemis : ce qui non seulement entraînerait des pertes conséquentes pour les armateurs, mais augmenterait encore le nombre de nos prisonniers.

A ces considérations déjà bien fortes se joint un danger que l'on doit prévoir, qu'il importe d'éviter : c'est celui des communications avec l'ennemi dont les tentatives pour exciter des troubles dans l'intérieur ont été si variées, et que l'on n'a déjouées que par une extrême surveillance. Les communications pourraient devenir fréquentes et seraient ignorées, puisque l'intérêt des équipages serait de garder le silence.

No. 426

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 7th February, 1805.

Sir,—You will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that, having dispatched the *Aigle* to recall Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, and being very anxious to learn whether the French squadron had entered Brest, I yesterday directed Captain Scott, in the *Niobe*, to stand in for Brest and endeavour to obtain intelligence, with which he was to return. It was then blowing strong from the N.E., and I was not able to get any of the things out of her intended for this ship.

The wind changed suddenly in the night and it blew hard at S.W., with rain in the same manner it did the day before yesterday. If it continues to the westward and clears up so as to enable us to make the land, I shall push for Torbay with the squadron. The *Lucy*, hired lugger, having been sent by Vice-Admiral Young some time since to Rear-Admiral Cochrane off Ferrol, the *Pickle*, armed schooner, which I had stationed there, sent, upon her putting into Plymouth with dispatches by the Vice-Admiral, away upon some other service. I therefore told Rear-Admiral Cochrane that I thought he might consider it an exchange for the time, though not a very equal one in point of force. Vice-Admiral Young acquainted me that the *Lucy* is arrived at Plymouth without communicating with the Rear-Admiral, who has in consequence been obliged to send the *Nile*, the only small vessel he had, with his public letters. If it is their Lordships' pleasure the *Lucy* should not return, I must take

II.

N

the first opportunity of sending a small vessel to join Rear-Admiral Cochrane.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 427

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 9th February, 1805.

Sir,—I request you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I arrived here this afternoon with the squadron.¹ Yesterday it was such thick weather we could not make the land with safety.

The Eagle has separated owing to the weather, which still is foggy. She was in company last evening.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

[The wind having come round to the eastward, Cornwallis put to sea again with the squadron on the morning of the 10th, having meanwhile taken in a great deal of water.]

No. 428

SIR R. CALDER TO MR. MARSDEN

Prince of Wales, off Ushant, 11th February, 1805, 4 P.M.

Sir,—You will be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, I have been close off this place three days and have as yet seen nothing of Admiral Cornwallis; therefore conclude he

¹ Ville de Paris, San Josef, Dreadnought, Britannia, Téméraire, Queen, Warrior, Defiance, Windsor Castle, Mars, Bellerophon, Veteran.

must have been obliged to bear up for Torbay, but as the wind is now to the eastward, I expect to be joined by him in a few hours. The Eagle joined me yesterday, and I have taken her under my orders. The Nile lugger joined me this morning from Plymouth, and the Dispatch brig joined me at noon this day from the inshore squadron on her way to Plymouth to refit.

Captain Hawkins informs me he looked into Brest yesterday, and he counted distinctly only three ships of three decks and eighteen ships of two decks, with frigates, &c. They had their topgallant yards across and appeared perfectly ready for sea. I have now with me six sail of the line, and I shall keep close in with Ushant during this easterly wind, but should the wind change to the westward before I make the junction with Admiral Cornwallis, and it comes to blow hard, I shall bear up for Torbay with the ships under my directions, and I shall order the Colossus to Plymouth to refit, as she has been out upwards of three months.

I am, &c.,

ROBT. CALDER.

No. 429

Intelligence obtained by Captain Sir Francis Laforey from the master of an American vessel on the 13th inst. [February] having sailed from St. Martin's the day before.

'Whilst he was at St. Martin's, in the Isle of Ré, the French squadron, consisting of four sail of the line and two frigates, sailed from Basque roads, on the morning of the 11th of January, with the wind at east-south-east; that the British squadron were seen off the Isle of Ré when the

French sailed ; that there were no French men-of-war in Basque roads.

The prevailing report was that destination of the French squadron was either for the Mediteranean or the West Indies.'

No. 430

CAPTAIN PROWSE TO CORNWALLIS

Sirius, off the Saints, 12th February, 1805.

Sir,—I beg leave to acquaint you that his Majesty's ship under my command recaptured, on the 13th inst., the brig Spring from Newfoundland, laden with a cargo of salt fish, captured by the General Perignon, French privateer, on the 9th inst. off the Land's End.

I am, &c.,
WM. PROWSE.

No. 431

CAPTAIN POYNTZ TO CORNWALLIS

Melampus, off Ushant, 12th February, 1805.

Sir,—I have the honour to inform you that I this morning fell in with and captured two gun-brigs, carrying two long 24-pounders and one 18-pounder each, having on board 50 men, the greater part soldiers ; also four luggers mounting one long 18-pounder each, manned with 25 men, mostly soldiers. These vessels are part of 27 of the same description from Bordeaux to Brest. Two more were captured (lugger-rigged) early the same morning by the Rhoda and Frisk, armed cutters.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
S. POYNTZ.

No. 432

LIEUTENANT NICHOLSON TO CORNWALLIS

Armed cutter Frisk, at Sea, 13th February, 1805.

Sir,—I have the honour to acquaint you that at daylight yesterday (Rhoda cutter in company) I discovered ten sail of the enemy's gun-brigs and luggers had come through the Passage du Raz, and the wind blowing fresh to the eastward they were not able to get to windward.

I immediately gave chase to the weathermost, a lugger, and at half-past seven (Point du Raz S.S.W., distant five miles) I captured her, and sent her to Plymouth. She proves to be No. 288 gun-vessel, mounting one long 24-pounder, with 25 men, 20 of whom are troops of the 44th Regiment, commanded by Mons. P. Roux, enseigne de vaisseau. At half-past eleven the Melampus hove in sight to leeward.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

JAMES NICHOLSON.

No. 433

LIEUTENANT BATT TO CAPTAIN POYNTZ

Hired cutter Rhoda, off Brest, 13th February, 1805.

Sir,—I beg leave to acquaint you at daybreak in the morning of the 12th inst., St. Matthew's bearing N.E. 3 miles, in company with H.M. hired cutter Frisk, I discovered a fleet of brigs and luggers bearing S. by W. After half an hour's chase I arrived up with one of the luggers; after exchanging a few shot I had the satisfaction to see her strike. She proved to be the gunboat No. 313, with a 24-pounder in the bow, and armed with small arms

bound to Brest, commanded by Mons. Frederick Widsmann, enseigne auxiliaire, with a company of 18 soldiers and 4 seamen, one of whom was found killed.

I remain, &c.,
JOS. BAIN BATT, Lt. and Com.

No. 434

LIEUTENANT GREGORY TO CAPTAIN PROWSE

Gun-brig Contest, at Sea, 13th February, 1805.

Sir,—I have the honour to inform you his Majesty's gun-brig under my command, on the 12th instant, Point du Raz bearing east 7 or 8 leagues, captured a French national gunboat, No. 299, mounting one long 24-pounder with small arms, commanded by Lieutenant Auguste Verger, having on board 20 men. She sailed from Bordeaux on the 9th instant, bound to Brest.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
JNO. GREGORY.

No. 435

CAFFARELLI TO DECRÈS¹

Brest, 26 pluviôse, an XIII [15th February, 1805].

Le capitaine de frégate Porchier, chargé de la direction de la flottille, est arrivé hier et m'a remis son rapport sur les événements et les circonstances de sa navigation depuis Bénodet ici. Il en résulte qu'ayant appareillé de Bénodet dans la nuit du 20 au 21 [February 9th, 10th] par un vent d'E.S.E., la division qui était composée de 8 chaloupes canonnières, 16 bateaux et 3 péniches, se trouva par l'effet de la mer un peu en désordre au passage du Raz; que plusieurs

¹ *Arch. de la Marine*, BB³, 244, f. 87.

de ces bâtiments continuèrent leur route, malgré la force du vent qui était à l'E.N.E. ; que d'autres gagnèrent le mouillage de Seins ou de la baie des Trépassés ; que d'autres enfin dérivèrent beaucoup. La vigie du Bec du Raz a assuré que 7 de ces bâtiments étaient tombés au pouvoir de l'ennemi. Jusqu'à présent il n'est arrivé que 5 canonnières de 1^{re} espèce, 6 bateaux canonniers, 3 péniches et les deux canots armés de MM. Le Boizec et Porchier. Ainsi il manque 13 bâtiments de la division partie de Bénodet, car je n'y comprends pas les deux canots armés.

[15th February.—The Barfleur, Captain Martin, joined the squadron off Ushant. Rear-Admiral the Earl of Northesk was to proceed with the Britannia, Téméraire, and Mars to Cawsand Bay, to make good defects and take in supplies. The Niobe and Melampus were stationed off Brest, but the latter was to be relieved by the Phoenix.]

No. 436

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 18th February, 1805.

Sir,—I have the honour to inclose, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a letter to me from Lieutenant Ussher, commanding the Colpoys, hired armed schooner, dated the 11th inst., relating to some occurrences, and acquainting me that he had detained several neutral vessels laden with wheat bound to the ports of Spain, which I am sorry has happened. Orders were given some time ago not to interrupt vessels so laden going to Spanish ports. But since the commencement of hostilities against Spain it has, I believe, been generally understood that those

orders were no longer in force, considering the grain to be enemy's property.

I have now received their Lordships' orders dated the 4th inst., with the instructions therein referred to from Lord Hawkesbury, directing that no neutral vessels are to be molested, laden with grain, and under the circumstances therein mentioned, bound to Spanish ports. I shall immediately issue the said orders and instructions to the respective flag-officers, captains, and commanders under my orders.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

INCLOSURE

LIEUTENANT USSHER TO CORNWALLIS

Colpoys, hired schooner, 11th February, 1805.

Sir,—I beg leave to acquaint you that I have detained the vessels as per margin, and that on the 5th inst., being off Cape Machichaco, I perceived a *chasse-marée* going along shore that I pursued in my boat, and that she ran on shore under a battery three miles to the westward of the Cape, four of the guns of which I spiked, and threw the fifth over the parapet. The *chasse-marée* was bilged; her cargo was brandy.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

THOS. USSHER.

The Catharina Christina, Swede, laden with earthenware, from Hull bound to Santander, detained the 28th ulto.

The Catharina Dorothea, Prussian galliot, laden with wheat, from Marans bound to Santander, detained the 3rd inst.

The Jonge Guiet-Bart [?], Prussian galliot, laden with wheat, from Marans bound to Santander, detained the 6th inst.

No. 437

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 19th February, 1805.

Sir,—I had yesterday morning the honour of receiving your letter of the 13th inst., and an order from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty of that date, marked 'Secret,' directing me to send a three-decked ship and four of two decks to Rear-Admiral Cochrane off Ferrol.

The ships named in the margin¹ have been completed according to the order, and parted from the squadron last evening. They were the ships fitted in all respects for such service as those with me; the others of two decks have been long from port and have defects. I have also received your letter marked 'Secret,' dated the 14th, by which I am informed that their Lordships have been pleased to order Rear-Admiral Cochrane upon other service; and that I was not to consider the Rear-Admiral, the Northumberland, or the 5 ships sent by me any longer under my command after they shall have joined Rear-Admiral Cochrane.²

Their Lordships were also pleased to direct me by your before mentioned letter to send a flag-officer from the squadron to take under his direction the ships of the squadron stationed to watch the enemy at Ferrol, and I am to acquaint you, for the information of their Lordships, that I have this day sent Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder in the Prince of Wales for that purpose.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

¹ Saint George, Spartiate, Veteran, Eagle, Atlas.

² Cochrane was ordered to the West Indies in pursuit of Missiessy. See note p. 162.

No. 438

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 22nd February, 1805.

Sir,—You will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I bore up with the squadron named in the margin¹ on the 20th, upon the wind coming to the westward, in hopes by an early arrival at Torbay to get the ships quickly supplied, as several of them had spared provisions and water to the detached ships.

Yesterday proved so thick that I could not venture to stand in to make the land, though not more than two leagues from the Start as it proved, and this day it has blown at times in hard squalls from the land, which has prevented our getting to an anchor until late in the evening.

I expect some provisions immediately from Plymouth, and should the wind continue to the westward two or three days I trust the ships with me will be completed.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

[The squadron remained in Torbay until 7th March refitting and preparing for service.]

No. 439

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 24th February, 1805.

Sir,—I have only this day received your letter dated the 19th inst., in which you acquaint me, by

¹ Ville de Paris, San Josef, Dreadnought, Windsor Castle, Queen, Courageux, Neptune, Warrior, Colossus, Barfleur, Bellero-phon.

command of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that it would have been more satisfactory to their Lordships if I had accompanied any intelligence obtained by any of my cruisers with my own opinion upon the probable correctness or falsity, which my situation must enable me to combine and to form a judgment upon with advantage.

Their Lordships observe that the contradictory information hitherto received leaves not only the destination of the Rochefort squadron, but the circumstances of its escape in a considerable degree of uncertainty. I request you will be pleased to acquaint their Lordships that I should be extremely sorry they did not believe I wished to give them every information in my power, or opinion if it was likely to be of use.

The first accounts were sent to their Lordships in my absence. I had an opportunity, however that very day, the 20th ult., of sending their Lordships information, from a good observation made by Lieutenant Beauman in the *Aigle*, that there appeared no increase of the enemy's force in Brest road. He was immediately dispatched to reconnoitre the only ports in the Bay where the enemy's squadron could have put into. He performed this service with great expedition, having returned to me with his report on the 5th of this month.

Then came the account from Rear-Admiral Cochrane, which was sent in by Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder just before I joined him from Torbay. Their Lordships had been informed that the Rochefort squadron were seen long before by Lieutenant Bourne in the *Felix* schooner, and by an American a very little while after off the Penmarcks, tacking to the southward, which made me anxious to know whether they had put into either of the ports before mentioned in the Bay of Biscay.

Much pains, of course, were taken by the enemy to deceive. I was in great hopes to have obtained some information by the ships I had sent, before I knew of the Rochefort ships having sailed, to join Sir Thomas Graves—the *Spartiate* and *Santa Margarita*; the former joined me without any of consequence, and I have only this day heard from Captain Rathborne, who, it seems, after cruising about for a considerable time, and detaining 3 neutrals with corn bound to Spain, went to Berehaven in Ireland, and by his letter dated the 10th he says, Rear-Admiral Drury had taken upon him to order him to look off Ferrol for Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Graves. Captain Rathborne was off Rochefort after the *Aigle* had been there, and he only saw the disabled ship which was probably the ship the American reported to be without foretop mast. She might perhaps have received other damage which occasioned her putting into port.

When Rear-Admiral Cochrane sent notice from Ferrol that the Spanish packet had passed through a squadron of 5 sail of the line, without mentioning frigates or brigs, for there were 10 in all seen by Lieutenant Bourne and the American, though they differed as to a ship of the line, it was immediately believed and may very likely be true. But, considering the intelligence came from the enemy and was not particular as to the number, only 5 sail of the line, that they showed no colours and took no notice, but were full of troops, if they were the French squadron, or that part of them consisting of the line-of-battle ships, and had a mind not to be taken notice of, I should have supposed it would have been full as well worth their while to have kept the troops out of sight as the colours. They also said they believed them to be the French squadron

bound to the Cape ; how that should be known I cannot conceive. It may be all true.

I have no other thing to judge from but what I have related, and every person who has seen the accounts I have mentioned is as well able to form an opinion on them as myself.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 440

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 25th February, 1805.

Sir,—I have had the honour this day of receiving your letter dated the 23rd marked 'Secret,' written by direction of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, containing instructions for my conduct with the squadron under my orders here, to which you will be pleased to acquaint their Lordships that I shall pay every attention. The Santa Margarita has this moment arrived from off Ferrol, and has brought letters with some intelligence from Rear-Admiral Cochrane, and the state of the ships there, which I have the honour of sending for their Lordships' information.

The Hero and Defiance, which ships I had directed to receive supplies at Plymouth for that station, have been ordered here, Vice-Admiral Young informs me, in consequence of their Lordships' desire to strengthen this squadron at present. Their Lordships will see by the state and conditions inclosed that unless the ships off Ferrol can be regularly relieved in stores, provisions and water sent to them, now they receive nothing from Spain, they will be obliged to leave their station and return into port.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

INCLOSURE A

Information received from the master of a Danish brig who left Corunna on the 13th February, 1805

That the 5 French line-of-battle ships were ready for sea, having been refitted and provided with new masts, sails, &c. They intend going over to Corunna the first easterly winds, when our squadron is out of the way; from thence they go to the West Indies, as soon as they have an opening by our being driven off the coast.

Four Spanish ships of the line are fitting out, 2 only are ready for sea, the equipment of the others is much retarded for want of stores and provisions. He did not know of the number of troops at Ferrol. At Corunna there are but few.

Says that the Spanish packet lately arrived got into Muros and not Camariñas Bay. She was told of the war by a Swedish ship. Two or 3 packets are yet expected. She fell in with the French squadron in lat. 40°, in the longitude of Teneriffe, steering southwest. They consisted of 5 sail of the line, with 3 smaller vessels. They took no notice of the packet. Bread is dear and scarce at Corunna and Ferrol, where cargoes of flour and wheat are daily expected from France and America.

INCLOSURE B

Observations made by his Majesty's ship Ajax, off the Harbour of Ferrol, 14th February, 1805

Three Spanish line-of-battle ships, known by their colours, at anchor in the entrance of the harbour, viz. : one rigged with sails bent, one rigged

with sails not bent, one with lower yards and topgallant masts struck, one line-of-battle ship, apparently large, alone in the basin of the arsenal. Her topgallant masts pointed through, but not stayed up. Men apparently rattling down the topmast rigging. Her yards across. Two frigates, apparently Spanish, above the arsenal, rigged and some sails bent; their mizens were hauled out.

No other ships to be seen, except the mast-heads of one—supposed to be close in with Graña village. No gun-boats to be discovered, nor any small craft. A flag-staff erected upon the top of Monte Faro, believed not to have been there before, and the guard-house apparently enlarged upon Prioriño Chico. Only one boat to be seen under sail, who ran into harbour upon our approach.

Corunna Side

The French frigate with topgallant masts struck, and anchored as before; doubtful if her sails are bent from a squall covering her; but think not bent. No other large ship in the Bay. Some small building, apparently new, near the water and to the right of the lighthouse. But not certain if a battery. A flag was seen flying, though not like Spanish colours. After dark observed the same fire lighted upon the high land to the westward of Corunna as when near the shore some days past with the Repulse and Malta, but which then I supposed related to a cutter in shore. No vessel being near this evening but the *Impétueux*, it must have related to the men-of-war being near the shore. Observed a similar fire near Sesárgas some days past, when near the shore, but which then I believed also related to a cutter in sight.

GARLIES.

*INCLOSURE C**COCHRANE TO CORNWALLIS*

Northumberland, at Sea, 21st February, 1805.

Since my former letter to you of this day, the *Repulse* has looked into the port of Ferrol. A report of which I beg to subjoin.

'There are 3 line-of-battle ships rigged, with lower yards, topmasts and topgallant masts struck, outside the arsenal, with Spanish pennants hoisted. One of them, a Spanish broad pennant, the southernmost ship, with her sails bent, supposed to be a line-of-battle ship. Above her lay two frigates; one of them had a Spanish pennant. One of the line-of-battle ships with a Spanish pennant had a very large white head. They all appeared very dirty, as if just come out of the arsenal. Within the arsenal is a line-of-battle ship, rigged, with lower yards, topmasts and topgallant masts struck, and another with only her lower masts in. The ship to the southward was the only one we could open, with sails bent. The frigate in Corunna has hoisted the white imperial pennant.'

By which report you will see there is one more additional line-of-battle getting ready since my last return. The French ships have hauled so near to Graña town that only the mast-heads of one are to be seen.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

A. COCHRANE.

No. 441

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 25th February, 1805.

Sir,—I have received the order of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to take his Majesty's ship *Ramillies* under my command, to which I shall

attend. In my letter to you dated the 29th ult., with the copy of one to me from Captain Maitland, of the *Boadicea*, mention was made that his Majesty's sloop *Hawk* had not been seen by him since the 1st December, when she separated from the *Boadicea* to examine a strange sail. I am sorry to add that I have not received any account of the *Hawk* since that time. She was stationed with the *Boadicea*, watching the Passage du Raz.

The *Mary* cutter, I am informed, sailed from Plymouth about the middle of December last with dispatches for me. She did not join the squadron off Ushant, and I have not heard anything of her since. I am therefore in doubt respecting her safety as well as the *Hawk*.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

[The *Hawk* and the *Mary* cutter both foundered in the Channel, and all on board were lost.]

No. 442

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 27th February, 1805.

Sir,—I request you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I have received a letter from Captain Gosselin, informing me of his arrival, at Plymouth, in the *Latona*, and that he had captured a Spanish ship from Carthagena, bound to Cadiz with a valuable cargo, and a brig laden with Campeachy wood, bound to Cadiz; they had also a quantity of specie, which is on board the *Latona*. The vessels are not yet arrived.

In consequence of some information received by a recaptured ship, arrived at Plymouth, I have

ordered the Santa Margarita to go in off Scilly, and to look out for the enemy's privateers, reported to be cruising thereabouts.

The Santa Margarita sailed from hence this morning, and Captain Rathborne is directed to put into Plymouth to replenish, Rear-Admiral Cochrane having taken her provisions and some stores for the supply of the Northumberland off Ferrol.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

[A Spanish merchant brig captured by the Veteran put into Torbay on 26th February. At this time some officers of Cornwallis's squadron expressed a wish that they might be permitted to land in any part of the Bay to walk for the benefit of their health when the wind was to the westward. He supported the wish, being persuaded that, in the state of affairs at the time, all would recognise that it was 'absolutely necessary that the ships of the squadron should be constantly ready to put to sea.']

No. 443

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO MR. MARSDEN

Prince of Wales, off Ferrol, 2nd March, 1805.

Sir,—I beg to acquaint you for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, I arrived here this day in pursuance of orders from the Honourable Admiral Cornwallis, and took upon me the command of the ships stationed off this coast, 'to watch the enemy's ships in at Ferrol and Corunna, and to use my best endeavours to intercept them should they attempt to put to sea; likewise to endeavour to gain all the intelligence I can of the proceedings and designs of the enemy, and to communicate the same by every opportunity.' Their Lordships may rely that every exertion on my part

shall be made to accomplish the wished for intentions as far as circumstances and the force I have under my directions will permit. But to enable me the better to effect the same, permit me to state, I think this would more effectually be done if I had two frigates and two small vessels put under my orders to place in the entrance of the harbour of Corunna and Ferrol, as very thick fogs are frequent off this place, attended with a very heavy swell, which tumbles in on this coast with light winds, and makes it very unsafe for large ships to keep close in with the land. This I have very often before experienced when cruising off this coast. I here inclose for their Lordships' information the rendezvous and instructions I have given out to the squadron placed under my direction. This I am led to hope will meet their Lordships' approbation, and have the desired effect in preventing the enemy's escape without being perceived by this squadron.

The force of the enemy ready on the 2nd inst. in at Ferrol is as follows, viz. :—Five sail of the line, and three frigates (French), and five sail of the line (one of three decks), and four frigates (Spanish). Inclosed I send the copy of a letter from the Honourable Captain Legge, of the intelligence he obtained from a Danish ship he boarded agreeably to my signal. The remainder of the Spanish ships at Ferrol are in the arsenal and getting forward.

I send a list of the ships now here, which are placed under my directions by the Honourable Admiral Cornwallis.¹

I am, &c.,

ROBT. CALDER.

P.S.—The *Hero* and *Defiance* have not yet joined me from England, but are expected daily, when I shall

¹ Prince of Wales, Repulse, Terrible, Impétueux, Montagu, Malta, Indefatigable.

instantly send the Terrible for Ushant, as she has sprung her main yards very badly, and I am compelled to take from her all the water she can spare, as this squadron is very short of that article, and none *now* to be got here.

ROBT. CALDER.

INCLOSURE A

General Instructions to the Ships of the Squadron placed to watch the Enemy's motions at Corunna and Ferrol.

They are to keep as close in shore as the wind and weather will permit them with safety, and to endeavour daily to look into those ports. It is advisable to do this as early and as late in the day as they can, and to place themselves during the night in the driftway of the harbours' mouth so that the enemy may not be able to come out without their being perceived. Upon such discovery you are to throw up rockets, burn blue lights, and fire guns until noticed and joined by me. On my approach you will make known their bearing, force, and how they are steering.

With the winds off shore, I shall keep as near as the weather will permit between Cape Prior and Ferrol, and shall endeavour to be close in shore about dark, and then stand off under such sail as to enable me to keep the squadron together, and to keep my station, standing off until midnight or until 2 or 4 A.M. according to the weather, when I shall tack and stand in shore. By attending to these directions and consulting the winds and weather for the night, you will always be enabled to find me in the night when necessary.

As the enemy may attempt to run frigates or corvettes with stores along shore into Ferrol or

Corunna during the night when the wind is easterly, I would particularly have you close in on the weather shore always as the day breaks.

In case of a long-continued easterly gale, and I should not be able to keep my station, I shall run round Cape Finisterre to shelter the squadron under the land in the bay to the southward of Cape Finisterre, so as to be ready to receive the enemy in case they should slip out from Ferrol or Corunna, and bound to the southward, which may be expected to be the case.

When the wind is westerly I shall, according to the weather, endeavour daily to come within sight of you ; but in case of a continued gale from the westward and I am not able to keep my station, I shall run round Cape Ortegal for shelter, and possibly I may be induced to anchor the squadron in Vares Bay to the eastward of Cape Cariño, rather than be blown quite off my station.

But instantly the wind changes in either case I shall return with all possible dispatch, and present myself off Ferrol and Corunna ; and as the enemy may be expected to make their push out on a change of wind, and to make the best of their way either round Cape Finisterre or Cape Ortegal, according to the wind ; in either of which cases you will be very attentive to the course they steer, that you may be enabled (by signal) to give me on my approach the earliest information of their force, and of their movements.

Given on board the Prince of Wales, off Ferrol,
2nd March, 1805.

To the respective captains.

ROBT. CALDER.

INCLOSURE B

CAPTAIN LEGGE TO SIR ROBERT CALDER

Repulse, Saturday night.

Dear Sir,—The vessel our boat boarded this evening was the Swedish ship *Providence*, Chas. Gastu, master, from Ferrol, in ballast, bound to Alicante; the above ship went into Ferrol on the 27th of last November while we were lying in Betanzos Bay. The master's report is as follows: That five French and five Spanish sail of the line are now lying in Ferrol, that they are ordered to be ready for sea by the 22nd of March, with troops. The new Commodore of the Spanish fleet arrived from Madrid two days ago—his name Don Domingo Grandellana. No French troops at Ferrol. Provisions very scarce and Spanish troops daily flocking in. The French and Spanish ships are in bad order, not half manned nor provisioned. The Swedish captain does not believe it is their intention to sail. Two Spanish brig packets of 14 guns each he thinks will sail from Ferrol to-night.

An English frigate and a sloop of war taken by a French frigate in the Mediterranean; the English frigate sunk.

No news of the Rochefort squadron. A report at Ferrol that the French fleet have sailed from Brest. The packets are yellow-sided brigs of 14 guns each. The Spaniards are very inveterate against and will do everything in their power to annoy England. It is said that Russia and Sweden are at war with France.

The Spanish ships have now moved to the northward, close to the Frenchmen, so that only one Spanish ship will be to be seen by our reconnoitring ships. The master spoke good English,

and had written the above intelligence down to communicate to the squadron, before the officer from the *Repulse* boarded him.

He has likewise sent some 'Courriers de Londres,' which he intends for Admiral Cochrane, and which I have inclosed.

He appeared to the officer of the *Repulse* to be a man to be depended on, and willing to give every information in his power.

I remain, &c.,

A. K. LEGGE.

P.S.—Another Swedish ship and a brig have come out from Ferrol, which were boarded by the *Malta* and *Indefatigable*. They gave the same report as above of the state of the enemy at Ferrol.

[The following is the very important dispatch wherein Napoleon outlined his modified plan of operations, in which Ganteaume was to have had command, superseding Villeneuve.]

No. 444

*NAPOLÉON TO GANTEAUME*¹

Paris, 11 ventôse, an XIII [2 March 1805].

Monsieur l'Amiral Ganteaume, vous appareillerez dans le plus court délai possible avec notre escadre de Brest forte de 21 vaisseaux, 6 frégates et 2 flûtes. Vous ferez au préalable embarquer sur chaque vaisseau 150 hommes et sur chaque frégate 80 hommes. Vous aurez soin, en outre, que vos équipages soient complets et que vos garnisons soient composées d'hommes bien portants et en bon état.

Vous veillerez à ce que vos vaisseaux portent le

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (x.) No. 8379.

plus de vivres possible et à ce que votre eau soit entièrement faite.

Vous ferez embarquer à bord de votre escadre l'artillerie dont l'état est ci-joint.

Vous vous dirigerez d'abord sur le Ferrol. Vous tâcherez d'attaquer et de prendre les 7 ou 8 vaisseaux de la croisière anglaise. Vous ferez au contre-amiral Gourdon, commandant notre escadre au Ferrol, composée de 4 vaisseaux et de 2 frégates, et à l'escadre espagnole, le signal de vous joindre.

Ayant ainsi rallié ces escadres, vous vous rendrez par le plus court chemin dans notre île de la Martinique. Vous y trouverez nos escadres de Toulon et de Rochefort, qui ont ordre de se ranger sous votre pavillon. Avec l'aide de Dieu, nous espérons que vous vous trouverez avoir sous votre commandement une escadre de plus de 40 vaisseaux de ligne.

Vous débarquerez 1,100 hommes à celle de nos îles sous le vent qui vous paraîtra en avoir le plus besoin ; et les 2,100 hommes qui sont à bord de votre escadre, en sus des équipages et garnisons, se trouveront sous les ordres du général Lauriston, qui du bord du vice-amiral Villeneuve, passera à bord de votre escadre au moment de votre jonction.

Sans perdre un instant, vous opérerez votre retour en Europe, vous éloignant le plus possible de la route ordinaire, et ne reconnaissant aucune terre. Vous arriverez sur Ouessant ; vous attaquerez les vaisseaux anglais qui pourraient vous y attendre, et vous vous dirigerez en droite ligne sur Boulogne, où nous serons de notre personne, et où nous vous ferons connaître notre intention sur votre destination ultérieure. Nous désirons que le temps et toutes les circonstances vous permettent d'arriver devant Boulogne dans le mois du 10 juin au 10 juillet.

Si par des circonstances quelconques, l'escadre de Toulon que commande le vice-amiral Villeneuve

n'avait pu vous joindre, comme vous serez en force moyennant votre jonction avec notre escadre de Rochefort, notre escadre du Ferrol et l'escadre espagnole, et que vous aurez plus de 25 vaisseaux de ligne, notre intention est que vous vous dirigiez également sur Ouessant pour arriver de la même manière devant Boulogne.

Mais, si vous réunissez sous votre commandement moins de 25 vaisseaux de ligne, notre intention est que vous vous dirigiez sur le Ferrol, où nous aurons soin de réunir tous les vaisseaux français et espagnols qu'il nous sera possible, et que, sans entrer dans le port, vous rangiez toutes ces forces sous votre pavillon et vous portiez sur Boulogne.

Cependant, si avec moins de 25 vaisseaux, par les renseignements que vous recevrez sur les mouvements des Anglais, et par le temps favorable que vous auriez, vous pensez pouvoir vous présenter dans la Manche avec quelque succès, vous vous dirigerez droit sur Boulogne, en reconnaissant Cherbourg, où nous aurons soins qu'il se trouve un officier de confiance pour vous donner les renseignements que vous pourriez désirer sur la situation des croisières ennemies devant Boulogne. Enfin, si l'escadre de Toulon n'était pas à la Martinique lors de votre arrivée, vous l'attendrez autant de temps que vous le croirez nécessaire, ce qui nous paraît devoir être au moins l'espace de trente jours.

Les deux flûtes que vous mènerez de Brest seront chargées de plus de vivres qu'il sera possible pour fournir à l'approvisionnement de l'escadre du Ferrol ; et, s'il n'y avait pas à Brest une assez grande quantité de biscuit tout confectionné pour le chargement de ces flûtes, vous y feriez suppléer par des farines qui, à tout événement, seraient utiles à la Martinique.

En vous confiant le commandement d'une armée aussi importante et dont les opérations auront tant

d'influence sur les destinées du monde, nous comptons sur votre dévouement, sur vos talents et sur votre attachement à notre personne.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 445

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 3rd March, 1805.

Sir,—I request that you will be pleased to move the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to grant me leave of absence for six weeks or two months, in order that I may have an opportunity of using some exercise on shore during that time for the benefit of my health, after having been so long at sea in the Ville de Paris.

Mr. Clark, the carpenter of this ship, who has been in the habit by my order of examining into the defects at times of all the ships of the squadron and reporting the same to me, has informed me that the Ville de Paris's stern frame was very much shaken, and many other defects occasioned by the very severe gales of wind and remarkably heavy sea in December last, which did so much damage to all the three-decked ships in particular, which were then in company, as to have obliged them all to be detained for a considerable time in port.

If, therefore, their Lordships would be pleased to allow me to proceed to Spithead in the Ville de Paris, she might there be conveniently refitted, in rigging and all respects, whilst such repairs as are absolutely required might be effected.

At the same time the officers and ship's company would, for a short time at that anchorage, be more in a situation of ease after their fatigues, and whilst the ship is refitting be in a way to receive such recreation and indulgence as their Lordships may

think their long confinement at sea requires, and their good and faithful services may deserve.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 446

*DECRÈS TO CAFFARELLI*¹

Paris, 13 ventôse, an XIII [4th March, 1805].

Je vous informe, Monsieur, que l'amiral Ganteaume part pour se rendre à Brest, où il disposera l'armée sous son commandement à un prompt départ. Il est nécessaire que les batiments qui la composent soient munis de 6 mois $\frac{1}{2}$ de vivres et plus s'ils peuvent les contenir. Il faudrait aussi que les flûtes fussent chargées d'environ 450,000 rations complètes de supplément.

No. 447

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 4th March, 1805.

Sir,—I have received your letter dated the 2nd inst., written by command of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, signifying their Lordships directions to me to cause 5 ships of the squadron as therein particularised to be completed in their stores and provisions for foreign service, and to be in readiness for sailing under the command of a flag-officer at the shortest notice, to which you will be pleased to acquaint their Lordships I shall pay attention. I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

[In accordance with these instructions Cornwallis ordered Vice-Admiral Collingwood, with the Dread-

¹ *Arch. de la Marine*, BB², 97, f. 167.

nought, Tonnant, Mars, Illustrious and Minotaur, to hold himself in readiness to proceed upon foreign service at the shortest notice. The 4 two-decked ships were all very recently from port.]

No. 448

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Torbay, 7th March, 1805.

Sir,—You will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I have removed provisions and stores to the ships which I mentioned in my letter to you yesterday for their Lordships' information I had selected as the fittest ships to be detached abroad according to their directions.

Early this morning the Dragon came into Torbay from Portsmouth, and I have taken some articles from her also to fill up those ships.

The wind has come round to the eastward and obliged me to put to sea with the squadron. I shall proceed slowly off Ushant as I expect to be joined by the Ramillies from Portsmouth, Foudroyant and Prince from Plymouth, besides some of the small vessels.

The ships in company are named in the margin.¹

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 449

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO MR. MARSDEN

Prince of Wales, off Ferrol, 8th March, 1805.

Sir,—Having sent Captain Otway in the Montagu close in off Cape Prioriño to endeavour to

¹ Ville de Paris, San Josef, Dreadnought, Windsor Castle, Barfleur, Tonnant, Queen, Courageux, Neptune, Warrior, Mars, Colossus, Dragon, Minotaur, Bellerophon, Illustrious.

obtain intelligence of the enemy's force and situation at Ferrol, I have the honour to inclose his report for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, by which they will perceive the account I obtained from the Hon. Captain Legge (a copy of whose letter I transmitted by the Ajax on the 5th inst.) is nearly the same. From these different reports agreeing so nearly, I am led to give credit to the force and situation of the enemy now ready for sea at this time at Ferrol.

From the anchorage the French and Spanish squadrons have now taken up off La Graña on the N.E. side of the harbour of Ferrol, I am led to think they meditate pushing out with the wind between the east and north points, in which case they evidently must be bound to the southward round Cape Finisterre. At their present anchorage they cannot easily come out from Ferrol with a southerly wind, therefore I think their destination is not to the northward. I have thought it my duty to state this for their Lordships' consideration.

I am, &c.,
ROBT. CALDER.

INCLOSURE

CAPTAIN OTWAY TO SIR ROBERT CALDER

Montagu, 4th March, 1805.

Sir,—I have the honour to acquaint you that, according to your wish, I last night sent Lieutenant Forrest in one of our boats off Ferrol, who succeeded in intercepting a fishing boat coming out of that harbour. He interrogated three of the crew separately, who all agreed in saying there were in that port 5 sail of the line, one frigate and a brig, French, lying together, with their sails bent, up off

La Graña (which is the reason our ships cannot see them from the offing). The fishermen also informed the lieutenant that there were 6 Spanish ships of the line and 2 frigates at anchor outside the basin, one of them a 3-decker, which came out of the basin about a week since ; the Dutch line-of-battle ship¹ has been sold to the Spanish merchants, being unfit for service.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
R. W. OTWAY.

No. 450

*Copy of Intelligence obtained from H.M.S.
Indefatigable off Ferrol*

Indefatigable, at Sea, 9th March, 1805.

Boarded the Swedish brig *Minerva*, Ludovic Laline, master, from Betanzos, in ballast, bound to Alicante for a cargo. Sailed from Ferrol 8th March. The master of this brig reports there were at Ferrol 5 French ships of the line and 1 frigate, and 1 at Corunna. Four Spanish ships of the line and 2 frigates nearly ready for sea ; there were also 3 more Spanish line-of-battle ships fitting and getting ready for sea.

The French ships altered their situation either on the 1st or 2nd of March, he is not certain as to the day. A Spanish ship of the line and a French frigate are still at anchor near the entrance of the harbour.

There are 14,000 troops at Ferrol ; a part of this number had lately arrived.

¹ The *Oldenbarneveldt*.

No. 451

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO CORNWALLIS

Prince of Wales, off Ferrol, 10th March, 1805.

Sir,—Captain Buller has rejoined the Malta as I wrote you in my last. I shall be under the absolute necessity of sending that ship from hence to Cawsand Bay in about a week ; during this time I shall strip her of all the water she can spare, leaving her three weeks' to carry her into port ; had it not been for her supply of water I should have been very much pushed to have kept this station with the ships you have been pleased to place under my directions. Permit me to observe the Repulse, Montagu, and l'Impétueux must come into port as fast as you can send ships to replace them ; their water is got very low and their provisions very short. I am clearly of opinion that one ship should be sent from hence every week or ten days if this squadron is to be kept in a proper state to be enabled to pursue the combined squadron of the enemy if they should escape from Ferrol, when I may be blown off the coast. Permit me to suggest if a ship could be sent to me every ten days, and you should approve of my sending one from hence at the same time, I humbly conceive this would have the desired effect of always having 10 sail of the line and frigates, &c., in a perfect state of readiness for any event that may happen to arise on this station. By this means it would not keep each ship out more than four months, allowing for coming, returning, and to remain here each three months. I am sure you will agree with me in thinking four months quite long enough for any ship to remain at sea. As to the Prince of Wales, I am led to think I can keep her out during all the summer, provided the relief of ships is very

frequent, as by that means I can keep up her provisions and water from the ships going into port. I beg leave to state to your consideration the propriety of sending here those two-deckers who are able to stow the largest quantity of water, as this will even here (during the summer months) be the article most wanted, as by your orders every ship has now five months' provisions on leaving port, and this will give me always an opportunity of taking some from each ship that joins me. Each ship coming from Plymouth could bring 12 bullocks and vegetables with water upon deck to serve them here, which would be a very seasonable supply to this squadron.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
ROBT. CALDER.

[Upon receiving this letter Sir Charles Cotton, off Ushant, decided to send the Ajax to Calder, with other ships expected to join him from England.]

No. 452

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO MR. MARSDEN

Prince of Wales, off Ferrol, 12th March, 1805.

Sir,—I have received by the Hero your letter of the 12th ult. inclosing one from Mr. Merry, his Majesty's Consul at Washington, containing intelligence of three Spanish frigates expected to arrive in Europe from Buenos Ayres. I shall communicate this intelligence to the captains here under my directions, and keep a good look out for them.

I am, &c.,
ROBT. CALDER.

No. 453

NAPOLEON TO GANTEAUME¹

La Malmaison, 24 ventôse, an XIII [15th March, 1805].

Monsieur l'Amiral Ganteaume, il y avait, au 6 ventôse, 5 vaisseaux de guerre espagnols en rade du Ferrol, avec leurs équipages et prêts à partir. Je suis donc assuré qu'il y a dans ce moment une escadre de 9 vaisseaux, 4 français et 5 espagnols, prêts à toute opération. Par des lettres de Cadix, du 8 ventôse, je suis instruit qu'il y avait alors dans ce port 6 vaisseaux en rade, et que la plus grande activité régnait dans les ateliers de la Corogne ; on espérait en avoir 10 pour le 21 mars. Je désire donc être instruit, par le retour de mon courrier, de l'époque où vous serez prêt. Nous voilà au 15 mars ; il n'y a donc plus un moment à perdre. Ne perdez pas de vue les grandes destinées que vous tenez dans les mains. Si vous ne manquez point d'audace, le succès est infaillible. Nelson, dans la Méditerranée, a été violemment tourmenté par la tempête ; il n'a que 12 vaisseaux ; 4 faisaient eau, et il avait été obligé de les conduire à Malte.

Recommandez bien aux officiers, quand ils auront ouvert leurs paquets, de garder le plus profond secret sur leur destination, car un bâtiment peut être pris et le secret connu de l'ennemi, quinze jours avant qu'il ne doit l'être, s'il est divulgué dans le bâtiment.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 454

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 12th March, 1805.

Sir,—You will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the Foudroyant

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (x.) No. 8436.

and Prince rejoined me yesterday, and that I bore up last evening with the squadron for Torbay, where I have this moment anchored with the *Ville de Paris*. The ships named in the margin ¹ are following me in.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 455

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 14th March, 1805.

Sir,—I had the honour of receiving your letter, dated the 5th, on the 9th of this month at sea, in which you acquaint me, by the direction of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that they are pleased to grant me the leave of absence I requested to have about the 10th of this month, and that Admiral Lord Gardner would be ordered to command the squadron during my absence.

I am wholly uninformed as to the present situation of Lord Gardner, except hearing that the ship appointed for his Lordship is ready in Cawsand Bay.

I beg to state that the time presses very much with me, and it is very long since I gave notice of my wish to be absent at this particular time to Lord Viscount Melville.

I should hope therefore that I may be allowed to take advantage of this westerly wind to proceed to the eastward. Copies of all papers which I conceive to be necessary are prepared and put up ready

¹ San Josef, Dreadnought, Foudroyant, Prince, Barfleur, Windsor Castle, Ramillies, Tonnant, Queen, Courageux, Neptune, Warrior, Mars, Colossus, Dragon, Minotaur, Bellerophon, Illustrious.

to be delivered, if this or any other mode should meet with their Lordships' approbation.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 456

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 16th March, 1805.

Sir,—I have had the honour of receiving your letter written by direction of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 14th inst., in which you mention a letter having been communicated to their Lordships from Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder as to the force with him off Ferrol.

Sir Robert also did me the honour to send me dispatches in which he demanded two cutters out of the three I have at present under my orders. One of the three is with him now, and if he meant to write to their Lordships upon such subjects, he might, I should think, save himself the trouble of sending long dispatches here.

If the Vice-Admiral has two frigates stationed with him, there must be fewer looking out off Cape Finisterre and farther to the westward for any squadron of the enemy which might be passing on to obtain intelligence.

The small vessels, if we had them to send at the moment, might be very useful, and I have no doubt the Vice-Admiral would find them very convenient. Neither Sir Edward Pellew nor Rear-Admiral Cochrane had more than one, nor did they apply for a reinforcement. I should have conceived that the Vice-Admiral might have waited until an opportunity had offered for him to know my sentiments before he had troubled their Lordships on that head.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 457

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Torbay, 18th March, 1805.

Sir,—I request you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that, according to their Lordships' directions signified to me in your letters dated the 16th inst., I have ordered the Queen to proceed to Spithead.

And I shall immediately deliver to Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Cotton instructions for his guidance with the squadron, and all unexecuted orders to be given over to Admiral Lord Gardner upon his arrival. And you will be pleased to acquaint their Lordships that I shall immediately proceed in the Ville de Paris to Spithead, when I shall direct Captain Whitby to cause what may be necessary to be done to the hull and rigging of the ship, to be completed with all possible expedition, according to their Lordships' directions.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 458

CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES COTTON

By the Honble. W. Cornwallis, Admiral of the White, &c.

Having applied to the Right Honble. the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for six weeks' or two months' leave of absence, with which they have been pleased to comply, their Lordships have acquainted me that they have directed Admiral Lord Gardner to command the squadron during my absence.

His Lordship arrived at Plymouth on Saturday,

but is, I understand, gone to town. Their Lordships have therefore been pleased to allow me to proceed in the *Ville de Paris* to Spithead, and have directed me to leave instructions and any unexecuted orders which I may have received from them with you, until the arrival of Admiral Lord Gardner.

You are therefore required and directed to keep the squadron together, and as complete in their water and provisions as possible, ready to put to sea on receiving any intelligence of the enemy sailing from Brest, or whenever the wind comes so far to the eastward as to make it dangerous for the ships to ride in the Bay, when you are to proceed off Ushant and most diligently to watch the enemy's squadron at Brest. And you will deliver the public letters and instructions which you will herewith receive to Admiral Lord Gardner upon his arrival. I inclose the disposition of the squadron.

Given on board the *Ville de Paris*, Torbay,
18th March, 1805.

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 459

SIR CHARLES COTTON TO MR. MARSDEN

San Josef, in Torbay, 19th March, 1805.

Sir,—You will please to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the Honble. Admiral Cornwallis sailed from this anchorage yesterday noon, with the *Ville de Paris* and *Queen* for Spithead, leaving the ships named in the margin under my command,¹ with which I weighed last

¹ San Josef, Dreadnought, Foudroyant, Barfleur, Windsor Castle, Neptune, Prince, Tonnant, Bellerophon, Mars, Courageux, Warrior, Illustrious, Colossus, Minotaur, Colpoys brig, Rapid gun-brig.

evening for the purpose of proceeding off Ushant, but the wind coming to the westward of north, I returned with the squadron to this anchorage, and herewith I transmit a copy of my order from the Honble. William Cornwallis, which I shall obey accordingly.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES COTTON.

[The wind coming round to the eastward at midnight on the 19th, Sir Charles Cotton put to sea with the squadron in order to proceed off Ushant.]

No. 460

CAPTAIN GOSSELIN TO SIR CHARLES COTTON

Latona, off Black Rocks, 18th March, 1805.

Sir,—I beg leave to acquaint you that I had a good view of the port of Brest at noon this day, and counted 22 line-of-battle ships and 5 frigates lying there.¹ Captains Elphinstone and Baker give nearly the same number.

T. LE M. GOSSELIN.

[On the same date Captain Baker, in the *Phoenix*, reported the positions of a three-deck ship flying an Admiral's flag, 2 others flying Rear-Admirals' flags, 20 two-deck ships, of which 1 flying a broad pennant, and 5 frigates, making 28 in all.]

¹ The line-of-battle ships were actually 21 in number: the *Impérial* (ex-*Vengeur*), 120; the *Républicain* (ex-*Révolutionnaire*) and *Invincible*, 110's; the *Alexandre* and *Foudroyant*, 80's; the *Ulysse*, *Conquérant*, *Éole*, *Impétueux*, *Diomède*, *Jean Bart*, *Aquilon*, *Wattignies*, *Tourville*, *Vétéran*, *Batave*, *Cassard*, *Jupiter*, *Brave*, *Patriote*, and *Alliance*, 74's. The frigates were the *Indienne*, *Valeureuse*, *Volontaire*, *Comète*, and *Félicité*. The *Diligente*, corvette and the *Espiègle*, brig, were also at the port.

No. 461

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

London, 23rd March, 1805.

Sir,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of their Lordships' order dated the 20th inst. directing me, during the absence of the Honble. Admiral Cornwallis, to take the command of his Majesty's ships and vessels named in the list also inclosed with their Lordships' said order, receiving from the said Admiral all such standing and unexecuted orders and instructions as have from time to time been given to him, and to carry the same as well as such others as may be received by me from their Lordships into execution.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
GARDNER.

No. 462

GANTEAUME'S INSTRUCTIONS¹

Paris, 3 germinal, an XIII [24th March, 1805].

[*Telegraphic—Ganteaume to Napoleon.*]

L'armée navale est prête et peut mettre sous voiles demain soir, mais il y a dans l'Iroise quinze vaisseaux anglais, et il est impossible de sortir sans risquer un combat.

Le succès n'est pas douteux. J'attends les ordres de votre Majesté.

[*Telegraphic—Napoleon to Ganteaume.*]

A transmettre sur-le-champ par le télégraphe.

Une victoire navale dans cette circonstance ne conduirait à rien.

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon (x.)* No. 8480.

N'ayez qu'un seul but, celui de remplir votre mission.

Sortez sans combat.

Ce qui doit vous joindre est parti.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 463

LIEUTENANT ROSE TO CAPTAIN PROWSE

Gun-brig Growler, off the Penmarcks,
25th March, 1805.

Sir,—I beg leave to inform you that this morning between eleven and twelve, as I was standing in shore between the Passage du Raz and the Penmarcks, I observed 15 sail of the enemy's gun-boats standing in shore. I made sail in chase of the headmost, but not finding it practicable to cut her off, I bore up and made sail for the leewardmost, and succeeded in capturing two of them. They proved to be No. 443 with 15 men, and No. 450 with 12 men on board. The remaining 13 having anchored under the Penmarcks, prevented me from capturing any more.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
JAMES ROSE.

No. 464

SIR CHARLES COTTON TO MR. MARSDEN

San Josef, off Ushant, 28th March, 1805.

Sir,—You will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that on the evening of the 26th inst. I received intelligence from Captain Gosselin, of the *Latona*, stationed in shore, that at daylight that morning one of the enemy's line-of-battle ships and two frigates had come out of Brest, and

were afterwards joined by a ship of the line, then working between Bertheaume and Camaret roads. I instantly (7 P.M.) detached the ships named in the margin¹ to the support of the advanced frigates, and about 3 P.M. the next day the signal was made that 27 sail had anchored in the before-mentioned roadsteads. The wind being then N. by E. with a steady and moderate breeze, I stood in with the whole squadron (7 sail of the line) within 5 miles of the enemy, and observed them to be anchored in the entrance of the Goulet, consisting of 21 sail of the line (3 of three decks), 4 frigates, and 2 brigs, and from every appearance ready to put to sea. Night closing very fast, and having previously placed Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Graves, with 4 sail of the line, and other smaller vessels, to keep sight of the enemy, I stood out with the squadron, and am now—1.30 P.M.—informed by signal that they are still in that situation. It has been reported to me by the officers commanding the small vessels that troops were perceived to be on board them. I have made every necessary arrangement, if the weather continues moderate, to insure being apprised of their further motions, and should they proceed to sea, I have confident hopes I shall be able to intercept them.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES COTTON.

No. 465

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, in Cawsand Bay, 30th March, 1805.

Sir,—By a letter I received yesterday evening from Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, dated off Ferrol the 18th inst., inclosing the state and condi-

¹ Colossus, Bellerophon.

tions of the ships under his command, it appears the ships under his orders had then only 6 weeks' water on board, and as these ships have not the means of replenishing their water or provisions, I beg leave to submit to their Lordships the necessity of transports with water being sent off Ferrol with as much dispatch as possible, otherwise the ships will be obliged very shortly to return into port.

The Ajax is completed, and I shall direct her commander to proceed off Ferrol without delay.

I shall also transmit to Sir Robert Calder copy of the letter which Vice-Admiral Young received yesterday evening from Sir Charles Cotton, dated the 28th inst., off Ushant, giving an account of 21 sail of the enemy's fleet in Brest having anchored in the outer roads of Bertheaume and Cawsand. I shall order the ships of the Channel fleet named in the margin¹ to complete their water, stores and provisions to 5 months with all the dispatch possible, and to return and join me off Ushant, or wherever else the fleet may happen to be at that time. It is now blowing fresh from the S.S.W., and the moment the wind shifts to enable us to put to sea I shall proceed to join the fleet, which I hope will meet their Lordships' approbation.

I am, &c.,
GARDNER.

No. 466

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, Cawsand Bay, 31st March, 1805.

Sir,—I this afternoon received your letter of the 29th inst., inclosing for my information a copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, dated

¹ Téméraire, Terrible, Malta.

the 10th inst., and signifying their Lordships' direction to me to relieve the ships off Ferrol as frequently as possible, agreeably to the plan recommended by the Vice-Admiral. In answer thereto, I acquainted you yesterday of my having ordered the Ajax to proceed immediately off of Ferrol, and it is my intention to send the Malta and Terrible (now here) thither so soon as those ships are refitted and ready. And I will endeavour to comply with the Vice-Admiral's wishes to send a ship every ten days or a fortnight, if the number of ships that I shall find off Ushant will admit of my doing so. I am still detained here by adverse winds from the S.W.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

No. 467

ADMIRALTY MINUTE FOR LORD GARDNER

31st March.

Intelligence being received that the French fleet has anchored in the outer road of Brest (of which of course he must have been informed by the officer who conveyed the dispatch from Sir Charles Cotton) directing Lord Gardner to proceed to sea immediately in the Hibernia, and carry into execution their Lordships' orders, taking with him such ships as are in readiness, and ordering the others to join him as expeditiously as possible.

No. 468

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 3rd April, 1805.

Sir,—I have the honour to acquaint you for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the

Admiralty, that I sailed from Cawsand Bay the 1st inst. and joined the fleet this morning, off Ushant, consisting of 17 sail of the line, and a brig as per margin,¹ and agreeably to their Lordships' orders of 20th ult., I have taken the said ships under my command, and have received from Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, Bart., such standing and unexecuted orders and instructions relative to the said command as were left by the Honourable Admiral Cornwallis for my information and government, and I am to desire you will acquaint their Lordships that I shall use my endeavours to carry the same into execution. The Vice-Admiral acquaints me that the enemy's fleet which anchored in Bertheaume and Camaret roads on the 26th ult. returned again into Brest Harbour on the 29th following.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

No. 469

*NAPOLEON TO GANTEAUME*²

Troyes, 13 germinal, an XIII [3rd April, 1805].

Monsieur le Vice-Amiral Ganteaume, l'escadre de Toulon a mis à la voile le 9 germinal, composée de 11 vaisseaux, 6 frégates et 2 bricks; le vent était nord-ouest; on l'avait perdue de vue. Le télégraphe m'a instruit de votre sortie à Bertheaume. J'espère que, si vous êtes encore en rade, vous ne tarderez pas à mettre à la voile. Le tout est de donner pour point de ralliement des parages où il n'y a point d'ennemis, et alors vous avez peu à

¹ San Josef, Dreadnought, Britannia, Neptune, Barfleur, Windsor Castle, Prince, Foudroyant, Tonnant, Courageux, Mars, Minotaur, Bellerophon, Warrior, Ramillies, Illustrious, Colossus, Colpoys brig. (The Dragon, Plantagenet, and Diadem joined on the 4th.)

² *Corresp. de Napoléon* (x.) No. 8521.

craindre de sortir de nuit, n'ayant pas à redouter les séparations. Si vous passez devant le premier point où vous devez aller, ne faites que passer et ne restez pas plus de douze heures en panne et à tirer des bordées.

J'imagine que vous aurez expédié votre courrier à Rochefort ; écrivez-le-moi par le retour de mon courrier, que vous dirigerez sur Lyon, et apprenez-moi que vous mettez à la voile. Dites au préfet maritime de donner au courrier une dépêche qui me fasse connaître la situation des affaires douze heures après votre départ.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 470

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO MR. MARSDEN

Prince of Wales, off Ferrol, 4th April, 1805.

Sir,—The *Impétueux* having sprung her bowsprit I am compelled to send her into port ; this squadron is now reduced to only five sail of the line, one frigate and a cutter, but I am in daily expectation and hopes of being joined by a strong detachment of ships from England, to enable me to cope with the enemy on their leaving Ferrol.

Their force there is increasing and getting ready for sea very fast, as you will perceive by the following intelligence which Captain Moore, of the *Indefatigable*, obtained lately from a very intelligent American who carried a cargo of corn in there. Captain Moore thinks this man's information may be depended upon (*viz.*) there are in at Ferrol five sail of the line, 2 frigates and a corvette, French, ready for sea, 5 sail of the line (1 of three decks) 3 frigates, and a brig, Spanish, perfectly ready for sea. Also 3 Spanish ships of the line lately come out of the arsenal getting ready for sea very

fast. A short time since there arrived at Ferrol some French soldiers from France who were put on board the French squadron, but the American judged from their number being small that they were only to complete those ships' complements. By this you will perceive the enemy's force now at Ferrol to be as follows : viz. 13 sail of the line, 5 frigates, and 2 corvettes.

The above statement you will be pleased to lay before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for their information.

I am, &c.,
ROBT. CALDER.

[On the same day Calder wrote in similar terms a letter to Cornwallis which would reach the hands of Lord Gardner. He said his squadron was reduced to five ships of the line, one frigate and a cutter. Water was running short, and unless he had a relief of ships well stored with water, fuel and provisions, and able to supply the other ships on their junction, he should have to return to port in about a month's time. Lord Gardner detached the Ajax, Malta, and Terrible from the squadron to join him, and the Admiralty approved.]

No. 471

CAPTAIN GOSSELIN TO LORD GARDNER

Latona, off Brest, 9th April, 1805.

My Lord,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's order and memorandum of the 30th ult. and letter of yesterday's date by the Colpoys, and beg leave to acquaint you the enemy's ships appear in the same situation as they have done since their return to Brest roads. We make out 26 ships, but cannot ascertain the exact

number lying there, owing to not having had a favourable opportunity to reconnoitre since the fleet went in. I have every reason to believe the whole of the fleet still continue there; they had topgallant masts down for two days, and got them up again on Sunday.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
T. LE M. GOSSELIN.

No. 472

REAR-ADMIRAL COLLINGWOOD TO
MR. J. E. BLACKETT¹

Dreadnought, 9th April, 1805.

Lord Gardner joined us a week ago to command the fleet in the absence of Admiral Cornwallis. I saw him yesterday for an hour or two, and was sorry to find him altered for the worse—old, and out of spirits; yet, I think, if he were established he would recover again and be as active as ever, for there is no officer a more perfect master of the discipline of a fleet than he is. The French ships are perfectly ready for sea, and ten days ago came out of Brest to Bertheaume road. We stood with our fleet, 17 sail of us, close up to their 21, but they did not show any disposition to come from under their batteries.

No. 473

NAPOLEON TO GANTEAUME²

Châlon-sur-Saône, 17 germinal, an XIII
[7th April, 1805].

Monsieur l'Amiral Ganteaume, j'ai vu avec plaisir, par votre dépêche du 9, que vous étiez content du zèle de vos marins et de la rapidité des

¹ Newnham Collingwood's *Life of Collingwood*, 3rd edit. p. 101.

² *Corresp. de Napoléon* (x.) No. 8542.

manœuvres de vos différents vaisseaux. J'ai remarqué avec intérêt qu'ayant appareillé et mouillé plusieurs fois il n'ait été fait aucune fausse manœuvre ni éprouvé aucun accident. L'escadre de Toulon est partie le 9 ; j'ai des nouvelles de Toulon du 11 ; on la supposait en bon chemin. J'ai des nouvelles du Ferrol qui m'annoncent que 2 frégates et 4 vaisseaux français et 2 frégates et 7 vaisseaux espagnols sont en rade et prêts à partir. Vous trouverez donc dans ce port 11 vaisseaux de guerre. L'essentiel sera de ne point perdre de temps devant le Ferrol, et, vos ordres une fois communiqués, cette escadre vous joindra.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 474

*NAPOLÉON TO GANTEAUME*¹

Lyon, 21 germinal, an XIII [11th April, 1805].

Monsieur l'amiral Ganteaume, je n'ai point de nouvelles de mon escadre de Toulon, qui, cependant, est dehors depuis le 9. Un courrier que je reçois de Cadix, en date du 8 germinal, me porte la nouvelle que l'amiral Gravina est prêt à partir pour se joindre à l'escadre française avec 8 vaisseaux et 2 frégates, ce qui portera l'escadre du vice-amiral Villeneuve à 20 vaisseaux. Vous trouverez au Ferrol 8 vaisseaux espagnols et 4 français ; j'espère donc que vous partirez du point de rendez-vous avec plus de 50 vaisseaux. Portez avec vous le plus de biscuit que vous pourrez. Si les vents ne vous ont pas encore permis de sortir, en vous tenant prêt à profiter de la première occasion, elle ne tardera pas à se présenter.

Vous tenez dans vos mains les destinées du monde.

NAPOLÉON.

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (x.) No. 8570.

No. 475

*SIR JOHN ORDE TO LORD ROBERT
FITZ-GERALD*

Glory, at Sea, 10th April, 1805.

My Lord,—I send a merchant ship near me with this, to acquaint you that, while at anchor yesterday off Cadiz, I had nearly been brought to action by the Toulon fleet of 20 or 24 sail, 11 to 12 clearly of the line, possibly having some Spanish ships from Carthagena with them; they stood in close to the harbour of Cadiz, with colours flying at every mast-head, and were apparently received with great joy by all description of people, flags being hoisted on every house; 7 or 8 sail of the line are in readiness to join them from Cadiz, and in 24 hours perhaps 2 or 3 more. Where their destination may be after this junction (which I am not astonished at) I cannot tell, but I judge it westward.

Where Lord Nelson is I cannot hear, but I am told he is likely to return to Egypt on hearing of the French fleet being at sea.

Pray forward this intelligence in all directions, with every possible dispatch.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. ORDE.

No. 476

SIR JOHN ORDE TO LORD GARDNER

Glory, at Sea, 12th April, 1805.

My Lord,—I think it my duty to acquaint you that on the 9th inst. I was induced to quit my station before Cadiz, with the squadron under my command, as per margin,¹ by the sudden appearance of the

¹ Glory, Renown, Defence, Polyphemus, Agamemnon, Ruby.

Toulon fleet, which joined the Spanish force in Cadiz the same evening. The combined fleet, ready, I judge, to leave Cadiz immediately after this junction, would amount to 19 or 20 sail of the line, with 10 or 12 frigates and several corvettes; 4 or 5 more Spanish line-of-battle ships might possibly be ready to put to sea in 48 hours.

What the destination of this force may be I cannot ascertain, but I judge westward—in any case I think it would not remain long in Cadiz.¹

Inclosed is a list of the Spanish part of this force, commanded by Admiral Gravina, authorised to carry his flag at the main, and having under him the Vice-Admirals Alava and Villavicencio;² the French division, consisting of 11 ships of the line at least, with 9 or 10 frigates, is commanded by a Vice-Admiral with two Rear-Admirals under him.³ At Carthagea the Spaniards had four sail of the line nearly ready some time ago, and it is believed that they also may have joined Gravina ere this.⁴

I have not heard from Lord Nelson since December last, nor can I positively ascertain his actual position and movements.

I have directed the commander of the ship who will deliver you this, and my dispatches for the Admiralty and for Ireland, to follow your orders for his further proceedings, thus leaving it to your

¹ The *Aigle* and six Spanish ships joined immediately, and the fleet sailed at once to Martinique.

² Appears to be an error. Don Rafael Villavicencio was captain of the *Firme*, 74, in Calder's action. The Spanish flag-officers employed at the time were Admiral Don Federico Gravina, Vice-Admiral Don I. M. de Alava, and Rear-Admirals Don B. H. de Cisneros and Don A. Escaño.

³ Villeneuve had with him Rear-Admiral Dumanoir Le Pelley. Rear-Admiral Magon, who left Rochefort on May 1 with 2 ships of the line, joined him in the West Indies.

⁴ The Spanish ships at Carthagea had refused to join Villeneuve.

Lordship to detach him on for England with my Admiralty letters, or to send them by any other means your Lordship may judge fit to insure their earliest delivery to the Admiralty, it being of the greatest consequence their Lordships should receive them without delay.

I shall with the remaining ships of my squadron make the best of my way to submit them to your disposal, so soon as a distribution of provisions and water is made, of which we are very short.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. ORDE.

We have had light westerly winds since the 10th.

No. 477

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 12th April, 1805, 11 o'clock A.M.

Sir,—I herewith inclose, for their Lordships' information, copy of a letter which I received this morning from Captain Gosselin, of the *Latona*, giving an account of 14 sail of the enemy's fleet in Brest Harbour being under way, and of their having anchored again.¹ In the event of these ships escaping from Brest I cannot but feel very uneasy for the squadron under Sir Robert Calder off Ferrol. I shall, however, apprise him of the enemy being in motion that he may be on his guard. Under the present circumstances of the enemy's force in Brest

¹ The airs were light, but Captain Gosselin thought, if the fog had continued, they intended to come down to Camaret. Some of the ships appeared to be standing out towards the Goulet.

and at Ferrol, I submit to their Lordships whether it is not advisable to recall Sir Robert Calder and the ships under his orders from their present station.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
GARDNER.

[On the 16th three line-of-battle ships, the Mars, Minotaur and Illustrious, which had been fitted for foreign service (in addition to the Queen and Dragon), were sent by Gardner, under Admiralty instructions, to Spithead or Cawsand Bay.]

No. 478

LIEUTENANT BOURNE TO LORD GARDNER

Felix, off Santander, 13th April, 1805.

My Lord,—Having learned through various channels that a large French schooner privateer under Spanish colours, mounting 16 guns with a complement of 130 men, lay at Santander waiting a favourable opportunity to join a privateer of similar force at Rivadéo, from whence they were to proceed in company off the N.W. coast of Ireland, I considered it my duty to cruise more immediately before that port in order to intercept her in the event of her putting to sea. Yesterday morning we stood close to the entrance of Santander, assuming an appearance calculated to induce an opinion that we would not presume to attack, and were capable of but a feeble resistance, and in the evening I had the satisfaction to find the deception we had practised attended with the success I anticipated. About 5 o'clock the enemy came out with a light air at

east, at which time we were occupied in taking possession of an American brig (the *George Clinton*, of New York) from San Sebastian to Seville, having wine and bale goods, chiefly velvets and silks, under a covering of wheat; but, knowing the force with which we were about to contend would not admit of any division of our numbers, I withdrew our people from the American and hauled to the S.S.E., apparently declining an action, until we got between the enemy and Santander, when we bore up, and having approached her within pistol shot, at 7 past 6 o'clock P.M. we opened our fire, our distance from the shore being about 4 miles. The wind being light and unsteady, our positions were often varied, but having defeated three attempts the enemy made to board us, about 8 o'clock we posted ourselves on her quarter, where we continued until 9, when she was wholly silenced, and the appearance of a light in her rigging confirmed the opinion that she had surrendered. Our fire was in consequence suspended while we endeavoured to close, in order to take possession; but that movement I was mortified to find could not be immediately carried into effect owing to our having had every brace and bowline shot away, together with the jib tye, main topsail tye and topping-lifts, and fore topgallant sheets and halyards. Every effort was devoted to the repair of these essential parts of our rigging, but during the interval of cessation I observed that the enemy, assisted by boats from Santander, drew towards the shore. Our fire was renewed with increased energy, but with concern I have to add that, notwithstanding the ardent exertions of the gallant fellows I have the honour to command, in 20 minutes she succeeded in retreating beyond the reach of our guns. The consequent mortification and disappointment of these brave men derived a temporary abatement

from the hope that she would not be able to reach Santander that night, and resolving in such case that the next morning should confirm the victory of which they had been thus surreptitiously deprived ; but unfortunately a light land air soon carried her under the batteries of Santander, and in the night I observed numerous lights conducting her into that port. Our loss has been 1 killed and 16 wounded, besides 2 hurt by the dismounting of a gun. I am unable to give expression to the sense I entertain of the cool and spirited perseverance evinced on this occasion by the crew of his Majesty's schooner. From the officers I experienced the most zealous support, particularly from Mr. Batty, midshipman, as well as from Mr. Harrison, previous to the event that deprived the service of a highly meritorious officer. From a Portuguese schooner that left Santander immediately after the departure of the privateer, I learn that she came out for the profitable purpose of taking us, and that in addition to her complement she had on board 50 volunteers, gentlemen and others, stimulated no doubt by the hope of an easy conquest as our force was considered by them not to exceed 6 or 8 guns. Feeling it necessary to render an account of the circumstances that have occasioned us to return unaccompanied by our opponent I have been thus diffuse in my narrative, and I trust that it will appear to your Lordship that her escape is not imputable to any deficiency of energy or perseverance on the part of his Majesty's schooner.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

RICHD. BOURNE.

INCLOSURE

List of killed and wounded on board his Majesty's schooner Felix, Lieutenant Richard Bourne, Commander, in action with the enemy on 12th April, 1805.

Mr. Harrison, midshipman, killed.	
John Robiland,	} Badly wounded:
Nichs. Fall,	
James Caldwell,	
John Mayor,	
Thomas Whiner,	
Thomas Morrison,	
James Oar,	} Slightly wounded.
John Renodin,	
William Bouman,	
William Mason,	
Thomas Davies,	
Robert Weir,	
John Reid,	
Robert Richardson,	
Peter Preston,	
Thomas Gray,	

RICHD. BOURNE, Lieut. Commg.

No. 479

NAPOLEON TO VILLENEUVE¹

Lyon, 24 germinal, an XIII [14th April, 1805].

Monsieur le Vice-Amiral Villeneuve, vous devez être arrivé à notre île de la Martinique avec 12 de nos vaisseaux et au moins 6 vaisseaux du roi d'Espagne; le contre-amiral Magon vous en amène deux. Notre intention est que si, trente-cinq jours

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon (x.)* No 3583.

après l'arrivée du contre-amiral Magon, vous n'aviez aucune nouvelle de l'amiral Ganteaume, que vous deviez supposer retenu par les circonstances du temps et le blocus de l'ennemi, vous opéreriez votre retour directement et par le plus court chemin sur le Ferrol. Vous y trouverez 15 vaisseaux français et espagnols, qui porteront votre escadre à 35 vaisseaux, Avec cette force, vous vous présenterez devant Brest, y opérerez votre jonction avec les 21 vaisseaux que commande l'amiral Ganteaume, sans entrer dans le port, et, avec cette armée navale, vous entrerez dans la Manche et vous présenterez devant Boulogne. Dans cette circonstance, notre intention est que vous ayez le commandement de toute l'armée navale.

Des frégates partiront successivement pour vous instruire des mouvements de la rade de Brest. Nous espérons cependant que le beau temps ne continuera pas, et qu'un coup de vent mettra enfin l'amiral Ganteaume à même d'appareiller.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 480

CAPTAIN GOSSELIN TO LORD GARDNER

Latona, off Brest, 18th April, 1805.

My Lord,—I beg to acquaint your Lordship that the Nimble brig and Rhoda cutter weré this morning close in with the Goulet to reconnoitre ; the Nimble made out 21 sail of the line, 5 frigates, 4 brigs, and 4 luggers, and the Rhoda 21 sail of the line and 6 frigates.

I thought the enemy's ships were getting under way this morning, but they were only exercising sails. Having light variable winds prevented my going in with the frigates to reconnoitre ; from where

we lay at anchor I count 21 ships in Brest roads, and 6 below their lower yards; the rest are landlocked from us.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

T. LE M. GOSSELIN.

No. 481

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 19th April, 1805.

Sir,—I am to desire you will please to acquaint their Lordships that the *Terrible* joined me yesterday from Cawsand Bay, and having delivered some stores and provisions which she took on board for conveyance to the fleet, I dispatched her the same evening to join Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder off Ferrol, and I hope that the arrival of the *Ajax*, *Malta*, and *Terrible* would enable the Vice-Admiral to furnish the ships with him with a sufficient quantity of water to enable him to keep his station until the arrival of the transports laden with water which you informed me, in your letter of the 1st inst., their Lordships had ordered the Commissioners of the Victualling to send off Ferrol, for the use of Sir Robert Calder's squadron, agreeably to my desire. I am, however, of opinion that the want of fuel and necessities will oblige him to send the *Repulse* and *Montagu* into port, and his force will then be so reduced and inferior to the enemy, that I am humbly of opinion his remaining off Ferrol, unless he is reinforced, will answer no good purpose, and if the enemy should escape from Brest, which I by no means think improbable, and should form a junction with the squadron at Ferrol (reported to consist of ten or thirteen sail of the line), Sir Robert Calder will then be very un-

pleasantly situated. The three ships named in the margin¹ having been a long time out, and reduced in many articles of provisions and necessities, it is my intention to distribute the water and salt provisions remaining on board of them to such ships as are most in want thereof, and to send the said three ships into port to replenish.

His Majesty's ship Agincourt has just joined the fleet, and I have taken the said ship under my command agreeably to their Lordships' orders of the 9th inst.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
GARDNER.

No. 482

*NAPOLÉON TO DECRES*²

Stupinigi, 30 germinal, an XIII [20th April, 1805].

Je reçois votre dépêche du 25 germinal. Vous verrez, par la lettre dont je vous envoie copie, que l'amiral Nelson a encore une fois pris le change sur notre escadre, et, probablement, fera un second voyage en Egypte. Des lettres du 15, de Cadix, m'assurent qu'il n'y a devant ce port que 5 vaisseaux ; je commence donc à n'avoir presque plus d'inquiétude pour l'escadre de Toulon. Après y avoir bien pensé, je préfère que Villeneuve vienne devant le Ferrol, où il trouvera 15 vaisseaux, et même, s'il m'est possible, je ferai entrer au Ferrol les 5 de Missiessy. Vous verrez aussi que je ne prescris point au général Villeneuve de revenir sur-le-champ, mais d'attendre trente-cinq jours, afin que mon escadre de Brest ait encore le temps de le joindre ; par Dieu ! pressez-la-donc. . . .

NAPOLÉON.

¹ Windsor Castle, Bellerophon, Warrior.

² *Corresp. de Napoléon* (x.) No. 8603.

No. 483

NAPOLEON TO DECRÈS¹Stupinigi, 1^{er} floréal, an XIII [21st April, 1805].

Monsieur Decrès, le non-départ de Ganteaume me contrarie beaucoup. Toutes les nouvelles que je reçois jusqu'à cette heure de la Méditerranée me portent à penser que Villeneuve aura fait une bonne et heureuse route. Vous n'avez point besoin de mon autorisation pour expédier des bricks ; faites-en partir un tous les huit jours, en prenant les précautions nécessaires pour qu'ils ne tombent point entre les mains de l'ennemi, et instruisez Villeneuve de tout ce qui se passe.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 484

CAPTAIN LEGGE TO SIR ROBERT CALDER

Repulse, off Ferrol, 21st April, 1805.

Sir,—The enemy's ships now visible in the entrance of Ferrol consist of 3 Spanish two-deckers, one of them carrying an Admiral's flag at the mizen, 2 Spanish frigates, 1 French frigate, and a brig. The French frigate does not appear to be the *Guerrière*, that used to lie in the same situation. On board of one of the ships lying to the southward in Ferrol, whose mast-heads can only be seen over the land, is a Spanish Admiral's flag at the fore ; she has her topgallant yards across and they all appear to be ready for sea, except one of the seventy-fours, who has not her topsails and courses bent, though her staysails are.

The French frigate at Corunna has moved under the outer battery, at the point of Corunna,

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (x.) No. 8609.

and has her topgallant yards across and all sails bent.

I remain, &c.,

ARTHUR K. LEGGE.

No. 485

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 22nd April, 1805.

Sir,—Captain Poyntz, of the *Melampus*, joined me this morning about 10 o'clock, but being under quarantine has only come in his boat alongside. From him I have obtained the following intelligence, which I transmit to you for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty by the *Felix* schooner, and shall write to Vice-Admiral Young to forward it by express.

Captain Poyntz states that on the 14th inst. he spoke the *Fisgard*, Lord Mark Kerr, off Cape Finisterre, who acquainted him that on the 9th inst. in the morning, 11 sail of the line, 7 frigates, and 2 brigs of the enemy were seen from Gibraltar to pass out of the Gut, and supposed to have 10,000 troops on board. The *Renown* and *Sophie* sloop were in the Gut at that time, and went out before the enemy; the *Renown* kept ahead, and the *Sophie* was seen to haul up for Cadiz.

Lord Mark Kerr hauled out of the Mole of Gibraltar at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the 9th inst., but did not see the French fleet afterwards; he hired a brig and sent her in search of Lord Nelson, who is supposed to have gone to eastward.

Captain Poyntz acquaints me he informed Sir Robert Calder of the above circumstance on the 16th inst. off Ferrol, at which time the Vice-Admiral had six sail of the line and two frigates with him,

and Lord Mark Kerr proceeded with the above information to Ireland.

Captain Poyntz also states that the Spaniards had collected eight sail of the line at Cadiz, besides l'Aigle, French line-of-battle ship, and that since the 9th inst., Captain Poyntz acquaints me, the wind has been constantly to the northward, until the last two days.

As the enemy have shown a disposition to put to sea from Brest, I shall consider it my duty to watch their motions with the ships I have with me, seventeen sail of the line, including the Agincourt and Diadem, and shall write to Vice-Admiral Young to hasten the ships who have been sent to Cawsand Bay to replenish, and I shall wait for further information respecting the enemy, and act to the best of my judgment for his Majesty's service.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

No. 486

*CAPTAIN LORD MARK KERR TO
LORD GARDNER*

Fisgard, 23rd April, 1805.

My Lord,—I beg to inform you that, being in the Mole of Gibraltar refitting on the 9th of April at 11 A.M., perceived a French fleet passing through the Gut with a strong Levanter, consisting of 11 sail of the line, 7 frigates, and 2 brigs, and knew them to be the Toulon fleet, which had some weeks before been driven back to that port by stress of weather; they had at that time 10,000 troops on board.

At the time they were as far advanced as Ceuta; his Majesty's ships Renown and Sophie, which were cruising off Tarifa, bore up, and made all sail to

the westward, of course to inform Sir John Orde, and I have not a doubt gave him timely notice of their approach.

By 3 P.M. on the 10th we were ready, and hauled out of the Mole, the French fleet out of sight, and Lord Nelson not in sight from the back of the Rock. Leaving behind our launch, barge, anchor, cables, carpenter's and boatswain's stores, and twenty-two ton of water casks, &c., made all sail, and ran through the Gut; seeing no more of them, and fearing to lose any part of the strong breeze then blowing, I determined to push for Ireland. Thirty leagues west of Cape Spartel, boarded two privateers for information—they had seen nothing. On the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th we had a strong gale from the N.W. b. W. to N.N.W., from which I am convinced they could not at this time have made much progress to the northward.

At noon on the 15th gave intelligence to his Majesty's ship *Melampus* and proceeded according to our former plan.

On the 18th saw two sail in chase of us belonging to the French squadron; bore up and ran five miles to leeward supposing they had not received the above intelligence. Answered signal No. 122, hauled our wind, and made all sail.

On the 21st, boarded the Greyhound lugger privateer of Guernsey, latitude $47^{\circ} 45' N.$, longitude $9^{\circ} 30' W.$, and, the wind being fair, forwarded the above intelligence to the Admiralty by her. On the 22nd it blew hard at S.S.W.; on the 22nd A.M. it was still hard at S.S.W.; so thick could not see a quarter of a mile; at 3 P.M. on the 23rd it fell calm, and remained so with very thick weather till 10 A.M., light breezes and cloudy, made all sail; at 11 saw the land bearing N.N.E.

M. KERR.

No. 487

NAPOLEON TO DECRÈS¹

Stupinigi, 3 floréal, an XIII [23rd April, 1805].

Monsieur Decrès, un courrier que je reçois de l'amiral Ganteaume, du 25, me dit qu'il est près de partir ; c'est avec bien de l'impatience que j'attends la nouvelle qu'il est enfin parti. J'ai vu avec plaisir que vous ayez donné l'ordre au général Magon de partir. Je vous recommande de nouveau l'expédition de bricks et de goëlettes ; répétez par le premier qui partira, et recommandez au général Villeneuve de faire tout le mal qu'il pourra à l'ennemi, en attendant l'amiral Ganteaume, puisqu'avec les Espagnols et les Français j'ai beaucoup de troupes là. Qu'on prenne Saint-Vincent, Antigua, la Grenade ; et pourquoi ne prendrait-on pas la Barbade ?

.
NAPOLÉON.

No. 488

NAPOLEON TO GANTEAUME²

Stupinigi, 3 floréal, an XIII [23rd April, 1805].

Monsieur l'Amiral Ganteaume, vous connaissez l'heureux résultat de l'expédition du contre-amiral Missiessy, qui a pris la Dominique et, je pense, Sainte-Lucie. Il ne me reste plus que d'apprendre la nouvelle de votre départ. Je pense que vous et vos équipages êtes constamment à bord et prêts à profiter du moindre moment. Je vous exprimerais difficilement toute l'impatience que j'éprouve. Ne manquez aucune des occasions qui se présenteront, mais maintenez à bord une sévère discipline, et

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (x.) No. 8618.

² *Ibid.* No. 8619.

tenez la main à ce que tout le monde reste à bord. Augmentez les vivres de vos flûtes autant qu'il vous sera possible.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 489

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 26th April, 1805.

Sir,—Lord William Fitzroy, of his Majesty's ship *Æolus*, joined me this morning about 11 o'clock, having been ordered by Captain Hill, of his Majesty's ship *Orpheus* (whom he fell in with on the 20th instant in latitude $42^{\circ} 26' N.$, longitude $12^{\circ} 30' W.$), to proceed with all possible dispatch with a copy of a letter for my information from Vice-Admiral Sir John Orde to Lord Robert FitzGerald, copy of which I herewith inclose for their Lordships' information, from which I learn that the Toulon squadron stood close in off the harbour of Cadiz on the 9th instant, and would probably be joined by seven or eight sail of the line, Spanish and French ships, in that port. Whether it is their intention to proceed to the northward or to the southward is very uncertain, but Sir John Orde is inclined to think their destination is westward. I send this by the Honourable Captain Legge, of the *Repulse*, and shall send duplicate thereof by the *Melampus*.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

No. 490

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 27th April, 1805.

Sir,—The *Fisgard* having joined me this day from the coast of Ireland, agreeably to orders which Lord Mark Kerr received from Rear-Admiral

Drury at Cork, to whom he had transmitted the intelligence which he brought from Gibraltar of the Toulon squadron having passed the Gut on the 9th inst. to the westward, and as the *Fisgard* hauled out of the Mole and sailed from Gibraltar in great haste, leaving behind her boats, anchor, cables, boatswain's and carpenter's stores, and twenty-two ton of water casks, &c., I have directed Lord Mark Kerr to proceed to Plymouth Sound, and wait their Lordships' orders for his further proceedings. The intelligence I transmitted to you yesterday by the *Repulse* (and in duplicate by the *Melampus*), contained in the copy of a letter, dated on board the *Glory* at sea the 10th inst., from Vice-Admiral Sir John Orde to Lord Robert FitzGerald at Lisbon, which I received yesterday by the *Æolus*, will inform their Lordships that the Toulon squadron had on the evening of the 9th inst. stood close to the entrance of the harbour of Cadiz, and are supposed to have formed a junction with 7 or 8 Spanish ships of the line from that place, which would increase their number to 18 or 19 sail of the line; and if their destination is to the northward, there can be very little doubt of their being joined by the squadron at Ferrol, consisting of 13 sail of the line and 6 frigates. Their force will then amount to 31 sail of the line. I therefore hope that the two squadrons to the southward, under Sir John Orde and Sir Robert Calder, will endeavour to join the fleet under my orders, consisting of 17 sail of the line, and that their Lordships will take such measures for my being reinforced as they may judge necessary.

A signal has just been made from the inshore squadron that the enemy's fleet in Brest continue in the same situation as when last reconnoitred.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

II.

R

No. 491

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 27th April, 1805.

Sir,—Since dispatching the *Fisgard* this afternoon to Plymouth, I have received by the *Nimble* brig a letter from Captain Gosselin, senior officer of the inshore squadron, acquainting me that the frigates reconnoitred Brest this morning, and that Captain Gosselin made out 21 sail of the line, 6 frigates and some smaller vessels, and an increase of two flags, one at the fore, the other at the mizen. Captain Elphinstone, of the *Diamond*, reports that there are 21 sail of the line, 7 frigates, and 3 corvettes, and the flags of one Admiral, one Vice-Admiral, and three Rear-Admirals flying.

The *Nimble's* water and provisions being nearly expended, I have sent her to Plymouth to replenish and return immediately.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

No. 492

Lord Gardner's Instructions

Notice, dated 18th April, received 27th April, acquainting me that their Lordships have ordered stores and provisions for completing the ships named in the margin¹ for foreign service, to be sent out from Plymouth by any of the ships of the squadron, and signifying their Lordships' directions to me to hold the said ships in readiness at all times to proceed on foreign service whenever it may be necessary.

¹ Dreadnought, Foudroyant, Barfleur, Windsor Castle, Ramillies, Tonnant, Warrior, Mars, Minotaur, Bellerophon, Illustrious, Colossus.

No. 493

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 28th April, 1805.

Sir,—The Polyphemus having joined me this day at noon with dispatches from Vice-Admiral Sir John Orde for the Admiralty, I lose no time in forwarding them to you by the Sirius, Captain Prowse, with directions on his arrival at Plymouth to send them immediately by express to London.

I also inclose for their Lordships' information copy of the Vice-Admiral's letter to me, dated the 12th inst., acquainting me of the Toulon fleet having put into Cadiz, and inclosing a list of the Spanish force at that place,¹ and acquainting me of his intention of proceeding with the ships named in the margin² to join me off Ushant, which ships I shall take under my orders on their arrival as well as the Polyphemus, until I receive further directions from their Lordships concerning them.

I have also received by the Polyphemus two letters from Sir John Orde, one addressed to his Excellency the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, and the other to Rear-Admiral Drury, which I shall forward by the Niobe.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

No. 494

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

[Extract.]

Hibernia, off Ushant, 29th April, 1805.

Sir Robert Calder informs me that he intends to keep the Orpheus with him for a short time, to look

¹ The report was of the Santissima Trinidad, 130, Santa Ana, 112, two 80's, four 74's, four 64's, and three frigates, Spanish, at the port, with, it was supposed, two three-deck ships, and nine 74's, French.

² Glory, Renown, Defence, Agamemnon, Ruby.

out between him and Cape Finisterre, in order to give him timely notice if the combined squadron should come his way with a view of releasing the Ferrol squadron, in which case he should retire from off Ferrol, and make the best of his way to join me.

[Calder's plan anticipated Admiralty orders, which Gardner received on 5th May. If the former should ascertain that the combined squadron was coming north, he was to proceed to the rendezvous off Brest.]

No. 495

*NAPOLEON TO DECRÈS*¹

Stupinigi, 9 floréal, an XIII [29th April, 1805].

J'attends avec bien de l'impatience le départ de l'escadre de Brest et de Rochefort. Je m'imagine que vous avez déjà fait partir quelques goëlettes et bricks. Il est bien instant que Villeneuve soit instruit. Je suis bien surpris que vous n'ayez pas de nouvelles directes de Missiessy. Toutes les nouvelles que je reçois, c'est que 5 ou 6,000 hommes aux Indes ruineraient la Compagnie anglaise. Dans le cas que, par des évènements quelconques, notre expédition n'ait pas un plein succès, et que je ne puisse pas arriver au plus grand de tous les buts, qui fera tomber tout le reste, je pense qu'il faut calculer l'opération de l'Inde pour septembre. Il y a aujourd'hui beaucoup plus de moyens qu'il y a quelque temps. On pourrait toute la baser sur le départ de l'escadre de Brest et sa jonction avec celle du Ferrol, puisque cela ferait 36 vaisseaux de guerre. Faites-moi connaître la saison où l'on pourra faire l'expédition d'Afrique. Ecrivez donc en Espagne pour le cinquième vaisseau, et en désarmant, s'il est

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (x.) No. 8654.

possible, une frégate, je me trouverai avoir le nombre de vaisseaux nécessaire.

Voyez à Brest, si l'on peut, sans décider que Ganteaume ne peut sortir, s'attendre à être débloqué par Villeneuve. Voyez donc alors de tâcher d'y joindre l'Océan ; quand il ne suivrait pas l'escadre, il pourrait prendre part au combat ; car vous ne doutez pas que l'escadre de Brest ne se batte, et un vaisseau à trois ponts de plus ne peut être que d'un grand avantage.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 496

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 30th April, 1805.

Sir,—By the hired armed ship *Pretty Lass*, which joined me this evening about 8 o'clock, I have received your secret letter of the 26th inst., acquainting me that in consequence of the information given me by Captain Poyntz, of the French squadron from Toulon having passed the Straits of Gibraltar, I shall probably receive in the course of a few days their Lordships' directions to make a detachment of 4 sail of the line from the fleet under my command. It is therefore their Lordships' directions in case the wind should come to blow from the westward, and I should judge it expedient to put into Torbay, that I order 4 of the two-decked ships which have been fitted for foreign service to proceed off the Lizard, with instructions to their captains to cruise within 5 leagues thereof until they receive fresh orders. In answer thereto, I am to desire you will please to acquaint their Lordships that I shall attend to their directions.

The 5 ships named in the margin¹ at present

¹ Dreadnought, Foudroyant, Barfleur, Tonnant, Ramillies.

with me, and under orders to be completed to six months, are in want of water, stores, fuel, and surgeon's necessities, and until those articles arrive from Plymouth they will not be in a state to proceed on foreign service, and I am humbly of opinion that the shortest way of completing ships for foreign service would be to order them to Cawsand Bay.¹ The greater part of the fleet are getting short of water, fuel, and necessities, and there is not a sufficiency of stores, &c., to complete the aforementioned 5 ships without stripping others, who must afterwards be sent in to replenish. Demands for the said 5 ships shall be sent to the Navy, Ordnance, and Victualling Departments.

Situated as I am at this time, I cannot even with a westerly wind go to Torbay, unless forced in by stress of weather, or I receive their Lordships' orders to send in part of the fleet from time to time to replenish, as they may otherwise be in general reduced at the same time.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

[The Windsor Castle, Warrior, Mars, Minotaur, Bellerophon, Illustrious, Colossus of Gardner's squadron were also ordered by the Admiralty to be fitted for foreign service.]

No. 497

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 30th April, 1805; Tuesday evening.

Sir,—About 5 o'clock this afternoon I received by the Nimble brig your secret letter of the 27th inst., signifying their Lordships' directions to me to dis-

¹ This proposal was approved by the Admiralty.

patch one of the frigates under my command immediately under sealed orders to Vice-Admiral Sir John Orde off Cadiz, directing her commander to collect from the Vice-Admiral such intelligence as he may be enabled to communicate respecting the present movements of the enemy's squadrons, particularly that which sailed from Toulon, with which intelligence he is to proceed without a moment's delay off Madeira in quest of Vice-Admiral Collingwood, whom it is their Lordships' intentions to dispatch thither with five sail of the line, and having communicated the same to Vice-Admiral Collingwood for his government he is to repair to the first port in England as therein directed.

In answer thereto I beg to refer their Lordships to my letter of the 28th inst., accompanying Vice-Admiral Sir John Orde's dispatches of the 12th inst., forwarded to you by his Majesty's ship *Sirius* on the same day, by which their Lordships would be informed of Vice-Admiral Sir John Orde's intention of quitting his station off Cadiz, and returning to the northward for the purpose of joining me, which he did about two hours ago with the five ships named in the margin,¹ as mentioned in my former letter of this date; and Sir John Orde not being able to give any further information respecting the movements of the enemy's squadrons to the southward, particularly that which sailed from Toulon. Under these circumstances I shall take upon me to delay the sailing of Vice-Admiral Collingwood until I hear further from their Lordships, or receive some information which may be depended on respecting the movement of the combined fleet at Cadiz—which I hope will meet their Lordships' approbation.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

¹ *Glory, Renown, Defence, Agamemnon, Ruby.*

No. 498

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 1st May, 1805.

Sir, — You will please to acquaint their Lordships that I received a letter this morning from Captain Gosselin, of the *Latona*, dated yesterday, informing me that the enemy's fleet in Brest continue in the same situation as before, except that three frigates were then under way, standing out of the Goulet.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

No. 499

CAPTAIN DUNDAS TO LORD GARDNER

Naiad, at Sea, 2nd May, 1805.

My Lord, — In compliance with your Lordship's order of the 23rd ult., we, on Sunday at 8 A.M. of the 28th, reconnoitred the enemy's force at anchor under the *Ile d'Aix*, Rochefort (the strong westerly winds directly on shore having prevented my approaching any part of the French coast sooner), and found it to consist of two sail of the line, two-deckers, the largest which we supposed to be of eighty guns, bore the flag of a Rear-Admiral; their sails were bent, and the Admiral's ship had the topgallant yards across. There was besides another under jury masts, which we supposed a prison or receiving ship, and sixteen sail of small craft of various descriptions, brigs, galliots, &c., &c., most of whom appeared like merchant vessels.

On Wednesday, the 1st instant, at 3 P.M., Port Louis Harbour, Lorient, bearing N.N.E., distant 4 miles, we reconnoitred the vessels of war at anchor there and found them to consist of three

sail of ships completely rigged—two with sails bent and topgallant yards across, apparently ready for sea—one of which had a Commodore's pennant flying. As the neck of land which separated them from us prevented our seeing their hulls, it was impossible to ascertain to a certainty whether they are of the line or not, but from their size we supposed them to be so. There was also one ship with her topmasts struck, and two brigs.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
THOS. DUNDAS.

No. 500

*NAPOLÉON TO DECRÈS*¹

Alexandrie, 12 floréal, an XIII [2nd May, 1805].

Je suis surpris d'apprendre que Rochefort n'est prêt à partir que le 2. Il me semble que vous devez être assez au fait pour savoir que les troupes d'embarquement n'étaient plus nécessaires lorsque Villeeneuve avait passé, et que, d'ailleurs, pour une expédition particulière comme l'est celle-là, il ne fallait pas . . . de troupes. Si on vous rendait compte de Rochefort tous les jours, vous leur auriez répondu. Le ministère est organisé de manière que rien ne s'y fait que par extraordinaire, et rien par la marche ordinaire des choses.

J'imagine que les frégates de Lorient sont prêtes. Ecrivez qu'elles doivent partir, toutes trois, six heures après mon courrier. Interdire la terre aux équipages et faire coucher à bord. Beaucoup de gens instruits m'assurent que Ganteaume a manqué sa sortie, parce qu'il l'a retardée de vingt-quatre heures, et que beaucoup de capitaines n'étaient pas à bord.

NAPOLÉON.

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (x.) No. 8670.

No. 501

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 3rd May, 1805; Friday evening.

Sir,—You will please to acquaint their Lordships that I am using every endeavour to complete the ships named in the margin¹ to six months from the different ships of the fleet, and I hope the four first named will be in a tolerable state with respect to water this afternoon—the quantity required for the whole is near 470 tons, and this will reduce those ships that remain with me to eight or nine weeks' water. I therefore request their Lordships will order water and fuel to be sent out to the fleet as soon as possible. After every exertion to fill up the above ships, they will go from hence short of stores, fuel, candles, medicines, and surgeons' necessaries, which it is not in my power to supply them, and the wants of the *Barfleur* are so great that I am doubtful whether I shall be able to complete her. The *Neptune* will be quite reduced, and I propose sending her in to replenish.

Their Lordships' directions are so pointed, to hold the ships in readiness at all times to proceed on foreign service whenever it may be necessary, and by your letter of the 29th ult. I am told I may shortly receive their Lordships' further instructions for my guidance, that I am of opinion I should have been liable to censure had I not distributed the water and provisions in the manner I have done. Otherwise I beg to assure their Lordships that I would not have reduced the water and provisions, fuel, coals, and candles of the Channel fleet to the low ebb they are at present. I hope, how-

¹ Dreadnought, Foudroyant, Tonnant, Ramillies, *Barfleur*.

ever, for their Lordships' approbation for what I have done.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

His Majesty's ship *Colossus* joined me this afternoon from Cawsand Bay.

No. 502

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 3rd May, 1805.

[Acknowledges receipt of their Lordships' directions, in consequence of the intelligence concerning the Toulon fleet, to suspend the execution of any orders he might have received for detaching Collingwood with a squadron of ships to the westward, and acquainting him that he would shortly receive their Lordships' further directions.]

No. 503

CAPTAIN GOSSELIN TO LORD GARDNER

Latona, off Brest, 4th May, 1805.

My Lord,—I beg leave to acquaint your Lordship that yesterday evening I examined the masters of two Prussian galliots that had come out of Brest and gave intelligence the enemy's fleet was unmoored on the 2nd inst. and was to have sailed, but in consequence of counter-orders arriving had again moored; they also mentioned the enemy's ships being full of men, but could not be certain of their having soldiers on board.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

T. LE M. GOSSELIN.

No. 504

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 5th May, 1805.

Sir,—I am to desire you will acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I have ordered the Naiad to proceed off Ferrol to Sir Robert Calder, with the intelligence received by the Beagle brig respecting the Spanish ships of war which Captain Burn fell in with on the 11th and 12th last month, transmitted to me by Vice-Admiral Young; and, having delivered my dispatches to Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, I have directed Captain Dundas to proceed and cruise from 10 to 30 leagues south-west of Cape Finis-terre, for the protection of the trade of his Majesty's subjects, and to keep a good look out should the combined fleet come to the northward from Cadiz, in which case he is directed to give Vice-Admiral Calder and me timely notice thereof, and if the enemy's ships should have troops on board he is directed to push on for Ireland, and to give Rear-Admiral Drury every intelligence in his power respecting the enemy's force. Captain Dundas is to continue on the above service until his water is nearly expended, when he is to return off Ushant, and not finding me there he is to proceed to Plymouth Sound to replenish, and afterwards to join me, wherever the squadron may happen to be at the time.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

No. 505

*SIR JOHN ORDE TO LORD GARDNER**Communication by telegraph from the Agamemnon.*

Glory, off Ushant, 5th May, 1805.

The vessel spoken with is from Marans, was two days at the Isle Dieu. By the guard-ship's report, two sail of the line sailed from Rochefort on 1st May; did not know the course they steered or whether with troops on board.

J. ORDE.

No. 506

*Intelligence obtained from Captain Martin, of the
Impétueux*

6th May, 1805.—His Majesty's ship *Impétueux* boarded three neutral vessels from Rochefort, and all of them agree in stating two French line-of-battle ships under a Vice-Admiral having put to sea from that port on the 1st inst. The ships had each 800 troops and the same number of seamen, and it was generally believed they were bound to Martinique. An embargo took place for several days before the ship sailed, and the neutrals were not permitted to depart till the day after.

The neutrals were boarded by five English frigates off Belle Isle and gave them the above information, but did not observe the frigates to make sail or alter their course in consequence of it.

T. B. MARTIN.

[The ships which left Rochefort for the West Indies on 1st May were the *Algésiras*, 74, and the

Achille, 74, under Rear-Admiral Magon, who anchored at Guadaloupe on 29th May, and joined Villeneuve early in June.]

No. 507

*NAPOLÉON TO DECRÈS*¹

18 floréal, an XIII [8th May, 1805].

Monsieur Decrès, . . . Ainsi donc, au plus tard, le 10 messidor (29 June), Villeneuve doit marcher et arriver comme un trait sur le Ferrol. Quant à Ganteaume, si, au 30 floréal (20 May), il n'est pas parti, mon intention est qu'il ne sorte plus, mais qu'il reste cependant toujours embarqué, toujours en haleine, toujours bien approvisionné. Vous lui ferez connaître alors le plan de campagne ; mais, pour qu'il se tienne plus sur ses gardes, vous lui annoncerez que Villeneuve doit paraître devant Brest du 20 au 30 messidor (9-19 July). Je pense qu'il est assez utile que vous fassiez mettre dans les journaux de Hollande qu'une nouvelle escadre sous les ordres de l'amiral Magon, forte de 3 vaisseaux et 4 frégates, est partie de Rochefort, qu'elle a à bord cet officier que devait amener Lauriston, que vous nommerez, et qu'on dira avoir été prisonnier à Sainte-Hélène tant de temps. En définitive, je tiens invariablement à ce système : Ganteaume doit sortir, s'il le peut, jusqu'au 30 floréal à minuit. Au moment du lever du soleil du 1^{er} prairial (21 May), aurait-il toutes les occasions possibles, il attendra de pied ferme à Brest, et ne sortira plus. L'amiral Villeneuve sera instruit de ces dispositions par la Topaze ; il aura l'ordre, le 10 messidor (29 June), de partir ; le Président partira de Lorient

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (x.) No. 869.

le 1^{er} prairial ; il fera connaître à Villeneuve que Ganteaume n'est pas parti, qu'il ne doit plus perdre une heure, qu'il est inutile qu'il attende davantage. A cet effet, vous ordonnerez à Ganteaume, si le 30 floréal à minuit il n'est pas parti, d'expédier aussitôt un courrier au commandant du Président pour le faire partir sur-le-champ. Par ce moyen, on épargnera beaucoup de jours. Le paquet aura été envoyé d'avance au commandant du Président. Au 25 messidor (14 July) je serai sur la côte, et, au 10 thermidor (29 July), j'attendrai le retour de mes escadres.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 508

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 9th May, 1805.

Sir,—I received by the Swinger gun-brig, who joined me this morning about 11 o'clock, their Lordships' order, dated the 4th inst., to deliver to Vice-Admiral Collingwood a packet which came inclosed to me bearing his address, and putting seven of the two-decked ships of my squadron under his command (selecting those which have been fitted for foreign service), direct him to proceed with them and the Dreadnought with all possible dispatch to the southward and westward, and when he shall have got to the distance of 50 leagues from Ushant, to open the said packet and carry into execution the instructions therein contained for his further proceedings. I have also received Mr. Barrow's letter of the same date (4th May) which accompanied their Lordships' order, signifying their direction to me notwithstanding their Lordships' order as before mentioned, in

case any intelligence should have been received by me (of which their Lordships are not in possession) and which in my opinion may render the measure of detaching Vice-Admiral Collingwood inexpedient, to withhold the delivery of the orders addressed to the Vice-Admiral, which are left open for my inspection, until I receive their Lordships' further instructions.

Should I not have received any intelligence which may render the measure of detaching the Vice-Admiral, agreeably to his orders, inexpedient, I am to seal the packet containing the same and deliver it to the Vice-Admiral.

In answer thereto I am to desire you will acquaint their Lordships that I have not received any intelligence respecting the Toulon or Spanish ships since that brought by the Beagle brig, dated the 12th ult., and transmitted to me on the 1st inst. by Vice-Admiral Young; and as I am not in possession of any intelligence which in my judgment can authorise me to detain the squadron which their Lordships have directed me to detach under the orders of Vice-Admiral Collingwood, I shall therefore order him to take the seven two-decked ships named in the margin ¹ under his command, and sealing the packet bearing his address, I shall direct him to proceed with them and the Dreadnought with all possible dispatch to the southward and westward of Ushant, and when he shall have got to the distance of 50 leagues from Ushant, to open the said packet and carry into execution the instructions therein contained for his further proceedings.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

¹ Tonnant, Mars, Minotaur, Illustrious, Bellerophon, Ramillies, Colossus.

No. 509

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 10th May, 1805.

Sir,—By the *Melampus* I yesterday received your letter of the 6th instant signifying their Lordships' directions to me to order Vice-Admiral Sir John Orde to proceed with the *Glory* and *Defence* to Spithead, and to send the *Renown*, *Ruby*, and *Agamemnon* to Cawsand Bay for further orders. Also their Lordships' further directions for me to send the *Polyphemus* to Cawsand Bay when she can be spared for the purpose of completing her stores and provisions, acquainting me at the same time that their Lordships had been pleased to order Vice-Admiral Sir John Orde to strike his flag and come on shore upon the arrival of the *Glory* at Spithead.

In answer to your said letter I beg to acquaint you for the information of their Lordships that the above six ships left the fleet yesterday afternoon to proceed to Spithead and Cawsand Bay agreeably to their Lordships' directions.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

No. 510

ADMIRAL THÉVENARD TO DECRÈS¹

Lorient, 20 floréal, an XIII [10th May, 1805].

La *Didon* est partie, ayant 10 hommes de moins;² le *Président* et la *Cybèle* en ont 10 à 15 moins qu'il n'en faut. Cependant, depuis 2 mois,

¹ *Arch. de la Marine*, BB⁷, 245, f. 125.

² The *Didon* carried Napoleon's dispatches to Villeneuve. She was captured, after her return from the westward, by the *Phoenix* on August 10th.

depuis 15 jours, j'ai exténué les équipages de nos convoyeurs ; j'ai fait crier haro par les caboteurs du commerce sur lesquels j'ai fait enlever des hommes ! Tous ces moyens n'ont pu suffire. L'inscription maritime n'a plus de ressources pour former l'équipage d'un vaisseau de 74 à une époque déterminée.

No. 511

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off the Lizard, 11th May, 1805.

Sir,—I dispatch the Nile lugger to acquaint you for their Lordships' information that since my letter of the 9th inst., forwarded then by the Swinger gun-brig (copy of which is herewith inclosed), the wind that evening shifted to the westward, and has continued ever since to blow so strong that it has been impossible to supply the Dreadnought and other ships with the supplies they were in want of.

The gale from the westward still increasing, I have stood over with the fleet off the Lizard, in the hope of getting into smoother water, and of my being able to supply the stores which are wanted to enable me to detach the Vice-Admiral and the ships named in the margin¹ agreeably to their Lordships' order of the 4th inst., and according to my intention as mentioned in my said letter of the 9th inst. ; but continuing to blow hard from the westward, and no prospect of removing the stores, &c., I now think it advisable not to detain the Vice-Admiral longer with me, but to order him with his squadron to Cawsand Bay, to complete his stores and provisions, and I hope my having so done

¹ Tonnant, Mars, Minotaur, Illustrious, Ramillies, Bellerophon, Colossus.

under the circumstances before mentioned will meet with their Lordships' approbation.

Your letter of the 6th inst. not having stated whether the Vice-Admiral and his squadron when completed in Cawsand Bay was to return to me or proceed agreeably to their Lordships' order of the 4th inst., or to remain there until he should receive further orders, I judge it best to seal and inclose to Vice-Admiral Collingwood the Admiralty packet addressed to him, with positive directions not to open the same until he receives further orders from their Lordships. I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

[The Admiralty directed Collingwood to sail immediately in pursuance of an open order which Lord Gardner seemed not to have delivered to him. After detaching Collingwood, the ships remaining with Gardner were the *Hibernia*, *San Josef*, *Britannia*, *Foudroyant*, *Barfleur*, *Prince George*, *Windsor Castle*, *Prince*, *Ville de Paris*, *Téméraire*, *Impétueux*, *Goliath*, *Prince of Orange*, *Plantagenet*, *Courageux*, *Agincourt*, *Warrior*, and the frigates *Melampus*, *Santa Margarita* and *Æolus*.]

No. 512

INTELLIGENCE BY CAPTAIN MARTIN

12th May, 1805.

His Majesty's ship *Impétueux* spoke a Danish brig, twenty days from Seville; says it was reported there, and he also heard from another neutral vessel, that the French fleet were gone to Lisbon.

He spoke an English frigate off Cape St. Vincent the 26th of April.

The plague rages dreadfully at Carthage.

T. B. MARTIN.

No. 513

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, at Sea off Ushant, 15th May, 1805.

Sir,—At one o'clock this morning I received by the Swinger gun-brig their Lordships' secret order, dated the 10th inst., to put eight sail of the line, in addition to the Dreadnought, under the command of Vice-Admiral Collingwood,¹ and to order the Vice-Admiral to proceed with the said ships without a moment's loss of time to Barbados, and on his arrival there to carry into execution the instructions contained in their Lordships' order to him of that day's date which was therewith inclosed, that in case the nine ships above mentioned should not be ready to proceed with Vice-Admiral Collingwood, I was to order the Vice-Admiral to proceed with such of them as may be ready, leaving instructions with the captains of the remaining ships to follow him to Barbados as they are ready to do so, desiring me to direct Vice-Admiral Collingwood to leave with the said captains a sealed rendezvous, not to be opened until they reach the distance prescribed therein by the said Vice-Admiral. In answer I beg leave to acquaint you for the information of their Lordships that having, as mentioned to you in my letter the 11th inst., directed Vice-Admiral Collingwood to proceed with the Dreadnought and the seven two-decked ships named to Cawsand Bay, agreeably to their Lordships' directions of the 6th inst., I now lose not a moment in forwarding by the Swinger gun-brig their Lordships' subsequent orders of the 10th inst. to the Vice-Admiral at that place.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

¹ The Warrior was intended to join Collingwood's flag at Plymouth.

I inclose for their Lordships' information the copy of an order I have this day sent by the Swinger gun-brig to Vice-Admiral Collingwood at Cawsand Bay, pursuant to their Lordships' aforesaid order to me of the 10th inst.

INCLOSURE

LORD GARDNER TO COLLINGWOOD

Given on board the *Hibernia*, at Sea, 15th May, 1805.

In pursuance of an order from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 10th inst., you are hereby required and directed to proceed in his Majesty's ship *Dreadnought*, together with such ships as have been placed by me under your command (and named in the margin¹) without a moment's loss of time to Barbados, and on your arrival there carry into execution the instructions contained in an order from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 10th inst., herewith inclosed to you.

In case the whole of the ships placed under your command should not be ready to go with you, you are to proceed with such of them as may be ready, leaving instructions with the captains of the remaining ships to follow you to Barbados as they are ready so to do, and leaving also with such captains a sealed rendezvous not to be opened until they reach a certain distance prescribed thereon by you.

GARDNER.

No. 514

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 15th May, 1805.

Sir,—By the *Contest* gun-brig I acquainted you yesterday afternoon, about 5 o'clock, for their Lord.

¹ *Tonnant*, *Ramillies*, *Illustrious*, *Mars*, *Minotaur*, *Bellerophon*, *Colossus*.

ships' information, that his Majesty's ship *Warrior* repeated a signal to me signifying that the enemy's fleet were under way and coming out of port, in consequence of which I stood in with the fleet for the Iroise Passage, and about 11 o'clock P.M. Captain Sturt, of the *Rambler* brig, hailed and informed me that he had repeated the above signal from the *Latona*, and had made sail by direction of Captain Gosselin, of that ship, to give me information of the circumstance.

At daylight this morning I was joined by the *Montagu*, one of Sir Robert Calder's squadron, soon after which the signal was made from one of the frigates of the inshore squadron that the enemy remained in the same situation as when last reconnoitred. I therefore called Captain Sturt, of the *Rambler*, on board and inclose to you copy of his report of the enemy's movements yesterday afternoon.

I also inclose for their Lordships' information a state of the enemy's force in Ferrol Harbour, as reconnoitred by Captain Otway on the 9th inst., and as the *Montagu* has only 10 tons of water on board, and equally in want of provisions and other articles, I have ordered her into port to replenish her water, and to complete her stores and provisions to five months.

The *Diadem*, Captain Charles Grant, has just joined me from Spithead, and I have taken him under my command.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

P.S.—I transmit you also, for their Lordships' information, copy of a letter addressed to me from Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, dated the 10th inst., inclosing Captain Otway's report as above mentioned.

INCLOSURE A

CAPTAIN STURT'S INFORMATION

The 14th May at noon perceived the enemy's fleet getting under way; half-past ditto Latona made the signal No. 405 (denoting that 'The enemy's ships are getting under way'); with five guns repeated the same to the Révolutionnaire, which was not answered. Half-past ditto observed four line-of-battle ships about four miles without St. Matthew's standing off with a fresh breeze. At one answered our signal No. 470 (denoting 'To proceed with all possible dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief to communicate to him the intelligence you are in possession of, or to make known to him the force, state, and situation of the enemy in view or in the quarter denoted'). At which time we saw three ships, the headmost bearing an Admiral's flag, almost abreast of the Black Rocks, and our frigates under their three topsails with their heads off shore.

H. E. P. STURT.

INCLOSURE B

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO LORD GARDNER

Prince of Wales, off Ferrol, 10th May, 1805, 6 P.M.

My Lord,—I have the honour to inclose Captain Otway's report to me of the state of the enemy in at Ferrol and Corunna, as far as can be obtained by ships sent in to reconnoitre those places; by this your Lordship will perceive I have hitherto had the good fortune to keep them in port, notwithstanding the very untoward weather we have had of late. By an American and a Portuguese, which Captain Otway boarded, from Corunna, I find these squadrons had once unmoored and had been stopped all of a sudden. It seems they have all troops on board

their ships independent of their complements. The reports at Corunna are that the Cadiz squadrons are gone to the West Indies.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ROBT. CALDER.

INCLOSURE C

CAPTAIN OTWAY TO SIR ROBERT CALDER

Montagu, off Ferrol, 9th May, 1805.

Sir,—I was unable, from baffling winds, calms, and thick weather to reconnoitre the enemy in Ferrol till this morning, when I stood in within gun-shot of the batteries, and had a distinct view of all that can be seen in that harbour from the offing. I find the position of most of the ships changed, and there are three more line-of-battle ships visible than when I last looked in there ; two of them are French, and the other bearing a Spanish Vice-Admiral's flag. I miss the French frigate in Corunna, and I learn by a neutral that she got into Ferrol about ten days since. For your further information I inclose you the enemy's position, and

I have the honour to be, &c.,

R. W. OTWAY.

INCLOSURE D

The enemy's force in Ferrol Harbour extending from the southward to the northward, as reconnoitred by H.M.S. Montagu, Thursday, 9th May, 1805

Southernmost ship, a Spanish corvette ready for sea.
A three-decker (Spanish), rigged, no sails bent.
A two-decker, ditto, sails bent, Rear-Admiral's flag.
A two-decker (Spanish), sails bent.
A Spanish frigate, sails bent.

A French frigate, sails bent, royal yards across.

¹ Ditto, ditto, ditto.

A Spanish two-decker, courses and staysails bent,
Vice-Admiral's flag.

A Spanish two-decker, sails bent.

A Spanish corvette, fitting, topmast fiddled.

A Spanish brig corvette, ready,

A French line-of-battle ship, sails bent, royal yards
across.

A French line-of-battle ship.

R. W. OTWAY.

No. 515

CAPTAIN SCOTT TO LORD GARDNER

Niobe, off the Bec du Raz, 15th May, 1805.

My Lord,—I have just boarded a Republican ship from Bordeaux which sailed on the 4th inst. The master of her informs me that an American brig from Charleston had arrived at Bordeaux on the 2nd, which fell in with the French fleet (supposed from Toulon), consisting of 14 sail of the line, 4 frigates, and 2 smaller vessels off the Western Islands; the master of the brig did not say about what time, but that they had troops on board.

The report at Bordeaux was that the French fleet had sailed from Cadiz about four weeks ago, and that Jamaica was their destination. The master of the Russian ship informs me that there is one ship of the line ready for sea at Rochefort, one was launched about six weeks ago, and another is on the stocks. I herewith inclose a report of the vessel. I trust your Lordship will approve of my sending the Rapid with this intelligence, and I request you

¹ The one that was in Corunna.

will order my pilot from the Bellerophon to return in her.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
M. H. SCOTT.

No. 516

CAPTAIN GOSSELIN TO LORD GARDNER

Latona, off Brest, 16th May, 1805.

My Lord,—I beg leave to acquaint your Lordship the enemy's fleet unmoored on the morning of the 14th inst., that 17 ships got under way, 9 of which stood towards the Goulet, but only 1 ship of 80 guns (carrying a Commodore's pennant) and 3 frigates came out, and kept standing off and on between Bertheaume and Camaret from noon until four o'clock, then returned to Brest. The ships that were not under way had their topsail yards at the masthead.

On the 13th I reconnoitred with the frigates and made out 21 sail of the line and 6 frigates, and Captain Baker 22 sail of the line and 5 frigates.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
T. LE M. GOSSELIN.

[19th May.—Lord Gardner acknowledged receipt of orders to detach a frigate to observe the motions of three of the enemy's ships at Lorient, which Captain Dundas, of the Naiad, had reconnoitred.]

No. 517

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 19th May, 1805.

[Incloses for the information of the Admiralty copies of letters and information received from Rear-Admiral Drury by the Flèche sloop, marked

Nos. 1 to 7, and forwarded by Lord Nelson to Ireland by the *Active*. Captain Digby, of the *Flèche*, had fallen in with the *Active* on the 17th inst., and had received the dispatches for Admiral Cornwallis and Lord Gardner.]

Situated as I am I do not consider myself authorised to send Lord Nelson any orders either to join me, go to Ireland, or return to the Mediterranean; their Lordships must know exactly his situation and may probably have sent, or will send, his Lordship orders for his further proceedings.¹

I have the honour to be, &c.,
GARDNER.

INCLOSURE A

NO. 1, LORD NELSON TO CAPTAIN
R. H. MOUBRAY² (*ACTIVE*)

Victory, 19th April, 1805, 10 leagues West from Toro,
South end of Sardinia.

Sir,—Having got on board at Gibraltar such provisions and water as you may want to carry you to England, you will proceed without one moment's loss of time or chasing out of your direct course towards the English Channel; and should you on your approach within 100 leagues fall in with any cruiser either belonging to the Channel fleet or the Irish station, you will direct the commander if he is junior to you, and if senior he will, of course, take charge of my letters for the one or other station and proceed with them as expeditiously as possible. But should you fall in with no cruisers belonging to either station or any vessel of war which you could with propriety dispatch with my letter to either

¹ Admiralty minute: 'Acquaint his Lordship that no directions can be given until further intelligence shall be received of Lord Nelson's squadron.'

² Afterwards Vice-Admiral Sir R. H. Hussey.

Ireland or the Channel fleet, you will in that case direct your course off Berehaven and deliver my letter to the first cruiser you may meet with off that place, and receive from him any information he may have. You will then proceed and join the Channel fleet off Ushant, unless you should meet any frigate or sloop going to it, in which case you will deliver my letter for the Commander-in-Chief to her, and proceed yourself to either Portsmouth or Plymouth, or any port more convenient further to the westward, and send my letter for Mr. Marsden by post office express, and wait their Lordships' orders for your further proceedings.

I am, &c., &c.,
NELSON AND BRONTÉ.

INCLOSURE B

NO. 2, LORD NELSON TO MR. MARSDEN

Victory, 19th April, 1805, 10 leagues West from Toro,
South end of Sardinia.

Sir,—The enemy's fleet having so very long ago passed the Straits and formed a junction with some Spanish ships from Cadiz, I think it my duty, which must be satisfactory to their Lordships, to know exactly my situation.

I have detached the Amazon to Lisbon for information, and I am proceeding off Cape St. Vincent as expeditiously as possible, and hope the Amazon will join me there or that I shall obtain some positive information of the destination of the enemy.

The circumstance of their having taken the Spanish ships which were ready from Cadiz satisfied my mind that they are not bound to the West Indies nor probably the Brazils, but intend forming a junction with the squadron at Ferrol, and pushing

direct for Ireland or Brest, as I believe the French have troops on board ; therefore if I receive no intelligence to do away my present belief, I shall proceed from Cape St. Vincent and take my position 50 leagues west from Scilly, approaching that island slowly, that I may not miss any vessel sent in search of the squadron with orders. My reason for this position is that it is equally easy to get to either the fleet off Brest or to go to Ireland should the fleet be wanted at either station. I trust this plan will meet their Lordships' approbation, and I have the pleasure to say that I shall bring out with me 11 of as fine ships of war, as ably commanded, as ever went to sea.

I have the honour to remain, &c.,

NELSON AND BRONTÉ.

I shall send to both Ireland and the Channel fleet an extract of this letter acquainting the Commander-in-Chief where to find me.

INCLOSURE C

NO. 3, LORD NELSON TO MR. MARSDEN

Victory, 19th April, 1805.

Sir,—Should their Lordships think it right to return any of this fleet to the Mediterranean, or other place abroad, I beg leave to point out the ships which need nothing from England : Victory, Spenser, Leviathan, Tigre, Conqueror, Swiftsure.

If service presses, the other ships, except the Superb who must be docked, could stay out the summer months, but they want coppering, more particularly the Royal Sovereign, who has been six years coppered.

I am, &c.,

NELSON AND BRONTÉ.

INCLOSURE D

NO. 4, CAPTAIN MOUBRAY TO LORD NELSON

Active, Gibraltar, 29th April, 1805¹

My Lord,—I have the honour to inclose a copy of the Active's log since parting from the fleet, and beg to acquaint your Lordship that, being off Cape Palos on the 27th inst., we saw towards the evening six sail of men-of-war at about the distance of 3 or 4 leagues from Carthagená, with the wind westerly, some on the starboard and others on the larboard tack; but latterly they were all on the larboard tack. At the close of day we had got so near them as almost to see their hulls from the deck; and although, from their being in an unfavourable light, I cannot positively pronounce them all line-of-battle ships, yet I think they were, and am confident of their being Spanish, satisfied that from their being on a wind when we discovered them, they were bound if anywhere to the westward. I concluded, as our course lay in the same point, we should see them in the morning; and the wind coming fair soon after dark, we steered direct for Cape de Gata, but as we did not see them in the morning, and the distance run during the night was so small, I presume they must have gone into Carthagená, and that they had come out by way of exercise.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

R. H. MOUBRAY

[The next inclosure, No. 5, omitted here, is an extract from the log of the Active.]

BLOCKADE OF BREST 271

INCLOSURE E

NO. 6, LORD NELSON TO THE OFFICER COMMANDING ON THE IRISH STATION

Victory, 19th April, 1805.

My Lord,—I send a copy of my letter to the Admiralty ; therefore if the Toulon and Cadiz squadrons are gone to the northward, you will know where to send information, that I may either join you, go to the Channel fleet, or return to the Mediterranean.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
NELSON AND BRONTÉ.

[The last inclosure with Lord Gardner's letter of 19th May, No. 7, omitted here, is from Captain Moubray, of the *Active*, describing his proceedings in execution of Nelson's order.]

No. 518

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 19th May, 1805.

[Acknowledges receipt of orders that in case Vice-Admiral Collingwood should fall in with him he should put another ship of the line under the Vice-Admiral's command, to make up the number to eight in addition to the *Dreadnought*. Replies that he proposes the *Warrior* for the duty.]

No. 519

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Newlands, 19th May, 1805.

Sir,—The two months' leave of absence which the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty were

pleased to grant me being expired, I am to request that you will be pleased to acquaint their Lordships that I am ready to return to my duty.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 520

*ADMIRALTY MINUTE ON THE PRECEDING,
21st MAY*

Acquaint him that, however desirous their Lordships are to avail themselves of his services, under the circumstances of the fleet at this moment, they judge it expedient that his return to the command should be postponed for a short time.

No. 521

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 20th May, 1805.

Sir,—In consequence of the dispatches I received from Lord Nelson, dated off the south end of Sardinia the 19th of April, . . . I am to desire you will acquaint their Lordships that I have ordered the *Melampus* to proceed to the westward of Scilly, and look out for Lord Nelson, on the position he intended to take, and have sent his Lordship all the intelligence which I have received respecting the Toulon fleet since its junction with the Spanish squadron at Cadiz. Captain Poyntz is directed to return with any dispatches Lord Nelson may have to send me, but in the event of his not meeting with Lord Nelson he is, at the expiration of seven days, to proceed off Lorient agreeably to their Lordships' directions contained in your letter to me of the 14th instant, and watch the motions of

three ships of war at that place reconnoitred by Captain Dundas, of the *Naiad* ; and in case of their putting to sea to give me, Sir Robert Calder, or Rear-Admiral Drury notice thereof, in order that such steps may be taken to intercept them as may be deemed proper, and at the expiration of three weeks I have directed Captain Poyntz to return and join me off Ushant.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

No. 522

CAPTAIN LAKE TO LORD GARDNER

Topaze, at Sea, 20th May, 1805.

My Lord,—I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that his Majesty's ship under my command has been again successful, having this day captured *El Fénix*, a Spanish privateer brig of 14 guns and 85 men, of San Sebastian, out from Vigo ten days without making a capture.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. LAKE.

No. 523

*ADMIRAL THÉVENARD TO DECRÈS*¹

Lorient, 1^{er} prairial, an XIII [21st May, 1805].

Nous avons ici 5 mois de biscuit pour 3 vaisseaux seulement ; l'armement des vaisseaux nous ayant démuné de ce comestible, nous travaillons à force, afin d'en avoir une plus grande quantité. Dix fours travaillent à brigades relevées pour former du biscuit. Les vins abondent. On fait moudre aux environs ; 20 moulins sont occupés, et si la

¹ *Arch. de la Marine*, BB⁷, 245 f. 132.

brigade du général Missiessy paraît ici, nous remplirons toutes les mesures spécifiées dans votre lettre du 26 floréal.

No. 524

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 22nd May, 1805.

Sir,—Vice-Admiral Collingwood with the ships under his command from Cawsand Bay having joined me this morning about 11 o'clock, I am to acknowledge the receipt of their Lordships' order to me of the 17th inst., directing me to look into Brest with the whole of my force, and so soon as I shall have satisfied myself that the enemy have no immediate intention to come out, to direct the said Vice-Admiral to proceed agreeably to their Lordships' order to him of the 16th inst., also directing me not to detain Vice-Admiral Collingwood one moment longer than may be necessary for looking into Brest and for putting the ships under his command as directed by their Lordships' order to me of the 17th inst.

The wind being at E.N.E., I shall stand in with the fleet off the Black Rocks, and show the whole of my force, when, if no particular reason leads me to suppose that the enemy have an immediate intention to come out, I shall order Vice-Admiral Collingwood to proceed with the squadron under his command, in execution of their Lordships' order to him of the 16th inst.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

[The Foudroyant (flag of Sir Thomas Graves), two other ships of the line, and the Endymion frigate were ordered to be added to Collingwood's command.]

No. 525

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 22nd May, 1805, 11 o'clock P.M.

Sir,—Having stood in with the whole of the fleet this afternoon, off Point St. Matthew's, when returning to my station, a frigate to leeward made the signal of having been chased by 5 of the enemy's line-of-battle ships. I immediately bore up and at half-past 7 P.M. Captain Maitland, of the Loire, delivered to me the inclosed report of his having on the 11th inst., in lat. $43^{\circ} 44'$ N., long. $20^{\circ} 48'$ W., fallen in with a squadron of the enemy's ships consisting of 1 ship of 3 decks, 4 of 2 decks, 3 frigates, and 2 brigs steering E.b.S. $\frac{1}{2}$ S., wind to the westward. Captain Maitland kept company with them until the evening, and after dark shaped a course for Ferrol. On the 14th he fell in with Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, who dispatched the Loire to me with a letter, copy of which is herewith inclosed for their Lordships' information. As there can be little or no doubt of the ships seen by the Loire being the Rochefort squadron returning from the West Indies, I have had some conversation this evening with Vice-Admiral Collingwood on the subject, and we are of opinion there can be no doubt of the enemy having got either into Rochefort or Lorient. I have therefore taken upon me to retain the five ships named in the margin,¹ part of the squadron placed under Vice-Admiral Collingwood's command, conceiving as five of the enemy's ships are returned from the West Indies, and the Vice-Admiral is directed to detach such proportion of ships to the West Indies as, from the best informa-

¹ Foudroyant, Windsor Castle, Warrior, Repulse, Reasonable.

tion he can obtain, the enemy may have sent there. I have to hope the steps I have taken will meet their Lordships' approbation, as, should it be ascertained that the Toulon fleet is returned to Cadiz, the five ships I have detained can very soon be sent after the Vice-Admiral, and probably reach the point of his present intended destination nearly as soon as himself.¹

I shall send the Nile lugger to reconnoitre the enemy's ships at Rochefort, and return to me as soon as possible.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER

INCLOSURE

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO LORD GARDNER

Prince of Wales, at Sea, 15th May, 1805, 6 P.M.

My Lord,—His Majesty's ship *La Loire* spoke me last night at 11 P.M. Captain Maitland reported to me he had fallen in with, on the 11th inst., a French squadron consisting of 5 sail of the line (1 of three decks), 3 frigates, and 2 brigs. Captain Maitland kept company with them for some time to ascertain the course they were steering, and found it to be E.b.S. $\frac{1}{2}$ S. When he had fixed this, he made the best of his way and joined me off Cape Prior.

Upon receiving this information, as the wind was then blowing very strong with heavy rain from the S.W., I instantly bore up with all sail with the squadron and pushed for Cape Ortegal, and got off that cape at dawn this morning, conceiving it possible the enemy might have intended to make Cape Ortegal.

Not seeing the enemy at break of day as I

¹ This action was approved by the Admiralty.

flattered myself of doing from the supposed situation Captain Maitland had given me of them last evening, I now concluded they must have kept farther to the northward. I therefore made all sail with the squadron and stood to the N.N.E. with the hope of crossing upon the enemy provided they were running down in the latitude of Rochefort, as I have every reason to think it is the Rochefort squadron who are upon the return from the West Indies to that port. As we have had the wind it was impossible the Ferrol squadron could put to sea. I therefore felt it my duty to take the chance of getting hold of this Rochefort squadron during the time the wind was hanging to the westward, but as it is now coming round to the northward and possibly will get to the eastward, I shall return with all possible dispatch to my rendezvous, not conceiving myself to be justified in pursuing this squadron farther. I conclude they have run to make the Isle Dieu in their way to Rochefort.

I trust my exertions will meet with their Lordships' approbation, although they have not been crowned with success.

I have given Captain Maitland orders to make the best of his way off Ushant, to report in person all these circumstances to your Lordship and for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

I beg leave to state that Captain Maitland appears to have conducted himself with very great propriety, and proves him to be a very zealous officer.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
ROBT. CALDER.

[Captain Maitland believed the strangers to be a squadron consisting of the *Majestueux*, *Magnanime*,

Orient, Jemmapes, Suffren, Infatigable, Gloire, Heureux, and two brigs whose names he could not specify. The squadron was that of Missiessy, which had left Rochefort on 11th January, and which, owing to the fact that Villeneuve did not get away from the Mediterranean so soon as had been expected, was recalled by the Palinure, 16, which found the squadron at Martinique. Missiessy succeeded in reaching Aix roads again on the 20th May, when his ships were at once put in hand to refit for further service. See the note on p. 162 for the composition of his squadron.]

No. 526

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 27th May, 1805.

Sir,—I have this day received by the Colpoys brig letters from Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, dated off Ferrol the 20th and 21st inst., by which I am informed that the Indefatigable spoke the Surinam brig on the 17th inst., charged with dispatches from the Admiralty for Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson at Gibraltar; that on the 16th, by log at 8 P.M. the wind at S.E. in lat. 47° 00' N., long. 8° 16' W., Captain Shippard saw a squadron of 10 sail, 4 of which appeared to be of the line, 3 frigates, and 2 brigs, bearing E.S.E. and on a wind on the starboard tack, which I have no doubt must have been the squadron the Loire fell in with on the 11th inst., as communicated to me by Captain Maitland on the evening of the 22nd inst.

On the 18th and 19th Sir Robert Calder acquaints me the Defiance and Indefatigable reconnoitred the ports of Ferrol and Corunna, at which

time the enemy were in perfect readiness for sea. The Vice-Admiral acquaints me the *Terrible* has carried away two main topmasts, with part of her maintop and he believes her mainmast is crippled. He therefore intends sending her into port, as soon as I can send any ships to reinforce the squadron under his command. I have been so circumstanced that it has not been in my power to send any ships to Sir Robert Calder since the *Terrible* left me ; and I beg to know if their Lordships will approve of my sending him the ships which have been ordered to fit for foreign service named in the margin,¹ and that I acquainted you in my letter of the 22nd inst. I had stopped from proceeding with Vice-Admiral Collingwood in consequence of the intelligence brought me by the *Loire*. If so I will immediately send the three last-named, being the most complete.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

No. 527

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 27th May, 1805.

Sir,—You will please to acquaint their Lordships that from the intelligence I have received of a squadron of the enemy's ships having been seen on the 11th inst. by the *Loire*, and the 16th inst. by the *Surinam* brig, I certainly should have detached a squadron in quest of them did I conceive myself justified in doing so from the force at present under my command, named in the margin,² amounting to 22 sail of the line, including the 5 last named ships

¹ Foudroyant, Repulse, Barfleur, Warrior, Raisonné.

² Hibernia, San Josef, Ville de Paris, Téméraire, Britannia, Neptune, Prince George, Prince, Barfleur, Plantagenet, Impétueux,

that were, agreeably to their Lordships' order of the 18th inst., intended to proceed with Vice-Admiral Collingwood, but which under the present existing circumstances I thought it my duty to detain until I receive their Lordships' further orders respecting them, which I hope to do in the course of two or three days.

The Goliath and Agamemnon I must send into Cawsand Bay to replenish; the latter ship, Polyphemus, Raisonnable, and Diadem have not yet been placed under my command; I therefore do not know whether it is their Lordships' pleasure they should be considered as part of the Channel fleet. Had I sent the five ships last named in the margin with Vice-Admiral Collingwood, and the Agamemnon and Goliath to Plymouth, my force would have been reduced to 15 sail of the line, including three 64-gun ships.

Having nearly unladen the 7 transports which were sent from Portsmouth under convoy of the Nemesis, and being still in want of 1400 tons of water to complete the ships at present with me, I intend ordering Captain Somerville, of the Nemesis, to proceed with the transports to Plymouth for the purpose of loading them with water, and in the event of his not receiving orders to the contrary, to return with them and join me off Ushant. The fleet will then be in a very good state to keep the sea.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

[In response to this letter the Admiralty placed the Polyphemus, Agamemnon, Raisonnable, and Diadem under Lord Gardner's command.]

Courageux, Goliath, Princess of Orange, Diadem, Agamemnon, Polyphemus, Foudroyant, Windsor Castle, Repulse, Warrior, Raisonnable.

MS. A. 1. 1. 1.

No. 528

LIEUTENANT GWILLIM TO LORD GARDNER

Gun-brig Rapid, off the Bec du Raz, 31st May, 1805.

My Lord,—I have the honour to inform your Lordship that on the afternoon of the 30th inst., standing in shore with H.M. gun-brig Rapid under my command, I discovered several sail of small vessels at anchor under the protection of a battery near the Penmarcks. As it appeared highly probable that some of these might be cut out, I dispatched the boat with Mr. William Pearse, sub-lieutenant, who succeeded in capturing *La Paix Désirée*, laden with salt ; the rest had run close under the battery, which kept up a small fire on the boat. Mr. Pearse has served as midshipman and mate ten years, and as he has always conducted himself with propriety I beg leave to recommend him to your Lordship's notice.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

THOS. GWILLIM.

[At this time the French were concerned for the protection of their ships in the outer roads of Brest, and Caffarelli and Ganteaume, under orders from Napoleon, investigated the question, and decided that batteries were required at Créachmeur and Toulinguet at the extremities of the anchorages at Bertheaume and Camaret. General Sanson was in charge of the work. Four batteries were to be ready by July 14th, and four camps, each with two battalions, were to be formed, independently of the men embarked under Generals Sarrat, Augereau, Sarrazin, and Varré.—*Arch. Nat.*, A.F. iv. 1190, No. 55, 1025, No. 4.]

No. 529

ADMIRAL MARTIN TO THE MINISTER OF
MARINE¹

Rochefort, 11 prairial, an XIII [31st May, 1805].

Des ouvriers de toute espèce, des mâtiers et deux ingénieurs vont être envoyés en rade aujourd'hui pour commencer les travaux du Jemmapes et du Suffren ; un maître expérimenté avec des ouvriers et des mâtiers va se rendre aujourd'hui à bord de l'Infatigable.

Les vaisseaux le Majestueux, le Magnanime, le Lion, les frégates l'Armide et la Gloire travaillent avec activité à l'embarquement de leurs vivres, aux réparations de leur gréement et de leur mâture. Les calfats ont commencé leurs travaux à bord de ces bâtiments ; ils seront entièrement disposés dans peu de jours.

Dès le 3 prairial, les gabares la Garonne et la Dordogne, chargées d'environ 600 tonneaux de vivres, étaient en rade. Malgré mes recommandations et la déclaration que j'ai faite que je manquais de bâtiments de transport, ces gabares ne sont pas encore déchargées.

Le général Missiessy s'est plaint de la qualité des vivres qu'il avait pour sa campagne, surtout du vin ; ce mal est général et tous mes efforts ne peuvent y remédier. Nous aurons beau faire ; tant que des hommes probes ne seront point chargés de ces sous-détails dans cette administration, la marine sera mal servie, les équipages mal nourris, et nos hôpitaux encombrés, à la rentrée de chaque escadre. La commission qui visite les vivres apporte à son

¹ *Arch. de la Marine*, BB⁷, 247, f. 92.

service une surveillance très scrupuleuse, mais, dans un moment où les besoins sont aussi pressants, on est forcé de se relâcher de la rigidité dont on ferait usage dans tout autre temps. Le munitionnaire ou ses agents calculent sur la circonstance et la mettent à profit pour nous donner des vins beaucoup trop faibles pour la restauration des équipages et leur conservation à la mer.

[On 2nd June Admiral Martin reported to the Minister of Marine that work upon Missiessy's squadron from Martinique, which is referred to in the above letter, was proceeding with all the activity he could desire. Large quantities of wine, biscuit, flour, beans, oil, vinegar, and salt had been supplied for the ships, as well as a considerable bulk of timber and much water.—*Arch. de la Marine*, BB⁷, 247, f. 96.]

No. 530

LIEUTENANT BATT TO CAPTAIN GOSSELIN

Hired cutter *Adrian*, 1st June, 1805.

Sir,—I beg leave to acquaint you that at daylight this morning I observed three *chasse-marées* working towards Brest, to which I immediately gave chase and drove one on shore, which I fortunately succeeded in getting off; the other two escaped; the one captured proved to be *La Marie*, barque, from Bordeaux to Brest, with wine and brandy. I am sorry to state the loss of Mr. Foss (mate), who was killed by a musket-ball while getting off the prize.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

JOS. BAIN BATT, Lt. and Com.

No. 531

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO LORD GARDNER

Prince of Wales, off Ferrol, 3rd June, 1805.

My Lord,—On the 30th ult. I had the honour to send you by a Portuguese schooner, coming to the fleet off Ushant with wine, the state of the squadron to that day, informing your Lordship at the same time I should be absolutely obliged to leave this in a month from that day provided I did not receive a reinforcement of ships complete in provisions and water, as this squadron had then only two months' on board.

I have now the honour to inform your Lordship that Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton joined me on the 1st inst. from Gibraltar,¹ agreeably to orders he had received from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, bringing with him the ships named in the margin.² These ships have provisions for near four, and water for three months. I have taken the Rear-Admiral and ships under my directions until such time as I receive further orders from your Lordship on this head, and by so doing I shall be enabled to continue this blockade for a further length of time. But I hope your Lordship will be able to send, without loss of time, ships to relieve those which have been out the longest; these are the Indefatigable, Prince of Wales, Hero, Defiance, Malta, and Terrible.

As to the Prince of Wales I can take provisions

¹ Sir Richard Bickerton reported that the Excellent lying at Naples and some frigates and sloops were the only vessels left in the Mediterranean. General Craig with the troops was at Gibraltar, and Rear-Admiral Knight had his flag in the Guerrier. Nelson had left Lagos on 10th May in pursuit of the enemy to the West Indies (Calder to Gardner, 4th June).

² Royal Sovereign, Queen, Dragon.

and water from the ships that join and return into port, so as to keep her up for two or three months to come, but we are all in great want of bullocks and vegetables, having had none since the Terrible joined, which was on the 21st of April.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
ROBERT CALDER.

No. 532

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 5th June, 1805.

[Acknowledges the receipt of orders to detach a force to watch the motions of the enemy's ships at Rochefort, to intercept them in case they should put to sea, and to follow them wherever they might go, and to take or destroy them.]

In answer thereto, I am to desire you will acquaint their Lordships that I have ordered Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Graves, K.B., in the *Foudroyant*, to take under his command the ships named in the margin,¹ and to proceed without a moment's loss of time off Rochefort for the purposes above mentioned; and as the enemy at Rochefort are supposed to consist of one first-rate, two 84, and three 74-gun ships, three frigates and two brigs, also two or three ships supposed to be at Lorient, I hope their Lordships will not consider the force I have ordered upon the above service to be too great, although I am sorry to add I shall be left with only 15 sail under my command, two of which are 64-gun ships. I must beg leave to call their Lordships' attention to the situation of Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, who is off Ferrol with only six sail of the line.

¹ *Barfleur*, *Windsor Castle*, *Repulse*, *Triumph*, *Warrior*, *Raisonné*, *Egyptienne* frigate, *Nile* lugger.

It has not been in my power to reinforce him, but was my intention to have sent the *Triumph* to him, as mentioned in my letter of yesterday's date, also the *Montagu*, *Thunderer*, and *Agamemnon*, so soon as they joined me from Plymouth, until the orders I have received this day to detach a proper force off Rochefort; by which the Channel fleet will be so much reduced that I shall not consider myself justified in making any further detachments without receiving their Lordships' order to do so. The squadron under Sir Robert Calder cannot at this time have more than six weeks' water remaining on board.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
GARDNER.

[Information gained by Captain Moore from a Swedish galliot stated that there were at Ferrol 6 French ships of the line and 2 frigates, and 5 Spanish ships of the line and 3 frigates, completely ready for sea; also 1 French and 2 Spanish ships of the line getting ready, but not rigged.]

No. 533

*ADMIRAL THÉVENARD TO DECRÈS*¹

Lorient, 18 prairial, an XIII [7th June, 1805].

Le sieur Hertel, ce Canadien dont je vous ai rendu compte le 16 de ce mois, n'a point donné lieu à plus de suspicion sur sa conduite. Mais la détestable politique anglaise est si acharnée et soutenue par de si grands forfaits pécuniaires qu'on doit se méfier tout à fait de ceux qui ont eu quelques rapports directs avec cette nation. J'ai donc signalé ce particulier à la police de cette ville, à l'effet d'en

¹ *Arch. de la Marine*, BB⁷, 245, f. 151.

suivre les démarches, en attendant votre décision sur son compte. Le commissaire employé à ce détail n'a aucun fonds et nuls moyens pour soudoyer des agents.

No. 534

*GANTEAUME TO DECRÈS*¹

Brest, 19 prairial, an XIII [8th June, 1805].

Depuis le 17, quinze vaisseaux anglais seulement ont été signalés sur Ouessant ; le 16 on en avait signalé 23. Il paraît que l'amiral anglais a détaché une 2^e fois une partie de ses forces, peut-être pour aller à Rochefort surveiller l'escadre du contre-amiral Missiessy. Tous nos vaisseaux sont en état de mettre sous voiles en 1^{er} ordre. Les vents sont O., très faibles.

No. 535

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

[*Extract.*]

Hibernia, at Sea, 11th June, 1805.

Captain Poyntz reports that he could only observe one ship of the line, one frigate, and a brig at Lorient, which place he reconnoitred on the 6th instant previous to his proceeding off Basque roads, where he found Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Graves at anchor, and received the dispatch with which he hastened to join me.

Since then the wind having shifted and blown very hard from the S.W. to the N.W., I hope Rear-Admiral Graves has been able to get the squadron to sea, otherwise I fear their situation would be extremely unsafe. The Rear-Admiral submits to me whether, after having ascertained the state the enemy's squadron are in, it is necessary to

¹ *Arch. Nat. A.F. iv. 1190, 2^e dossier, No. 57.*

keep the whole or any of the ships of his squadron except a frigate employed upon the service he is ordered on. In answer to which I shall acquaint him that I do not consider myself authorised to recall him or any part of his squadron from the service they are at present employed upon unless I receive their Lordships' orders to do so.¹

No. 536

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, at Sea, 13th June, 1805,
Lizard, N.N.W., distant about 10 leagues.

Sir,—I acquainted you yesterday, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of my arrival with the fleet off the Lizard, stating my intention if the wind continued to blow from the westward to have proceeded this morning for Torbay.

The wind, however, inclining last night to the northward with every appearance of fine weather, I am to desire you will please to acquaint their Lordships that I am proceeding with the fleet to the southward to regain my station off Ushant.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

No. 537

NAPOLEON TO DECRES²

Vérone, 27 prairial, an XIII [16th June, 1805].

Monsieur Decrès, je vois par votre lettre du 21, huit heures du matin, que 7 vaisseaux et 2 frégates

¹ Lord Gardner was ordered to withdraw two line-of-battle ships from Sir Thomas Graves's squadron to join the forces off Brest or Ferrol.

² *Corresp. de Napoléon* (x.) No. 8897.

sont devant Rochefort. Je ne vois pas ce que l'amiral Ganteaume pourrait faire. A quoi aboutirait une bataille ? A rien. Faites seulement mettre dans les journaux que les Anglais, ayant appris que l'escadre de Rochefort était arrivée le 18, ont envoyé 8 vaisseaux devant ce port, et qu'ils ont affaibli d'autant leur croisière de Brest ; de sorte que, les 18, 19 et 20, elle n'était que de 15 vaisseaux ; qu'on ne conçoit pas comment l'escadre française ne profite pas de cette circonstance. Le lendemain, un autre journal dira qu'il est fort extraordinaire que les journalistes se permettent de pareilles réflexions ; qu'avant de condamner ou d'approuver la conduite d'un amiral, dans une affaire de cette nature, il faudrait connaître ses instructions, et que, probablement, comme l'Empereur ne les a pas fait connaître aux journalistes, tout ce qu'ils disent là-dessus est fort inutile. Que la flotte de Rochefort se prépare à partir au premier signal, car les Anglais ne tiendront pas ce blocus.

Ne prononcez ni le mot de Brest ni celui de la Manche à qui que ce soit. Je ne sais pas d'ailleurs jusqu'à quel point le Gouvernement espagnol voudrait concourir à un projet de cette espèce. Aussi ai-je toujours éludé quand on m'a demandé mon secret. Quant à vous, votre réponse est simple : vous devez dire que vous ne le savez pas.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 538

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO MR. MARSDEN

Prince of Wales, off Ferrol, 18th June, 1805.

Sir,—I received your letter of the 8th by his Majesty's brig *Beagle* on the 16th inst. You will be pleased to inform their Lordships that in

II.

V

obedience to their directions I delivered to Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton his orders, with the dispatches for himself and Vice-Admiral Collingwood.

Yesterday the Rear-Admiral shifted his flag from the Royal Sovereign to the Queen, agreeably to their Lordships' order, and in obedience to their directions I made the exchange of two lieutenants from the Royal Sovereign to the Queen, also the flag-lieutenant; likewise, by the Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton's request, I exchanged the masters of the two ships. Inclosed I send a list of the names of the officers exchanged from the two ships agreeably to your letter of the 8th.

You will be pleased to inform their Lordships Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton parted company with me in the Queen this morning at 9 A.M., with a strong easterly wind, to put their Lordships' orders into execution. The Indefatigable, which brings this to Admiral Lord Gardner, reconnoitred the port of Ferrol on the 15th inst., when the enemy continued in the same state, perfectly ready for sea—13 sail of the line, 5 frigates, and 3 corvettes. I have now left with me only 8 sail of the line, and the Sirius frigate.

I am &c.,
ROBT. CALDER.

No. 539

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 20th June, 1805.

Sir,—By his Majesty's ship Phœnix, which joined me last evening, I received their Lordships' orders dated the 15th inst. to take Rear-Admiral Stirling, in the Glory, and his Majesty's ships Revenge and Agincourt under my command; also their Lordships'

order of the same date to Captain Briggs, of the latter ship, to place himself under my command accordingly, which said orders you will please to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty shall be duly complied with.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

No. 540

*NAPOLÉON TO DECRES*¹

Boulogne, 3 messidor, an XIII [22nd June, 1805].

L'objection que vous faites à mon idée de faire rentrer quelques vaisseaux dans la rade ne m'avait pas échappé. Je trouve quelque inconvénient aux sorties de Ganteaume. Il n'y a aujourd'hui que 18, 19, 20 ou 21 vaisseaux devant Brest. Rien de plus imprévoyant que le Gouvernement anglais; c'est un gouvernement occupé de chicanes intérieures et qui porte son attention où il y a du bruit. Je ne suis point d'avis que Ganteaume sorte; je ne crains rien à Bertheaume; il est inexpugnable; 20 vaisseaux entourés de batteries, avec un port derrière, ne s'attaquent pas facilement. Cela ne peut se comparer à Aboukir, à cause du voisinage de la terre, des équipages, de la position, et enfin l'amiral qui est devant Brest n'a pas, comme Nelson, une immense sottise à réparer. Mais, pour Dieu! qu'on me mette des caronades. Ce n'est qu'avec des canons qu'on arme des vaisseaux, et pour des vaisseaux il n'y a que des canons de gros calibre.

Si Ganteaume veut donc sortir, je ne vois pas à quoi bon sa sortie; j'ai peine à la comprendre. Cependant s'il la croit nécessaire, au lieu de la faire à la fin, qu'il la fasse avant le 15 messidor [July 4th].

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (x.) No. 8938.

Mon intention serait d'endormir les Anglais le plus possible sur l'escadre de Brest, sans affectation cependant, et diriger le tout vers le Texel. Ecrivez dans ce sens à Marmont.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 541

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 24th June, 1805.

Sir,—By his Majesty's ship *Æolus*, which joined me this morning, I received your letter of the 18th inst., acquainting me, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having ordered Admiral Cornwallis to proceed and resume the command of the Channel fleet, you have received their Lordships' commands to signify their direction to me on his joining the fleet to deliver up the command to him accordingly, and to proceed in the *Hibernia* to Cawsand Bay for further orders. Which you will please to acquaint their Lordships I shall comply with.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

No. 542

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Newlands, 27th June, 1805.

Sir,—I request that you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I am this moment setting off to join the *Ville de Paris* in Cawsand Bay.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

[Cornwallis had had correspondence with the Admiralty concerning the appointment of a first captain to his flag-ship. The Board were of opinion that either a flag-officer or captain within forty of the top of the list should be appointed. Cornwallis had understood that the Admiralty would not require an officer of higher rank than Captain John Whitby, whom he desired for the appointment. His view was not accepted, and on June 12th he requested that Vice-Admiral Nugent might be appointed.]

No. 543

SIR THOMAS GRAVES TO LORD GARDNER

Foudroyant, at anchor off the Passage d'Antioche,
28th June, 1805.

My Lord,—As by your Lordship's order of 25th inst., this moment received by the *Æolus*, I am deprived of two of the best ships of the squadron—being extremely anxious to make your Lordship acquainted with the rapid progress of the equipment of the enemy's ships at Rochefort and of the great increase of their frigates, which your Lordship will see by the inclosed reports from the Hon. Captain Fleeming, and Lieutenant Fennell, of the Nile lugger¹—I cannot resist sending the latter, notwithstanding the great inconvenience I find in the want of small vessels, which are so necessary for the watching the motions of the enemy, as they seem determined to put to sea, either the whole or in part; and as they have such a number of frigates, and the *Egyptienne* the only one with me, they may in the night push out their frigates to draw me off, that their line-of-

¹ Lieutenant Fennell's report is not printed here.

battle ships may escape with the greater security without my being able to find out the mistake before it is too late. The enemy sent out a convoy last Saturday from St. Martin's, which proceeded leisurely to the northward as if intended as a lure to draw us off from the blockade of this passage, and I regretted much that I had not frigates to detach after them, but I still more regret the want of them to watch the enemy and to counteract whatever movement they may make, as well as to have the honour of making your Lordship acquainted with whatever may happen at this critical moment.

I beg leave to call your Lordship's attention to the state of some of the ships with me, as their water is getting so short as to render them incapable of following the enemy far ; and there is little hope with such bad sailing ships and so loaded with stores and provisions as the Windsor Castle and Warrior, who can seldom open their lower deck ports in this fine weather, and under easy sail, to come up with the enemy without a long chase. We are now in sight of them, but I fear the first westerly wind that makes it necessary for the squadron to obtain an offing will also give the enemy an opportunity to escape, which I do not see a possibility to prevent as the winter approaches, but whatever is possible to be done shall not be neglected, and I trust your Lordship will see the necessity of sending a sufficient number of frigates and three or four small vessels, without which it is impossible to keep up the blockade.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
THOS. GRAVES.

[Lord Gardner informed the Admiralty in relation to Sir Thomas Graves's letter that he had not a single frigate unemployed or with the fleet.]

INCLOSURE

*Captain Fleeming's report of the enemy's force in
Rochefort*

Egyptienne, off Rochefort, 20th June, 1805.

Captain Fleeming has the honour to acquaint Sir Thomas Graves that the French squadron are all now ready for sea, except one line-of-battle ship whose lower yards are down.

The Admiral has re-hoisted his flag at the mizen of the three-deck ship and the broad pennant is not flying. The small frigate with a poop is dismantled, as are two sloops of war. A frigate which had only her lower masts in when he looked in last has bent her sails this morning. On the *Egyptienne's* standing in seven ketch-rigged boats got under way, and from their having pennants he supposes them gun-vessels.

[Vice-Admiral Missiessy, commanding the Rochefort squadron, having fallen ill, Captain Zacharie Allemand was appointed *chef de division* to succeed him, 24 June.]

No. 544

*Captain Fleeming's report of his examination of
the brig Catherine from Rochelle*

[*Extract.*]

There is a French man-of-war brig lying at St. Martin's, which lately came there from Rochefort, said to sail immediately, and it is reported that the squadron is bound for the West Indies and will sail as soon as ready. A lugger and schooner are lying near the Pointe de Sablonceaux to intercept the English lugger when sent in to reconnoitre. There was a general thanksgiving on Thursday and Friday

last, and great illuminations at Rochelle and Rochefort on those days, on account of St. Domingo and some British islands taken in the West Indies. There had been a very hot press, and people of every age and description were taken, which has now ceased, as the squadron is said to be manned.

[On 2nd July Captain Fleeming reported the enemy's force at Rochefort to be 5 sail of the line, 3 frigates, 3 armed vessels, 1 brig and 1 lugger ready.]

No. 545

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 1st July, 1805.

Sir,—By the Harlequin hired armed ship I have this day received their Lordships' order dated the 27th ult. directing me to take Sir Richard Strachan in his Majesty's ship *Cæsar* under my command ; which you will please to acquaint their Lordships so soon as such ship joins me shall be done accordingly.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
GARDNER.

No. 546

*COLLINGWOOD TO DR. CARLYLE, OF
INVERESK¹*

Dreadnought, off Cadiz, 2nd July, 1805.

[After describing how he had been ordered to prepare a squadron for prize service, and as a measure of precaution.]

The sailing of the Toulon squadron and their joining the Spaniards here put me in motion. My

¹ In the possession of Lieutenant H. Blackett, R.N.

ships were increased to 14 sail to pursue them, unless I received certain information that Lord Nelson had, and then I was to be directed in my conduct by the best intelligence I could get of the enemy. Lord Nelson was at this time supposed to have taken a station west of Ireland, convinced from the style of their preparation that the enemy were destined for that quarter. In my way south I met Sir Richard Bickerton, who first informed me of the real state of things. Finding the Spaniards here and at Carthage had a considerable force ready to sail, I determined to come here, where I found them on the eve of departing, waiting only for the Carthaginians, who actually did sail on the very day I arrived here, but, hearing of us on their way down, returned to their port. I sent two ships to strengthen my friend in the West Indies, and the rest are divided between the two ports here. Such is my employment at present, without means of giving much annoyance to the Spaniards while they keep snug, and with little expectation of their coming out. But I think it is not improbable that I shall have all these fellows coming from the West Indies again before the hurricane months, unless they sail from thence directly for Ireland, which I have always had an idea was their plan, for this Bonaparte has as many tricks as a monkey. I believe their object in the West Indies to be less conquest than to draw our force from home. The Rochefort squadron seems to have had nothing else in view. If the Toulon people can put the Spaniards in possession of Trinidad, and cause a great alarm, and draw a great force there from England, they will have so much less to oppose them in their real attack, which will be at home in harvest time.¹

¹ In an earlier letter to the same correspondent, written on board the *Prince*, off Ushant, 27th June, 1804, Collingwood

No. 547

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO LORD GARDNER

[*Extract.*]

Prince of Wales, off Ferrol, 5th July, 1805 ; 6 P.M.

The Frisk cutter spoke an English American from Ferrol two days since, who was directed by the English, who is also the American Consul at Ferrol, to speak one of the English squadron and to assure him in private that there was a French Admiral expected daily from Paris, to supersede the present one at Ferrol, and that the 13 sail of the line with the frigates and corvettes have orders to leave Ferrol, and to be down at Corunna by the middle of this month.

I have directed Lord Henry Paulet, in the *Terrible*, not to lose a moment in joining your Lordship with this intelligence, that Government may be informed thereof immediately.

I beg leave to state that in case the enemy take up their anchor at Corunna it will behove me to alter my present plan of the blockade, by which I have hitherto had the good fortune to have thus far succeeded in, by preventing all their attempts to escape from Ferrol.

I am sorry to say it will become a much more difficult task to keep them in at Corunna. In order therefore to enable me to secure them in at this anchorage as effectually, I shall then still more require a second frigate and cutter, as there will be many more points of the compass open for them to effect their escape than there were at Ferrol.

refers to a rumour then current in the fleet. 'I have been told that Lord Melville found at the Admiralty an order recalling Lord Nelson from the Mediterranean, which he put in the fire.'

No. 548

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, off Ushant, 6th July, 1805.

Sir,—The Royal Sovereign joined me this morning from off Ferrol, with letters from Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder to the 2nd inst. He acquaints me the Thunderer and Agamemnon joined him on the 19th, the Frisk cutter on the 20th ult., and the Barfleur and Repulse on the 1st inst. The enemy's force at Ferrol seem to be in the same state as when reconnoitred by Captain Moore, of the Indefatigable, and to consist of 13 sail of the line, 3 frigates, a corvette and a brig. This is confirmed from information obtained from two neutral vessels which left Ferrol on the 26th June, and were boarded the same day by the Sirius, the report of which the Vice-Admiral believes may be depended on. The Caroline brig with six sail of transports under convoy from Plymouth, laden with provisions and water, joined Sir Robert Calder on the 23rd ult., but owing to the bad state of the weather, they were not unloaded before the 29th following. Such supply, with the water and provisions taken from the Royal Sovereign, Sir Robert is of opinion will nearly complete the squadron to three months. He also states, in a letter dated the 23rd June, that off Ferrol is by no means a place for victuallers to be sent to, as there is always a heavy swell even in a calm, and, when there is any wind, so heavy a chopping sea as to prevent boats from clearing victuallers. Sir Robert Calder further states in his said letter that he does not think nine sail of the line equal to the blockade of Ferrol, but that everything in his power shall be done for his Majesty's service with such a

force as their Lordships shall deem adequate to the critical service he is employed upon.

I have ordered the Royal Sovereign to proceed to Spithead agreeably to their Lordships' directions contained in your letter of the 20th ult., which ship Sir Robert Calder acquaints me makes a great deal of water when pressed with sail.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

No. 549

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 7th July, 1805.

Sir,—I request you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I have just joined the squadron.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 550

LORD GARDNER TO MR. MARSDEN

Hibernia, Cawsand Bay, 8th July, 1805.

Sir,—I am to desire you will please to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that upon the Honourable Admiral Cornwallis joining the fleet yesterday afternoon, I delivered up to him the command thereof, together with copies of such instructions and unexecuted orders relative to the said command as remained in my hands, and having received the Admiral's dispatches, I parted company with the fleet yesterday evening, and arrived in Cawsand Bay this morning in his Majesty's ship Hibernia, agreeably to their Lordships' order of the 21st ult. I have the honour to be, &c.,

GARDNER.

No. 551

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 9th July, 1805, 5 P.M.

Sir,—I have this moment received by the Moucheron a letter from Vice-Admiral Young, dated the 7th inst., making known to me the arrival of the Curieux sloop at Plymouth, with dispatches from Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson, and giving an account of the combined squadrons of the enemy being on their way home from the West Indies, as they were seen on the 20th of last month in lat. $33^{\circ} 12' N.$ and long. $57^{\circ} 00' W.$, and that it was said they were very sickly.

You will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, I instantly detached the Colpoys to Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, off Ferrol, communicating this intelligence to him, and at the same time I sent the Nimble with the information to Rear-Admiral Stirling off Rochefort.¹

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 552

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO MR. MARSDEN

Prince of Wales, off Ferrol, 11th July, 1805.

Sir,—[After reference to the arrival of the combined squadrons at Martinique.]

I inclose a copy of Captain Prowse's report of the movement of the enemy from Ferrol and Corunna, by which their Lordships will perceive the enemy have begun to make the movements conformable to

¹ Special orders in relation to the return of the enemy from the West Indies were dispatched by the Admiralty to Cornwallis on the 9th.

what I had the honour (in my dispatches of the 5th inst. sent by his Majesty's ship *Terrible*) to state to Lord Gardner was likely soon to take place, from the information I had lately obtained.

I am, &c.,

ROBT. CALDER.

INCLOSURE

Captain Prowse's Report

A French brig went from Ferrol to Corunna on Monday. A Spanish ship (corvette) came out on Tuesday morning and anchored close in to the inner battery, and crossed over and got into Corunna at daylight this morning. On Tuesday a French line-of-battle ship was under way in Ferrol Harbour.

Tuesday, the 10th July, 1805.

No. 553

REAR-ADMIRAL STIRLING TO CORNWALLIS

[*Extract.*]

Glory, off Rochefort, 12th July, 1805.

Accompanying this I send the weekly accounts of the different ships, and I beg leave to call your attention to the quantity of water on board. I have given the most positive injunctions for the utmost care to be taken in the expenditure, consistent with the health of the crews.

But if the enemy should escape a fortnight or three weeks hence, I submit to your consideration the want of [ability to] effect a junction with Sir Robert Calder, or of proceeding on foreign service without we get a supply. My information by neutrals from Rochefort is very uncertain and contradictory. One says there was rejoicing the other day from accounts of Jamaica being captured; another

says that Spain has declared war against Portugal ; another that the French squadron mean to sail the first favourable moment, being quite ready for sea, and are bound for the West Indies ; whilst another says they are going to Ferrol.

We could perceive yesterday that six sail were under way, but after a little parade they came to an anchor towards the evening. I have placed the *Egyptienne* as close off the Pertuis d'Antioche as safety will admit, and whilst the weather is favourable I keep the large ships at anchor within sight of signals, having the Nile lugger within all. But Captain Fleeming informs me by letter of the 9th that notwithstanding every precaution he can take, the enemy may escape him in hazy weather without being perceived, and if this should unfortunately be the case, which is certainly more than probable, I must take the liberty of observing that I have not any solid ground for determining which route it would be most advantageous for me to pursue.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHAS. STIRLING.

No. 554

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO CORNWALLIS

Prince of Wales, off Ferrol, 15th July, 1805.

Sir, — [Acknowledges receipt of Cornwallis's letter of the 9th concerning the return of the combined squadron of the enemy from the West Indies.] I shall pay every attention in my power to prevent being surprised, or to be caught by them embayed, and, as far as the force placed under my directions will enable me, I shall endeavour to prevent the combined squadrons expected from the West Indies from making a junction with those

now at Ferrol, which I have little doubt is their intention, and then to make the best of their way to Rochefort.

The enemy at Ferrol are increasing daily, and evidently upon the move; the last ships of the line, lately out of dock, are nearly ready for sea, when their joint force will then consist of 16 sail of the line, 5 frigates, and 3 corvettes.

Many of the ships begin to get low in water, wine, butter, cheese, and molasses.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ROBT. CALDER.

No. 555

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO CORNWALLIS

Prince of Wales, off Ferrol, 15th July, 1805.

Sir,—His Majesty's ship *Egyptienne* joined me this morning, with your dispatches dated the 11th, also a letter from Rear-Admiral Stirling, dated the 12th inst., saying he was making the best of his way to join me, with the ships under his direction.

I shall not lose a moment after he joins me in putting your orders of the 11th into force, and I hope to have the good fortune to fall in with the enemy; when I trust I shall be enabled to give you good account of them.¹

The enemy in at Ferrol are as before; the *Sirius* has just reconnoitred the harbour.

I find his Majesty's ship *Egyptienne* has sprung her mizenmast; she is now fishing it.

Inclosed is a letter from Lieutenant Nicholson

¹ Cornwallis on July 11th had instructed Stirling, with five sail of the line, the *Egyptienne* frigate and the *Nile* lugger, to reinforce Sir Robert Calder off Ferrol. Upon his arrival the Vice-Admiral was to proceed thirty or forty leagues to the westward for six or eight days for the purpose of intercepting, if possible, the combined squadron of the enemy.

of the Frisk cutter, giving an account of vessels he has lately destroyed; his vigilant and active conduct on this, as well as on every occasion whilst under my command, has been very conspicuous, and has met with my full approbation.

Rear-Admiral Stirling has joined me with his squadron, and I am just going to bear up for my station 30 leagues west of Cape Finisterre, agreeably to your last order, received this morning by his Majesty's ship *Egyptienne*.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
ROBT. CALDER.

INCLOSURE

LIEUTENANT NICHOLSON TO SIR ROBERT
CALDER

Hired cutter Frisk, off Cape Prior, 12th July, 1805.

Sir,—I have the honour to acquaint you that his Majesty's hired cutter Frisk, under my command, has captured four of the enemy's *chasse-marées* since the 8th inst. in Cape Prior Bay, viz.: one laden with grain bound to Corunna, which I liberated and permitted to proceed, two with iron pig ballast for the ships of war at Ferrol, and one with tin, which I destroyed.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
JAMES NICHOLSON.

No. 556

ADMIRAL MARTIN TO THE MINISTER OF
MARINE¹

Rochefort, 28 messidor, an XIII [17th July, 1805].

L'escadre de S. M., commandée par le capitaine de vaisseau Allemand, a mis sous voiles ce matin à

¹ *Arch. de la Marine*, BB¹, 247, f. 130.

5 heures par un vent de N.E., bon frais, propre à faire filer de 6 à 8 nœuds. Ce vent s'est soutenu toute la journée jusqu'au moment où je vous écris (4 h. du soir). L'escadre est ainsi composée :— Vaisseaux : Majestueux, de 118 canons; Magnanime, 74; Suffren, 74; Jemmapes, 74; Lion, 74. Frégates : l'Armide, 44, portants du 18; la Gloire, idem; la Thétis, idem. Bricks : le Sylphe, de 18; le Palinure, de 16.

L'escadre a 7 mois de vivres complets et 2 mois d'eau; ses rechanges et autres objets de consommation journalière sont calculés pour 5 mois de campagne, comme d'usage. S. M. peut la regarder comme armée à neuf.

Les garnisons sont au complet et les troupes en remplacement de marins forment 374 hommes. Ainsi, sur 5286 hommes, il ne manque que 320 marins de toutes classes, dont 126 mousses et 66 surnuméraires, domestiques, etc.

On a payé 5 mois de solde, appointements; on a réparti les 68,000 fr. d'espèces qui provenaient des contributions.

[Allemand's purpose was to fall in with Villeneuve, but he failed owing mainly to the changed plans of the latter of which he had no intelligence. The Didon, carrying Villeneuve's dispatches and orders for him, was captured by the Phœnix on 10th August.]

No. 557

*NAPOLÉON TO DECRÈS*¹

Saint-Cloud, 29 messidor, an XIII [18th July, 1805].

Monsieur le Ministre de la marine, je ne puis rien comprendre à l'immobilité de Ganteaume; com-

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (xi.) No. 8991.

ment est-il possible, lui qui est au fait de tous mes projets, qu'il laisse paraître l'ennemi sans faire aucun mouvement? J'avais prévu, dans mes instructions, que l'ennemi devait disparaître de Brest; voilà quatre jours, à ce qu'il paraît, qu'il n'a pas paru; ce qui, joint à la disparition de la croisière de Rochefort, ne peut guère laisser de doute sur l'arrivée de Villeneuve. L'amiral Gardner s'est porté à vingt lieues de Brest à la rencontre de Villeneuve, qui, probablement, éprouvera quelques jours de retard pour opérer la jonction du Ferrol. Comment Ganteaume n'a-t-il pas chassé les croisières de frégates, afin de savoir ce qu'il y avait derrière? J'imagine que vous avez expédié aujourd'hui un courrier extraordinaire à Brest; expédiez-en un second, pour que Ganteaume, s'il apprenait que Gardner se fût trop avancé, entre dans la Manche et aille droit au but.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 558

*NAPOLÉON TO GANTEAUME*¹

Saint-Cloud, 1^{er} thermidor, an XIII [20th July, 1805]

Monsieur le Général Ganteaume, commandant notre armée navale à Brest, notre ministre vous fera connaître les nouvelles que nous venons de recevoir, par l'Angleterre, de notre escadre que commande l'amiral Villeneuve. Il vous apprendra également que la croisière anglaise a levé le blocus de Rochefort, ce qui a mis notre escadre à même d'appareiller le 28 messidor [July 17th].

Vos dépêches télégraphiques m'ont pareillement instruit que, depuis plusieurs jours l'armée anglaise n'était plus signalée devant votre rade.

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (xi.) No. 8998.

Nous vous avons déjà fait donner l'ordre de sortir et de chasser les frégates ennemies, et de reconnaître où l'ennemi s'est porté.

Si vous le trouvez au large de Brest, au nombre de moins de 16 vaisseaux de ligne, notre intention positive est que vous l'attaquiez avec vos 21 vaisseaux de ligne. Nous sommes fondé à espérer du succès.

Si au contraire, l'ennemi n'est pas en vue, et qu'il se soit porté sur le Ferrol, ou qu'il soit très-éloigné en pleine mer, à la rencontre de l'amiral Villeneuve, notre intention est que vous entriez dans la Manche et que vous vous portiez devant Boulogne, où tout est préparé et où, maître trois jours de la mer, vous vous mettrez à même de terminer le destin de l'Angleterre.

Si l'ennemi avait une croisière assez considérable devant Brest, mais pas assez forte pour vous combattre, et que cette croisière prit chasse devant vous, vous vous étudierez à la chasser, si cela est possible, et à vous mettre en situation de secourir l'amiral Villeneuve et de vous joindre à lui au moment où il se présentera devant Brest ; et, si même vous étiez porté à penser que l'escadre qui est devant vous s'est affaiblie pour renforcer la croisière du Ferrol et faire obstacle à l'amiral Villeneuve, nous vous autorisons, après que vous aurez chassé l'ennemi de devant Brest, à disparaître de devant lui par une fausse route, et à vous porter sur le Ferrol, pour y surprendre la croisière ennemie, vous y joindre à une autre escadre combinée, qui est forte de 15 vaisseaux, puis à vous joindre à notre escadre de Rochefort, commandée par le capitaine Allemand, et dont le ministre de la marine vous fera connaître la station. Déconcertant ainsi les opérations de l'amirauté anglaise, vous entrerez rapidement dans la Manche. . . .

. . . Si l'ennemi se dégarnit devant vous, c'est qu'il est persuadé que l'offensive doit venir de l'amiral Villeneuve. Trompez ses calculs en prenant vous-même l'initiative. Nous nous en rapportons à votre zèle, à votre bravoure, à votre expérience dans la marine, et à votre attachement pour notre personne. Ayez de la prudence, mais ayez aussi de l'audace.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 559

CAPTAIN POYNTZ TO CORNWALLIS

Melampus, Plymouth Sound, 23rd July, 1805.

Sir,—I have the honour to acquaint you that in executing Admiral Lord Gardner's orders, his Majesty's ship under my command, the 13th inst., in latitude 50° N., longitude 20° West, captured the *Hidra*, Spanish private ship of war, 28 guns, mounting 22 long nines on the main-deck and 6 sixes on the quarter-deck, with a complement of 192 men, 3 of whom were killed and several wounded in the skirmish. Her cruise of four months terminated the seventieth day without any loss to the trade of this country; and her superior qualifications induce me to recommend her for the King's service.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
S. POYNTZ.

No. 560

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 26th July, 1805.

Sir,—I have had the honour to receive your letter, dated the 16th inst., by which it appears that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are not

pleased at the Révolutionnaire, Naiad, Melampus, and Æolus having been sent to cruise, and by your said letter I am directed not to send a frigate or small vessel away for more than eight or ten days, a period frequently too short to admit of sending orders to the stations. I beg you to state to their Lordships that I did not send any of those frigates away, and that I was surprised when I looked into the disposition of the squadron to find them so employed, for, if I am not mistaken, Lord Gardner said he had not sent anything to cruise. In regard to the restriction their Lordships have been pleased to put me under in this respect by your letter, I beg to observe that I did before conceive the flag-officer placed here was occasionally to send ships for the protection of the trade, or other services, the necessity of which his advanced position might give him earlier information of than could be obtained by their Lordships, or even the Port Admirals, if such powers are vested in them.

I found many frigates cruising belonging to the squadron when I had the honour to succeed Earl St. Vincent in this employ during the last war, and I have generally selected for a distant, and what I deemed a necessary, service those ships which have been long stationed in closely watching the enemy's ports, more as a relief to the officers and men after their very fatiguing and anxious situation than with a view to emolument, which is pretty much out of the question. But if their Lordships are pleased, notwithstanding the display of consequence in my appointment, to leave so little to my discretion, I request of you to assure them that I shall continue to execute their orders with all possible diligence and attention.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 561

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 28th July, 1805, 8 P.M.

Sir,—I have the pleasure to inclose for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, giving an account of his success against the combined squadron of France and Spain.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

INCLOSURE

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO CORNWALLIS

[*Quadruplicate.*]

Prince of Wales, 23rd July, 1805, Ferrol bearing East,
distance 49 leagues; Cape Finisterre, S. 52° E.,
distance 39 leagues.

Sir,—Yesterday at noon I was favoured with the view of the combined squadrons of France and Spain, consisting of 20 sail of the line, also 3 large ships armed *en flûte*, of about 50 guns each, with 5 frigates and 3 brigs; the force under my directions at this time consisting of 15 sail of the line, 2 frigates, a cutter and lugger. I immediately stood towards the enemy with the squadron, making the needful signals for battle in the closest order, and, on closing with them, I made the signal for attacking their centre. When I had reached their rear, I tacked the squadron in succession. This brought us close under their lee, and, when our headmost ships reached their centre, the enemy were tacking in succession. This obliged me to make again the same manoeuvre, by which I brought on a very decisive action, which lasted upwards of four hours, when I found it

necessary to bring to the squadron to cover the captured ships, whose names are in the margin.¹

I have to observe the enemy had every advantage of wind and weather during the whole day. The weather had been foggy at times a great part of the morning, and very soon after we had brought them to action the fog was so thick at intervals that we could with great difficulty see the ships ahead or astern of us. This rendered it impossible to take the advantages of the enemy by signals, as I could have wished to have done. Had the weather been more favourable I am led to believe the victory would have been more complete.

I have very great pleasure in saying every ship exerted and was conducted in the most masterly style, and I beg leave here publicly to return to Rear-Admiral Charles Stirling, and every captain, officer, and man whom I had the honour to command on that day my most grateful thanks for their very conspicuous, gallant, and very judicious good conduct.

The Honourable Captain Gardner, of the *Hero*, led the van squadron in a most masterly and officer-like manner, to whom I feel myself particularly indebted, as also to Captain Cuming for his assistance during the action.

Inclosed is a list of the killed and wounded on board the different ships. The enemy must have suffered greatly. They are now in sight to windward, and, when I have secured the captured ships, and put the squadron to rights, I shall endeavour to avail myself of every opportunity that may offer to give you some further account of these combined squadrons.

At the same time it will behove me to be upon my guard against the combined squadrons at Ferrol,

¹ San Rafael, 84 guns ; *Firme*, 74.

as I am led to believe they have sent off one or two of their crippled ships last night for that port. Therefore, possibly I may find it necessary to make a junction with you immediately off Ushant with the whole squadron.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ROBT. CALDER.

P.S.—I am under the necessity of sending the Windsor Castle to you, in consequence of the damage she sustained in the action. Captain Buller has acquainted me that the prisoners on board the prizes assert Ferrol to be the port to which the enemy's squadrons are bound, as you will perceive by letters inclosed with my original despatch, together with other private information.

ROBT. CALDER.

[The two personal accounts of Calder's action which follow are bound up with the 'Admirals' Dispatches,' copies having been forwarded to the Admiralty. Calder's dispatch is accompanied by lists of killed and wounded and other papers not printed here.]

No. 562

*PRIVATE LETTER FROM THE SENIOR
LIEUTENANT OF THE EGYPTIENNE*


29th July, 1805.

As we are in hourly expectation of seeing the land, my dear father, and if possible shall give up our charge without anchoring, I will not longer delay giving you an account of our proceedings since my last (13th July), when off the Ile d'Aix. On that evening a second brig-of-war joined the squadron, and from the intelligence she brought we

set off with the whole of the squadron for Ferrol. The next morning at daylight we were dispatched to Sir Robert Calder with the news of the combined fleets' being on their return from the West Indies and of our squadron being on its way to join him ; on the 15th in the morning we spoke the inshore ship of Sir Robert Calder's squadron, learned from her the Admiral's bearing, and were in the act of tacking to stand towards the squadron, when away went our mizenmast head ; fortunately it did not come about our ears, and though tottering very much, we contrived to save the topmast rigging, sails, &c. ; gave the news to the *Sirius* frigate, who was close to us, and proceeded slowly on to join the Admiral. We soon got sight of him and his squadron, consisting of ten sail of the line, a frigate, brig, and cutter ; we were much in the dumps lest the Admiral should send us into port to get another mizenmast, and by that lose the opportunity of meeting with the enemy, which was daily expected by us all. The Admiral sent his carpenter on board, and by a little persuasion we got this man of wood to agree to its being the best plan to saw the head of the mast off, shape the stump to receive the top, and so re-rig it. In 19 hours after we received the Admiral's permission for doing it, we had the topgallant sail set and everything at aunt as before, except that our mizenmast was 19 feet shorter, so that we could only set a double-reefed spanker. Never did I see fellows work so famously. That day our squadrons joined us, so that their united force made 15 sail of the line, two frigates, a brig, lugger, and cutter ; the brig was dispatched in shore—I believe between Ferrol and Corunna—and the squadrons having formed the order of sailing towards the close of the evening (that the ships in Ferrol should not see what we were about), away we went to the south-

ward and westward, all in high spirits at the signal to prepare for battle being made. On the 19th inst., in latitude $43^{\circ} 11'$ N., longitude $11^{\circ} 01'$ W. of London, we got information from one of our Lisbon packets of the enemy's being at hand, and on the 22nd, at about $\frac{1}{2}$ after 11 in the forenoon, one of the headmost ships made the signal for them. We were then on the starboard tack standing to the W.S.W., the wind at N.W., in latitude $44^{\circ} 17'$ N., longitude $11^{\circ} 52'$ W. of London. At noon they were full in view; they had their studding-sails booms out ready to be off, but as they could not make out more than 14 sail of our line, from the Dragon, one of our 74-gun ships, being 7 or 8 miles directly to leeward, they boldly brought their leewardmost ships to, and formed in line of battle on the starboard tack, and when formed filled and stood to windward of us.

As *l'Egyptienne*, even with her stump mizenmast, retained her superiority of sailing, her signal was made to keep sight of the enemy and lead the fleet by night. We passed our Admiral about half-past one o'clock, and by half-past three had fetched within half gun-shot of the enemy's centre, and ran along to the last ship but one in their rear. About half a mile astern and a little on the weather-quarter of the rear ship of the enemy's line was a very fine frigate with a merchantman in tow; we could have cut her off with great ease. It was a tantalising situation, but the signal being made to keep close to our squadron we were obliged to shorten sail. We had now clearly made out the enemy's force as they had permitted us to pass unmolested close to leeward of their line, though our fleet were from 3 to 4 miles off. They had 20 sail of the line, 5 frigates, a ship sloop, and 2 brigs. At $\frac{1}{4}$ before 4 their headmost ship tacked under easy sail, and so on through their line in succession; our fleet had



by this time arrived abreast of their rear about long gun-shot off, and crossing on opposite tacks in close line with all sail set. Twenty-five after 4, our fleet tacked in succession, headmost ships first per signal.

The enemy were all about on the starboard tack, but their rear ship, when the Hero, our headmost ship, tacked. *L'Egyptienne* was then close to the enemy's lee quarter, waiting most impatiently for the signal to engage. We here reefed our topsails; for the prudence of it I do not answer, but for the audacity of it I never saw it equalled; it was trusting a little too much to our own insignificance in the eye of the enemy's ships of the line, and to their good nature, but they did not molest us. About 4.30 the enemy's van ships, six in number, bore up and placed themselves in the rear; it immediately struck us that these were the unfortunate Spaniards whom the French Admiral had determined should bear the brunt of the action, and it proved to be the case. At 35 past 4 the signal to engage the enemy's centre and rear was made by our Admiral; the fleets were then on opposite tacks, our leading ship just able to steer for the rear ship of the enemy, whom she arrived up with a few minutes before 5, at which time the rear of the enemy hoisted their colours (Spanish), and opened their fire on the Hero, *Sirius*, and *Egyptienne*. We were on the second ship's quarter, which proved to be the *San Rafael*, a Spanish 80-gun ship; here we lay as long as we could, consistent with our orders, which were to be to leeward of our line in time of action. I never before regretted belonging to a frigate, but my hopes were a little buoyed up with the expectation of some one of the enemy's ships losing a mast, and by that dropping astern and to leeward so that we might get alongside of her. As our line ranged up we were forced to cease firing, and strange to say that,

though we could almost see the mustachios of the Dons, there were not more than a few grape-shot that touched us, and not a person hurt on board.

The weather, that had been hazy during the early part of the day, increased until it became one of the thickest of fogs I remember seeing; many of the enemy continued firing, though impossible for them to see the ship ahead of them in their own line. About a $\frac{1}{4}$ past 6 it cleared up a little, sufficient to see about 300 yards, and within about half that distance was an immense Spaniard of two decks crossing our stern, and must have been some way to leeward of his line. We immediately clapped our helm apart to preserve ourselves from being raked, and to bring our broadsides on him, but my gentleman was too quick for us, and such was the misery of their aim that they did not place a shot in our hull. How he got where he was I cannot account for, except that from the confusion and fog he expected to get off to leeward, but he was soon brought up and paid dearly for it by my old ship, the Windsor Castle, who passed between us before he could fire his second broadside, exchanged fires, tacked and came up upon him again. Thus it was that we ranged up with their centre, for each ship of our line in crossing the rear of the enemy advanced on and tacked when she could fetch her opponent, beginning from their centre. The fog became less thick towards 7 o'clock, when we saw a two-deck ship with her topmasts gone, and immediately tacked to make a dash at her, as she was going away to leeward, but finding she was observed she struck her colours, luffed to under the lee of our line, and away went her main and mizen masts; another soon after shared the same fate.

Our van were much separated from the centre, the enemy's rear and centre ships making all sail

off. We could not for the smoke make out what damage our van had sustained, and the Windsor Castle was the only one of our centre that had lost a topmast; she had behaved most gloriously. At $\frac{1}{2}$ past 7 the fog had become so great that we could see none of our ships; the firing had ceased in our centre and rear, the van still in action. About 8 o'clock it cleared up a little, and our ships had their distinguishing lights displayed; all firing had ceased, and the signal to bring to on the starboard tack (the tack we engaged on) was made by our Admiral. We tacked and passed within hail of the Glory, the second in command (Rear-Admiral Stirling), and received orders to stay by the prizes, and tow them up to leeward of our fleet, as they had dropped astern.

We had just then seen a sky-rocket let off on the weather bow of our fleet, and were in expectation of their coming down to renew the action, but in the morning they were 5 miles to windward of our fleet on the same tack. We had been employed during the night shifting prisoners and taking one of the two Spanish line-of-battle ships that had struck in tow—their names are the San Rafael and the Firme, the former an 80-gun ship, and the latter, which we have in tow, a 74-gun ship. They have each lost from 100 to 150 men, and as many wounded. Our fleet have not lost more than 50 or 60 men, and I believe no officer of distinction is hurt. We left the fleet three days since in company with the Windsor Castle and Sirius, the latter having the other prize in tow; we parted with the Windsor and Sirius last evening, but the former is again in sight. The fleets have again met, I have little doubt, for when we left ours they tacked so as to stand towards the place where we supposed the enemy to be; we could not see

them from our mast-heads when the fleet parted with us, but I have reason to suppose our look-out ship must. With respect to the issue of the second meeting I have most sanguine hopes from the miserable state their fleet were in; they have many sick on board, and the Dons whom we have on board do most cordially detest their allies, and say they are not singular.

30th.—We are now running into the Sound at Plymouth, and are in great hopes we shall not have to anchor, for there may be a straggler for us. Though we have not shared so great a proportion in the glory of the day, yet have we had a most confounded fagging time with near 600 prisoners, and a 74 making 3 feet of water to attend to, besides our own ship. The enemy were, when we saw them first, running for Ferrol with an intention of forcing a passage through our blockading squadron, which they thought did not amount to more than 8 sail of the line; they had about 5,000 troops dispersed among their fleet, and have only taken, when in the West Indies, 9 sail of merchantmen. The moment that they found Nelson was after them, which they learned from a neutral 11 weeks ago, they determined upon being off for Europe. They never saw him as it was supposed at first. They have left 3 frigates, and they say about 800 troops at Martinique. They took the Diamond Rock, and were at Martinique about 20 days. The Spaniards were intended for Trinidad had not Nelson been so close upon them; they were becalmed ten days on the tropic, having crossed much further to the westward than the proper course to be more out of sight of vessels. If we go out we shall remain about six weeks longer, and I suppose go to the squadron off Ferrol, if we have any there. I know not how you will be able to make out all this sea jargon, my dear father, but I

hope it is only a preparative to you for an account of some one that l'Egyptienne may claim as her own.

31st.—We have been put under quarantine, and have now just received orders to join Admiral Cornwallis; we shall sail immediately.

No person has joined in Mr. Pasco's vacancy, so that I am still senior lieutenant.

No. 563

*LETTER FROM AN UNKNOWN
CORRESPONDENT*

Egyptienne, 23rd July, 1805.

On the 22nd July, 1805, the squadron, consisting of the ships named in the margin¹ as they stood in the line of battle, being in latitude $44^{\circ} 17'$ N., and longitude $11^{\circ} 50'$ W., were in the following order when the enemy were first seen by the look-out ship.

The Defiance and Ajax 6 or 7 miles ahead of the Admiral, the Sirius to windward, the Dragon 10 miles to leeward, and the Egyptienne 2 miles on the Admiral's weather beam examining a brig. The rest of the squadron were in the order of sailing in two columns on the starboard tack, with a moderate breeze from the N.W., steering S.W. b. W. Water smooth and the weather rather hazy.

A little before noon the Defiance made the signal for the enemy. The Admiral immediately altered his course to the S.W. and showed the signal to prepare for battle, which was succeeded by the Dragon's signal to make all possible sail. At 1 P.M.

¹ Hero, Ajax, Triumph, Barfleur, Agamemnon, Windsor Castle, Defiance, Prince of Wales, Repulse, Raisonnable, Dragon, Glory, Warrior, Thunderer, Malta; Frigates: Egyptienne, Sirius; Nile lugger, Frisk cutter.

the *Egyptienne's* signal was made to keep sight of the enemy; she was then drawing fast ahead of the Admiral. At 1.15 the Admiral made the signal to keep closer order, which was soon afterwards repeated by him. The *Ajax* denoted that the enemy had 20 sail of the line; at 2 P.M. we counted in all 30 sail (20 of the line formed in close line of battle, in the order annexed,¹ together with 6 frigates, 1 corvette, 2 brigs, and a merchant ship). At 2.20 the Admiral directed the *Ajax* and *Defiance* to take their stations, which was complied with. Observed a frigate in the rear of the enemy's fleet take the merchant ship in tow. At 3 the *Egyptienne* being abreast of the sixth ship in the enemy's line, the van got on the starboard tack, and the frigate who led the fleet made sail to windward. A thick fog came on which prevented us at times from seeing the Admiral; backed the main and mizen topsails occasionally to keep in sight. As it cleared up at times we perceived the squadron forming the line of battle on the lee column. At 4 the *Hero* was directed by signal to alter the course one point to starboard. The *Egyptienne* having passed from the van to the rear of the enemy, tacked and reefed topsails; the *Sirius* wore, and made the signal for 19 sail of the line; the frigate with the tow fired several guns and passed to leeward of the enemy's rear, and windward of their van. At 4.25 the squadron tacked, as per signal. At 4.35 the Admiral made signal No. 33 with preparative to engage the centre of the enemy; this is the last signal which the Admiral was observed to make during the action, the fog being so thick as to render them useless.

At 5 P.M. perceived the leading ship of the enemy's line through the fog going large on the starboard tack; she soon came abreast of us, followed by two

¹ The order of battle, given in the margin, is omitted here.

others, hauled up, hoisted Spanish colours and commenced the action with firing her broadside at the *Hero*, who was then in stays ; the second and third ships discharged their broadsides at us and the *Sirius*, which was instantly returned. We then bore up to make room for our line, and owing to the thickness of the weather ran between the sixth and seventh ships in the enemy's line ; the former fired her broadside but fortunately without effect. The British squadron tacked in succession, and kept a very heavy fire upon the enemy ; both fleets were now totally hid in the fog. At 5.30 tacked ; at 6, clearing up a little, we perceived some of the squadron tacking ; at 7.25 saw the *Windsor Castle* with her fore topmast shot away keeping up a most brilliant fire ; the *Malta* passed close to us on the larboard tack, and fired her weather guns ; lowered the colours under the fog to show that we were English ; at 7.40 the *Sirius* half a cable's length ahead, the lugger and cutter under our lee.

Observed the *Defiance*, then ahead of the *Windsor Castle*, throw all aback, which prevented the latter from being raked by a French ship who bore up for that purpose, and who hauled her wind between the *Windsor Castle* and a Spanish ship, who at 7.45 stood out of the line with her main and mizen masts gone ; tacked and stood towards her, but perceiving the *Defiance* did not fire at her, concluded she had struck, when we re-tacked to be ready to assist the *Windsor Castle*. A little before 8 o'clock, the fog clearing up, we saw 5 French ships with all sail set to windward, and one apparently much disabled, passing through our line astern of the *Prince of Wales*, who was then astern of the *Windsor Castle*. Saw several of our ships engaged ahead, and one of the enemy, which we took for the Spanish Admiral, with his foremast gone. At 8.40, it being dark, the

firing ceased. At 10 hailed the *Glory*, who directed us to take charge of the two captured ships; bore up for them, sent boats on board, and lay by them during the night. The squadron lying to on the starboard tack.

On the 23rd at 5 A.M. the *Malta*, *Sirius*, and two prizes in company; weather thick and hazy, squadron not in sight; half-past 5 the *Thunderer* joined; at 6.30, clearing up to windward, saw our squadron in that quarter; *Thunderer* made sail for them, wind N.N.W., fresh breezes with small rain. At 8.40 took *El Firme* in tow, as did the *Sirius* the *San Rafael*; part of the enemy's fleet seen a great way to windward. The *San Rafael* had about 200 men killed and 80 wounded, the *Firme* 180 killed and wounded; each had 900 men on board at the beginning of the action, most of them troops, there being no less than 7 different corps in the two ships; the defence they made was highly creditable to themselves, and they appear to have sustained their part in the action much better than the French, who gave them no support.

The squadron sailed on the 9th April from Cadiz the day the French squadron came off that port, but parted company the following night. Three of them were in sight of five English ships the next day. The *Terrible*, *Firme*, *España*, and *Magdaléna* frigate were the first that arrived at Martinique; afterwards Admiral Gravina in the *Argonauta* with the *America*. Some days afterwards the *San Rafael* joined them, having sailed from Cadiz two days after the rest. They found the French squadron there with the *Achille* and *Algéciras*, which sailed from Rochefort subsequent to the squadron which left that port. These united squadrons sailed from Martinique with an intention to attack Antigua, and captured a convoy of 15 sail of merchant ships,

by whom they got intelligence that Lord Nelson was at Barbados with 19 sail of the line, which occasioned their return to Europe. The report of their being sickly is untrue, except in the two ships from Rochefort. The Spaniards have no disease on board.

No. 564

CAPTAIN BULLER TO SIR ROBERT CALDER

Malta, 23rd July, 1805.

Sir,—The ships I took possession of were the *Firme*, 74, and the *San Rafael*, the first commanded by Don Rafael Villavicencio, and the *San Rafael* by Don Rafael Montez, each 850 men; Admiral Gravina commanding the Spanish squadron of 6 of the line. Admiral Villeneuve and the Rear-Admiral Magon, with 14 of the line, 6 frigates and a prize, left Martinique the 5th June; took a small English convoy. They took the Diamond Rock. Have not taken any English West India island. Two thousand troops in the Spanish ships, some French troops now on board the French ships. They sent 4 frigates with troops to Guadaloupe and left some at Martinique. About 80 killed and 50 wounded on board the *San Rafael*; the officers report pretty near the same number the *Firme*. On board of the French and Spanish ships about 150 on the average sick with a dysentery, as per signal made some days before the action commenced. Lord Nelson they understood, from the English corvette taken with the convoy, had arrived at Barbados with 19 sail of the line, 3 three-deckers. The prizes are now wrecks. I was under the necessity of having about 50 seamen and 24 marines to assist in

taking care of them, attended by 2 lieutenants. I have on board the *Malta* all the principal officers of the Spanish ships, with 100 Spanish seamen. I have had the misfortune to have 5 men killed and 40 badly wounded, but the ship is in a perfect state for battle. I am in love with all hands. I forgive and forget former nonsense. God bless you, Sir! Kindly remember me to Cuming.

I am, with great respect, wishing you every possible success, ever yours,

E. BULLER.

No. 565

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO CORNWALLIS

Prince of Wales, at Sea, 26th July, 1805.

Sir,—By the *Nile* lugger I have the honour to send you the quadruplicate of my dispatches of the 23rd inst., and I hope she may arrive in time for you to correct the unfortunate mistake of my secretary respecting the omission of Rear-Admiral Stirling's name in my public thanks. This, believe me, sir, has given me very great concern that such an omission on my part should have occurred, and nothing but the ill state of my secretary's health could have occasioned it, for be assured the Rear-Admiral's conduct has been such as to merit my fullest approbation.

Lieutenant Geo. Fennell, who will have the honour of delivering this to you, has conducted himself very much to my satisfaction since under my orders; was very active during the action, and with Lieutenant Nicholson rendered me every possible assistance in his power. The activity and zeal of the latter officer I had the honour to mention in a former dispatch to you, which inclosed a letter of his to me

giving an account of vessels he had captured off Ferrol.

Since my last, I have learnt from the prisoners on board the captured ships the exact force of the enemy on the 22nd inst. At the commencement of the action it was as follows: 14 of the line (French), 6 of the line (Spanish), 2 armed *en flûte*, 6 frigates, and 3 brigs. Yesterday evening the Malta made the signal of having sprung her fore-yard, and the Repulse the signal of having sprung her bowsprit. This obliged me to bring the squadron to for the night. This morning the Repulse made the signal of being able to make sail, and I am now steering S.S.E. for Cape Finisterre, distant about 30 leagues. I am in great hopes I shall fall in with Lord Nelson, provided his intentions were to come off Ferrol.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ROBT. CALDER.

No. 566

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO CORNWALLIS

Prince of Wales, at Sea, 26th July, 1805.

Sir,—I purpose cruising on the rendezvous No. 52 for a few days, in the hope of seeing Lord Nelson in his pursuit of the combined squadrons. Should he not cast up in that time, I purpose leaving the Dragon (Captain Griffith), which has sustained no damage in the action of the 22nd, on this rendezvous for a week after I leave it, to give his Lordship, should he arrive after I am gone, all information of the combined squadrons, as well as of the force which was in at Ferrol prior to the arrival of the Toulon and Cadiz squadrons; also to give intelligence to any ships which may arrive off Cape Finisterre; likewise to tell his Lordship that I am gone

to ascertain whether the combined squadrons are at Ferrol. If they are, I then purpose sweeping round the bay to reconnoitre Rochefort, to see what force is in that port,¹ and then I shall make the best of my way to join you off Ushant, as I conceive you would not approve of my remaining off Ferrol, or Rear-Admiral Stirling being left off Rochefort, particularly so as the ships all more or less require their damages to be repaired in their masts, yards, and bowsprits, added to which most of the ships are getting short of water, &c., &c. I am led to hope and trust my conduct will meet with your approbation, as well as of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. If I err, I hope it will be attributed to my own zeal for his Majesty's service at these critical and momentous times.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
ROBT. CALDER.

No. 567

LORD NELSON TO CORNWALLIS²

Victory, off Cape St. Mary's, 27th July, 1805.

My dear friend,—The enemy's fleet from the West Indies being certainly gone to some port in the Bay, I am proceeding to the northward with eleven sail of the line. I shall either call off Cape Clear, or proceed direct to Ushant to form a junction with you, as circumstances may, in my judgment (from intelligence) require. I shall only hope, after all my long pursuit of my enemy, that I may arrive at

¹ In relation to this Cornwallis wrote to Marsden on the 29th, 'I have taken upon me to say that after the enemy had the opportunity of being reinforced by ships from Ferrol and Rochefort, I did not conceive that with the force he now has that it would be advisable to adopt that measure.'

² Nicolas, *Dispatches and Letters of Nelson* vi. 500.

the moment they are meeting you, for my very wretched state of health will force me to get on shore for a little while.¹

I am ever, my dear friend, your most faithful and attached,

NELSON AND BRONTÉ.

No. 568

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 29th July, 1805.

Sir,—By the latest accounts from Sir Robert Calder you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that it appears to be his intention to take a station to the westward of Cape Finisterre for a few days, in expectation of meeting Lord Nelson, after which he proposed coming here. It is therefore very probable that he will soon join me with his whole squadron. I shall hope to receive instructions from their Lordships as to the steps to be taken upon that occasion.

They will probably come to me with many defects, and some of them low in the articles of water and provisions, all perhaps expecting to go into port to refit.

By what I can learn from those who saw the ships of the enemy for some days after the action, they did not in general appear to be disabled. It is likely, therefore, that the combined Powers will have in the ports of the Bay of Biscay, including those known to have been there before, a very great force of line-of-battle ships.

I do not learn from Vice-Admiral Young that orders had been given for sending victuallers, &c., to Falmouth, where I was to expect to find them,

¹ The Victory anchored at Spithead on August 18th.

by their Lordships' order to Lord Gardner, dated the 18th of June.

I was, by my instructions dated the 24th of August last, and by others subsequent, to take favourable opportunities of westerly winds to water in Torbay, and, as those instructions have not, to my knowledge, been cancelled, I am, from these circumstances, fearful of not doing what their Lordships might wish. Considerable exertion will, I apprehend, be necessary upon the present occasion.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 569

CAPTAIN BULLER TO SIR ROBERT CALDER

Malta, at Sea, 31st July, 1805.

Sir,—I have the honour to acquaint you that two Spanish officers belonging to the navy have unsolicited informed me that they observed the French ship *Le Scipion* strike her colours, and ceased firing, but, upon not being immediately boarded, made all sail, and hauled out of the line to windward in the fog.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
E. BULLER.

No. 570

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

[*Extract.*]

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 2nd August, 1805 11 A.M.

Sir Robert Calder also states his having again formed the blockade of Ferrol,¹ and directed Rear-

¹ With the *Prince of Wales*, *Barfleur*, *Thunderer*, *Hero*, *Repulse*, *Defiance*, *Ajax*, *Dragon*, and *Agamemnon*.

Admiral Stirling to do the same off Rochefort, with the remaining four ships,¹ as it does not appear, by Captain Neve's account, there can be many of the enemy's ships there ready for sea.²

No. 571

*NAPOLEON TO DECRÈS*³

Saint-Cloud, 14 thermidor, an XIII [2nd August, 1805].

Monsieur Decrès, je pars pour Boulogne. J'imagine que vous avez donné ordre à l'amiral Ganteaume de se tenir dans la rade de Bertheaume, et que vous l'avez prévenu que, Magon ayant rejoint Villeneuve, ils ne tarderont pas à paraître. Du moment que votre santé vous permettra de supporter les fatigues, je vous attends à Boulogne. Faites-moi passer exactement toutes les nouvelles que vous aurez de la mer.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 572

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 4th August, 1805.

Sir,—I have had the honour of receiving your letter, dated the 26th of July, directing me by order of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send three more ships of the line, now with me, to the Downs.

I have accordingly directed the Princess of Orange, Ruby, and Polyphemus to proceed there without loss of time. I had at the time eighteen

¹ Glory, Warrior, Triumph, Raisonné.

² In sending this dispatch Sir R. Calder said that the enemy must be in a very crippled state 'if I may judge from the action we had with them.'

³ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (xi.) No. 9037.

sail of the line with me off Ushant. This detachment reduces my number under that prescribed by their Lordships' directions, dated the 23rd of February, for my cruising here.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 573

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 9th August, 1805.

Sir,—I request you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I detached the *Naiad* on the 6th instant to the southward and westward to endeavour to obtain information of the enemy's combined squadrons. Last evening she returned to me, having the preceding night fallen in with a squadron of the enemy which Captain Dundas took to be the ships from Rochefort. I have the honour to inclose for their Lordships' information a copy of his letter to me, stating the particulars. Captain Dundas showed much resolution and good conduct upon this occasion.

You will also be pleased to acquaint their Lordships that I sent the *Iris* early yesterday morning to Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, and I transmitted to him, by that ship, the moment I received it, made known to me by Vice-Admiral Young, some intelligence of an enemy's squadron seen off Cape Finisterre, on the 31st of last month, by a Portuguese vessel, and said to be looking out for the Oporto convoy. The *Æolus* I sent on the 29th of last month to Sir Robert Calder, and the *Niobe* has been ordered to join him.

I have this morning sent the *Melampus* to Rear-Admiral Stirling with the intelligence of the enemy,

supposed to be the Rochefort squadron, seen by the Portuguese, and also acquainting him that Captain Dundas had, in the *Naiad*, fallen in with a squadron of the enemy, particularising their situation at the time, and their course, probably the same squadron returning into the bay.

The *Moucheron* came to me yesterday, having dispatches on board for Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson from Vice-Admiral Young, who desired me to direct Captain Hawes where it was most likely to find Lord Nelson. By a letter which I received from his Lordship I understood he meant to go off Cape Clear or to come off Ushant. In the latter case I conceived the dispatches would not be of much consequence, and therefore recommended it to the commander of the *Moucheron* to proceed off Cape Clear.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.¹

INCLOSURE

CAPTAIN DUNDAS TO CORNWALLIS

Naiad, at Sea, 8th August, 1805: Lat. $47^{\circ} 56'$; long. $6^{\circ} 44'$.

Ushant by chart south-south-west $\frac{1}{2}$ west, 25 leagues.

Sir,—I beg leave to acquaint you that this night, at 10 minutes past 12 A.M., when standing to the southward and westward, with his Majesty's ship under my command, agreeable to your order of the 6th instant, we discerned eleven sail under our lee bow which we took for vessels of war. I then ordered the ship to be put about, and made the private signal, which not being answered I kept under a commanding sail in order to ascertain their

¹ An Admiralty minute on the dispatch says their Lordships concluded Cornwallis, on receiving this information, had immediately sent ships to reinforce Stirling.

force when daylight should appear; the weather being thick and hazy, and, the wind shifting from north-north-west to west-by-north, brought them on our weather beam, and as they made no signals I did not suppose any of them were in chase of us. At daybreak I found a large frigate within little more than a gunshot of us on our weather quarter, and another under our lee, and the whole of the other vessels under a press of sail in chase also, consisting of four ships of the line (one of which of three decks), four large frigates, including the two close to us, and three brigs. On their not answering the day private signal I made all sail, and hoisted our ensign; the frigate on our weather quarter having closed with us, within pistol shot, hoisted French colours and began firing her bow gun, which we returned with our stern chaser. She then put her helm a-weather and gave us her larboard broadside under our stern, which fortunately did us no material injury further than cutting our sails and running rigging. This manœuvre I believe ultimately saved the *Naiad*, for had she come boldly alongside of us and brought us to close action, she would have damaged us so much that we must have fallen an easy prey to the ships astern, which were gaining on us fast. We continued firing in this manner from five o'clock till half-past six, when she hauled her wind, and made from us. It gave me much pleasure to perceive our shot had done her considerable injury. The other frigate fired a gun to leeward and made the *Africaine's* number, but soon afterwards put about and steered for the line-of-battle ships that had hauled their wind on the larboard tack.

I suppose this to be the Rochefort squadron; they were steering about north-east when first observed by us, close to the wind.

I want words sufficiently to express my obliga-

tions for the assistance I received from my officers and ship's company in this very critical situation, and had it been possible for us to have risked an action, I am certain they would have done their duty as becoming British seamen.

I have the honour, &c.,

THOS. DUNDAS.

[The *Æolus*, 32, Captain Lord William Fitzroy, had sighted Allemand's squadron on 5th August, and had followed it at a distance for some hours. Allemand had captured the *Ranger*, 16, on 17th July. He fell in with and took the *Calcutta*, 54, some leagues N.N.W. of Ushant on the 25th September, and remained at sea making depredations upon British commerce, but entirely failing in his purpose of uniting with Villeneuve. Many efforts were made to locate him and bring him to action, and Sir Richard Strachan was on this service when on 4th November he encountered *Dumanoir le Pelley*, and accounted for the four ships which had escaped from Trafalgar.]

No. 574

LIEUTENANT DELAFONS TO CORNWALLIS

[*Extract.*]

Nimble, 11th August, 1805.

Made the best of my way for Ferrol, where I arrived on the afternoon of the 10th instant, having been all the morning off Cape Prior, looking for Sir Robert Calder's squadron. Several vessels at anchor were at 2 P.M. discovered off Ferrol, and when about three miles distant I discovered 24 sail (apparently of line-of-battle ships), 7 sail of whom had Spanish ensigns flying, the rest with French, and among them 4 flags, 3 French with 1 Spanish,

5 frigates and 2 brigs. I then hove to and made the private signal, which was flying for twenty three minutes, and then hoisted our number at the gaff end, which blew out exceedingly clear and distinct, still keeping the private signal flying; all this time a large frigate, with French colours flying, was carrying a crowd of sail in pursuit of us, and a brig, who appeared to have come out of Ferrol, following the frigate. Finding they did not answer our signals, the private signal having been flying forty-three minutes, and the frigate now in our wake about two and a half or three miles astern, I made all sail on a wind on the starboard tack, with the wind at E.N.E., and had the good fortune to out-sail and weather the enemy in chase of us, who returned to Ferrol about half-past 7 P.M., having been upwards of three hours in pursuit of us. The whole of the fleet appeared perfectly in order as to their rigging, and I rather imagine they had either just arrived at their anchorage, or some fresh ships were in the act of joining when we first discovered them, as, on our observing them, they had their ensigns flying, and 5 sail were under way, working to the eastward. Not having been able to find Sir Robert Calder, Bart., I judged it most expedient to return immediately to you for your further orders, and remain with respect, &c.,

THOS. DELAFONS.

[Calder had been blown from his station after the action of 22nd July. Villeneuve had proceeded to Vigo Bay, where he anchored on the evening of the 26th. He sailed again, with 15 sail of the line, seven frigates and two brigs on the 30th, and on 1st August, in the absence of Calder, entered Ferrol. On the 5th he dispatched the Didon in search of Allemand, who was at sea, and, on the

evening of the 9th, with 29 sail of the line, left the port, but was delayed upon the coast by contrary winds until the 11th. Having failed to fall in with Allemand, instead of proceeding to Brest, as Napoleon expected, he went south to Cadiz. The French and Spanish ships of the line which left Ferrol with Villeneuve were the Neptune, Bucentaure, Pluton, Mont Blanc, Berwick, Formidable, Intrépide, Scipion, Swiftsure, Indomptable, Aigle, Achille, Algéciras, Argonaute, Duguay-Trouin, Fougueux, Héros, Redoutable, Neptuno, Argonauta, Terrible, Monarca, Montañez, San Augustin, San Francisco de Asis, San Ildefonso, San Fulgencio, San Juan Nepomuceno, and Principe de Asturias.]

No. 575

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 12th August, 1805.

Sir,—I have received your letter dated the 1st instant, sent to me by command of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and you will be pleased to acquaint their Lordships according to their direction to me therein signified, I have written to Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, communicating to him, as expressed, their Lordships' satisfaction and approbation of his conduct and that of Rear-Admiral Stirling, the captains, officers, and men under the orders of the Vice-Admiral, in the action with the combined fleets of France and Spain on the 22nd of last month, and expressing their Lordships' hopes that the advantage obtained will be improved to the utmost of his power.

I am also honoured with your letter of the 5th, making known to me, by direction of their Lord-

ships, that orders have been given for sending victuallers to Falmouth, and that it is their direction that I should, when the ships are supplied there with provisions, take the same opportunity of completing their water instead of sending them to Torbay.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 576

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 13th August, 1805.

Sir,—I request that you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the *Raisonné* joined me last evening from Rear-Admiral Stirling, without having received the sealed orders. I have therefore directed Captain Josias Rowley to get provisions and water from the *Prince*, and proceed immediately. I received by the *Raisonné* letters from Rear-Admiral Stirling, by which I find he had received intelligence of the enemy's squadron from Rochefort having sailed the 25th of last month, and had therefore thought it advisable to join me, and he is now in sight. The *Nimble*, which left me the 29th of last month, the *Hazard*, the 2nd of this, the *Révolutionnaire*, the 6th, and the *Melampus*, the 9th, to look for him, had none of them been fortunate enough to meet with him, except the *Melampus*, the day before yesterday.

I expect every day to receive some information obtained by those ships and vessels. But in the meantime I have thought it most advisable, particularly as the wind is to the westward, to send the Rear-Admiral with the *Glory* and *Warrior* to Caw-

sand Bay, that they may get supplies of all kinds, and I hope that they will be hastened as much as possible, and in that case it may upon the whole be the most expeditious method.

If the enemy should have returned to Rochefort, it would be to no purpose sending Rear-Admiral Stirling with those two ships, supposing their wants could be supplied here, and I have not any more ships to send with him. The Goliath is gone off Ferrol, the Terrible and Raisonnable different ways according to their Lordships' orders, and I am sending the Defence and Zealous, which last has just joined me, to Sir Robert Calder. I shall now have remaining only 15 sail of the line, which I believe their Lordships will be of opinion is a very inferior force for this service. But I am anxious to forward the relief as much as possible, and trust that some more ships will join me immediately.

Vice-Admiral John Leigh Douglas joined the squadron last evening, and he has shifted his flag to the Hibernia.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 577

CAPTAIN BAKER TO CORNWALLIS

Phoenix, at Sea, 13th August, 1805.

Sir,—I cannot but exult in the honour of imparting to you the extreme good fortune of his Majesty's ship under my command on the 10th instant—latitude $43^{\circ} 16'$ N., longitude $12^{\circ} 14'$ W.—in the capture of the Didon, a remarkably fine, and the fastest sailing frigate in the French navy, of 44 guns and 330 men, which had sailed but a few days

from Corunna, and was upon a secret cruise.¹ The action commenced at a quarter past nine in the morning (La Didon having waited my approach to leeward),² and lasted three hours, never without pistol-shot, during which all our ropes were cut to pieces, our main topsail yard shot away, and most of our masts and yards severely wounded. The necessity of our engaging to windward, in order to prevent the possibility of the enemy's escape, exposed us to several raking broadsides before it could be prudent to return the fire, and the superiority of La Didon's sailing, added to the adroit manœuvres of Captain Milius, convinced me of the skill and gallantry I should have to contend with, which has been fully evinced by the stubborn defence of his ship until she became a perfect wreck, and his subsequent honourable deportment. Owing to the lightness of the wind, and La Didon's attempt to board, brought our starboard quarter in contact with her larboard bow, in which position we remained full three-quarters of an hour, subject to a galling fire of musketry that robbed me of such support of officers and men as there could be no compensation for but in complete victory; in this situation I had the misfortune to lose the assistance of Lieutenant Steel, of the Royal Marines, who had received a dangerous wound in the head, and was obliged, with his two brave sergeants, to be conveyed from the deck, with sentiments however of great reluctance. To Lieutenant Pleydell therefore devolved the management of the Marine party, and were it possible for anyone in time of battle to fulfil a double capacity, his conduct, though a very young man, distinguished

¹ She was on her way from Villeneuve at Ferrol with dispatches and orders for Allemand.

² It is stated that the captain of the Didon had received information leading him to undervalue the *Phoenix*.

him for that character. The second lieutenant, John Bounton, and master's mate, George Donelan, were, unhappily, killed, a very great loss to the service, and irreparable to me. Messrs. Tozer and Curling, midshipmen, have received very serious wounds, and, although very young, demonstrate great instances of valour. Being so deprived and weakened of officers early in the action, the duty became truly arduous to my first and third lieutenants, Joseph Oliver and Samuel Brown, whose undaunted courage and attention to every branch of their duty showed them well qualified and deserving their present, and what might be expected from them in superior, situations. Mr. James Woodford, the master, has my warmest thanks for his judicious suggestions and firmness at his post, whilst shot were flying in all directions around him. I have not words to convey my commendation of Mr. William Warden, surgeon, and Mr. James Bartlett, assistant, for their humanity, skill, and attention to the wounded, which is felt and acknowledged by every individual. The conspicuous courage of Mr. John Collman, the acting purser, has been pointed out to me by every officer in the ship. Indeed, were I to enumerate the meritorious conduct of everyone, I should have to praise the warrant and petty officers, pilot, and, in short, every individual under my command. I should be still wanting in gratitude to Mr. Edward Philips, midshipman, who twice guarded my life, and actually killed my adversary, were I to omit the praise due to the occupation he had chosen of warning others of the dangers that he trusted his single musket would remove from himself. To the sick also is due the greatest merit, for the instant we beat to quarters (although many of them were with difficulty removed from their beds) they placed themselves in

useful situations, and as well as they were able assisted in handing up the powder.

With sorrow I transmit you a list of the killed and wounded, and have the honour, &c.,

THOS. BAKER.¹

INCLOSURE

A list of the killed and wounded on board the Phoenix and La Didon on the 10th August, 1805

Ships' names.	Number killed.	Number wounded.	Number killed and wounded.
Phoenix . . .	12	28	40
Didon . . .	27	44	71
Difference . .	15	16	31

No. 578

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 13th August, 1805.

Sir,—I request that you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that since I wrote the letters in the morning the Hero has joined me, and Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder is in sight, it having been discovered that the squadron the Vice-Admiral engaged on the 22nd ultimo are at Ferrol, with the ships that were there before. I send the Hero in, as that ship is damaged in her masts; shall act with the rest according to the directions received from their Lordships. I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

¹ Four days after the action the Phoenix and Didon, with the Dragon in company, fell in with a division of Villeneuve's fleet and were chased. They escaped, and the two first named proceeded to Plymouth.

No. 579

CAPTAIN BARTON TO CORNWALLIS

Goliath, at Sea, 15th August, 1805.

Sir,—I beg leave to acquaint you for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that agreeably to your order of the 11th instant, standing for Ferrol this day at 8 A.M., in latitude $45^{\circ} 32'$ N., and longitude $7^{\circ} 25'$ W., we fell in with *Le Faune*, brig-corvette, mounting 18 guns, which, after a short chase we captured. She was chased by the *Camilla* (who was in company) since 11 P.M. She was from Martinique, bound to any part of the coast she could make; she had on board 22 men belonging to the *Blanche*, which, I am sorry to inform you, was taken and burnt on the 18th ultimo by the ships named in the margin,¹ in the latitude of $21^{\circ} 15'$, and longitude $66^{\circ} 12'$. I have sent the corvette in charge of the *Camilla* (Captain Taylor), who is bound to Portsmouth, and shall immediately proceed to put your orders in execution.

I have, &c.,

R. BARTON.

N.B.—*Le Faune* is perfectly new, this being her first voyage, she sails remarkably fast, and I think is a great acquisition to the service for this class of vessels.

¹ *La Topaze*, 44 guns; *La Torche*, 18; *Le Département des Landes*, 20; *Le Faune*, 18. The names are not given quite correctly in the original. The *Blanche*, from Jamaica to Barbados with dispatches of Nelson, was taken after a prolonged resistance and foundered shortly afterwards. Of her assailants, the *Faune* and *Torche* were both captured by Captain Barton, as is recorded in the above letter and in another (No. 582) dated 18th August.

No. 580

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 16th August, 1805.

Sir,—I request you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the ships named in the margin,¹ which joined me yesterday with Lord Nelson, being in condition for service, and none of those remaining which joined with Sir Robert Calder having occasion to shift lower masts, I shall keep them as long as I can or until others join.

You will be pleased to acquaint their Lordships that, as the enemy have a strong force in the Bay, I have put 20 sail under Sir Robert Calder, and directed him to proceed off Ferrol, to block up that port, or intercept the enemy if they should attempt to sail, or follow them if there appears a prospect of overtaking them.²

I have left for the service here at present but a few ships. I trust, however, to some joining me soon, and the remainder of those sent to the Downs. I have thought the step I have now taken might meet with their Lordships' approbation, as a means of keeping the enemy's squadrons in check, if that from Rochefort is still at sea; and should their Lordships be pleased to order the ships in any other direction, it may be easily effected.

I have sent the Repulse to Spithead, the Belleisle to Plymouth.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

[The Admiralty approved of the measure adopted,

¹ Canopus, Spencer, Conqueror, Donegal, Leviathan, Spartiate, Swiftsure, Tigre.

² Villeneuve had left Ferrol on the 11th.

and informed Cornwallis that he would be reinforced 'as speedily as the ships could, with the utmost exertions, be got ready for sea.' The most urgent directions had been issued to the Port-Admirals. Sir Charles Cotton was to join him immediately.]

No. 581

CORNWALLIS TO SIR ROBERT CALDER

By the Honourable William Cornwallis, Admiral of the White, &c.

The French and Spanish squadrons from the West Indies, having arrived at Ferrol, you are hereby required and directed to proceed off that port immediately with the ships named in the margin.¹ The Dragon has been left there, and the Goliath was sent to you on the 12th instant. The inclosed orders you will deliver to the respective flag-officers and captains, to follow your directions.

You are to endeavour, as soon as possible, to get information of the enemy's force and situation, and use your utmost exertion to prevent their sailing, or to intercept them should they attempt it.

If you should learn, upon your arrival off that port, that part of the enemy's ships have sailed from thence, and it should appear to you that with the whole, or part (according to the force of the enemy), of the squadron under your direction you should have no prospect of overtaking them, you are in that case to keep what may be deemed a sufficient force for any French or Spanish ships

¹ Prince of Wales, Britannia (Rear-Admiral Earl of Northesk), Canopus (Rear-Admiral Louis), Spencer, Spartiate, Donegal, Tigre, Swiftsure, Conqueror, Leviathan, Prince, Téméraire, Neptune, Revenge, Zealous, Defence, Orion, Polyphemus, Dragon, Goliath, Sirius, Attack.

remaining at Ferrol ready for sea, and to send the remainder of the ships to join me off Ushant.

The several frigates, &c., named herein¹ have been sent by me to gain intelligence and to watch the enemy; you are to keep such of them as you may conceive necessary to send me information, upon all occasions when anything occurs which may be thought of sufficient consequence.

You are to give directions to the ships looking out, upon their discovering the enemy at sea, to ascertain, if possible, their course and probable destination, and then to push on before them, to communicate the same to you, or to the flag-officer under my command who may be hereafter stationed off Rochefort, to me off Brest, or to Ireland, if that should appear to be their route, giving the information with all possible expedition, that the officers so stationed may be the better prepared to intercept the force of the enemy.

Upon your falling in with the *Lady Warren* and transports, laden with water, &c., you are at liberty to clear them, and they are to return to Plymouth, as before directed.

Given on board the *Ville de Paris*, Ushant, 16th August, 1805.

W. CORNWALLIS.

[Calder had joined Cornwallis on 14th August, and Nelson at 3 P.M. on the 15th. The latter after his pursuit of the French to the West Indies, had anchored at Gibraltar on 19th July, there to complete his fleet 'to four months' provisions, and with stores for Channel service.' He left on the 22nd for Tetuan to take bullocks and other necessities on board, and sailed again on the 23rd, but contrary winds delayed him, and three weeks elapsed before he fell in with

¹ *Naiad*, *Iris*, *Nimble*.

Cornwallis. The latter took the ships under his command, and authorised Nelson to proceed in the Victory to Portsmouth, and he cast anchor at Spithead on 18th August].

No. 582

CAPTAIN BARTON TO CORNWALLIS

[*Extract.*]

Goliath, 18th August, 1805.

I have the satisfaction to add, at 8 P.M. we captured La Torche, French national corvette of eighteen guns, 196 men, commanded by Monsieur Dehen, having on board fifty-two of the late Blanche's crew. Had they not separated, and night coming on very fast, I am confident La Topaze would have been in my possession also.

The Raisonnable appearing in sight, and being to windward, I made her signal to chase, with a view of getting into the wake of her, but the evening drawing on so fast I fear she has not succeeded, and having since parted company, cannot give further information.¹

I beg leave to add the captain of the late Blanche, I am informed, is now on board La Topaze, with the greatest part of the officers, and in good health, except the lieutenant of Marines, who received a severe wound in the action from a splinter.

No. 583

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 19th August, 1805.

Sir,—I request you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I detached on the 17th instant Vice-Admiral Sir

¹ The Topaze made good her escape to Lisbon.

Robert Calder, and under his direction Rear-Admiral the Earl of Northesk, Rear-Admiral Louis, and the ships named in the margin¹ to proceed off Ferrol, as mentioned to you in my letter of the 16th instant for the information of their Lordships. The Dragon has been left off that port by the Vice-Admiral, and the Goliath I sent to join him on the 11th instant previous to his leaving that station.

This morning the Naiad brought me accounts of the combined squadrons of the enemy having sailed from Ferrol, received from Captain Brace, of the Iris, copies of which I have the honour to send herewith, to be communicated to their Lordships.² A part of the enemy's ships were also seen by the Naiad on the morning of the 14th instant. I immediately sent Captain Dundas to Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder with this intelligence, and I hope, as I have directed him to go in pursuit of the enemy instead of going off Ferrol, that he will gain further information from the ships and vessels I have sent to look out for the enemy, and be enabled to fall in with them. I have also sent the Hazard to the Vice-Admiral, with a duplicate of my dispatch sent by the Naiad.

The Révolutionnaire has just returned to me, but the weather being thick and unfavourable, it has not been ascertained, either by the Révolutionnaire or Hazard, what ships exactly were at Rochefort, except those refitting, as before reported by Captain Neve.

I now send the Révolutionnaire in to replenish.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

¹ Prince of Wales, Britannia, Canopus, Spencer, Spartiate, Donegal, Tigre, Swiftsure, Conqueror, Leviathan, Téméraire, Prince, Neptune, Revenge, Zealous, Defence, Orion, Dragon, Goliath, Polyphemus, Sirius, Attack (gun-boat).

² Captain Brace had found the combined fleet off Ferrol on the 13th, and had been pursued by some of their ships.

No. 584

*Intelligence obtained by Captain Hope, of the Defence,
21st August, 1805, from a Portsmouth sloop, viz.*

Twenty-six sail of the line, seven frigates, brigs and sloops, in all forty sail, sailed on the 13th from Corunna and Ferrol. They anchored, and were joined by ships from Ferrol on the 13th, and were close off Ferrol last night; saw but one small ship there.

No. 585

NAPOLEON TO DECRES¹

Camp de Boulogne, 2 fructidor, an XIII
[20th August, 1805].

Monsieur Decrès.—. . . C'est actuellement à Ganteaume à réunir toutes ses forces, à mouiller à Bertheaume pour se trouver au combat de Brest, si ce n'est le premier jour, au moins le second. Je ne sais quelle sera l'issue de tout ceci; mais vous voyez que, malgré tant de mauvais jeux et de circonstances défavorables, la nature du plan est foncièrement tellement bonne que nous avons tous les avantages.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 586

NAPOLEON TO GANTEAUME²

[Telegraphic.]

Camp de Boulogne, 2 fructidor, an XIII
[20th August, 1805], 7 heures du soir.

Etes-vous mouillé à Bertheaume? Avez-vous reçu un courrier du Ferrol? J'espère que vous sentez l'importance du moment et que vous connaissez ce que j'ai droit d'attendre.

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (xi.) No. 9101. ² *Ibid.* No. 9102.

No. 587

NAPOLEON TO GANTEAUME¹

Camp de Boulogne, 4 fructidor, an XIII
[22nd August, 1805].

Monsieur le Vice-Amiral Ganteaume, M. le vice-amiral Villeneuve a appareillé du Ferrol le 22 thermidor [August 10th], mais n'est effectivement parti que le 26 [14th], afin de vous rejoindre à Brest. D'après ce que j'ai pu comprendre de ses dépêches, il me paraît qu'il est dans l'intention de passer par le Raz. Il me paraît aussi qu'il doute si, joint avec vous, il ne passera pas plusieurs jours à Brest pour se ravitailler. Je vous ai déjà fait connaître, par le télégraphe, que mon intention est que vous ne souffriez pas qu'il perde un seul jour, afin que, profitant de la supériorité que me donnent 50 vaisseaux de ligne, vous mettiez sur-le-champ en mer pour remplir votre destination et pour vous porter dans la Manche avec toutes vos forces. Je compte sur vos talents, votre fermeté et votre caractère dans une circonstance si importante. Partez et venez ici. Nous aurons vengé six siècles d'insultes et de honte. Jamais, pour un plus grand objet, mes soldats de mer et de terre n'auront exposé leur vie.

NAPOLÉON.

No. 588

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, Bay off Brest, 22nd August, 1805.

Sir,—I request that you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that yesterday in the forenoon a signal was made to me from the Felix schooner that the enemy were out

¹ *Corresp. de Napoléon* (xi.) No. 9114.

of port. I stood up towards the entrance of Brest with the squadron, a moderate wind at north-east, and advanced in the *Ville de Paris*, above St. Matthew's Point, to observe their position. They were at anchor across the Channel in no particular order, twenty-one of the line, four frigates, one corvette, one brig. I thought at that time there was a prospect of being able to get at them. I therefore anchored the whole of the squadron, seventeen sail of the line, for the night off the Black Rocks, intending to attempt the attack in the morning, although I had heard of the numerous batteries lately erected along the shore. I weighed at break of day, but before we could form in order of battle the enemy's fleet were getting under way, and appeared to show an intention to attack the squadron under my orders. But when their headmost ship¹ had advanced off St. Matthew's Point, and nearly within gunshot of our sternmost ship, she fired her broadside and tacked. The rest followed without having been in a regular line. I then wore the squadron together by signal, and endeavoured with the *Cæsar* and *Montagu* to cut off the rear ships of the enemy. This, however, could not be effected from the immense quantity of shot and shells thrown from their batteries. The enemy continued standing in, and anchored again between the Points at the entrance of Brest Road, and no mischief of any consequence happened to the ships of the squadron.²

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

¹ The *Alexandre*, 80, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Willaumez.

² Cornwallis himself and a midshipman in the *Ville de Paris* were struck by spent fragments, and in the *Cæsar* three men were killed and six wounded.

No. 589

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 27th August, 1805.

Sir,—I request you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the winds having been very light for some days past, and the victuallers clearing, I have not been able to stand in to observe the state of the enemy's squadron at Brest, but by the signals made to me from the look-out ships I imagine they continue, the whole of them, without the Goulet. In this situation they can go to sea with almost any moderate wind, and require to be very closely watched, which it is difficult to do whilst the squadron are receiving supplies. But every possible attention shall be paid to them should they make any further movements.

This ship has been so built up with bulkheads, which it is necessary should be kept out of the way, as there may be occasion to use the guns at a very short notice, and as it is also necessary to have the cable tiers clear, there is no place to put the quantity of things which have been taken down. I have therefore directed them to be sent to Plymouth.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 590

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

[*Extract.*] Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 2nd September, 1805.

The Audacious and Repulse having joined me, and learning from Captain Legge that two ships would probably come immediately from Portsmouth, you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commis-

sioners of the Admiralty that I yesterday detached Rear-Admiral Stirling with the ships named in the margin¹ to endeavour to fall in with the enemy's ships, which chased the *Melampus* the day before. The Rear-Admiral was directed to find out whether those French ships had taken shelter at Lorient or Rochefort, in which case he was to cruise off either of those ports to keep them in. Otherwise, upon receiving information that they had not returned to port, he was immediately to proceed to the northward to protect the homeward-bound convoys and see them into the Channel.

No. 591

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

[*Extract.*] Ville de Paris, of Ushant, 2nd September, 1805.

The enemy's ships, after working about and exercising with a moderate westerly wind, returned on Saturday within the Goulet of Brest. Signals have been made to me this morning that some of them have moved out again, but it is so very hazy that it cannot be ascertained at present how many. Only two have been seen from this ship, and no other signals have been made, there being, at present, very little wind from the northward.

No. 592

LIEUTENANT SIMPSON TO CORNWALLIS

Wasp, at Sea, 3rd September, 1805.

Sir,—I have the honour to inclose you the proceedings of his Majesty's sloop *Wasp* from the time the *Melampus* made signal 469, all sail set,

¹ Glory, Repulse, Triumph, Dragon, Warrior, Crescent.

pursued by a line-of-battle ship and frigate that appeared fast gaining on us. Employed sawing the gunwales, throwing overboard the heavy stores, and starting the water and pumping it out. At ten, finding the enemy's ships still approaching us, with little prospect of escaping, cut the bower anchors from the bows and threw all our carronades overboard, except four. At 2 P.M., finding the headmost of the enemy's frigates, and a line-of-battle ship nearly within gunshot of us, made the signal 28 to the Growler, which was answered by 374, from which I concluded all her guns had been thrown overboard. At 4 P.M. the headmost frigate commenced firing at us, but finding her shot fell short, discontinued it till 10 minutes past 4, when she again fired several shot at us, and hauled her wind, as did all the others of the enemies' ships. Continued our course and made the signal 108 to the Growler, which was not discovered till nearly 6 P.M. when she made all sail to join us; at half-past 7 dispatched the Growler to the southward with the inclosed order.

On the 31st, at half-past 4, discovered the enemy's squadron, bearing N.N.W., about 4 miles distant, steering as we supposed about S.S.E. Bore up, and made all sail, which we perceived the whole of the enemy's squadron do, about 10 minutes after us. At 8.10 all the line-of-battle ships hauled their wind on the starboard tack; at this time a large frigate and a brig within gunshot of us. At 8.45 found the brig so near us as to provoke our fire, which was commenced with two 6-pounders out of the stern ports with very good effect, as the frigate and brig yawed occasionally to give us their broadside, the latter with round and grape, but so ill-directed as only to send a few shot over us, the others falling considerably short. On finding from our attention to

the sails and keeping away in the smoke that we had distanced the frigate, but still finding the brig coming up with us, Mr. Harper, the first lieutenant—a very deserving officer who had directed the stern chase guns the whole of the time—at this period double-shotted them, and I have reason to think with very good effect, for at fifteen minutes past 10 the frigate and brig hauled their wind and gave us their parting broadside, without one shot striking us, from the press of canvas they were both under when they fired. Should the conduct of the Wasp in this transaction meet with your approbation, may I presume to mention the conduct of Lieutenant Lewis (acting and not yet confirmed) as a very deserving young officer? I should also feel I was not doing justice to Mr. Finch, the master's mate (who has passed for a lieutenant), should I omit to say I was much pleased with his steady and officer-like conduct at the head of the marines and boarders; indeed I should not do justice to my feelings were I to omit expressing my thorough satisfaction at the steady and determined conduct of all the officers and crew of the Wasp.

I have the honour, &c.,

J. SIMPSON.

No. 593

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 5th September, 1805.

Sir,—You will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that a vessel, which Mr. Gambier has taken up for the purpose of sending dispatches to the officer here and to England, joined at noon to-day.

It appears by the information contained in the

letters which I have the honour to send,¹ that the combined squadrons entered the port of Cadiz the 20th ult., and were seen by Vice-Admiral Collingwood, and from their numbers I should think, without having made a detachment, which I was most anxious about.

With the San Josef, which joined me yesterday, I have only 17 sail of the line. Otherwise I should have hoped to have been approved by their Lordships if I had sent all the ships that could have been spared instantly to join our squadron off Cadiz.

The Brest fleet were reported to me yesterday to continue in the road. Their late movement would make me suppose they intended going to sea, as I never heard of a number of ships anchoring without the Points in the way they at first did, except previous to their immediately putting to sea.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

INCLOSURE

COLLINGWOOD TO MR. JAMES GAMBIER

Dreadnought, off Cape Trafalgar, 20th August, 1805.

Sir,—This morning the combined fleet of 26 ships came down upon me when I was before Cadiz with three, and obliged me to abandon my station. I had two days before received information that they were expected, but among the variety of reports which were told, it was not easy to select the true. They are gone to Cadiz for the purpose of replenishing and refitting their ships, and are expected to sail again soon, reinforced by eight from that port

¹ Among these letters is one from Collingwood to Mr. James Gambier, which follows. Mr. Gambier was consul-general at Lisbon.

and eight from Carthagen. Any information you can give me of the British squadron I shall be very glad of, which Mr. Lemprière will be able to send to me by putting on board one of my ships which will be south from Cape St. Mary's seven or eight leagues. . . .

I am, &c.,
CUTHB. COLLINGWOOD.¹

[Villeneuve explained his action in proceeding to Cadiz instead of to Brest by saying he had no confidence in his fleet, and that he believed the state of affairs to have essentially changed since the issue of the Emperor's orders. Napoleon, however, at the camp at Boulogne had written to Ganteaume on 22nd August in the full belief that Villeneuve had left Ferrol in order to proceed to Brest. (See No. 587.) Villeneuve explained later on that, seeing no chance of success, he determined on the evening of 15th August, three days after leaving Ferrol, being then eighty leagues W.N.W. of Cape Finisterre, to bear up for Cadiz. When intelligence of his arrival at that port reached Napoleon he was bitterly disappointed and exasperated. Daru, his secretary, being sent for, found him in a transport of rage, pacing to and fro, and exclaiming, 'What a fleet! What sacrifices for nothing! What an admiral! All hope is gone! That Villeneuve, instead of entering the Channel,

¹ Collingwood to his wife : 'I have very little time to write to you, but must tell you what a squeeze we had like to have got yesterday. While we were cruising off the town, down came the combined fleet of 36 sail of men-of-war; we were only three poor things with a frigate and a bomb, and drew off towards the Straits, not very ambitious, as you may suppose, to try our strengths against such odds. . . . I hope I shall have somebody come to me soon, and in the meantime I must take the best care of myself I can.'

should have taken refuge in Cadiz! He will be blockaded there!' In consequence of the failure of his combinations Napoleon immediately changed his plans, and orders for the campaign of Austerlitz were thereupon issued. Thiers's 'Consulat et Empire,' v.]

No. 594

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 7th September, 1805.

Sir,—I request you will be pleased to make known to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the *Venus* frigate joined me yesterday, and made a signal that she had intelligence to communicate, but the weather was too bad all the day to admit of it. This morning Captain Matson came on board, and I have the honour to inclose for their Lordships' information the copy of intelligence which he has brought.¹ But I am entirely at a loss to conjecture what enemy's squadron he could have seen. It seems, by the account brought me this morning by Captain Sykes, of the *Nautilus*, that 28 sail of the line went to Cadiz, which was the utmost number of the line stated to have sailed from Ferrol on the 12th of last month. The Rochefort ships were, at the time Captain Matson mentions, in the eastern part of the Bay. I have directed him to look for the homeward-bound convoys ten days, to give notice to the commanding officer, and put him upon his guard; then to follow his former orders. I have also given him directions for impressing the seamen.

It appears by the accounts brought by the *Nautilus* that Rear-Admiral Knight had joined

¹ On the 2nd, in 46° 40' N. lat., 23° 0' W., Captain Matson had seen 9 sail of the line and an armed brig bearing south.

Vice-Admiral Collingwood, which made up eight sail of the line and five frigates, and that Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, with eighteen of the line and two frigates, was off Cape St. Vincent, using his utmost endeavours to join him. Herewith I send a copy of Sir Robert Calder's letter and the other communications from Captain Sykes.

The *Melampus* came in sight yesterday with a signal that she had been chased by four line-of-battle ships off the Saints. But it has been very thick, and that ship has only this moment closed with me. I find it was the evening of the 5th that Captain Poyntz saw the French ships.¹ Captain Hotham's report dated the same day I send for their Lordships' inspection.

The *Æolus* has also just communicated with me, and brought a letter from Captain Scott, of the *Niobe*, by which it appears that the line-of-battle ship is yet at Lorient, and only two small ships at Rochefort. Our frigates have seen nothing of Rear-Admiral Stirling; from thence I conclude he has received intelligence or had an early opportunity of looking into Rochefort, and finding nothing of consequence there, has proceeded for the protection of the homeward-bound convoys.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 595

LIEUTENANT USSHER TO CORNWALLIS

Colpoys hired brig, 8th September, 1805.

Sir,—I have the honour to inform you that on the 5th inst., Arcachon bearing east four miles, and

It would appear that the ships which chased the *Melampus* were the *Niobe* and *Æolus*. See No. 598.

on the 6th inst., San Sebastian bearing S.W. ten leagues, I captured the French sloops as per margin,¹ from San Sebastian bound to Brest, laden with 5,000 sweeps and 400 grinding stones. They sailed nearly at the same time with a Spanish brig having a similar cargo.

They are upon Government account and were intended for the flotilla at Boulogne.

I have the honour, &c.,

THOS. USSHER.

No. 596

CAPTAIN PARKER TO CORNWALLIS

Amazon, off Ushant, 17th September, 1805.

Sir,—I beg to acquaint you we fell in with the homeward-bound Jamaica fleet at sunset on August 31, during a hard N.W. gale, 80 leagues to the westward of Scilly, and having with some difficulty learnt from one of the convoy that several of the fleet had separated I judged it proper to continue on the station directed in your order in hopes of collecting and affording protection to the stragglers. We have not met any, but I am happy to inform you on the 12th instant, in lat. $49^{\circ} 50' N.$, and long. $18^{\circ} 30' W.$, his Majesty's ship under my command captured the Principe de la Paz, a Spanish corvette privateer carrying twenty-four nine-pounders and four brass swivels, with 160 men on board, principally French. This ship was fitted out at Vigo five weeks before, and had taken the Prince of Wales packet from Lisbon and the Lady Nelson letter of marque from Virginia bound to Glasgow. We found part of the crew of the latter ship on board the privateer and a considerable sum in specie.

¹ L'Anna Maria, La Fédération.

I have much satisfaction in her capture as she was completely stored for remaining two months longer at sea, and her captain, François Beck, an experienced cruiser, who commanded the French privateer *Le Brave* during the late war, greatly to the annoyance of our trade.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. PARKER.

No. 597

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO CORNWALLIS

Prince of Wales, off Cadiz, 21st September, 1805.

Sir,— . . . I beg leave to inform you the enemy are still in at Cadiz, consisting of 35 sail of the line, apparently ready for sea, with frigates and corvettes in preparation. Many of the ships that were in the action with me on 22nd July have been new masted, bowsprited, &c., &c. One ship of the line, the *Scipion*, is found unserviceable, and the men are turned over to a Spanish ship of three decks, called the *Santa Ana*; this was the ship which struck to our squadron, but could not be taken possession of owing to the fog. The three ships the enemy were obliged to leave at Vigo in consequence of the damage sustained in the action of 22nd July are the *Atlas*, French 74, the *Santiago España*, and the *Santiago America*, both Spanish ships of 68 guns each. There were two more ships of the line left at Ferrol owing to the damage sustained on 22nd July, but whose names I have not been able to ascertain. This makes 6 sail of the line of the enemy out of the 20 to have been rendered unserviceable for this year, besides the two taken. From every information I can get, there was not a single ship detached from the combined squadron after they left Ferrol. They sailed with 29 sail of

the line and 7 frigates, and they entered Cadiz with that number, as reported to me by all the look-out ships off this port, and who saw them go into Cadiz.

I have this day been informed by a Portuguese vessel that the French and Spaniards are sending round to Cadiz (by land) from Vigo and Ferrol all the seamen that were on board the different men-of-war at those places. The patron¹ asserted he had himself seen near 2,000 men on their march to Cadiz.

Vice-Admiral Collingwood informs me the convoy from England passed through the Straits on the 20th instant, on their way to Gibraltar.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

R. CALDER.

[Nelson, who had left St. Helen's in the Victory, on 15th September, reached the fleet off Cadiz on the 29th and assumed command.]

No. 598

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

[*Extract.*]

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 22nd September, 1805.

When Captain Scott, of the *Niobe*, was here the other day, he made it appear that it was his ship and the *Æolus* which chased the *Melampus* on the 5th of this month. There were also two brigs in sight at the time. I shall inquire of Captain Poyntz when he returns what could induce him from thence to make a signal to me that he had been chased by four sail of the line.

¹ *Patrón*, Spanish, the master or commander of a trading vessel.

No. 599

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 28th September, 1805.

Sir,—You will be pleased to request the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that, it being my intention, should the wind come to the westward, immediately to stretch over to the Lizard with the squadron, and to go off Falmouth, I have placed the *Cæsar*, *Hero*, *Namur*, *Captain*, and *Bellona*, off Brest under the direction of Sir Richard John Strachan, to remain there to watch the enemy, and for the protection of the frigates and small vessels stationed at the entrance of Brest. The ships named in the margin¹ remain with me. The *Æolus* from Plymouth rejoined yesterday. I have detached her to cruise off Cape Finisterre.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 600

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 29th September, 1805.

Sir,—I request you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that early this morning the *Diligente* store-ship brought me intelligence of a line-of-battle ship and several frigates of the enemy having taken a number of ships of different convoys. The *Diligente* was sent by Captain Bouverie, of the *Aimable*, who had

¹ Ville de Paris, *Hibernia*, *San Josef*, *Glory*, *Malta*, *Princess Royal*, *Prince George*, *Windsor Castle*, *Repulse*, *Audacious*, *Terrible*, *Warrior*, *Goliath*, *Courageux*, *Triumph*, *Montagu*, *Barfleur*.

charge of the Lisbon and Oporto ships. In consequence of this information I sent her inshore to Sir Richard Strachan, and directed him to proceed with the ships then with him in quest of the enemy and to see the store-ship across the Bay, but to return again immediately if he was not able to obtain further intelligence which might give him a prospect of meeting the French squadron.

A very few hours after the Moucheron sloop came to me with an account that she had two days before fallen in with a French squadron, of which I inclose the report.¹ Captain Hawes acquainted me that they appeared to have taken that position as cruising ground, and were taking everything which came in their way. I therefore thought it for the service to run immediately to the spot, particularly as the enemy in Brest showed no sign of moving. Several of the ships were reported to me to be refitting with topmast struck and topgallant mast on deck. The frigates under my orders which could be spared from watching Brest I had stationed round the Bay to gain intelligence of what has been called the Rochefort squadron, which, from the account Captain Hawes gives of one being a three-decker, was, I suppose, that which he fell in with. I shall return as soon as possible if I have not the good fortune to fall in with or obtain certain accounts of the enemy.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

¹ Fourteen sail. On 8th October Cornwallis wrote that later reports appeared to confirm Captain Hawes's statement.

No. 601

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO MR. MARSDEN

Prince of Wales, off Cadiz, 30th September, 1805.

Sir,—Having learnt with astonishment yesterday by the ships just arrived, and by letters from my friends in England, that there has been a most unjust and wicked endeavour to prejudice the public mind against me as an officer, and that my conduct on the 23rd of last July in particular has been animadverted on in the most unjust and illiberal manner, for such it must be deemed, having been done at a time when I am absent abroad, employed in the service of my King and country, I must therefore request you will be pleased to move the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to grant an inquiry into my conduct on the 23rd July last, or upon the whole, or such part of it (when in presence of the enemy) as shall appear to their Lordships for the good of his Majesty's service, and for the purpose of enabling me to give my reasons publicly for my conduct at that time, and to refute such unjust, illiberal, and unfounded assertions, when I trust I shall make it appear to the satisfaction of my King, country, and friends, that no part of my conduct and character as an officer will be found deserving of those unfavourable impressions which at present occupy the public mind, being conscious everything in my power (as an officer) was done for the honour and welfare of my King and country, after a very mature investigation of all the existing circumstances, and the very critical situation I was placed in with the squadron I had the honour to command at the time alluded to. I am, &c.,

ROBERT CALDER.¹

¹ An extract from Calder's defence at the court-martial will be found at the close of this volume.

No. 602

MR. MARSDEN TO CORNWALLIS

Admiralty, 9th October, 1805.

Sir,—The fleet under your command being now rendered, by the addition of the ships which have lately been put under your command, superior to that of the enemy, I have it in command from my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to recommend it to you to keep no more ships at present off the port of Brest than you may judge sufficient for preventing the enemy from putting to sea, but to station the excess either at Falmouth or Cawsand Bay as in your opinion may be most advisable, taking care to give the strictest injunctions to the senior officer of the ships which you may station at those places to cause the respective ships under his orders to be kept in constant readiness to join you at the shortest notice, as from the ships stationed at Falmouth and Cawsand Bay you will constantly be enabled to relieve such of the ships under your immediate command as may be most in want of refitting or their stores completed. Their Lordships have commanded me to acquaint you that they will take measures for adding such others to them as occasion may appear to require.

Their Lordships have at the same time commanded me to signify to you their approval of your coming into Falmouth or Torbay with the whole or part of the fleet under your command, as you may judge best, and remaining there during the hard westerly winds, coming in and going out of those roads with the ships under your command as wind and weather, or other circumstances, may in your opinion render it necessary. Their Lordships, however, depend upon your care and attention in

stationing your frigates at all times off Brest, in such manner as that the earliest information may be conveyed to you of the movements of the enemy.

In case (notwithstanding every precaution to prevent it) any of the enemy's ships should get to sea, it is their Lordships' direction that you lose not a moment's time in detaching at least an equal number of your best sailing ships of the line in pursuit of them, with instructions to the senior officer of the ships you may so detach to use his best endeavours to come up with those of the enemy, and to take or destroy them.

Whenever you shall have frigates to spare from the services of the fleet, it is their Lordships' direction that you detach them to the westward, with orders to their respective captains to cruise on such station as you may judge best for the protection of the trade of his Majesty's subjects, and the annoyance of the enemy; taking care to rejoin you at the expiration of a month or five weeks, or such shorter period as from existing circumstances you may judge most expedient.

I herewith inclose you a list of ships and vessels at present under your command, and have the honour to be, &c.,

WM. MARSDEN.

No. 603

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, at Sea, 12th October, 1805.

Sir,—You will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that, standing over towards Falmouth on the evening of the 10th, the wind came suddenly round to the north, and increased to a fresh gale, but appeared unsettled.

I therefore thought, after receiving the account of the expected convoys, and particularly the distressed state of that from the Leeward Islands, that I could not do better than run to the westward for their security and protection. The wind fell very much yesterday, and this morning, in latitude $40^{\circ} 10'$, and longitude $8^{\circ} 07'$, both these convoys were seen, which had joined the day before. The Vanguard, being leaky, had left some of the merchant ships from Jamaica in charge of the Illustrious. In the night the wind came to the south-west, and I have given the orders according to their Lordships' directions for impressing the seamen, and taking especial care to send sufficient officers and men to navigate the ships in safety to their ports, which I hope will be executed before it comes to blow hard, of which there is some appearance.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 604

*LIEUTENANT PATER TO CORNWALLIS*¹

A report of a Swedish vessel—examined by his Majesty's ship the Bellona, Cape Finisterre bearing S.S.E. eight leagues, 8th November, 1805, at 10 o'clock P.M.—the Susannah, C. Bavz, master, from Corunna, bound to Lisbon.

Intelligence.

He sailed from Corunna on Wednesday, the 6th instant A.M., and at 6 o'clock the evening preceding, the post had arrived from Cadiz with such information that caused a general consternation, alarm, bustle, and despondency in all ranks of people that

¹ Corunna rumours concerning Trafalgar.

it was impossible for him to describe, occasioned by the account brought by the post of an action fought between [*sic*] the combined fleets of France and Spain, which, he said, to the best of his recollection, for he saw the account and read it, had sailed from Cadiz on the 22nd or 23rd ulto., and he thought the action, to the best of his recollection, for all was hurry and agitation, was fought about the 28th. But, so great was the confusion and dismay, that he could not charge his memory with the exact dates, or get any minute information except what he here related. He was anxious to sail, fearing he might be detained by the French frigate, as war was daily expected, but assured me of a most complete and decisive victory on our side by the fleet under Lord Nelson. He said the account stated it to have been the most obstinate and determined battle ever fought, and that, except the list of a very few of their ships which had arrived, which list he read, that it was feared by the Spaniards that all the rest were either taken or destroyed. He saw a list of 22 sail of the line which were missing. He stated that the Santissima Trinidad had fallen into the hands of the English, and that one French 74 had blown up in the action ; this was seen to have taken place by the ships which had returned.

Admiral Gravina had lost his arm, and the captain of his ship had lost his leg, both of whom had arrived at Cadiz.

As soon as this news had arrived the only ship there, being a French frigate of 38 guns, bent her sails by moonlight late at night, and was to embark troops and to sail, with two other frigates of the same force with French troops, at the same time, from Ferrol for France, supposed either Lorient or Rochefort, the first fair wind, and that nothing had stopped them the next day but our ship

having been seen off the Cape, which was announced to them by signal of an enemy's ship of the line being on the coast.

C. D. PATER.

No. 605

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 20th November, 1805.

Sir,—I have had the honour this day to receive your letter dated the 9th instant, written by command of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, acquainting me that, in consequence of his Majesty having been pleased to order the rank of Admirals of the Red to be restored in the navy, and a promotion of flag-officers to take place, their Lordships had signed a commission appointing me to the rank above mentioned, which I have had the honour to receive.

The commissions inclosed for the other flag-officers with me I have sent to them, and my secretary will receive the described fees, accounting for the same as you have desired. The original commission for Rear-Admiral Sir Richard John Strachan is returned herewith. You will be pleased to acquaint their Lordships I have received their order, dated the 13th instant, to take the Rear-Admiral under my command.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 606

CORNWALLIS TO SIR RICHARD STRACHAN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 20th November, 1805.

Sir,—In my letter to you dated the 10th instant, I conveyed my thanks for your gallant conduct in

II.

B B

taking the four French line-of-battle ships with the detachment under your direction, and I requested you to assure them how sensibly I was affected by their brave and steady exertions in your support. I have now the honour to send, for your information, the copy of a letter to me from Mr. Marsden, received this day, written by command of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to express their high satisfaction on the above occasion, and you will be pleased, according to the direction of their Lordships, to signify the same to the captains, officers, and crews of the ships at the time with you.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
W. CORNWALLIS.

No. 607

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, at Sea, 2nd December, 1805.

Sir,—The wind coming round to the north on Sunday morning, and afterwards veering to the eastward, you will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I directed the outer ships to sail from Falmouth, and this morning I weighed with the rest, and am proceeding off Ushant. The *Atalante* has just joined me from the inshore frigates with an account that the enemy were nearly in the same state. Some have been under sail, as Captain Elphinstone informs me, to exercise, he supposes, but that they have anchored farther in than before. I inclose copies of his reports to be laid before their Lordships. We did not find any difficulty in getting the ships in or out of Falmouth Harbour, but it would require more assistance for a number of ships, which Commis-

sioner Bowen said he had signified to you for their Lordships' information.

I believe if the wind had fortunately continued to the westward, by bringing the other ships separately into the harbour, there would, with the assistance afforded by Commissioner Bowen, have been no difficulty in placing the 15 ships. But, as it turned out, we had an opportunity of getting very little water on account of the wind shifting so soon, and as Commissioner Bowen, I understand, is obliged to attend his duty in town, and will continue at Falmouth only for a very short time, I do not think it advisable, under these circumstances, to return there with the squadron until their Lordships have been pleased to make some arrangement and establishment at that port; but I shall, upon the wind coming round to the westward, put into Torbay for supplies, requesting that the provision vessels may be sent there.

Vice-Admiral Douglas has made known to me that yesterday morning, off the Lizard, the *Bellerophon* and *Belleisle* appeared in sight. The latter made the signal for the *Victory* bearing south and in distress, requiring a ship to see her into port. In consequence of which he immediately by signal sent the *Warrior* to the assistance of the *Victory*.

The wind coming to the northward, the *Glory*, *Windsor Castle*, and *Goliath* have not proceeded to Cawsand Bay to get paid and replenish. The ships now with me are as per margin.¹

I have the honour to be, &c.,

W. CORNWALLIS.

¹ Ville de Paris, Hibernia, San Josef, *Glory*, Malta, Princess Royal, Prince George, *Windsor Castle*, *Barfleur*, *Impétueux*, *Goliath*, *Dragon*, *Plantagenet*, *Triumph*, *Captain*, *Audacious*, *Montagu*.

No. 608

CORNWALLIS TO MR. MARSDEN

[*Extract.*] Ville de Paris, at Sea, 20th December, 1805.

It seems the enemy's ships have moved so far up to the northward it is very difficult to see them without standing close over to Camaret, and that only seven were seen at one time when the Diamond reconnoitred.

No. 609

SIR ROBERT CALDER'S DEFENCE AT THE COURT-MARTIAL¹[*Extract.*]

Admiralty Secretary's Department, Courts-Martial (1805).

Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court,—I appear before you in a singular, I may almost say an unprecedented, situation. Having served my King and country not only without reproach, but I may add with some degree of reputation, for upwards of forty-six years, during which I have been more than once honoured with marks of approbation from my Sovereign, having for the last ten months been employed on a most severe and critical service without once being in port, and having in the course of it, with a very inferior fleet, forced a superior one of the enemy, who had the advantage of wind and situation, into action, and obtained a decisive victory over them, I felt myself impelled to solicit the present inquiry, for the purpose of vindicating my

¹ The court-martial demanded by Sir Robert Calder sat from 23rd to 26th December, 1805, and adjudged him to be severely reprimanded for not having done his utmost to renew the action on 23rd and 24th July, but exculpated him from any charge of cowardice or disaffection. The extract from his defence here given is for the purpose of making clearer the general conditions of the operations at the time.

honour and my character from a variety of injurious and unfounded aspersions, which have been cast upon me in consequence of the not having renewed the engagement during the two days that the enemy afterwards remained in sight.

.

In the month of February I was dispatched by Admiral Cornwallis from the fleet off Ushant to blockade the harbours of Ferrol and Corunna. Although at that time there were five French ships of the line and three frigates, and five Spanish ships of the line and four frigates nearly ready for sea, besides three Spanish line-of-battle ships, which were just come out of the arsenal and were getting ready, seven sail of the line were all that could be spared me, which were afterwards increased to nine; and, though I repeatedly made application for two frigates and two small vessels to place at the entrance of these harbours, I only obtained one of each. I do not mention this by any means as complaining of the conduct of the Admiralty, or imputing to them any inattention to my situation, or to the public service. I well know that at that critical period they had abundant means of employing all the force they could collect, and I have no doubt but that they supplied me with as many as they could, consistently with their attention to other parts of the service. I am defending myself, not imputing blame to others, and my sole object in making this statement is that the Court may be aware of the very critical situation in which I was placed.

With my small force, however, I kept my station, and from time to time reported to the commander of the fleet off Ushant, and to the Admiralty, the information I received respecting the state of the enemy's fleet.

About the month of April the Toulon and Cadiz fleets joined, and, it being then uncertain what would be their destination, and the Brest fleet being also on the move, my situation became so dangerous that Lord Gardner gave me directions, upon perceiving the enemy's ships to direct their course to the northward, or on receiving intelligence that could be depended upon of their taking that route, to proceed to join his Lordship, either at the rendezvous off Brest, or wherever else I might learn with certainty that he might be with the squadron.

The combined squadron, however, went to the West Indies, and, it being expected that they would return and attempt to form a junction with the fleet at Ferrol, I was directed, both by Lord Gardner and the Admiralty, to be on my guard in that event.

In the meantime the preparations at Ferrol continued. On the 5th July I received information that there was a French Admiral expected daily from Paris or Brest to supersede the Admiral then at Ferrol; that the combined squadrons, consisting of 13 sail of the line, besides frigates and corvettes, had orders to leave Ferrol and to be at Corunna by the middle of the month.

A report made to me by Captain Prowse, a few days before that, agreed with so much of this intelligence as respected the number of ships ready for sea, and added that three other line-of-battle ships were getting ready. On the 10th July I received a further report from him that the ships had actually begun to move. From subsequent events it appears that these reports were accurate.

In addition to this I had learned that the enemy had erected signal posts from Cape Finisterre and Cape Ortegal to Ferrol, so that the combined squadron on their return from the West Indies

might, by sending forward a frigate or corvette to one of the small bays near Cape Finisterre, communicate by land their approach to the squadron at Corunna or Ferrol, and direct them to be ready to push out upon the signal posts announcing their being off the coast.

On the 11th July Admiral Cornwallis, who had now joined the fleet off Ushant, ordered Admiral Stirling, with five sail of the line, the *Egyptienne* frigate and Nile lugger from Rochefort, to join me, and directed me, upon being joined by the Rear-Admiral, to proceed thirty or forty leagues to the westward, and cruise six or eight days for the purpose of intercepting the French and Spanish squadron (which, by a letter from him, it appears he had never heard consisted of more than 16) upon its return from the West Indies, after which I was to return to my post off Ferrol, and Rear-Admiral Stirling off Rochefort, each to follow their former orders. This order was brought me by the *Egyptienne* on the 15th. Admiral Stirling with the rest of his ships joined me on the same day, and we made sail to the westward on that evening.

At the time Admiral Stirling left Rochefort there were in it nine sail (five of them of the line) ready for sea. The wind that enabled him to sail for the purpose of joining me, of course, afforded them the means of quitting Rochefort, and Admiral Stirling has proved that they sailed on the 18th.

When we sailed to the westward also the wind was fair for the enemy's fleet to get out of Ferrol, which, I have before stated from Captain Prowse's report, they appeared anxious to do, and from the other intelligence it appears that they were ordered to get into Corunna. The wind continued fair two or three days for the purpose, and if they took the advantage of it and got to Corunna they might

almost at any time have got from thence. It is, indeed, proved that they might have sailed from Ferrol on the 24th, for although, when the question was put to the witness, it was assumed that the wind on that day was north-west, it afterwards appeared that the wind was from north-north-east to north-east. I shall, however, put this matter beyond a doubt by putting in the charts from which the winds would enable ships to get out of Ferrol or Corunna may be easily ascertained. Besides, I need hardly observe to the Court that, in mountainous countries like that, there are frequent land winds which would enable them to get out during the night. These observations are only so far material as they will enable the Court to judge of the correctness of my apprehension after the engagement, that the Ferrol as well as the Rochefort squadron might be at sea.

On the 19th July we met with the Auckland packet from Lisbon. Captain Brown, of the *Ajax*, spoke with her, and brought me a letter from Mr. Gambier, the Consul-General at Lisbon, including a copy of an order from Lord Nelson, dated the 15th June at sea, directed to the commanding officer of his Majesty's ships in the Tagus, &c., acquainting him that the combined squadrons had passed Antigua on the 8th, standing to the northward, and, his Lordship believed, were bound to Europe, and therefore strongly recommended to such commanding officer the proceeding or sending off Ferrol to acquaint the Admiral off that port of that information, that he might be upon his guard in case the enemy were bound to Ferrol.

On the 23rd July, about noon, the combined squadrons came in sight, their force consisting of 20 sail of the line, 7 frigates and 2 brigs, a much greater force than, as I before stated, Admiral

Cornwallis supposed them to consist of ; and it appears from Lord Gardner's letter to me of the 6th July that, when seen off the Diamond Rock at Martinique on the 16th May, they consisted only of 16 sail of the line and 6 frigates.

My force consisted of 15 sail of the line, 2 frigates, the Frisk cutter, and Nile lugger.

Notwithstanding this superiority, and notwithstanding they had the advantage of the wind, I forced them to action. The general result of it you are already acquainted with. As it is not particularly the object of your inquiry, it is unnecessary to take up your time with observations upon it. Amidst the numerous prejudices that have assailed me, I have never yet heard the slightest insinuation to my disadvantage either as to the mode of the fleet being carried into, or conducted in action. The victory certainly was ours, and most decisively so.

.

[In the winter of 1805-6, in compliance with the views expressed by the Admiralty, the closeness of the blockade was relaxed. Frigates were kept off Brest and the Passage du Raz, while the squadron of Cornwallis was usually in Torbay or at Falmouth, the commodiousness and suitability of the latter as an anchorage being under investigation. The real interest of the blockade, as it is treated in these pages, ended with the battle of Trafalgar. Cornwallis was on his way from Torbay to Ushant when Vice-Admiral Leissègues with the *Impérial* (ex-*Vengeur*), *Alexandre*, *Jupiter*, *Brave*, and *Diomède*, and Rear-Admiral Willaumez, with the *Foudroyant*, *Vétéran*, *Cassard*, *Impétueux*, *Patriote*, and *Éole*, put to sea from Brest, each with some frigates, on 13th December—the former to be defeated by Sir John Duckworth off San Domingo on 6th February,

1806, and the latter, after an adventurous cruise in West Indian waters and the North Atlantic, to have his squadron broken up in action with various British forces. Cornwallis was in Cawsand Bay on 22nd December, when intelligence of the departure of a French squadron reached him, and the captains of the frigates off Brest and the Passage du Raz informed him that they thought they must have seen any ships sailing from Brest at the time indicated. On 30th January, 1806, Cornwallis was again off Ushant, and reported that the French had in Brest ten sail of the line (two of them three-deckers), four frigates, and one corvette. Early in February he returned to Cawsand Bay, afterwards proceeding to Torbay, and struck his flag on 22nd February, being succeeded by Lord St. Vincent, who maintained an effective blockade throughout the year.]

INDEX

The names of many of the ships engaged in the blockade operations occur so frequently that complete references are not given.

(F.) French. (S.) Spanish. (D.) Dutch.

- ACASTA, i. 4, 5, 11, &c.
 Actéon (F.), ii. 113, 162
 Admiralty letters, orders, &c., i.
 3, 5, 11, 16, 41, 46, 47-51, 55, 82,
 83, 109, 122, 125, 142, 145, 156,
 163, 169-174, 174-179, 187, 188-
 190, 318; ii. 92, 95, 98, 127, 244,
 247, 260, 274, 365
 Adour storeship (F.) captured, i. 73
 Æolus, ii. 142, 147, &c.
 Affronteur (F.) captured, i. 14, 22
 Agamemnon, ii. 225, &c.
 Agincourt, i. 194; ii. 233, &c.
 Aigle, i. 10, 11, &c.
 Aigle (F.), i. 89 n., 97, 101
 Aigle (F.) merchantman captured,
 i. 25
 Aimable, i. 325
 Ajax, ii. 81, &c.
 Alarm, i. 2, 32 n., &c.
 Albion, i. 4, 9, &c.
 Aldham, Capt. G., ii. 46, 157
 Alerte (F.) captured, i. 184
 Alexandre (F.), i. 129
 Algéciras (F.), i. 130
 Allemand, Capt. Zacharie, ap-
 pointed *chef de division*, ii. 295;
 leaves Rochefort, 306; his depreda-
 tions on British commerce, 234
 Alliance (F.), i. 129
 Amphion, i. 12, &c.; ii. 87
 Anderson, Lieut., i. 310
 Anna Maria captured, ii. 359
 Antelope, i. 325, 329
 Aquilon (F.), i. 129
 Ardent, i. 49, &c.
 Argonaute (F.), i. 79 n., 97, 99, 207,
 239, 314; ii. 65
 Armide (F.), ii. 113, 162
 Arnous, Lieut. H. (F.), i. 26
 Arrow, i. 107
 Ascott, Lieut., ii. 88, 89
 Astrea (S.), i. 90
 Atalanta letter of marque, i. 103
 Atalante, i. 11, 14, 167
 Atalante (F.) privateer captured,
 i. 105
 Atlas, ii. 140
 Attack, ii. 344 n.
 Audacious, ii. 362
 Autumn, i. 164
 Aventure (F.) privateer captured,
 i. 210
 Aylmer, Capt. John, i. 40, 70
 BACCHANTE (F.) captured, i. 52
 Baker, Capt. Thos., i. 197, 229; ii.
 42, 214, 266, 338-341
 Barbados, squadron under Colling-
 wood ordered to, ii. 260
 Barfleur, ii. 204 n., 242 n.
 Barlow, Sir Robert, i. 93, 107
 Barton, Capt. R., ii. 342
 Batave (F.), i. 129
 Batavian Republic, orders to detain
 ships, i. 11, 16, 55; to seize ships,
 41, 55

- Batt, Lieut. J. B., ii. 181, 283
 Batty, Mr., midshipman, ii. 230
 Bayonnaise (F.) destroyed on shore,
 i. 218; distribution of crew, 240
 Beagle, ii. 252, 290, &c.
 Beauclerc, Capt. Lord A., i. 279
 Beauman, Lieut. Fras., ii. 170, 173,
 187
 Bedford, Capt. Wm., i. 2, 37, 71,
 85, 108, 110-119, &c.
 Bedout, Rear-Adml. (F.), i. p. xxv;
 biographical sketch of, 47 *n.*; his
 squadron from the West Indies,
 47, 80, 85 *et seq.*, 101, 135 *n.*;
 correspondence with Pellew, 182;
 strikes his flag, 239
 Bellerophon, ii. 242 *n.*
 Bellona, ii. 362
 Bellone, French privateer, i. 209,
 236
 Betanzos Bay, i. p. xlvii, 263, 274,
 305
 Bickerton, Rear-Adml. Sir Richard,
 joins Calder off Ferrol, ii. 284
 Bigot, Lieut. (F.), i. 205
 Biter, ii. 26
 Bittern, i. 93, 102
 Bizand, B. B., French privateer
 captain, i. 184
 Bligh, Capt., i. 171
 Blonde (F.) privateer captured, ii. 43
 Boadicea, i. 37, 39, 40, 76 *n.*, &c.
 Bolton, Capt., i. 327
 Bonaparte, Jerome, i. 110, 149,
 149 *n.*, 333
 Bouillon, Duc de (*see* D'Auvergne,
 Capt.)
 Bourne, Lieut. Richard, i. 357; ii.
 62-64, 160, 166, 228, 231
 Bouverie, Capt., ii. 362
 Bowen, Lieut. James, i. 54
 Boyle, Hon. Capt., i. 107
 Brace, Capt. E., ii. 347
 Brave (F.), i. 129
 Brave, French privateer, i. 215,
 236; captured, 296
 Brennan, Henry, sailmaker, killed,
 i. 168
 Brest, blockade of, i. 1, 2, *passim*;
 Admiralty ideas as to system,
 6, 11, 82, 83, 175, 176; ii. 59-62,
 69, 76, 281; progress of naval
 armaments, i. 21, 31, 37, 46, 75,
 129, 187 *n.*, 234, 249, 355 *n.*; ii.
 59, 113, 203, 215; force in, i. 43,
 44, 45, 60-62, 66, 67, 76, 78, 127,
 212, 229, 235, 271, 282, 323, 346,
 360; ii. 129 *n.*, 138, 157, 170, 172,
 179, 214, 214 *n.*, 242; deplorable
 situation, i. 49, 56-58; 73, 354;
 ii. 50, 69, 176; plans for burning
 the French fleet at, ii. pp. xiii-
 xix, 2-32; probability of the
 French moving out of, 36, 48, 54,
 131, 237, 251; action with the
 Brest squadron, 349
 Briggs, Capt., ii. 291
 Brisbane, Capt. Chas., i. 203, 243,
 254; biographical sketch, 214 *n.*;
 his share in the projected burn-
 ing of the enemy's ships at Brest,
 ii. pp. xiii-xix, 2-29
 Britannia, ii. 98, &c.
 Britannia recaptured, i. 209, 256
 British fleet, readiness of, i. p. xii;
 impressment of seamen, p. xii, 1-
 4, 7, 8, 10, 70, 122, 123 *n.*; ii.
 152; want of frigates and small
 vessels for, i. p. xxiv, liii, 13, 52,
 59, 70, 126, 138, 161, 274, 338;
 ii. 40, 54, 211; disaffection in, i.
 p. li, 159, 320-322, 351-353;
 sickness in, 223, 232, 237, 296,
 323, 324, 339; victualling and
 watering of the, 69, 135, 217, 221,
 335, 337, 338, 339 *n.*; ii. 47, 222,
 250, 280; damage to ships of
 the, i. 104, 138, 165, 180, 184,
 208, 224, 226, 229, 237, 255;
 ii. 70
 Broughton, Capt. W. R., i. 326
 Brutus captured, i. 254
 Buller, Capt. E., i. 93, 101, 165; ii.
 324, 329
 Burke, Capt. H., i. 137
 Burn, Capt., ii. 252
 Burstal, Richd., master, gallantry,
 i. 167
 CAFFARELLI, naval Prefect at Brest,
 i. p. xxxvii; letters and orders,
 21, 45, 54, 73, 81, &c.; ii. 175,
 182, 203

- Calder, Sir Robert, biographical sketch, i. 42 *n.*; joins Cornwallis off Ushant, 69; to blockade Ferrol, 121; detached to the Irish coast, 210, 220; blockades Rochefort, 297; promoted to vice-admiral, 313; his services off Corunna, &c.; ii. pp. xxxiii-xxxix; off Rochefort, 39, *passim*; orders to watch Ferrol and Corunna, 194-197; action with combined fleet, 311-323; his plans, 326; asks for a court-martial, 364; his defence at the court-martial, 372-377
- Camden cutter, i. 230
- Campbell, Capt. Patrick, i. 203; ii. 166; biographical sketch, i. 286 *n.*, 293; and the projected burning of the French fleet, ii. p. xiii, 2, 7, 11, 19
- Campbell, Rear-Admiral George, orders regarding impressment of seamen, i. 1; to make a press in Torbay, 7; reports to the Admiralty, 8-10, 85-93, 107; to send into port all French and Batavian ships, 11; commands the inshore squadron, 30; to intercept Bedout's squadron, 48; his failure, 85, *et seq.*
- Canopus, i. 49, 64, 68 *n.*, 86, &c.
- Captain, ii. 362
- Captives of gunboats, transports, merchantmen, &c., various, i. 34, 105, 144, 147, 162, 210, 244, 293, 310, 337, 349, 357, 365; ii. 42, 43, 62-64, 102, 133, 144, 150, 180-182, 216, 273, 283, 305, 309, 312, 342, 358-359
- Caraces, J. F., French pilot, i. 159
- Caro, Lieut. (F.), i. 40
- Carrega, Capt. (D.), i. 19
- Cassard, (F.), i. 22, 129
- Cerberus, i. 257
- Chameau (F.) captured, i. 258
- Charente (F.) burned by the English, ii. 33-34
- Chasseur captured, i. 26
- Chiffonette (F.), captured, i. 139
- Churruca, Don Cosme Damian de (S.), i. 316, 316 *n.*
- Clara, Spanish treasure ship, captured, ii. 98
- Clorinde (F.), i. 97, 99
- Coast defences, French, i. p. xi., 54, 57, 73 *n.*, 81, 355 *n.*; ii. 131, 136, 281
- Cocambeaux, M., French Royalist, i. 145, 187
- Cochrane, Rear-Adml. Alexander, his blockade of Ferrol, i. p. 1, 314, 317; biographical sketch, 318 *n.*; his difficulties with the Spaniards, 334; suggests paying a bounty to Dutch seamen, 339, 364; negotiations with the Spaniards, letters, &c., ii. 34 *et seq.*; instructions from Cornwallis, 54-56; ordered to West Indies in search of Missiessy, 185, 185 *n.*
- Collingwood, Rear-Adml., joins Cornwallis off Ushant, i. 33; commands the inshore squadron, 56, 120; biographical sketch, 56 *n.*, 120, 313; letters to Mr. Blackett, i. 120; ii. 120, 122, 174, 223; off Rochefort, ii. 65, 84, 127; orders to be ready to proceed on foreign service, 203; intended to go to Barbados, 260; letter to Dr. Carlyle, 256, 256 *n.*, 296
- Colombe (F.) captured, i. 40
- Colossus, i. 119 *n.*, 121, 126, &c.
- Colpoys, Sir John, i. 42, 54, 75, 145, 256; ii. 116
- Combined fleet, movements of the, ii. 225-227, 356; action with, 311-324, 360; sails from Ferrol, 347; enters Cadiz, 355
- Comète (F.), i. 21
- Conflict, i. 164
- Congreve, Sir William, ii. 13-18
- Conquérant (F.), i. 129
- Conqueror, i. 58, 68 *n.*, 86, 144, &c.
- Contador, Diego, governor of Ferrol, i. 219, 276
- Contest, ii. 113
- Corbet, Capt., i. 93; biographical sketch, 94 *n.*, 287, 294, &c.
- Cornélie (F.), i. 98
- Cornwallis, Admiral Hon. Wm., biographical sketch, i. pp. xiii-xxii;

- his friendship with Nelson, xv ; his ballad on the action of April 1782, xviii ; his system of blockade, xxii, xl ; his instructions, xxv ; orders to his captains, xxx, xxxi ; appointed to the command, 3 ; letters, orders, instructions, &c., 6, 7, 11, &c. ; his strategic ideas and dispositions, 30, 31, 35, 37, 52, 58, 70, 196, 199, 210, 234 ; ii. 48-50, 54-56, 174, 327 *n.*, 343-345, 362 ; his letters and reports to the Admiralty, i. 12-14, 17-19, 28-30, 33-38, &c. ; letter from Lord Mayor to, 301-303 ; made Admiral of the White, 313 ; application for leave, 369 ; ii. 202 ; order to relax closeness of Brest blockade, ii. 365 ; created Admiral of the Red, ii. 369 ; strikes his flag, 378
- Corunna, the blockade of, i. p. xlvi, 103, 141, 203 ; ii. 194, 197, 298 ; enemy's force in, i. 100 *n.*, 136, 151, 207, 239, 270, 318 ; ii. 131, 190, 191
- Cotton, Adml. Sir Charles, biographical sketch, i. 32 *n.*, 232, 257, 313 ; in temporary command off Brest, 368 ; ii. 36 *et seq.* ; letters, 213, 216, &c.
- Courageux, i. 4, &c.
- Courier de Terre Neuve (F.) captured, i. 82
- Cullands Grove, East Indiaman, i. 122, 125
- Culloden, i. 4, 10, 29, 44, &c.
- DACRES, Capt., i. 60, 69
- Davies, Lieut., W. i. 138
- Dean, Lieut. W., i. 67
- D'Auvergne, Capt. P., Duc de Bouillon, i. 17 ; biographical sketch, 35, 37, 301 ; ii. 131
- De Courcy, i. 229, 235
- Decrès, French Minister of Marine, i. pp. xxxvi-xl ; biographical sketch, 20 *n.* ; correspondence between Caffarelli and, 20-23, 45, 56-58, 81, 128-130 ; ii. 76, 175, 182, 203 ; Ganteaume, 69, 287 ; letters and instructions from Napoleon, i. 310 ; ii. 36, 59-62, 82-84, 90, 152, 234, 235, 239, 244, 249, 254, 288, 291, 306, 330, 348 ; views as to the flotilla, ii. p. x ; letters and reports to Napoleon from, 76, 156
- Defence, ii. 225 *n.*
- Defiance, i. 119 *n.*, 160 *n.*, 175 *n.*, 198 ; ii. 195, &c.
- Delafons, Lieut. Thos., intelligence from, ii. 334
- Desaix (F.), i. 129
- Diamond, i. 11, 34, 40, 59, 131, 133
- Diana, i. 238
- Dickson, Capt., i. 8
- Didon (F.) captured, ii. 338
- Digby, Capt., ii. 267
- Diligence *chasse-marinée* captured and destroyed, i. 295
- Diligente (F.), i. 98 ; ii. 362
- Diomède (F.), i. 129
- Disaffection in the Fleet (*see* British Fleet)
- Discovery, i. 164
- Domett, Rear-Adml., i. 36, 75, 126, 229, 303, 313, 324 ; to hoist his flag if Cornwallis were killed, 318
- Donegal, i. 165
- Dordelin, Rear-Admiral, i. p. xxxvi ; commanding the French force at Brest, 20, 21, 157
- Doris, i. 4, 14, 29, 34, 43, 44, 47, 55, 58, 64, 68 *n.*, 86, 101, 160 *n.* ; wrecked, ii. 158, 163-166
- Douarnenez Bay as an anchorage, i. 249 ; ii. 111-113, 122-124
- Douglas, Vice-Adml. John Leigh, ii. 338, 371
- Dragon, i. 36, 40, 56, 70, &c.
- Dreadnought, Cornwallis's flagship, i. 4, 8, 10, 27, &c.
- Drury, Capt. W. O'B., i. 8, 260
- Dryad, i. 34
- Duckworth, Admiral Sir J. T., i. 83, 109
- Duff, Capt. Geo., i. 358
- Duff, Mr., British Consul at Cadiz, i. 88, 89 *n.*
- Duguay-Trouin (F.), i. 89 *n.*, 97, 99, 141, 314 ; ii. 65, 121, &c.
- Dundas, Capt. T., ii. 128, 133, 249, 252, 332

- Duquesne, (F.), i. p. xxiv, 97
 Durham, Capt. P. C., i. 203; biographical sketch, 213 n., 241, 280, 286
 Dutch at Ferrol, i. 17-70
 Duthoya, Lieut. M. A. (F.), i. 15
- EAGLE, ii. 178, &c.
 Egyptienne, i. 52, 74, 110, &c.
 Ellis, Mr. i. 138
 Elphinstone, Capt., i. 31, 131; ii. 80, 145, 214, 370
 Endymion, i. 37, 39, 40, &c.
 England, invasion of, i. p. xxxiv; Admiralty ideas regarding, 169-174; ii. 48, 58
 Entrepise (F.) captured, i. 293
 Eole (F.), i. 129
 Epervier (F.) captured, i. 102, 110
 Etonnante (F.), i. 22
- FAMA, Spanish treasure ship, captured, ii. 99
 Faune (F.) captured, ii. 342, 342 n.
 Fédération captured, ii. 359
 Félicité (F.), i. 129
 Felix, ii. 86, &c.
 Fénix (S.) captured, ii. 273
 Fennell, Lieut. G., i. 346, 360; ii. 325
 Fernandez, Francisco, Vice-Consul at Ferrol, i. 152 n., 161, 182, 218, 247
 Ferrier, Capt., i. 2, 33
 Ferrol, the blockade of, i. p. xlvii *et seq.*; Dutch squadron at, 17, 18, 26, 39, 70; progress of naval armament at, 150, 195, 238, 240, 269, 274; ii. 125, 131, 136, 143, 206; enemy's force at, i. p. xlvii, 135, 140, 207, 239, 268, 340
 Festin (F.) i. 21, 46 n., 129
 Finistère (F.), i. 129
 Firme (Don Rafael Villavicencio), ii. 312, 324
 Fisgard, ii. 236
 Fisher, Lieut. William, i. 86, 99, 100, 240, 242
 FitzGerald, Lord Robert, British Minister at Lisbon, i. 359; ii. 240
- Flèche, ii. 267
 Fleeming, Capt. C. E. i. 52, 103 n., 110, 139; ii. 295
 'Fleet in Being,' i. p. xxxi
 Flying Fish recaptured, i. 215
 Foudroyant, i. 159, 175, 250, 296
 Foudroyant (F.), i. 22, 129
 Fougueux (F.), i. 48 n., 79 n.; ii. 65, &c.
 Fox, i. 58, 68 n., 86, 88, 208
 Franchise (F.) captured, i. 23, 33, 98
 French fleet, unpreparedness in 1803, i. p. xi, 45, 57, 81; want of men for the, 22, 46, 58, 348 n., 355; ii. 50, 69, 76; preparation of squadrons, i. 128; actions with, i. 325-330; ii. 228-231; plans for burning at Brest, ii. pp. xiii-xix, 2-32; general view of operations, xx-xlii
 French Royalists, assistance for, i. 145, 267, 295
 French ships, orders to seize or destroy, i. 16
 Frere, John Hookham, Envoy Extraordinary, Madrid, biographical sketch, i. 223 n., 238, 252, 265, 267, 268, 290; ii. 126, 131
 Frigates and small vessels, want of, i. p. xxiv, 52, 59, 70, 126, 138, 161, 274, 338; ii. 40, 54, 211
- GALATEA, i. 190
 Galloper, i. 172
 Gambier, Adml. Lord, ii. p. xix, 116
 Gambier, Mr. Jas., Consul-General at Lisbon, ii. 354, 355 n.
 Ganges, i. 189 n., 221, 237, &c.
 Ganteaume, Vice-Admiral, appointed to command French forces at Brest, i. p. xxxix; biographical sketch 346 n.; reports on state of the squadron, 346, 354; views as to invasion flotilla, ii. p. xii; general view of his operations at Brest, xx-xli; letters and instructions, 50, 59-62, 68, 69, 199-202, 209, 215, 220, 223, 239, 307-309, 348, 349

- Gardner, Lord, appointed to command off Brest during Cornwallis's absence, ii. p. xxxiii; orders to, 140, 215; his fears for the British squadron off Ferrol, 227, 233, 299; his strategic dispositions, 240, 252, 272, 275; letters and reports to the Admiralty, 217-219, 227, 233, 236, 240-244, 245-248, 250-252, 255, 257, 258, 266, 272, 274, 278, 280, 287-288, 290; returns to Cawsand Bay, 300
- Garlies, Capt. Lord, ii. 191
- Gaulois (F.), i. 129
- Gelykheid (D.), i. 174
- Général Moreau (F.) captured, i. 123
- Glenny, Midshipman, i. 67
- Gloire (F.), ii. 113, 162
- Glory, ii. 115, 225, &c.
- Goliath, i. 214, 241, 243, &c.
- Gordon, Midshipman, i. 67
- Gore, Capt., ii. 87, 89, 97
- Gosselin, Capt. T. le M., ii. 39, 193, 214, 232, 266
- Gourdon, Admiral (F.), i. p. xlviii, 264, 314
- Granville (F.) i. 22
- Graves, Lieut. Thos., ii. p. xiv, 2, 7, 31, 32
- Graves, Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas, to command inshore squadron, i. p. xliii, 216; 232, 308, 313, 319, 368; ii. 36, 161; ordered to proceed to Rochefort, 285, 293
- Gravina, Vice-Adml. (S.), ii. p. xxvi
- Gregory, Lieut. John, ii. 113, 168
- Grierson, Midshipman, i. 215
- Griffith, Capt. E., ii. 149
- Growler, ii. 154, &c.
- Guerrière (F.), i. 89 n., 97, 99, 141, 143 n., 314; ii. 65
- Guion, Capt., ii. 148, 150
- Gwillim, Lieut. Thomas, ii. 281
- HAMON, J., British spy, i. 60-67
- Hamond, Sir Andrew, ii. 13-18
- Hamond, Capt. Graham E., i. 31, 37, 74, 82; biographical sketch, 82 n.; ii. 325
- Hancock, Capt. J., i. 325
- Happy Return, ii. 27
- Hardi (F.), i. 97
- Hargneuse (F.), i. 22
- Harlequin, ii. 296
- Harrison, Midshipman, ii. 230, 231
- Hartsinck, Vice-Admiral (D.), i. 17, 19, 19 n.
- Haviland, Lieut., ii. 89
- Hawes, Capt., ii. 332
- Hawk or Hawke, i. 342, &c.; ii. 40, 41, &c.; lost, ii. 193
- Hawkins, Capt. E., i. 167; ii. 102, 179
- Hazard, i. 4, 17, 25, 30, &c.
- Hermione (F.), i. 130
- Hero, ii. 195, &c.
- Héros (F.), i. 79, 97, 99, 314; ii. 65
- Hibernia, ii. 259, 338, &c.
- Hidra (S.), captured, ii. 309
- Higginson, Lieut., ii. 27
- Hill, Capt., ii. 240
- Hodge, Lieut., i. 341; ii. 45
- Hole, Lieut., ii. 89
- Holland, Capt. (D.), i. 19
- Hope, Capt., ii. 348
- Hort, Mr. Thos., secretary to Cochrane, i. 336; ii. 113, 136, 136 n., 145
- Hostilities with France declared, i. 16; with Spain, ii. 145
- Hotham, Capt. Henry, biographical sketch, i. 209 n., 254, 256
- Hunter, Mr. John, Consul-General at Madrid, i. 181, 193, 247, 334, 335; ii. 121, 125, 131
- Hurd, Capt. T., i. 319; ii. 52, 53 n., 104, 107-113, 123
- Hussar, i. 74, 83, 160 n., 200; lost, 264, n.
- ILLUSTRIOUS, ii. 81 n., 146
- Imogene, i. 10
- Impatient, i. 55
- Impatient (F.) captured, i. 26
- Impérial (F), ex-Vengeur (*see* Vengeur)
- Impérieuse, i. 146, 165, 203, &c.
- Impétueux, i. 119 n., 165, 175 n., &c.
- Impétueux (F.), i. 129

- Impressment of seamen (*see* British Fleet)
 Indefatigable, i. 199, 203, 236, &c.
 Indienne (F.), i. 22, 129
 Infante Carlos (S.), captured, ii. 144
 Infatigable (F.), i. 21, 130, 246; ii. 113, 162
 Innes, Capt. T., i. 208; ii. 42
 Intelligence gained from various sources, i. 18, 39, 43, 61-63, 65, 84, 94, 95, 97, 99, 100, 150, 161, 162, 166, 180-182, 194, 195, 199, 233, 239, 246, 252, 255, 274, 284, 286, 290, 296, 298, 304-305, 333, 341, 349, 365; ii. 36, 37, 45, 66, 67, 85, 98, 117, 136, 172, 179, 192, 205, 225, 232, 236, 242, 253, 263, 264, 265, 298, 301, 331-334, 352-354, 357, 360, 367
 Invasion flotilla, i. pp. x, xxviii, 37, 41, 45, 62, 75, 76, 130, 155, 174, 242, 291, 325; ii. 66; want of men for the, i. 22, 354, 355; ii. pp. viii-xiii, 50, 69, 101, 176, 182
 Ireland, French purposes against, i. p. xxix, 128-131, 174, 190; ii. 69, 82-84, *passim*; Admiralty plans for defending, i. p. xxx, 169-174, 210-212, 221; ii. 95-97, 119, 140-142, 174, 188; watchfulness and readiness, i. 142-143, 163-165, 169-174, 188, 234, 262; ii. 48, 50, 58, 80, 252, 261
 Iris, ii. 331
 Irwin, Lieut., i. 67
 Italian and Ligurian Republics, ships to be seized, i. 146
 JACKSON, Capt., i. 164
 Jalouse sloop, i. 142
 Jean Bart (F.), i. 129, 166
 Jeanne brig (F.) captured, i. 14 *n.*
 Jemmapes (F.), i. 130; ii. 113, 162
 Jerine (F.), i. 98
 Jervis, Capt. W. H., i. 165, 190, 298, 299, 314; drowned, ii. 169
 Joie, (F.), destroyed, ii. 34
 Jones, Lieut. H. S., i. 214; ii. 161
 Joseph cutter, i. 160, &c.
 Jupiter (F.), i. 129
 Jurien, Capt. (F.), i. 24
 KEITH, Lord, i. 42, 142, 156, 163, 169, 325; ii. 26
 Kent, Lieut., i. 214; dies from wounds, 243 *n.*
 Kerimel, Lieut. (F.), i. 52
 Kerr, Lord Mark, ii. 237
 Knight, Rear-Admiral, i. 306, 306 *n.*, 308; ii. 105
 LAFOREY, Capt. Sir Francis, ii. 162, 179
 Lagrange, Gen., ii. 162
 Lake, Capt. W., ii. 273
 Lancaster, Capt. (D.), i. 18
 Langston, Lieut., i. 214; dies from wounds, 243 *n.*
 Lapenotiere, Lieut. J. R., i. p. lii, 159
 La Plume (black general), i. 88
 Latona, ii. 143
 Latouche-Tréville, Admiral, i. p. xxxiv, 97 *n.*; letter from Napoleon to, 360-362; death of, 362; ii. 56
 Layman, Lieut. Wm., i. 97; biographical sketch, 97 *n.*
 Leblond-Plassan, Capt. (F.), i. 218 *n.*
 Le Boizec, Capt. (F.), i. 309 *n.*; ii. p. xi
 Legge, Capt. Arthur K., ii. 205, 235, 251
 Leissègues Adml. (F.), ii. p. xlii
 Lemperriere, Lieut. (F.), i. 85, 118
 Lennard, Lieut., i. 96
 Les Amis (F.) captured, i. 217
 Letourneur, Lieut. (F.), i. 291
 Leviathan, ii. 269, &c.
 Lion (F.), i. 131; ii. 113, 162
 Lively, i. 303; ii. 81, 86, &c.
 Loire, ii. 43, &c.
 London, Common Council thanks to Cornwallis and his officers, i. 302
 Lorient, the blockade of, i. pp. xii, xxviii, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxvii, 132 *n.*, 163, 174, 176, 281, 288; ii. 163,

- 172; progress of naval armaments, i. 130, 162, 201, 203, 246, 333, 355; ii. 85; enemy's force in, i. 185, 246
 Louis, Lieut. John, i. 67, 87, 347
 Lynx (F.), ii. 113, 162
- MAGNANIME (F.), i. 131; ii. 113, 162
 Magnificent, i. 165, 189 *n.*; wreck of the, 299, 306-309
 Maitland, Capt. F. L., i. 37, 54, &c.; ii. 40, 44, &c.
 Maître de Famille (F.) captured, i. 25
 Majestic, i. 119 *n.*, 189 *n.*, &c.
 Majestueux (F.), ii. 113, 162
 Malta, i. 175
 Manby, Capt. Thomas, i. 325
 Manley, Capt. John, i. 28
 Mansfield, Capt. C. J. M., i. 8, 23, 64, 72, 228
 Marie (F.) captured, ii. 283
 Marks, John, boatswain, bravery, i. 148
 Mars, i. 4, 27, 30, &c.
 Marsden, Mr. William, Secretary of Admiralty, letters, i. 12, 13, &c.
 Martin, Arnaud (F.), privateer captain, i. 105
 Martin, Capt. T. B., biographical sketch, i. 225 *n.*; ii. 150, 253
 Martin, Vice-Admiral, naval Prefect at Rochefort, i. 214, 291; ii. 40, 113, 282
 Mary cutter lost, ii. 193
 Masefield, Capt. J. O., i. 162, 167; ii. 101
 Mason, Capt. F., i. 326
 Mather, Lieut., i. 327
 Matson, Capt., ii. 357, 357 *n.*
 Medea, Spanish treasure ship, captured, ii. 98
 Medusa, ii. 87
 Megæra fireship, ii. 11
 Melville, Lord, First Lord of the Admiralty: his correspondence with Cornwallis and others indicating policy and Admiralty preparations, i. p. xxxv, 366-368; ii. 95-97, 104-107, 117-120; private letters to Cornwallis and others in relation to Capt. Puget's plan for burning the French ships, 8, 9, 14-16, 23, 27, 32, 38
 Mends, Lieut., ii. 31, 78
 Mercedes, Spanish treasure ship captured, ii. 97
 Messenger (F.) captured, i. 126, 144
 Mignonne (F.), i. 98
 Miln, Lieut. Robert, i. p. lv, 293, 365; ii. p. xiv., 2, 7, 12, 13, 31, 78
 Minotaur, i. 4, 10, 29, 30, &c.
 Missiessy, Rear-Admiral, commands a division at Brest, i. 157; temporarily in chief command, 338; at Rochefort, ii. 56, 113; escapes to West Indies, 152 *et seq.*; returns to Rochefort, 277
 Mondelot, Capt. (F.), i. 73
 Montagu, mutinous conduct on board, i. 351-354
 Montague, Admiral, i. 42, 142
 Montañes (S.), i. 89
 Montfort, Lieut. (F.), i. 53
 Moore, Capt. Graham, i. 199; biographical sketch, 199 *n.*, 201, 203, 246; ii. 70, 75, 86-89, 99, 221, 286
 Morris, Capt. J. N., ii. 167
 Morrogh, Patrick, Vice-Consul at Corunna, i. 152, 194, 217
 Moubray, Capt. R. H., letter with enclosures from Nelson, ii. 267, 270
 Musquetier, Capt. (D.), i. 18
- NAIAD, i. 4, 30, 35, 36, 55, 56, 62, &c.
 Namur, ii. 362
 Napoleon: his purposes in 1803, the invasion flotilla, i. p. xxvi *et seq.*; larger plans, xxxii-xxxv; his ideas as to efficiency, 311-312; his strategy explained to Latouche-Tréville, 360; his strategic plans and ideas, 361-362; ii. 61, 82-84, 199-202, 231, 234, 239, 244, 254, 291, 307, 309, 349, 357; his exasperation at Truguet's

- inertness, i. 311; his confidence in Ganteaume, ii. p. xii; general view of his plans, pp. xx-xlii; letters, 56, 59, 82, 152, 199, 209, 220, 223, 224, 231, 234, 235, 239, 244, 249, 254; urges efficiency, 60; his desire to avoid fighting, 289, 291; his displeasure at Ganteaume's failure to move, 306, 348, 349, &c.; he leaves St. Cloud for Boulogne, 330; his anger at Villeneuve's going to Cadiz, 356
- Nautilus, ii. 86
- Nécessité (F.), i. 129
- Nelson, Lord, his blockade of Toulon, i. pp. xxxi, xlviii, 275, 343-345; Admiralty orders to, 13; important letters from, 305; ii. 267, 269; sails for St. Vincent, 268; at Barbados, 324; joins Cornwallis, 343, 345; leaves for Portsmouth, 346; assumes command, 361
- Nemesis, i. 11, 25, 30 &c.
- Nepean, Sir Evan, Secretary of Admiralty: letters from and to, i. 5, 6, 7, &c.
- Neptune, i. 4, 10, 29, 69, &c.
- Nesham, Capt., ii. 159
- Neve, Capt. R. S., i. 31; ii. 39, 51, 346
- Nicholas, Lieut. Robert, i. 96
- Nicholson, Lieut. James, i. 88; ii. 181, 304, 305, 325
- Nile, ii. 258
- Nimble, ii. 345 *n.*
- Nimrod, i. 74, 76, 78
- Niobe, i. 281
- Northesk, Rear-Adml. the Earl of, i. 354; ii. 98, 134, 183, 347
- Northumberland, i. 175, 224, 317
- Nuestra Señora de los Dolores (S.) captured, ii. 148
- O'BRIEN, LEWIS M., Vice-Consul, i. 350; ii. 37, 66, 136
- Observateur (F.), ii. 65
- Océan (F.), i. 129; ii. 82
- O'Connor, Irish rebel, ii. 60, 132
- Octaraneo, Don Francisco, correspondence with Cochrane regarding, ii. 34-36
- Oldenbarneveltdt (D.), i. 18, 39 *n.*, 195, 207, 239; sold to Spanish merchants, ii. 206, 206 *n.*
- Orde, Vice-Adml. Sir John, orders concerning French and Spanish war and treasure ships, ii. 114, 126; important intelligence from, 225, 227, 240; orders to strike his flag, 257
- Orion, ii. 344 *n.*
- Orpheus, ii. 240
- Oswald, Capt. J., i. 5 *n.*, 314
- Otway, Capt. R. W., i. 321; ii. 205, 262, 264, 364
- PAGET, Capt. C., i. 37, 52 *n.*, 73, 123, *passim*
- Paix Désirée (F) captured, ii. 281
- Pallas (D.), i. 17, 19
- Parker, Lieut., ii. 89, 359
- Pater, Lieut. C. D., ii. 367
- Patriote (F.), i. 129; attempt to burn at Brest, 236; ii. 50
- Paulet, Lord H., i. 236; ii. 298
- Pearse, Sub-Lieut. Wm., ii. 281
- Pearson, Capt. R. H., i. 2, 14, 15, 30, 43, 93, &c.
- Pélagie (F.) captured, i. 47
- Pellew, Sir Edward: his blockade of Ferrol, i. pp. xlv-1, 38, 71, &c.; Cornwallis's instructions to, 26-28, 38; biographical sketch, 26 *n.*; his letters and reports on his pursuit of the Dutch from Ferrol, 38, 70, 103, &c.; courteous correspondence with Spanish officers and officials, 133, 277; returns to Ferrol, 165, 180; recalled to England, 314
- Pelter, ii. 26
- Pender, Capt. F., ii. 147
- Penelope, i. 325-329
- Pensée, (F.), i. 21
- Perseverance recaptured, i. 193
- Phillips, Midshipman E., ii. 340
- Phoenix, i. 197; ii. 86, &c.
- Phosphorus, ii. 26
- Pickle, i. p. lii, 36, 63 *n.*, 77, &c.

- Pique of St. Malo (F.) captured, ii. 151
 Plantagenet, i. 4, 53, 59, 82, &c.
 Pleydell, Lieut., ii. 339
 Polyphemus, ii. 225 *n.*, 243
 Porchier Capt. (F.), ii. p. xii, 182
 Poursuivante (F.), i. 98 ; ii. 113
 Poyntz, Capt. S., ii. 172, 180, 272, 309
 Pretty Lass, ii. 245
 Préville, Lieut. (F.), i. 67
 Prévoyant (F.), i. 21
 Prince, ii. 92 *n.*, &c.
 Prince George, ii. 92 *n.*, &c.
 Prince of Wales, i. 42, 69, 72, 165, 175 *n.*, 198, 208, 210, &c.
 Princess of Orange, ii. 330
 Princess Royal, ii. 92 *n.*, &c.
 Principe de la Paz (François Beck) (S.) captured, ii. 359
 Printemps (F.), i. 22
 Providence (F.) captured, i. 67
 Prowse, Capt. W., biographical sketch, i. 25 *n.*, 131
 Puget, Capt. Peter, as a surveyor, i. 308 ; his plans for burning the enemy's fleet at Brest, ii. pp. xiii-xix, 2-32 ; biographical sketch, 3 *n.* ; special plan for blockading Brest, 77-79
 Purvis, Capt. J. C., i. 185, 208
 Pym, Capt. S., i. 314
- QUATRE SŒURS (F.) captured, i. 279
 Queen, ii. 157, &c.
- RAISONNABLE, ii. 275, &c.
 Rambler, i. 69, 74, 195, &c.
 Ramillies, ii. 192, 204, &c.
 Rapid, ii. 265, &c.
 Rathborne, Capt. Wilson, i. 261 ; ii. 58, 102
 Rebecca (F.) captured, i. 24
 Redoutable (F.), i. 79 *n.*, 314 ; ii. 65, &c.
 Renown, ii. 225 *n.*
 Républicain (F.), i. 129, &c.
 Repulse, ii. 39, 275, *passim*
 Retardi (F.), i. 97
- Revanche (F.), i. 99, 270, 314 ; ii. 65
 Revolutie (D.), i. 18
 Révolutionnaire, i. 90
 Reynolds, Capt. G., ii. 104, 128 128 *n.*
 Rhoda, ii. 154, 180
 Richards, Capt., i. 90
 Rifleman, ii. 26
 Rochefort, the blockade of, i. pp. xii, xxviii, xxx, xxxiii-xxxv ; enemy's force at, 185, 333, 342 ; ii. 40, 42 ; movements of enemy's ships at, i. 304, 331 ; progress of naval construction, 234, 333 ; ii. 249
 Romaine (F.), i. 21
 Romy, Lieut. Ramon, (S.), ii. 144
 Rosalie (F.) captured, i. 294
 Rosario sloop, i. 105
 Rose, Lieut. James, ii. 216
 Rosily, Adml. (F.), ii. 56
 Rousillon, M., French Royalist, i. 145, 187
 Rowed, Lieut. Henry, i. 147, 206
 Rowley, Capt. Josias, ii. 337
 Royal Sovereign, i. 132 *n.*, 161, 175, 198, &c.
 Ruby, i. 174
 Russell, i. 9, 29, 32, &c.
 Ruysch, Capt. (D.), i. 19
- SABINA (S.) escapes, ii. 116
 Ste. Catherine (F.) captured, ii. 62
 St. Joseph schooner (F.) captured and destroyed, i. 295
 St. Vincent, Lord, i. 5, 41
 Salamandre (F.), i. 22, 129
 San Josef, i. 32, 175, 198 *n.*
 San Julian (S.), i. 89, 117
 San Rafael (Don Rafael Montez) (S.) captured, ii. 312, 324
 Santa Isabel. Spanish treasure ship, captured, ii. 100
 Santa Lucia (S.), i. 89
 Santa Margarita, i. 261 *n.*, 292, &c.
 Santa Rufina (S.), i. 89
 Saumarez, Sir James, i. 42, 156, 257
 Sceptre, i. 4, 10, 29, 34, &c.
 Schrikverwekker (D.), i. 19
 Scipio (D.), i. 19
 Scott, Capt. M. H., i. 281 ; ii. 265
 Seaflower, i. 160 *n.*

- Seagull, i. 136
 Seahorse, i. 107
 Searle, Capt. William, i. 2, 35
 Selby, Capt. William, i. 258
 Serpente (F.), i. 98
 Sheerness, i. 160 *n.*, 206
 Shippard, Capt., ii. 278
 Sickness in the Fleet (*see* British Fleet)
 Silk, Mr., i. 192, 195
 Simpson, Lieut. J., ii. 352
 Sirius, i. 10, 11, 30, 40, 56, &c.
 Smith, Commodore Sir Wm. Sidney, i. 325-330
 Sneedon, mutinous deserter, i. 159
 Société, (F.), i. 129
 Somerville, Capt. P., ii. 280
 Spain, warlike preparations, i. 151, 161, 182, 222, 265, 268, 290; ii. 65, 125, 143, 146; friendly attitude, i. 315; disarming, 316; hostility, ii. pp. xxiii-xxxix; disregard of laws of neutrality, 34, 36; preparations for war, 136-137, 139, 143, 206; war declared with, 145
 Spanish ships, Admiralty orders concerning, i. 16, 28; ii. 81, 132, 154
 Spanish treasure, store, and war ships: orders concerning, ii. 75, 86, 146, 152; action with, 87-89; capture of, 99, 135, 144, 148, 149 *n.*
 Spartiate, i. 4, 27, 30, 38, &c.
 Spencer, i. 119 *n.*, 121, 135, &c.
 Spitfire, i. 190
 Stephens, P., Adty., i. 41
 Stewart, Midshipman, i. 67
 Stirling, Rear-Ad., ii. 301, 302, 303; instructed to reinforce Calder off Ferrol, 304 *n.*, 312; ordered to blockade Rochefort, ii. 329
 Stopford, Capt. Hon. R., i. 204, 337, 349
 Strachan, Sir Richard, i. 165; ii. 296, 334, 369
 Strachey, Capt. C., i. 142
 Stuart, Lord William, ii. 142
 Stuart, Midshipman, i. 215
 Sturt, Capt. H. E. P., ii. 263
 Suffren (F.), i. 130; ii. 113, 162
 Sutton, Capt. J., i. 12, 17, 28, 117, 351; commands the inshore squadron, 160
 Swain, Lieut. Thos., ii. 151
 Swiftsure, ii. 115, 269
 Swinger, ii. 255, 260
 Sykes, Capt., ii. 357
 TAYLOR, Capt. B. W., ii. 342
 Téméraire, i. 356
 Téméraire (F.), ii. 65
 Temperance, i. 285
 Temple, Lieut., i. 285
 Terrible, i. 236, 238
 Texada, Capt.-General Felix de, ii. 67-73
 Thévenard, Adml., naval Prefect at Lorient, i. 163, 333, 355; ii. 138, 257, 273, 286
 Thrasher, ii. 16 *n.*, 26
 Three Brothers captured, i. 25
 Thunderer, i. 4, 23, 29, 34, 110, &c.
 Tigre, ii. 269
 Tonnant, i. 4, 30, 38, 77, 121, &c.
 Torche, La (Monsieur Dehen) captured, ii. 342 *n.*
 Toulon squadron, i. 243; ii. 84, 200, 224, 225, 237, 241, 243, 245, *passim*
 Tourville (F.), i. 129
 Trade, orders for protection of, i. 83, 123, 138, 200, 259, 262, 289, 300; ii. 252
 Triumph, i. 92, 107
 Troubridge, Sir Thos., i. 41
 Truguet, Vice-Adml., i. pp. xxvii, xxxix; appointed to command the French forces at Brest, 156; biographical sketch, 156 *n.*; Napoleon's exasperation at his inactivity, 311; superseded, 313, 338
 ULYSSE (F.), i. 179
 Ussher, Lieut. Thomas, biographical sketch, i. 244, 271, 279, 295, 323; ii. pp. xiii, xiv, 2, 30 *n.*, 78, 182, 359

- VAILLANT**, French privateer, i. 215, 236
Valeureuse (F.), i. 21, 129
Vargas, Commodore, J. de (S.), i. 117
Vautour (F.) captured, i. 205
Vencejo, ii. p. xi
Venerable, i. 4, 9, 25, 29, 34, 56, 161, 175 *n.*, 198 *n.*; rotten state, 222; wrecked, ii. 129
Vengeur (F.), i. 129, 166, 187 *n.*
Venteux (F.), i. 22; captured, 53
Vénus (F.) captured, i. 85, 118
Vertu (F.), i. 98
Veteran, ii. 140, 194
Vétéran (F.), i. 22, 129
Victorieuse, i. 90
Victory, i. 12, 13, 16, &c.
Victualling the Fleet (*see* British Fleet)
Vigilancia (S.), i. 90
Ville de Paris, Cornwallis's flagship, i. 69, &c.
Villeneuve, Vice-Adml., appointed to command Toulon squadron, his operations, ii. pp. xxiv-xli, 56, 84, 162, 231, 254, 356
Volontaire (F.), i. 21; ii. 82
Vulcain (F.), i. 129

WALKER, Lieut. Geo., ii. 39
Wallis, Capt. James, i. 26, 78, 133, 206

Wasp, ii. 352
Watignies (F.), i. 129
Watt, Lieut., i. 126, 143, 144, 150
Weatherston, Lieut., i. 138
Whitby, Capt. John, his adverse comments on Nelson, i. 343, 345 *n.*; ii. 212
Wilkinson, Capt. P., i. 76, 83, 201, 264 *n.*
Williams, Capt. Robert, i. 24, 30
Willaumez, Adl. (F.), ii. p. xlii
Windsor Castle, i. 356, &c.
Winter, Admiral de (D.), i. 17, 18, 19 *n.*
Winthrop, Capt. R., i. 2, 10, 59, 104, 218, 220
Wolfe, Capt. Geo., i. 17-19, 28, 38, 39, 128, 141, 201, 241; ii. 33
Wood, Capt. James A., i. 35, 44, 78, 210
Wright, Capt. J. W., ii. p. xi

YORKE, Capt. S., ii. 147
Young, Admiral W., ii. 10, 17, 21, 23, 27

ZEALOUS, ii. 344 *n.*
Zélé (F.), i. 129
Zéphir (F.) captured, i. 25

THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY

PATRON

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES, K.G., K.P., K.T.

PRESIDENT

EARL SPENCER, K.G.

THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY, which has been established for the purpose of printing rare or unpublished works of naval interest, aims at rendering accessible the sources of our naval history, and at elucidating questions of naval archæology, construction, administration, organisation and social life.

The Society has already issued :—

In 1894: Vols. I. and II. *State Papers relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, Anno 1588*. Edited by Professor J. K. Laughton.

In 1895: Vol. III. *Letters of Lord Hood, 1781-82*. Edited by Mr. David Hannay.

Vol. IV. *Index to James's Naval History*, by Mr. C. G. Toogood. Edited by the Hon. T. A. Brassey.

Vol. V. *Life of Captain Stephen Martin, 1666-1740*. Edited by Sir Clements R. Markham.

In 1896: Vol. VI. *Journal of Rear-Admiral Bartholomew James, 1752-1828*. Edited by Professor J. K. Laughton, with the assistance of Commander J. Y. F. Sullivan.

Vol. VII. *Hollond's Discourses of the Navy, 1638 and 1658*. Edited by Mr. J. R. Tanner.

Vol. VIII. *Naval Accounts and Inventories in the Reign of Henry VII.* Edited by Mr. M. Oppenheim.

In 1897: Vol. IX. *Journal of Sir George Rooke.* Edited by Mr. Oscar Browning.

Vol. X. *Letters and Papers relating to the War with France, 1512-13.* Edited by M. Alfred Spont.

Vol. XI. *Papers relating to the Spanish War, 1585-87.* Edited by Mr. Julian Corbett.

In 1898: Vol. XII. *Journals and Letters of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Thomas Byam Martin, 1773-1854* (Vol. II.). Edited by Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton.

Vol. XIII. *Papers relating to the First Dutch War, 1652-54* (Vol. I.). Edited by Mr. S. Rawson Gardiner.

Vol. XIV. *Papers relating to the Blockade of Brest, 1803-5* (Vol. I.). Edited by Mr. John Leyland.

In 1899: Vol. XV. *History of the Russian Fleet during the Reign of Peter the Great. By a Contemporary Englishman.* Edited by Vice-Admiral Sir Cyprian A. G. Bridge.

Vol. XVI. *Logs of the Great Sea Fights, 1794-1805* (Vol. I.). Edited by Rear-Admiral T. Sturges Jackson.

Vol. XVII. *Papers relating to the First Dutch War, 1652-54* (Vol. II.). Edited by Mr. S. Rawson Gardiner.

In 1900: Vol. XVIII. *Logs of the Great Sea Fights* (Vol. II.). Edited by Rear-Admiral T. Sturges Jackson.

Vol. XIX. *Journals and Letters of Sir T. Byam Martin* (Vol. III.). Edited by Sir R. Vesey Hamilton.

In 1901: Vol. XX. *The Naval Miscellany* (Vol. I.). Edited by the Secretary.

Vol. XXI. *Papers relating to the Blockade of Brest, 1803-5* (Vol. II.). Edited by Mr. John Leyland.

